SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 60295/00
by István MÁZSA and Sándor PAPP
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 20 January 2004 as a Chamber composed of
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze,
MrsA. Mularoni, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 7 April 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants, Mr István Mázsa and Mr Sándor Papp, are Hungarian nationals, who were born in 1959 and 1958, respectively, and live in Becsehely and Galambok, Hungary. They are represented before the Court by Mr L. Noll, a lawyer practising in Nagykanizsa, Hungary. The respondent Government are represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Deputy State-Secretary, Ministry of Justice.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
In 1987 the applicants instituted proceedings before the Tapolca District Court seeking damages from a company and its board members. On 28 April 1989 the court allowed their action. On appeal, on 8 June 1990 the Veszprém County Regional Court modified the first-instance judgment and reduced the amount of damages awarded. This judgment became final.
The judgment was not executed.
On 7 July 1993 the defendants requested the District Court to re-open the case as the final judgment had been based on false information. On 14 April 1994 the court accepted their request and ordered the case to be re-opened.
On the applicants’ appeal, on 24 June 1994 the Regional Court annulled the first-instance order and remitted the case to the District Court, holding that the defendants had failed to append the documents cited in their request.
Subsequently, the District Court again ordered the re-opening of the case. The applicants’ appeal against this order was dismissed on 19 April 1996 by the Regional Court.
On 23 February 1999 the District Court annulled the final judgment of 8 June 1990 and ordered the defendants to pay a reduced amount of damages to the applicants.
On the appeals of both parties, on 27 August 1999 the Regional Court modified parts of the first-instance judgment of 28 April 1989 in so far as they concerned the applicants and upheld the final judgment of 8 June 1990.
A copy of the decision of 27 August 1999 was received, with a view to its despatch, at the Tapolca District Court on 28 September 1999. It was posted by registered mail at the Tapolca Post Office on 30 September 1999. On Friday, 1 October 1999 it was received at the Nagykanizsa Post Office with a view to its delivery.
The Government have submitted the avis de réception attached to the letter containing the decision. They maintain that the handwritten date of service appearing on the avis de réception is 1 October 1999. A letter sent by the Legal Directorate of the Hungarian Postal Service corroborated that the decision was served on the applicants’ lawyer on that date.
The applicants have submitted a copy of the decision which was allegedly stamped on arrival at their lawyer’s office on Sunday, 10 October 1999.
The Government submit that no postal delivery takes place on Sundays in Hungary.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicants complain that the proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time. They invoke Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in its relevant parts, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government argue that the application should be declared inadmissible as the applicants failed to introduce their application within the six-month period required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In this connection they observe that the final decision in the case was served on the applicants on 1 October 1999, whereas the application was introduced only on 7 April 2000.
The applicants contest this. They allege that the final decision was served on their lawyer on 10 October 1999. Therefore, they complied with the six-month time-limit.
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, in so far as relevant, provides:
“The Court may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.”
The Court recalls that the six months’ rule, in reflecting the wish of the Contracting Parties to prevent past decisions being called into question, after an indefinite lapse of time, serves the interests not only of the respondent Government but also of legal certainty as a value in itself. It marks out the temporal limits of supervision carried out by the organs of the Convention and signals to both individuals and State authorities the period beyond which such supervision is no longer possible (see, for example, Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec), no. 34979/97, ECHR 2000-I).
The Court further recalls that where an applicant is entitled to be served ex officio with a written copy of the final domestic decision, the object and the purpose of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention are best served by counting the six-month period as running from the date of service of the written judgment (see Worm v. Austria judgment of 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V, p. 1534, § 33). Where the applicant has designated a lawyer to represent him, as in the instant case, the six-month period runs from the date on which the applicant’s lawyer was served with the final decision, notwithstanding the fact that the decision might only have been notified personally to the applicant later.
In the instant case it has not been disputed that the six-month period ran from the date on which the applicants’ lawyer was notified of the final decision.
The applicants state that the date of service was Sunday, 10 October 1999.
The Government provide evidence to support their submission that the decision was served on Friday, 1 October 1999. In particular, they assert that the avis de réception was stamped at the despatching Nagykanizsa Post Office on 1 October 1999, and the handwritten note showing its receipt by the addressee bears the same date.
In these circumstances, the Court considers that the service of the final decision took place on 1 October 1999 and the six-month time-limit began to run on that date. However, the application was lodged only on 7 April 2000, i.e. more than six months later.
It follows that the application has been introduced outside the six-month time-limit prescribed by Article 35 § 1 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
S. DolléJ.-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy