SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 69582/13
Zoltán MARTIN
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 7 April 2015 as a Committee composed of:
Helen Keller, President,
András Sajó,
Robert Spano, judges,
and Abel Campos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 29 October 2013,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Zoltán Martin, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1966 and lives in Pécs.
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
3. The applicant is a practising lawyer and member of Pécs Bar Association.
4. At the material time the applicant was acting as the legal representative of a company in a medical malpractice case before the Baranya County Regional Court. In its decision of 6 February 2009 a panel presided by Mr A.D. ordered the respondent to pay damages.
5. On 25 February 2009 the applicant filed a notice of appeal with the court for the attention of the Pécs Court of Appeal. In his appeal he wrote, inter alia:
“in its judgment, the court ‘dreamt’ that there were pains and swellings in the plaintiff’s limbs... again, the judge dreamt about something in the judgment and in the expert opinion that is not there... the judge, severely biased against the respondents and their legal representative disregarded the expert opinion.”
6. On 10 March 2009 the applicant completed the appeal, adding that the perceived serious breach of law could not be explained as a mistake of an inexperienced judge, since the judgment was rendered by a judge of a regional court with years of practice.
7. In separate proceedings in the same court and before the same judge, that is Mr A.D., the plaintiffs, represented by the applicant, lodged a request for exclusion of Mr A.D. for bias. They argued that he “had demonstrated unlawful kindness” towards the plaintiffs in the first set of proceedings, proving his dislike towards the applicant as a lawyer.
8. On 24 March 2009 the applicant complained to the President of the Regional Court about the sitting judge, suspecting him of criminal conduct. As a consequence, criminal investigations were opened against Mr A.D., which were eventually discontinued.
9. Following a complaint lodged by Mr A.D. with the Pécs Bar Association, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the applicant. On 14 July 2009 the Bar Association’s Disciplinary Board fined the applicant 120,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 400 euros) for having committed a disciplinary offence. On appeal, the National Bar Association overturned that decision and remitted the case to the first-instance.
10. In the resumed first-instance proceedings the applicant lodged a motion for bias against the Pécs Bar Association, which was dismissed. In its decision of 21 October 2010 the Disciplinary Board again fined the applicant HUF 120,000 for having committed a deliberate disciplinary offence. The Board were of the opinion that the expressions used by the applicant in his various submissions amounted to a personal attack against the court and the sitting judge, to disrespecting the court’s dignity and to denying the judge the requisite respect. This was a disciplinary offence consisting of the applicant’s breaching the relevant ethical obligations. The Disciplinary Board dismissed the applicant’s argument that his statements were protected by his constitutional right to freedom of expression.
11. The decision was upheld on appeal by the National Bar Association Appeal Disciplinary Board on 30 March 2011. The applicant sought judicial review of the decision.
12. In its judgment of 25 September 2012 the Budapest Court of Appeal upheld the disciplinary measure. Relying on the case-law of the Court and the Constitutional Court it held that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was justified because his disrespectful tone was capable of undermining the authority of the judiciary.
13. The applicant lodged a petition for review with the Kúria, which was dismissed on 10 April 2013. This court endorsed the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in that the interference was necessary for the protection of the authority of the judiciary.
COMPLAINTS
14. The applicant complained that his right to express himself freely in his capacity as an attorney had been violated in that he had been fined for a disciplinary offence, for infringing the dignity of the judiciary. He relied on Article 10 of the Convention. He also maintained that the judgment of the Kúria did not, or not sufficiently, deal with the various arguments advanced by him, in violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
THE LAW
15. The applicant complained that the sanction imposed on him for utterances made by him about the judge and the court dealing with a case in which he had acted as legal representative amounted to a breach of Article 10, which provides as relevant:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, ... for ... maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”
16. The Court notes that the present case bears similarities with Meister v. Germany (nos. 25157/94 and 30549/96, Commission decisions of 18 October 1995 and 10 April 1997, respectively (unreported)), where a lawyer made insulting statements about judges and other persons whom he regarded as having decided or acted incorrectly in the context of, or in relation to, court proceedings; with W.R. v. Austria (no. 26602/95, Commission decision of 30 June 1997 (unreported)), where a lawyer described the opinion of a judge as “ridiculous”; with Mahler v. Germany (no. 29045/95, Commission decision of 14 January 1998 (unreported)), where a lawyer asserted that the prosecutor had drafted the bill of indictment “in a state of complete intoxication”; with A. v. Finland ((dec.), no. 44998/98, 8 January 2004), where the applicant was issued with a warning for his statements of a disparaging nature submitted in a written appeal concerning the presiding judge; with Saday v. Turkey (no. 32458/96, 30 March 2006), where the accused described the Turkish judiciary as “executioners dressed in gowns”; with Žugić v. Croatia (no. 3699/08, 31 May 2011), where the applicant’s notice of appeal used a langue implying that the judge as a person was arrogant and incompetent to exercise the duty of a judge; and with Kincses v. Hungary, (no. 66232/10, 27 January 2015), where a lawyer’s submissions amounted to belittling the sitting judge’s professional capacities and implied that the court in question had circumvented the law.
17. The Court observes that in the instant case the Kúria found in its final judgment of 10 April 2013 that the restriction on the applicant’s freedom of expression was justified for the protection of the authority of the judiciary.
18. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. The impugned statements were expressed in an offensive tone, denying the judge the requisite respect, accusing him of having incorporated imaginary elements in a judgment. There is nothing to suggest that the applicant could not have raised the substance of his criticism without using the impugned language (see A. v. Finland (cited above)). Furthermore, as regards the nature and severity of the sanction imposed, the Court notes that the applicant was merely fined, in an amount not excessive, in the course of disciplinary proceedings, which were not made public and had no consequences on his right to exercise his profession.
19. The Court considers that the reasons given by the domestic courts in support of their decisions were “relevant and sufficient” and that the fine imposed on the applicant was not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, namely, the maintenance of the authority of the judiciary. Therefore, the interference with the applicant’s freedom of expression was “necessary in a democratic society”.
20. This complaint is thus manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
21. The applicant further complained about the allegedly unsatisfactory reasoning of the judgment, in his view amounting to a breach of Article 6 § 1 which provides as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
22. The Court recalls that Article 6 § 1 obliges courts to give reasons for their decisions, but cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Nor is the Court called upon to examine whether arguments are adequately met (see Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 19 April 1994, § 31, Series A no. 288). In the present case, the Kúria explained, relying on the Court’s case-law, that the Court of Appeal had rightly held that the applicant’s sanctioning was nothing more than justified restriction on his right to freedom of expression, applied so as to maintain the authority of the judiciary. In these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the judgment of the Kúria was furnished with sufficiently reasoning.
23. Consequently, this complaint is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 30 April 2015.
Abel CamposHelen Keller
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy