FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 50184/06
by Ján MARTIKÁN
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 17 March 2009 as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Giovanni Bonello,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 24 November 2006,
Having regard to the decision to grant priority to the above application under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Ján Martikán, is a Slovakian national who was born in 1974 and lives in Snežnica. He was represented before the Court by Mr Š. Bucha, a lawyer practising in Žilina. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Criminal proceedings
On 16 January and 22 March 2004, respectively, the applicant was charged with the ill‑treatment and rape of his wife (Articles 215 and 241 of the Criminal Code).
On 12 July 2004 the applicant was indicted before the Žilina District Court to stand trial on the above charges.
On 30 August 2005 the District Court found the applicant guilty of violence and rape (Articles 197a and 241 of the Criminal Code) and sentenced him to ten years and six months’ imprisonment.
On 14 November 2005 the Žilina Regional Court quashed the judgment on appeal and remitted the case to the District Court for the taking of further evidence and re‑examination.
Following the entry into force on 1 January 2006 of the new Criminal Code, the offences of which the applicant was accused have been categorised as “crimes”.
The Court has no information about the further course of the criminal proceedings.
2. Detention
On 16 January 2004 the applicant was arrested on the above ill-treatment charge.
On 19 January 2004 the District Court in Žilina remanded the applicant in detention on the grounds that there was a risk that he might collude and continue to engage in criminal activities within the meaning of Article 67 § 1 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1961 (“the 1961 CCP”). Under that Code, the absolute maximum duration of detention, including both in the pre-trial phase of proceedings (prior to the filing of the bill of indictment) and during the trial (after the bill of indictment was lodged), was five years (Article 71 § 2). There was no separate time-limit for the duration of detention during the trial alone.
On 17 March 2005 the District Court found that the ground for detaining the applicant under Article 67 § 1 (b) of the 1961 CCP (risk of collusion) no longer applied.
On 12 January 2006 the Supreme Court authorised the extension of the applicant’s detention until 16 April 2006. It observed that on 1 January 2006 a new Code of Criminal Procedure (“the 2005 CCP”) had entered into force, which had entirely replaced the previous one. The new Code set new time-limits for the maximum duration of detention as a whole (Article 76 § 6), and also for detention during the trial (Article 76 § 7). However, criminal trials where the bill of indictment had been filed prior to 1 January 2006 and proceedings concerning detention in such trials were to continue to be governed by the 1961 CCP (Article 564 §§ 3, 4 and 5). The Supreme Court observed that in the applicant’s case the bill of indictment had been filed on 12 July 2004 and that, consequently, the 1961 CCP applied. It held that the offence of which the applicant had been accused fell within the category of “extremely serious crimes”. Detention in connection with such offences could potentially last as long as four years. The applicant’s detention during trial could last up to one-half of this period, that is to say until 12 July 2006.
On 12 April 2006 a different bench of the Supreme Court again authorised the extension of the applicant’s detention, until 31 August 2006. Relying on Article 564 § 5 of the 2005 CCP, the court held that the applicant’s case was to be examined under the rules of the 1961 CCP and found that the conditions for extending his detention under Article 71 of that Code were met.
On 11 August 2006 the District Court informed the applicant of the presiding judge’s request that his detention be prolonged. The applicant was invited to comment on the request within three working days.
In a letter of 14 August 2006, delivered on 16 August, the applicant asked for leave to consult the file prior to submitting his comments. In his letter of 16 August 2006, delivered on 18 August, the applicant quoted the relevant constitutional and international legal provisions and objected that he had been detained after indictment for longer than the time permitted under Article 76 §§ 6 and 7 of the 2005 CCP and that, consequently, his continued detention was discriminatory, unlawful and unconstitutional. He also stated that he would submit further comments after he had consulted the file.
On 16 August 2006 the District Court sent the Supreme Court a request for a further extension of the applicant’s detention. It transmitted to the Supreme Court the above-mentioned letters from the applicant on 25 August 2006.
