AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 14062/88
by M.D. and M.D.
against Sweden
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 10 April 1991, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, President of the Chamber
G. SPERDUTI
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. WEITZEL
H.G. SCHERMERS
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Mr. F. MARTINEZ
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Second Chamber,
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 18 February
1988 by M.D. and M.D. against Sweden and registered on 26
July 1988 under file No. 14062/88;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent
Government on 17 May and 16 August 1990 and the observations submitted
in reply by the applicant on 5 July, 9 October and 5 December 1990;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicants are Swedish citizens, born in 1955 and 1938
respectively. They are married and reside at S., Austria.
The present application concerns two different sets of civil
proceedings involving the applicants.
I
By judgment of the Labour Court (Arbetsdomstolen) of 16
February 1983, the applicants were obliged to pay damages to two of
their former employees, amounting to approximately 38,000 Swedish
crowns. This made the applicants institute, on 18 February 1983,
proceedings against the former employees before the District Court
(tingsrätt) of Mora, claiming that they had caused damage to the
applicants by giving incorrect information or failing to tell the
truth in the previous case. On 14 November 1983 the parties were
called to attend an oral preparatory session at Malung on 15 December
1983.
The applicants were opposed to the session taking place at
Malung and accordingly they did not appear. On 15 December 1983, the
District Court pronounced judgment by default (tredskodom) as the
applicants had failed to appear in court although they had been
properly summoned. On 11 January 1984 the applicants asked for the
proceedings to be resumed, and on 8 November 1985 the parties were
accordingly called to an oral preparatory session on 5 December 1985
during which the applicants' claim for damages was reduced to the
symbolic sum of 1 Swedish crown.
The case was examined again by the District Court of Mora on
3 October 1986. After hearing the parties' arguments, and after an
evaluation of the information and documents submitted, the District
Court rejected the applicants' claim for damages and costs were
awarded against them. Judgment was pronounced on 31 October 1986.
On 18 November 1986 the applicants appealed against the
judgment to the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) which asked the
parties to file written submissions.
Having obtained the necessary written submissions from the
parties, the Court of Appeal pronounced judgment in the case on
9 September 1990. The Court upheld the judgment of the District
Court.
On 5 October 1990 the applicants asked for leave to appeal to
the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen). However, on 6 November 1990 the
Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.
II
In 1983 a dispute arose between the applicants and certain
former employees and proceedings commenced in the District Court
of Mora on 16 March 1983. Before the District Court each party
claimed damages from the other owing to alleged irregularities in a
labour contract. On 15 December 1983 the District Court pronounced
judgment by default against the applicants as they had failed to
appear in court when summoned to do so. On 27 December 1983 the
applicants asked for the proceedings to be resumed and on 8 November
1985 the parties were called to attend an oral preparatory session on
5 December 1985. In March 1987 the parties were called to attend the
main hearing which took place on 1 and 2 June 1987. After hearing the
parties' arguments and after an evaluation of the information and
documents submitted, the District Court found against the applicants,
who were ordered to pay a total of approximately 30,000 Swedish crowns
plus interest to the former employees.
On 8 July 1987 the applicants appealed against the judgment to
the Labour Court which, after obtaining written observations from the
parties, held a hearing in the case on 27 September 1988. In its
judgment of 2 November 1988 the Labour Court upheld the judgment of
the District Court.
COMPLAINTS
As regards both part I and part II, the applicants complain
that their civil cases were not determined within a reasonable time.
They invoke Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 18 February 1988 and
registered on 26 July 1988.
On 5 March 1990 the Commission decided to adjourn the
examination of the application as far as it concerned the length of
proceedings as set out in parts I and II above and to declare
inadmissible the remainder of the application. It was furthermore
decided to bring the adjourned part of the application to the notice
of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written
observations on the admissibility and merits.
The Government's observations on admissibility and merits were
submitted on 17 May 1990 and the applicants' observations in reply
were submitted on 5 July 1990.
Supplementary observations were submitted by the Government on
16 August 1990 and supplementary observations in reply were submitted
by the applicants on 9 October and 5 December 1990.
On 8 January 1991 the Commission decided to refer the
application to the Second Chamber.
THE LAW
The applicants complain of the length of the proceedings as
described above under part I and part II. They invoke Article 6 para.
1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
The Commission notes that it is undisputed that the
proceedings related to civil rights and obligations and came within
the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which
inter alia recognises that everyone is entitled to a hearing within a
reasonable time.
As far as the periods to be taken into consideration are
concerned, the Commission notes that the proceedings relating to
part I of this application commenced on 18 February 1983, when the
applicants instituted proceedings in the District Court of Mora, and
ended with the decision of the Supreme Court on 6 November 1990. Thus
these proceedings lasted approximately 7 years and 8 1/2 months.
As regards part II of the present application, the proceedings in the
District Court of Mora commenced on 16 March 1983 and ended with the
judgment of the Labour Court of 2 November 1988. These proceedings
accordingly lasted approximately 5 years and 7 1/2 months.
The applicants argue that these periods cannot be regarded as
reasonable within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention. The Government, on the other hand, have submitted that the
length of the proceedings in question was in particular due to the
applicants' conduct and was therefore reasonable.
The European Court of Human Rights and the Commission have
consistently held that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
coming within the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention must be assessed in each case according to its particular
circumstances and on the basis of the following criteria: the
complexity of the case as regards the facts and the law, and the
conduct of the applicant and the competent authorities.
Applying these criteria, and taking into account the
circumstances of the present case, the Commission considers that the
periods of time which elapsed in the two sets of proceedings raise
serious issues under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
requiring an examination of the merits of the case.
Consequently, the Commission considers that these complaints
are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para.
2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other grounds for declaring the
complaints inadmissible have been established.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE,
without prejudging the merits of the case.
Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber
(K. ROGGE) (S. TRECHSEL)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy