MATIĆ v. CROATIA

FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 1962/12
Mate MATIĆ
against Croatia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 11 June 2019 as a Chamber composed of:

Krzysztof Wojtyczek, President,
Ksenija Turković,
Aleš Pejchal,
Armen Harutyunyan,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Pauliine Koskelo,
Tim Eicke, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 29 December 2011,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

1.  The applicant, Mr Mate Matić, is a Croatian national who was born in 1956 and lives in Zagreb. He was represented before the Court by Ms V. Drenški Lasan, an advocate practising in Zagreb.

2.  The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.

A.  The circumstances of the case

3.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

4.  At the beginning of November 2003 the applicant, who is an advocate, decided to buy a car, a BMW X5. He contacted a certain Mr D.P. who he believed was the owner of company F., which operated a car dealership. They agreed that D.P. would obtain such a car directly from Germany and sell it to the applicant for 60,000 euros (EUR). The applicant agreed to trade in his old car, valued at EUR 25,000, and pay the remaining EUR 35,000 in cash upon delivery.

5.  The sale-purchase contract dated 13 November 2003 between the applicant as the buyer and company F. as the seller reflects that agreement, save for the purchase price, which was indicated as EUR 65,000. The contract was signed in the name of company F. by D.P.’s brother, G.P., who was actually the director and sole shareholder of the company. On 10 December 2003 a notary public certified G.P.’s signature on the contract as authentic.

6.  It would appear that the contract was drafted on the same day as the applicant was informed that the vehicle had arrived and picked it up from the car dealership, namely on 13 November 2003. After paying the purchase price, he was provided with an invoice issued by company F. for the sum of 494,000 Croatian kunas (HRK) and other relevant documents including a German vehicle registration certificate and a customs declaration.

7.  Later that day the car was registered in the applicant’s name in the register of motor vehicles of the Ministry of the Interior.

8.  Shortly afterwards the police opened an inquiry into the vehicle’s origin, suspecting that it had been stolen and/or that the customs declaration was forged.

9.  On 28 November 2003 the applicant was interviewed by the police. During the interview he stated that in early November he had decided to buy the above-mentioned car. In the course of his work he had met D.P., whom he believed to have been the owner of the car dealership operated by company F. He had offered to obtain a car for the applicant from abroad at a slightly better price than via the car dealership. During negotiations with D.P. the applicant had made it clear that the car had to be new and fully equipped. D.P. had promised to obtain such a car and they had eventually agreed on EUR 60,000 as the purchase price, which had included all the levies payable until registration. On 13 November 2003 the applicant had been informed that the vehicle had arrived, whereupon he had gone to the premises of company F. where he had picked the car up and had been given the invoice and the relevant documents, including the customs declaration (see paragraph 6 above). The applicant and D.P. had then gone to the police to register the car. D.P. had offered to take care of the registration and had eventually registered the car in the applicant’s name (see paragraph 7 above).

10.  On 14 January 2004 the police interviewed D.P., who explained that company F. was registered in the name of his brother, G.P. (see paragraph 5 above), but that it was him who had actually been running the company.

11.  The police eventually established that the car had not been stolen but that it had been imported into Croatia from Germany on the basis of a forged customs declaration.

1.  Administrative-offence proceedings

12.  On 24 September 2004 the police instituted administrative-offence proceedings (prekršajni postupak) before the Customs Administration (Carinska uprava) against company F., its director G.P. and his brother D.P. The applicant was not charged with any offence.

13.  By a decision of 18 May 2007 the Customs Administration found company F. and its director guilty of selling undeclared goods to the applicant – an administrative offence defined in section 243(1) of the Customs Act (see paragraph 28 below) – and imposed fines of HRK 70,000 and HRK 10,000 respectively. In particular, since G.P. had stated during the proceedings that his brother had told him that he had brought the car in question from Germany into Croatia without declaring it to the customs authorities, the Customs Administration found that G.P. had known that the car in question had been brought into Croatia illegally – a constitutive element of the offence defined in section 243(1) of the Customs Act. G.P. lodged an appeal against that decision belatedly, so the decision became final as early as on 17 August 2007.

14.  By a decision of 22 May 2007 the Customs Administration temporarily stayed the proceedings against D.P. It was established that his participation in the proceedings could not be secured because he was serving a prison sentence in Slovenia and as such was out of the Croatian authorities’ reach.

15.  By a decision of 4 February 2013 the Customs Administration discontinued the proceedings against D.P. because prosecution of the administrative offence in question had in the meantime become time-barred.

2.  Administrative proceedings

16.  Meanwhile, on 29 September 2004 the Customs Administration instituted administrative proceedings against company F., its director G.P. and the applicant with a view to collecting the customs debt due on the importation of the applicant’s car.

17.  By a decision of 2 February 2005 the Customs Administration ordered company F., its director and the applicant to pay jointly and severally the customs debt totalling HRK 113,747.58 (consisting of the customs duty, VAT and the special tax on motor vehicles). In so deciding it relied on section 205(5) sub-paragraph (c) of the Customs Act, which provided that owners or possessors of contraband goods were also liable for the customs debt as the person who had illegally brought those goods into the country (see paragraph 28 below).

18.  The applicant appealed, arguing that he had not been aware that his car had been brought into Croatia in breach of customs regulations. Since the lodging of an appeal did not prevent the decision from becoming enforceable, on 22 February 2005 the applicant alone paid the customs debt in full.

19.  On 26 January 2006 the Ministry of Finance (Ministarstvo financija), as the second-instance administrative authority, allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the first-instance decision of the Customs Administration and remitted the case. It held that the contested decision, in so far as it concerned the applicant, was unintelligible, based on incomplete facts and in breach of procedure because he had not been heard in the proceedings.

20.  In the resumed proceedings, on 3 November 2006 the applicant gave a statement to the Customs Administration. He stated that he was aware of the administrative-offence proceedings (see paragraphs 12-15 above) and the content of his statement to the police given on 28 November 2003 (see paragraph 9 above). He further stated that he had bought the car from the car dealership operated by company F., as evidenced by the invoice of 13 November 2003, for EUR 65,000, which price had included VAT. He had then registered the car himself (see paragraphs 6-7 above). He argued that company F. was solely liable for not paying the customs debt, because he had paid the full price for the car, which had included all levies payable on importation of a motor vehicle.

21.  By a decision of 10 May 2007 the Customs Administration again found the applicant jointly and severally liable with company F. and its director for the customs debt and ordered them to pay it. In so doing, it repeated, in substance, the reasons advanced in its earlier decision (see paragraph 17 above).

22.  The applicant again appealed, reiterating his earlier arguments.

23.  On 28 August 2008 the Ministry of Finance dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the first-instance decision. It held that the applicant had failed to check whether his car had been imported legally.

24.  The applicant then brought an action for a judicial review in the Administrative Court (Upravni sud Republike Hrvatske).

25.  By a judgment of 17 November 2010 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action. The relevant part of that judgment reads as follows:

“The court accepts the view that the plaintiff, when buying the car at issue, should have verified whether it had been legally imported. The plaintiff exercises the profession of an advocate and knows the law. [He] could thus have suspected that in the given circumstances the importation of the car in question had been illegal. It is evident from the case file that it was established, through the verification with the Customs Administration’s department for prevention of smuggling, that company F. is not recorded in the register of export-import companies. [This means that] in the period between 1 January 2002 and 9 January 2004, that is, at the time the car at issue was imported, it did not import [cars or] any [other] goods into Croatia. By further checks it was found that the company in question had not paid any excise, tax or customs duties, which undoubtedly indicates that it was operating illegally. Having regard to the above, the court finds correct the conclusion of the administrative authorities that the plaintiff must have known in the given circumstances that the car in question had been illegally imported into Croatia. The Customs Administration was therefore entitled to find that, in addition to the importer, the plaintiff was also a customs debtor within the meaning of section 205 of the [Customs Act].”

26.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to fair proceedings and non‑discrimination.

27.  By a decision of 12 July 2011 the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible for not raising any constitutional-law arguments, and served its decision on his representative on 1 September 2011.

B.  Relevant domestic law and practice

28.  The relevant provisions of the Customs Act (Carinski zakon, Official Gazette, no. 78/99 with subsequent amendments), which was in force between 1 January 2000 and 30 June 2013, reads as follows:

Section 205

“(1)  Customs debt on importation is also created:

(a) by the unlawful entry of goods into the customs territory of Croatia,

(b) ...

(2)  ...

(3)  Customs debt arises upon the unlawful entry of goods into the customs territory of Croatia.

(4)  ...

(5)  [Customs] debtors are:

...

(c) persons who have acquired the goods in question in terms of ownership or possession, even though at the time they acquired or received the goods they knew, or in the circumstances must have known, that the goods had been illegally brought into the customs territory of Croatia ...”

Section 217

“If several persons are liable for payment of the customs debt, they shall be jointly and severally liable.”

Section 241(1)

“A legal entity is liable to a fine of between 3,000 and 900,000 kunas for an administrative offence and an official of a legal entity or a natural person is liable to a fine of between 1,000 and 100,000 kunas:

(1) if, when entering or leaving the customs territory, he or she brings or attempts to bring goods across the border crossing without declaring it to customs (section 49 paragraph 1) ...”

Section 243(1)

“Legal entities and their officials, or natural persons who are found in possession of goods or who buy, sell, hand over, receive as a gift, conceal, receive for storage or for transport, use or receive on any other grounds goods which they know or, under the circumstances could have known, are the object of an offence referred to in section 240 or 241 of this Act, shall be punished as if they had themselves committed the offence, [and so are liable to] the same penalty prescribed for the perpetrator.”

29.  The Government submitted the following extracts from the case-law of the Administrative Court, which they considered relevant in the present case:

“The plaintiff purchased the vehicle from a natural person who is not an authorised importer or seller, and thereby assumed the risk of the vehicle being illegally imported (case no. Us-5515/2010).”

“Since the vehicle in question had foreign license plates, it was correctly established ... in the proceedings that the plaintiff knew or must have known that such a vehicle is subject to customs duties and other levies (case no. Us-2683/2010).”

“... knowing that I.Ž. was not authorised to import motor vehicles, the plaintiff should have, in the given circumstances of the case, been aware that the importation in question was not legal (case no. Us-1628/2009).”

“Since the plaintiff has in his possession goods for which he has no accounting and customs documentation to prove that all obligations under positive legislation with regard to the goods have been met, the court finds that the respondent authority acted correctly by not accepting the plaintiff’s argument that in the circumstances he could not have known that the goods were illegally imported because he inherited them from his predecessor (case no. Us-4862/2009).”

“From the content of the case file, as well as from the cited legislation, it undoubtedly follows that the respondent authority was correct in finding that the cars in question were illegally brought into the country and that a customs debt arose... The fact that the plaintiff admits to bringing only one vehicle within the customs area without registering it at customs office at the border has no effect [and could not lead to] a different outcome in the present case because [he] failed to check the legality of the importation when receiving the other eight cars. The customs office was therefore correct in obliging him to pay the debt for the said vehicles as well (case no. Us‑3132/2008).”

“Since it was indisputably established that M.C. imported the motor vehicle at issue carrying foreign license plates without registering it at the customs office of entry ... he is considered to be a customs debtor within the meaning of subparagraph (a) of section 205(5) of the Customs Act as regards the calculated customs debt.

However, since subparagraph (c) of section 205(5) of the Customs Act prescribes that the customs debtors are also persons who have acquired the goods in terms of ownership or possession, even though at the time they acquired or received the goods they knew, or in the circumstances must have known, that the goods had been illegally brought into the customs territory of Croatia, the argument raised in the appeal ... contesting the established joint and several liability because they themselves did not bring the vehicle in question into Croatia, does not point to a breach of the law at the detriment of the plaintiff because, as correctly found by the respondent authority, of [his] failure to check the legality of its importation ... prior to the purchase (case no. Us-8674/2007).

“During examination in the administrative-offence proceedings the plaintiff stated that it was correct that at the relevant time she had been operating the vehicle her father had brought from Germany and had given it to her to use [while indicating that] he would provide her with the vehicle documentation later. In that state of affairs the first-instance authority correctly concluded that in the circumstances of the case the plaintiff could have known that the vehicle had been brought into the territory of Croatia without being declared to the customs authorities (case no. Us-5687/2006).

“The court finds that the respondent authority correctly established that at the time of conclusion of the sale and purchase agreement the plaintiff could have, by consulting the documentation of the vessel, checked whether the vessel had been cleared at the customs in Croatia, which he failed to do (case no. Us-1520/2006).”

“... the respondent authority correctly found [as stated] in the reasons for the contested decision that, by checking the customs declaration of the vehicle in question, the plaintiff could have easily determined that the customs declaration does not refer to the said vehicle and that it had been illegally imported ... (case no. Us‑6949/2005).

“...the plaintiff as the buyer had to make sure that the documents accompanying the goods were authentic. By failing to exercise due diligence, he assumed the liability for the possible consequences (case no. Us-9324/2005).”

COMPLAINTS

30.  The applicant complained under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto, and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention that the domestic authorities’ decisions had imposed on him an excessive individual burden and constituted discrimination on the grounds of his profession and/or education.

THE LAW

31.  The applicant complained under Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 thereto that, in view of the reasons given by the Administrative Court, finding him liable for the customs debt and ordering him to pay it had imposed on him an excessive individual burden and had amounted to discrimination on the grounds of his profession and/or education. He also relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 to the Convention. Those Articles read as follows:

Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination)

“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (protection of property)

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 (general prohibition of discrimination)

“1.  The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.

2.  No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those mentioned in paragraph 1.”

32.  The Government disputed the admissibility of the applicant’s complaints, arguing that they were manifestly ill-founded.

A.  Submissions of the parties

1.  The Government

33.  The Government first referred to the Court’s case-law according to which the States had a wide margin of appreciation in passing laws which regulate the enforcement of tax debts (Gasus Dosier- und Fördertechnik GmbH v. the Netherlands, 23 February 1995, § 60, Series A no. 306‑B). When enacting the Customs Act the State had therefore been entitled to extend the liability for customs debts to those who had known or must have known that the goods they had acquired or received had been illegally imported. The legitimate aim of such measure was expedient and efficient collection of customs debts.

34.  The Government listed a number of elements (see paragraphs 4-10 above) justifying the domestic authorities’ conclusion that the applicant had known or must have known that the car he had ordered had been imported illegally:

-  he had obtained a new and fully equipped car from abroad at a better price than if he had ordered it through the car dealership from which he had eventually received the invoice;

-  he had negotiated and agreed on the car purchase with a person who was not an employee or the owner of the car dealership issuing the invoice;

-  there had been a discrepancy between the purchase price initially agreed (EUR 60,000) and the amount stipulated in the sale and purchase contract of 13 November 2003 (EUR 65,000),

-  a notary public had certified the authenticity of the signature of the car dealership’s director on that contract a month after its conclusion;

-  he had made a cash payment, whereas payment through financial institutions was obligatory; and

-  he had entrusted the vehicle registration to another person.

35.  In the Government’s view, those elements would have raised suspicion concerning the legality of the importation with anyone, regardless of his or her legal expertise, and would have prompted him or her to exercise due care and carry out the relevant checks. The applicant had either ignored, or chosen to ignore, those elements and had approached the purchase of the car rather carelessly. He could not therefore argue that verifying the legality of the importation had imposed on him an excessive individual burden or that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his profession.

36.  To clear those suspicions, the applicant had not been required to make inquiries incumbent on the administrative authorities or to undertake an expert analysis (see paragraph 42 below), but to check publicly available records, namely, whether the customs declaration for the car had been recorded in the customs system.

37.  As regards the discrimination complaint, the Government, in addition to the above arguments, emphasised that the decisions of the administrative authorities in the applicant’s case did not even state that the applicant was an advocate let alone that he had been obliged to make inquiries into the legality of the importation because of his profession (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above). The Administrative Court had upheld those decisions primarily because it had accepted the reasons given by the administrative authorities, which had made no reference to the applicant’s profession (see paragraph 25 above). The case-law of the Administrative Court showed that the court expected anyone, regardless of their profession, to question and check the lawfulness of importation in similar circumstances. The additional arguments advanced by that court in the applicant’s case, which had referred to his profession, were thus to be understood as meaning that given his legal expertise, he should have suspected even more the legality of the importation and been prompted to make the relevant inquires, it being understood that that was expected from anyone in the given circumstances. Since the applicant had therefore not been treated differently from persons who were not members of the Bar or did not know the law, the reasons given by the Administrative Court in his case could not be considered discriminatory.

38.  Lastly, the Government pointed out that section 205(5) of the Customs Act had required the authorities to examine whether persons who had acquired contraband goods had known or “in the circumstances” must have known that the goods had been illegally imported (see paragraph 28 above). In view of that provision, the fact that the applicant had legal expertise was a circumstance which, for the domestic authorities, was difficult to ignore.

39.  The Government concluded that the applicant had not been forced to bear an excessive individual burden, nor had he suffered discrimination on the grounds of his profession. They therefore urged the Court to find no violation of any of the Articles of the Convention relied on by the applicant.

2.  The applicant

40.  The applicant stressed that the domestic authorities had imposed on him the duty to verify the legality of importation because he was an advocate, at pain of being held liable for the customs debt, a task normally incumbent on public authorities. This had placed on him an excessive individual burden and amounted to discrimination on the basis of his profession.

41.  In this connection, the applicant first pointed out that his conduct had not been illegal. Yet, the domestic authorities had found him jointly and severally liable for the customs debt together with those who had actually been convicted of an administrative offence on account of the illegal importation of his car, namely, together with company F. and its director G.P. Imposing on him an obligation to pay the customs debt had thus, in reality, had a punitive effect and had amounted to an administrative penalty.

42.  Secondly, the applicant found it unreasonable that the duty to verify the legality of importation had been imposed on him, especially given the time taken by the police and other specialised domestic authorities (such as the Customs Administration’s department for prevention of smuggling) to establish that his car had been imported on the basis of a forged customs declaration and that company F. had been operating illegally (see paragraphs 8, 11 and 25 above). Moreover, company F. had been duly registered in the register of commercial companies and his car in the register of motor vehicles kept by the police. Given that the relevant authorities had allowed those registrations and had not removed either company F. or his car from the respective registers for the alleged illegalities, the applicant had had no reason to suspect that his car had been illegally imported or that company F. had been operating contrary to the law.

43.  As regards his discrimination complaint, the applicant, in addition to the above arguments, emphasised that when buying the car he had not been acting in his professional capacity. In his view, there was no legitimate aim or objective, nor any reasonable justification, for treating advocates differently from ordinary citizens when it came to the purchasing of imported goods.

B.  The Court’s assessment

44.  The Court considers that the applicant’s complaints (see paragraphs 30-31 above) must first be examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention taken alone.

45.  The following general principles emerge from the Court’s case-law under that Article as regards taxation (see, for example, Arnaud and Others v. France, nos. 36918/11 and 5 others, §§ 23-25, 15 January 2015):

 “23.  The Court reiterates that taxation in principle constitutes an interference with the right guaranteed by the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and that this interference is justified under the second paragraph of this Article, which expressly provides for an exception as regards the payment of taxes or other contributions.

24.  However, this issue is nonetheless within the Court’s control, since the correct application of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is subject to its supervision. In that regard the Court reiterates that the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 has to be construed in the light of the general principle set out in the first sentence of this Article. It follows that the interference in question should strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights (...). Consequently, the financial liability arising out of the raising of taxes or contributions may adversely affect the guarantee secured under this provision if it places an excessive burden on the person or entity concerned or fundamentally interferes with his or its financial position (...) ...

25.  Moreover, it is in the first place for the national authorities to decide what kind of taxes or contributions are to be collected. The decisions in this area will commonly involve the appreciation of political, economic and social questions which the Convention leaves within the competence of the States parties because the domestic authorities are clearly better placed than the Court to assess such problems. The power of appreciation of the States parties in such matters is therefore a wide one and enjoys a wide margin of appreciation and the Court will respect the legislature’s assessment in such matters unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation (...).”

46.  Having regard to its case-law (see also Di Belmonte v. Italy, no. 72638/01, § 38, 16 March 2010, and Imbert de Trémiolles v. France (dec.), nos. 25834/05 and 27815/05, 4 January 2008), the Court finds it evident that the decision by the Customs Administration of 10 May 2007, which was upheld by the Ministry of Finance on 28 August 2008, ordering the applicant to pay (jointly and severally with company F. and its director) the customs debt totalling HRK 113,747.58 (see paragraphs 21 and 23 above) constituted an interference with his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.

47.  That decision was based on section 205(5) (c) of the Customs Act (see paragraphs 28 above). It was not argued by the applicant, and there is nothing to suggest, that the provision in question did not satisfy the qualitative criteria of accessibility and foreseeability. The interference in question was therefore provided for by law and aimed to secure the payment of taxes, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

48.  The provision in question imposes liability for the customs debt on those who knew or must have known that the goods they had acquired had been imported illegally (see paragraph 28 above). Establishing that the subjective element of that liability exists – namely, that a person knew or must have known that the goods they had acquired had been imported illegally – must be based on certain factual findings by the domestic authorities.

49.  In this connection, the Court reiterates that when it comes to establishing the facts, it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its task and must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case. Where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not the Court’s task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and it is for the latter to establish the facts on the basis of the evidence before them. Though the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts and remains free to make its own assessment in the light of all the material before it, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by the domestic courts (see Bărbulescu v. Romania [GC], no. 61496/08, § 129, ECHR 2017 (extracts), and Europapress Holding d.o.o. v. Croatia, no. 25333/06, § 62, 22 October 2009).

50.  The applicant’s main argument, however, was that the domestic authorities had not found him liable for the customs debt because the evidence had suggested that he had known or must have known that the car had been illegally imported. Rather, in the applicant’s view, the domestic authorities had held him liable because they considered that he should have verified whether the car had been illegally imported. That was not an assessment of fact but rather amounted to imposing a personal obligation on him, which he considered excessive in the given circumstances (see paragraphs 30-31 and 40 above).

51.  The Court is not convinced by that argument, which, in its view, seeks to invert the logic behind the domestic authorities’ decisions. Indeed, it transpires from those decisions, and in particular the judgment of the Administrative Court, that

-  anyone, and especially an advocate, could have suspected that in the given circumstances the importation of the car in question had been illegal; this would have prompted them to make relevant inquiries in order to alleviate that suspicion;

-  the fact that the applicant did not make such inquires meant that he knew or must have known that the car had been imported illegally.

52.  The Court therefore considers that the domestic authorities drew inferences from the evidence before them and that their conclusion that the applicant knew or must have known that his car had been imported illegally was indeed a factual finding.

53.  The Court further considers that there are no cogent elements that would lead it to depart from that factual finding (see paragraph 49 above).

54.  That being so, the Court, having regard to the domestic authorities’ wide margin of appreciation in tax matters, also finds that it cannot be said that the rule imposing joint and several liability for customs debt on those who knew or must have known that the goods they had acquired had been imported illegally is at odds with the principle of proportionality inherent in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see paragraph 45 above).

55.  Lastly, the foregoing (see paragraph 48-53 above) suggests that the applicant’s profession and/or education were not decisive for the domestic authorities’ conclusion that he knew or must have known that his car had been imported illegally and for finding him liable for the customs debt on that account. Their decisions thus cannot be considered discriminatory within the meaning of Articles 14 of the Convention and 1 of Protocol No. 12.

56.  It follows that the present application is inadmissible under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.

For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 4 July 2019.

Renata DegenerKrzysztof Wojtyczek
Deputy RegistrarPresident

 

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