In the meantime, on 23 August 2006, the Supreme Court had authorised the extension of the applicant’s detention until 16 January 2007. Referring to Article 564 §§ 3 and 5 of the 2005 CCP, it determined the matter under the 1961 CCP and found that the conditions in Article 71 of that Code for extending detention were met. Lastly, the Supreme Court pointed out that on 16 January 2007 the applicant would have been detained for three years and that criminal matters involving detention should be dealt with as fast as possible.
On 11 January 2007 the Supreme Court decided not to authorise the applicant’s detention any further on the ground that it was no longer justified. On 16 January 2007 the applicant was released.
3. Applications for release
On 24 February and 8 March 2006 the applicant applied for release.
The District Court dismissed the applications on 20 March 2006.
On 23 March 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint against that decision. The District Court submitted the file to the Regional Court on 19 May 2006.
On 30 May 2006 the Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s complaint. The file was returned to the District Court on 14 June 2006. The Regional Court’s decision was served on the applicant and his counsel on 16 and 20 June 2006 respectively.
4. Constitutional proceedings
On 21 June 2006 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court about delays in the proceedings concerning his applications for release of 24 February and 8 March 2006. He relied on Article 17 §§ 2 and 5 of the Constitution and Article 5 § 4 of the Convention.
On 30 November 2006 the Constitutional Court declared admissible the complaint about delays in the proceedings before the District Court. It found no unjustified delays in the proceedings before the Regional Court.
On 14 September 2006 the applicant complained under Article 17 § 2 of the Constitution and under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that his procedural rights had been disregarded by the Žilina District Court and by the Supreme Court in the proceedings leading to the latter’s decision of 23 August 2006 to extend his detention.
On 20 March 2007 the Constitutional Court declared admissible the complaint about the conduct of the Supreme Court. The decision stated that the latter was under an obligation to redress any shortcomings which might have occurred as a result of the District Court’s conduct.
In a different decision of 20 March 2007 the Constitutional Court joined the proceedings concerning the applicant’s above two complaints as a single set.
On 27 March 2007 the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment. It found that the Žilina District Court had violated the applicant’s rights under Article 17 §§ 2 and 5 of the Constitution and Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as a result of the protracted length of the proceedings concerning the applications for release filed on 24 February and 8 March 2006. The overall period of 51 days during which the District Court had dealt with the request for release was unacceptably long. The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant 30,000 Slovakian korunas[1] (SKK) as just satisfaction.
In the judgment the Constitutional Court further held that the Supreme Court had infringed Article 17 § 2 and Article 50 § 3 of the Constitution and Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in the proceedings leading to its decision of 23 August 2006. In particular, the applicant had been prevented from having his arguments examined and he had not been able to protect his rights in an appropriate manner before the decision to extend his detention had been taken. The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant SKK 20,000[2] as just satisfaction on that account.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. The Constitution (Constitutional Law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) and the Constitutional Court’s practice
Pursuant to Article 7 § 5 of the Constitution, international treaties on human rights and fundamental freedoms which have been ratified and promulgated in the manner required by statute take precedence over law.
All human beings are equal in dignity and rights (Article 12 § 1) regardless of sex, race, colour, language, faith, religion, political affiliation or conviction, national or social origin, nationality or ethnic origin, property, birth or any other status. No one can be discriminated against, favoured or disfavoured on any of these grounds (Article 12 § 2).
Statutory restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms must apply equally in all cases meeting given conditions (Article 13 § 3).
Pursuant to Article 17 §§ 1 and 2, liberty of person is guaranteed and no one is to be prosecuted or deprived of liberty except for reasons and in a manner provided for by law. Paragraph 5 of Article 17 permits a person’s detention exclusively on grounds and for a period defined by law and on the basis of a court’s decision.
Article 50 § 3 guarantees persons accused of an offence time and facilities to prepare their defence and the right to defend themselves either in person or through counsel.
