THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 18847/23
Nikolaos MEÏNTANAS
against Greece
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 29 April 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Peeter Roosma, President,
Ioannis Ktistakis,
Lətif Hüseynov, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 18847/23) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 3 May 2023 by a Canadian, Greek and United States national, Mr Nikolaos Meïntanas (“the applicant”), who was born in 1960, lives in Chalandri Attikis and was represented by Ms S. Markou, a lawyer practising in Athens;
the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the length of the custody proceedings under Article 8 of the Convention to the Greek Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mrs S. Trekli, Senior Advisor at the State Legal Council, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the decision to give priority to the application (Rule 41 of the Rules of Court);
the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns length of custody proceedings.
2. The applicant married M.K. in 2005. In 2007 they had a son. The couple divorced in 2014.
3. On 18 November 2014, following interim measure proceedings initiated by M.K, she was provisionally awarded sole custody of the child and the applicant was ordered to move out of the family home.
4. On 24 November 2014 the applicant submitted a request for the determination of his contact rights with the child. On 13 February 2015 the first instance court issued a decision temporarily regulating the applicant’s rights of contact with his child. Specifically, it was determined that the applicant would meet with his child “every Wednesday afternoon from 3.30 p.m. to 8 p.m., every first and third Friday weekend of every month from 4.30 p.m. on Friday to 6 p.m. on Sunday, during Christmas, New Year, and Easter for seven days and during the holiday season for a continuous month”. He challenged this decision unsuccessfully. The issue was finally determined on 11 November 2016. It appears that this schedule has been generally respected.
5. In the meantime, on 11 June 2015, M.K., who was exercising temporary custody, applied to the Athens Court of First Instance for the final assignment of custody to her.
6. On 1 March 2017 the applicant filed a counterclaim against M.K. for the custody of the child.
7. On 7 September 2021 the first instance court decided to award custody to the applicant considering that while both parents had been capable of taking care of the child, the child wished to reside with his father and his wish had to be respected.
8. On 6 May 2022 this decision was reversed on appeal. The Court of Appeal decided that while the child’s opinion mattered, the first instance court had not been obliged to comply with it, considering the minor’s emotionally strained state and the rift caused by the severe conflict between his parents. The court considered that both parents had been capable of caring for the child. It was in the child’s best interest to maintain custody with M.K. to uphold stability and continuity in his living and school environment.
9. The matter of custody was finally determined on 27 January 2023 by a decision of the Court of Cassation which upheld the appellate court’s findings and awarded custody to M.K.
10. Pending the custody proceedings, the legal dispute between the parties escalated, extending to various issues concerning their relationship and their minor child. The parties lodged several requests for injunctive measures, applications and lawsuits which aggravated the relationship between them. Among other actions, the applicant contested decisions concerning his communication with the minor; he contested the temporary custody on three separate occasions, namely, 29 November 2017, 8 January 2021, and 21 October 2021; he also applied to the court on 19 September 2019 to bar M.K’s partner from having contact with the minor; through an application dated 25 August 2022, he sought that custody be assigned to him pending the final determination of the matter; and he further applied to have the child examined by a new psychologist claiming that he feared for its health and safety. Similarly, M.K. lodged various applications for injunctive measures, challenged the report produced by a court appointed expert and requested the submission of a new expert opinion, among others. All the above issues were examined by the domestic courts which had to issue various interim decisions.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
11. The applicant claimed that the domestic courts failed to decide on the custody issue within reasonable time, breaching his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. This delay, for which he had no responsibility, caused him sadness, anxiety, and uncertainty.
12. The Government argued that throughout the relevant period the applicant had full, unimpeded, and meaningful communication with his child which, as acknowledged by the domestic courts, allowed him to maintain and strengthen his bond with his child over the years. The domestic courts’ decisions were taken following adversarial proceedings. The applicant lodged several challenges which inevitably led to delays in the final determination of the custody dispute. He consented to adjournments and his conduct was not particularly diligent. Notably, he delayed filing a counterclaim to M.K.’s custody application.
13. In cases concerning a person’s relationship with his or her child, there is a duty to exercise exceptional diligence in view of the risk that the passage of time may result in a de facto determination of the matter. This duty is decisive in assessing whether a case was heard within a reasonable time as required by Article 6 § 1 and also forms part of the procedural requirements implicit in Article 8 (see Ribić v. Croatia, no. 27148/12, § 92, 2 April 2015; Kopf and Liberda v. Austria, no. 1598/06, § 39, 17 January 2012; both with further references).
14. There is no dispute between the parties that the custody proceedings fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention. The proceedings started on 11 June 2015 with M.K.’s application for final assignment of custody to her and ended on 27 January 2023 with the decision of the Court of Cassation (see paragraphs 5 and 9 above). Thus, the proceedings spanned seven years and seven months at three levels of jurisdiction.
15. These proceedings were undoubtedly prolonged. However, in the present case the Court cannot but observe that the applicant had contact with his child throughout the proceedings. His contact rights were regulated as early as 24 November 2014 (see paragraph 4 above). The applicant does not contest the Government’s submission that the contact schedule has been generally respected, and he had had unimpeded and meaningful communication with his son throughout the proceedings which enabled them to maintain and strengthen their bond over the years. In this respect, the present case is to be differentiated from cases where the applicants’ contact with their children was restricted requiring domestic authorities to exercise exceptional diligence in the conduct of the proceedings (compare, among many other authorities, Anagnostakis and Others v. Greece, no. 46075/16, § 59, 23 September 2021, and Prodělalová v. the Czech Republic, no. 40094/08, §§ 62 and 63, 20 December 2011, where the applicants’ contact with their children were significantly restricted and could have resulted in a de facto determination of the matter). It is evident from the documents before the Court that this was not the situation in the present case.
16. The Court cannot also ignore the fact that the conduct of the proceedings was clearly influenced by the animosity between the parties who instituted several sets of proceedings against each other. The applicant himself delayed significantly in submitting his counter appeal to M.K.’s application for custody. While M.K. applied for the final assignment of custody to her on 11 June 2015, the applicant counterclaimed it on 1 March 2017 (see paragraphs 5 and 6 above). He also unsuccessfully contested the temporary assignment of custody to M.K. on three separate occasions, applied to the courts to bar M.K’s partner from seeing the child, sought the child’s examination by a new psychologist, among other claims (see paragraph 10 above). Even though the applicant had the right to bring those claims, several intermediate decisions had to be taken, which inevitably caused a delay in the proceedings.
17. In light of the criteria set out in its case-law, and regard being had to the particular circumstances of the case, the Court finds that although the proceedings lasted a considerable length of time, this had not had an excessive bearing on the applicant’s rights for respect of family life under Article 8.
18. It follows that the application must therefore be declared inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded and rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 22 May 2025.
Olga Chernishova Peeter Roosma
Deputy Registrar President