MEJLIS OF CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE v. RUSSIA

Published on 20 October 2025

FOURTH SECTION

Application no. 25361/17
MEJLIS OF CRIMEAN TATAR PEOPLE
against Russia
lodged on 28 March 2017
communicated on 3 October 2025

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The application concerns the banning of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People (hereinafter – “the Mejlis”) by the “Supreme Court of Crimea” on 16 April 2016. The Mejlis is represented before the Court jointly by the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre and the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union.

The Mejlis, operating in Crimea, is the high representative and executive body of the Crimean Tatar people and was founded in 1991 to represent the interests of the Crimean Tatars before the Ukrainian and Crimean authorities, as well as before international organisations. Consisting of thirty-three members elected by and accountable to the Qurultai (the general assembly of Crimean Tatars), the Mejlis is the high representative and executive body of the Crimean Tatar people. It functions as the permanent executive body between the sessions of the Qurultai (held every five years), implementing its decisions and representing the Crimean Tatar people. The most recent full Qurultai session took place in Bakhchysaray, Crimea, in October 2013, when the current Mejlis composition was elected.

On 15 February 2016, relying on the anti-extremism provisions of the Russian Federation legislation, the “Prosecutor of the Republic of Crimea” brought before the “Supreme Court of Crimea” an action against the Mejlis seeking a judgment declaring the Mejlis an extremist organisation and consequently banning its activities. On 12 April 2016 the activities of the Mejlis were temporarily suspended pending the “court’s decision”. On 26 April 2016 the “Supreme Court of Crimea” granted the prosecutorial action. On 29 September 2016 the Administrative Division of the Russian Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by the Mejlis. This appeal judgment is final and not amenable to any further appeal. The Mejlis was declared as an extremist organisation and its activities were banned.

The applicant complains that the order for its dissolution and the ban on its activity constituted an interference with its freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention.

The applicant complains under Article 18 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 11, that the real purpose of the above-indicated ban was to silence and to punish it for its political opposition.

The applicant alleges several breaches of its right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Specifically, it maintains that the “Supreme Court of Crimea” was not “established by law” in light of the annexation of Crimea; that it had no relevant ratione materiae jurisdiction; and that, in any event, it was not independent and impartial due to the judges’ involvement in other political cases, and finally that the equality between the parties was violated due to the prosecutor’s presence in the administrative process.

Relying on Article 7 of the Convention, the applicant argues that the designation of the Mejlis as an “extremist organisation” retroactively criminalised legitimate activities of Crimean Tatars and exposed them to prosecution under vague and unforeseeable Russian anti-extremism laws which lacked clarity given that they blurred the line between extremism and lawful activity. It further argued that the retroactive imposition of Russian law in occupied Crimea, without proper publication, constituted a violation of Article 7 of the Convention, as also reflected by the safeguards set out in Articles 64 and 65 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.

Lastly, and relying on Thlimmenos v. Greece [GC], no. 34369/97, § 44, ECHR 2000-IV, the applicant complains under Article 14 of the Convention, in conjunction with Article 11, that no distinction was made between the specific status of the Mejlis as a representative body of the indigenous peoples and other public associations of Crimean Tatars.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1.  Has the applicant complied with the admissibility requirements set forth in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention?

2. Can the applicant in the present case be considered to be a non‑governmental organisation within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention?

3.  In the affirmative, has there been a violation of the applicant’s right to freedom of association, contrary to Article 11 of the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], nos. 20958/14 and 38334/18, §§ 1123-28, 25 June 2024)?

4.  Were the restrictions imposed by the respondent State in the present case, purportedly pursuant to Article 11 of the Convention, applied for a purpose other than those envisaged by that provision, contrary to Article 18 of the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 1351‑82)?

5.  Was the applicant’s case adjudicated by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 943‑46, 25 June 2024?

6.  Does the designation of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People as an extremist organisation, triggering the applicability of Russian anti-extremism legislation in Crimea, comply with the requirements of Article 7 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 1274-78)?

7.  Was the legislation of the Russian Federation, on which the Mejlis was designated as an extremist organisation, officially published in Crimea at the time of the proceedings concerning the applicant? In the affirmative, the Government are requested to provide a copy of the official publication of the full text. If it was not published, can the law on the basis of which the decision was taken be considered sufficiently accessible and foreseeable, as required by Article 7 of the Convention?

8.  Has the applicant suffered discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 11 (see Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) [GC], cited above, §§ 1181-90)?

In particular, has the applicant been subjected to a difference in treatment by failing to recognise its specific status as a representative body of the indigenous peoples?