Under Article 50 § 6, criminal liability for an act is assessed and the sentence is imposed pursuant to the law in force at the time when the offence was committed. Law enacted subsequently is to be applied where it is more favourable to the perpetrator.
In case no. III. ÚS 164/06 the Constitutional Court addressed a detained person’s complaint under, inter alia, Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention and Article 13 § 3 of the Constitution. The plaintiff challenged a Supreme Court decision of 5 April 2006 (case no. 1 Toš 25/2006), which had concluded that: (i) detained persons who had been indicted prior to the entry into force of the 2005 CCP were not entitled to have the duration of their detention as a whole or their detention during trial governed by the provisions of the 2005 CCP; and (ii) the detention during trial of such persons in the period subsequent to 1 January 2006 could not exceed the period for which the 2005 CCP provided in Article 76 § 6. The Supreme Court’s decision indicated, among other things, that the principle that the accused should benefit from more lenient subsequent legislation applied, in accordance with Article 50 § 6 of the Constitution, exclusively in the sphere of substantive criminal law.
The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on 17 May 2006. It found that the Supreme Court’s above interpretation and application of the relevant provisions of the two Codes of Criminal Procedure were in conformity with the Constitution and the Convention.
2. Code of Criminal Procedure of 1961 (Law no. 141/1961 Coll., as applicable at the relevant time)
Under the 1961 CCP, detention on remand was governed by the provisions of Articles 67 et seq. A person charged with a criminal offence could be detained, inter alia, where there were reasonable grounds for believing that he or she would influence the witnesses or the co-accused or otherwise hamper the investigation (Article 67 § 1 (b)) or continue criminal activities, complete an attempted offence or commit an offence which he or she had prepared or threatened to commit (Article 67 § 1 (c)).
The duration of detention was regulated by the provisions of Articles 71 et seq. Detention on remand in the pre-trial phase of the proceedings and during the trial, taken together, could not exceed two years. An extension could be authorised by the Supreme Court if it had been impossible to complete the proceedings earlier because of the complexity of the matter or for other important reasons and the release of the detainee would jeopardise the purpose of the proceedings. The total duration of the detention could not, however, exceed three years or, in the case of offences qualified as extremely dangerous, five years (Article 71 § 2).
The category of “extremely dangerous offences” was defined in Article 41 § 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Law no. 140/1961 Coll., as amended) and included rape.
3. Code of Criminal Procedure of 2005 (Law no. 301/2005 Coll., as amended)
The new Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted on 24 May 2005 and its text was published in the Collection of Laws on 2 July 2005. It entered into force on 1 January 2006. The duration of detention is regulated by Articles 76 et seq.
The total duration of detention in the pre-trial phase of the proceedings and during the trial, taken together, cannot exceed twelve months where the case concerns a lesser crime (prečin), thirty-six months in the case of a crime (zločin), and forty-eight months in the case of an extremely serious crime (obzvlášť závažný zločin) (Article 76 § 6). Detention in the pre-trial phase of the proceedings and during the trial, taken separately, can last up to one-half of the above periods (Article 76 § 7). As regards detention during the trial, the period is to be counted from the moment when the bill of indictment is filed (Article 76 § 5). If the detainee faces charges for more offences, the one carrying the most severe potential penalty should be used as the basis for determining the maximum permissible duration of the detention (Article 76 § 8).
The temporal application of the 2005 CCP is regulated by the provisions of Articles 564 et seq. As a general rule, proceedings where the bill of indictment was filed prior to the entry into force of the 2005 CCP should continue under the 1961 CCP (Article 564 §§ 3 and 4). This includes proceedings in which the duration of and grounds for detention are examined (Article 564 § 5).
4. The Supreme Court’s practice
The provisions on the temporal application of the newly introduced 2005 CCP initially gave rise to different interpretations by the benches of the Supreme Court. The criminal law section (kolégium) of the Supreme Court therefore adopted a standpoint indicating how Article 76 § 6 and Article 564 § 5 of the 2005 CCP should be interpreted (case no. Tpj 14/06, standpoint adopted on 8 December 2006 and subsequently published in the Collection of standpoints of the Supreme Court and decisions of courts, no. 2/2007).
