Communicated on 22 January 2016
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 55214/15
Rafael MARTINS O’NEILL PEDROSA
against Portugal
lodged on 28 October 2015
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Mr Rafael Martins O’Neill Pedrosa, is a Portuguese national who was born in 1995 and is detained in Lisbon. He is represented before the Court by Mr H. Garcia, a lawyer practising in Mafra.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 5 December 2013 criminal proceedings were initiated against the applicant (domestic proceedings no. 6635/13.4T3SNT) by the public prosecutor of the Department of Investigation and Prosecution (Departamento de Investigação e Ação Penal) in Sintra on allegations of having committed the crimes of coercion (coação), aggravated attacks upon the physical integrity of a person (ofensas à integridade física qualificada), rape (violação) and failing to assist a person in danger (omissão de auxílio).
On 2 June 2014 the public prosecutor issued a European arrest warrant (“EAW”) against the applicant to secure his presence before a judicial authority to be questioned (primeiro interrogatório judicial).
On 28 August 2014 the applicant was arrested in the United Kingdom. In execution of the EAW issued by the Portuguese authorities, he was surrendered to Portugal on 27 February 2015.
On 27 February 2015, the applicant was given the status of defendant in the criminal proceedings against him (constituição de arguido) and questioned by the investigating judge. On the same day, the investigating judge remanded the applicant in custody.
On 19 March 2015 the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the decision remanding him in custody. On 2 April 2015 the appeal was admitted and on 11 May 2015 the Lisbon Court of Appeal received the case file.
On 24 June 2015 the applicant lodged a habeas corpus application with the Supreme Court claiming that the lack of analysis of his appeal in respect of the lawfulness of the decision placing him in pre-trial detention had violated Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. He further argued that the time-limit of 30 days established under Article 219 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had not been complied with. Therefore, his pre-trial detention was unlawful.
On 2 July 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the application. Examining the effects of the 30-day time-limit on pre-trial detention orders, it considered that Article 219 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained a guiding principle illustrating the urgency of the matter. It further noted that the lack of a speedy review of an order remanding a person in custody did not constitute a ground for a habeas corpus application under Article 222 of the Code and pointed out that Article 219 § 1 was not, in any case, the provision that stipulated the maximum length of any pre-trial detention. In this regard, the non-compliance with the 30-day time-limit did not mean that the applicant’s pre-trial detention was unlawful.
On 2 July 2015 the Lisbon Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the investigating judge’s decision of 27 February 2015 to hold him in pre-trial detention.
B. Relevant domestic law
The relevant provisions of the Portuguese Code of Criminal Procedure
Under Article 219 § 1, the appellate court has a maximum of 30 days in which to rule on the lawfulness of a pre-trial detention order, starting from the date on which it receives the relevant case file (autos).
Under Article 222 § 1, anyone who is illegally held in pre-trial detention may lodge a habeas corpus application with the Supreme Court.
Under Article 222 § 2 pre-trial detention is unlawful if a) it was ordered by an authority without competence to do so; b) the law does not allow the ordering of pre-trial detention for the reasons cited; or c) it has exceeded the time-limits established by law or judicial decision.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that his request for a review of the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention during the aforementioned period was not examined speedily.
QUESTION TO THE PARTIES
Did the length of the proceedings in the present case, in which the applicant sought to challenge the lawfulness of his pre-trial detention, comply with the “speed” requirement of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention (see, for example, Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462/95, § 84, ECHR 2000-XII; Kadem v. Malta, no. 55263/00, §§ 44-45, 9 January 2003; and Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064/05, § 96, 1 June 2006)?
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