With reference to Article 13 § 3, Article 17 § 5 and Article 152 § 4 of the Constitution, the criminal law section of the Supreme Court held that persons who had been indicted prior to the entry into force of the 2005 CCP were not entitled to have the duration of their detention as a whole or the duration of their detention during trial governed by Article 76 §§ 6 and 7 of the 2005 CCP. Article 564 § 5 of the 2005 CCP clearly indicated that that had not been the intention of the legislature. That situation did not amount to unequal treatment as the persons concerned had been remanded in detention under a different legal regime, namely that governed by the 1961 CCP.
However, both categories of detained persons – those whose detention was governed by the 1961 CCP and those detained under the 2005 CCP – should receive equal treatment as regards the duration of their detention during trial after the entry into force of the 2005 CCP. In practical terms, the detention during trial of persons falling within the former category in the period after 1 January 2006 should not last longer than six, twelve or twenty-four months, depending on the nature of the offence in issue, as specified in Article 76 §§ 6 and 7 of the 2005 CCP. In that respect those persons were treated equally to the other category of detainees. For example, the detention during trial of persons who had been remanded and indicted, prior to 1 January 2006, for offences which the 2005 Criminal Code qualified as extremely serious crimes could not exceed two years as from 1 January 2006. Detention of such persons after 1 January 2008 was therefore not permissible.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained that his detention after 12 January 2006 had violated his rights under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4, Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) and Article 14 of the Convention. He also alleged an infringement of Article 13 of the Convention in that he had no effective remedy at his disposal in respect of his complaints under Article 5 § 4 and Article 6 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained that his detention after 12 January 2006 had been unlawful and discriminatory. He relied on Article 5 § 1 and Article 14 of the Convention. Those provisions, as far as relevant, provide:
Article 5
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: ...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ...”
Article 14
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The Government first objected that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. It had been open to him to seek redress by means of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution. They relied on a number of decisions in which the Constitutional Court had held that it had the power to examine in proceedings brought by individuals whether the way in which ordinary courts acted or decided was compatible with the Constitution or the relevant international treaty on human rights.
With reference to the Supreme Court’s decision in case no. Tpj 14/06 and the Constitutional Court’s judgment in case no. III. ÚS 164/06 the Government maintained that during the relevant period the applicant had been detained in accordance with the law and that he had not been discriminated against.
The applicant argued that it was impossible for him to obtain any redress from the Constitutional Court given that the violation of his rights stemmed from legislation and that, according to the Constitutional Court’s long-standing case-law, individuals lacked the capacity to challenge legislation. He considered irrelevant the case-law invoked by the Government.
The applicant maintained that the maximum term of detention during trial of those tried, like him, for offences categorised as “crimes” was 18 months, whereas he had been detained during his trial for more than 30 months, from 12 July 2004 to 16 January 2007. Although, strictly speaking, his detention in this period was in accordance with the applicable laws (Article 71 § 2 of the 1961 CCP in conjunction with Article 564 §§ 3 and 5 of the 2005 CCP), it was discriminatory in relation to those detainees who were indicted after 1 January 2006.
The Court notes that in its judgment in case no. III. ÚS 164/04 the Constitutional Court, on 17 May 2006, accepted as being in conformity with the Constitution and the Convention the Supreme Court’s interpretation (in case no. 1 Toš 25/2006) of what the applicable rules were as regards the duration of detention of persons who had been indicted prior to 1 January 2006. The criminal law section of the Supreme Court later upheld that interpretation in its standpoint of 8 December 2006 (case no. 1 Tpj 14/06).
Thus, the Constitutional Court, in a different set of proceedings and before the present application was lodged, took a position on the issues which gave rise to the complaints under consideration. That position was confirmed by the criminal law section of the Supreme Court. In these circumstances, it is questionable whether the applicant was required to seek redress before the Constitutional Court in respect of the same issues.
In any event, the Court considers that this part of the application is inadmissible for the reasons set out below.
Article 5 § 1 of the Convention essentially refers back to national law and states the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof, but it requires in addition that any deprivation of liberty should be consistent with the purpose of Article 5 of the Convention, namely to protect individuals from arbitrariness. It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. However, since under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention failure to comply with domestic law entails a breach of the Convention, it follows that the Court can and should exercise a certain power to review whether this law has been complied with (see, for example, Kučera v. Slovakia, no. 48666/99, § 86 with further references, ECHR 2007‑...).
The situation complained of in the present case came into being as a result of the enactment of a new Code of Criminal Procedure which replaced the previous one adopted more than forty years ago, when the former Czechoslovakia was governed by a socialist regime. Such a substantial change in criminal law inevitably obliged the legislature to include provisions in the new Code with a view to ensuring a smooth transition without excessive interference with criminal proceedings pending at the moment of its entry into force.
Articles 564 et seq. of the 2005 CCP provide that, as a general rule, proceedings where the bill of indictment was filed prior to the entry into force of the 2005 CCP should continue to be governed by the 1961 CCP. This includes proceedings in which the duration of and grounds for detention are examined.
Those provisions applied to the applicant’s case, since he had been indicted on 12 July 2004. Under the 1961 CCP, the overall detention of the applicant could last up to five years. Such a situation did not obtain as the applicant was released after three years. That period corresponds to the maximum duration of detention of a person indicted for the same offence after the entry into force of the 2005 CCP.
The applicant’s complaint specifically concerned the fact that his detention during trial had exceeded 18 months, which was the maximum period under the 2005 CCP in cases concerning “crimes”.
The Court observes that the 1961 CCP did not separately specify the maximum duration of pre-trial detention and detention during trial. The relevant limitation was introduced by the 2005 CCP. The Supreme Court held that, with a view to ensuring equal treatment of persons whose detention was governed by the 1961 CCP and those detained under the 2005 CCP, the duration of any person’s detention during trial in the period after the entry into force of the 2005 CCP should not exceed the periods laid down in the latter Code. The Constitutional Court had found such interpretation to be in compliance with the Constitution and the Convention.
The applicant was released on 16 January 2007. His detention after 1 January 2006 thus lasted one year and sixteen days, a period that is shorter than the maximum duration of 18 months permissible under the 2005 CCP.
In the light of the documents before it the Court finds no indication that after the entry into force of the 2005 CCP the domestic courts deciding on the applicant’s detention incorrectly interpreted or applied the relevant provisions of the criminal law or that the application of those provisions resulted in the arbitrary deprivation of the applicant’s liberty contrary to the guarantees of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention.
The applicant further complained that he had been subjected to discriminatory treatment in that his detention during trial exceeded the 18-month time-limit introduced by the 2005 CCP.
The Court first notes that the present case concerns application of two successive pieces of legislation on criminal procedure depending on the time when the persons concerned were remanded in custody and indicted. The difference in treatment complained of by the applicant is based on the need to ensure a transition from the old CCP to the new one in respect of persons who had been indicted under the provisions of the former and who continued being detained after the entry into force of the latter.
In this respect it may be questioned whether the use of the time of indictment criterion for the differential treatment of detained persons as regards the maximum duration of their detention is a ground of prohibited discrimination covered by the expression “other status” within the scope of Article 14 (see, mutatis mutandis, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 42184/05, §§ 74 and 75, 4 November 2008, with further references).
In any event, the applicant’s argument that he had been discriminated against in breach of Article 14 cannot be upheld for the following reasons.
In situations like the present one, when Contracting States introduce new systems of comprehensive legislation which replace previous and outdated ones, it is sometimes necessary to use cut-off points that apply to large groups of people and which may to a certain extent appear arbitrary. The choice of a cut-off date in similar cases must be considered as falling within the wide margin of appreciation afforded to a State when reforming its legal system (see, mutatis mutandis, Twizell v. the United Kingdom, no. 25379/02, § 24, 20 May 2008).
As indicated above, a specific limitation of the length of detention during trial was introduced as from 1 January 2006, when the 2005 CCP entered into force. The interpretation given by the Supreme Court and upheld by the Constitutional Court, to the effect that the detention during trial of any person in the period after the entry into force of the 2005 CCP should not exceed the time-limits laid down in that Code, does not appear arbitrary or otherwise incompatible with the requirements of Article 14 of the Convention. The Court sees no basis, either in domestic law or under the Convention, which could have entitled the applicant to have the limitation introduced by the 2005 CCP applied in respect of his detention during trial prior to its entry into force.
The Court does not attach particular importance to the fact that various benches of the Supreme Court initially interpreted the relevant provisions in a differing manner. As indicated above, the criminal law section of that court issued a standpoint harmonising the way in which those provisions should be interpreted and applied, which the Court has found acceptable. The applicant’s detention was not contrary to that standpoint.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant complained that his applications for release of 24 February and 8 March 2006 had not been determined speedily and that his procedural rights had been violated in the proceedings leading to the Supreme Court’s decision of 23 August 2006 to extend his detention on remand. He relied on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
The Government referred to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 27 March 2007 and argued that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
The applicant disagreed.
The Court reiterates that a decision or measure favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive the applicant of his or her of status as a ‘victim’ unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see Amuur v. France, 25 June 1996, § 36, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, and Dalban v. Romania [GC], no. 28114/95, § 44, ECHR 1999-VI).
On 27 March 2007 the Constitutional Court found that the Žilina District Court had violated the applicant’s rights under Article 17 §§ 2 and 5 of the Constitution and Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as a result of the protracted length of the proceedings concerning the applications for release filed on 24 February and 8 March 2006. The overall period of 51 days during which the District Court had dealt with the request for release was unacceptably long. The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 892 as just satisfaction. Prior to that, in its decision on admissibility it held that there had been no delays contrary to Article 5 § 4 when the Regional Court had examined the applicant’s complaint against the District Court’s decision.
In the judgment the Constitutional Court further held that the Supreme Court had infringed Article 17 § 2 and Article 50 § 3 of the Constitution and Article 5 § 4 of the Convention in the proceedings leading to its decision of 23 August 2006. In particular, the applicant had been prevented from having his arguments examined and from protecting his rights before the decision to extend his detention had been taken. The Constitutional Court awarded the applicant the equivalent of EUR 595 as just satisfaction on that account.
The sums awarded by the Constitutional Court are lower than awards made by the Court under Article 41 of the Convention in similar cases. Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and considering the advantages offered by a domestic remedy (see, mutatis mutandis, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 139, ECHR 2006‑V), the Court nevertheless accepts that by its above-mentioned judgment the Constitutional Court provided the applicant with adequate redress for the breach of his rights under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention which he alleged. In this respect the applicant can therefore no longer claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. The applicant alleged that his right to a fair hearing under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention had been infringed in the above proceedings concerning his detention.
This complaint relates to the proceedings concerning the applicant’s detention, which it has examined above under Article 5 of the Convention. The Court finds that no issue under Article 6 arises in that respect.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
4. Finally, the applicant complained that he had no effective remedy at his disposal in respect of his complaints under Article 5 § 4 and Article 6 of the Convention. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which provides:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The Court reiterates that Article 13 applies only where an individual has an “arguable claim” to be the victim of a violation of a Convention right (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, 27 April 1988, § 52, Series A no. 131). The Court has declared the complaints under Article 5 § 4 and Article 6 inadmissible. Accordingly, the applicant did not have an “arguable claim” and Article 13 is, therefore, not applicable.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
[1] SKK 30,000 was equivalent to 892 euros (EUR) at the relevant time.
[2] SKK 20,000 was then equivalent to EUR 595.
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