SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 13063/23
M.G.
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 2 June 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Jovan Ilievski, President,
Gediminas Sagatys,
Hugh Mercer, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 13063/23) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 17 March 2023 by an Ivoirian national, M.G. (“the applicant”), who was born in 1999, lives in Glasgow and was represented by Mr L. Roach-Kett (Duncan Lewis Solicitors), a lawyer practising in London;
the decision to give notice of the application to the United Kingdom Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms E. Ainsley of the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office;
the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the adequacy and effectiveness, for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention, of investigatory measures taken after the applicant, an asylum-seeker, was stabbed by another asylum-seeker.
2. In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, many asylum-seekers in the United Kingdom were transferred at short notice from their homes to hotel accommodation. The applicant was one such asylum-seeker. On 3 June 2020 he was moved to the Park Inn Hotel in Glasgow. At an incident at the hotel on 26 June 2020, he and five other individuals were stabbed by B.A., an asylum-seeker who had been displaying signs of psychiatric problems and who had previously threatened to stab residents in nearby rooms. The applicant sustained a serious injury leading to the removal of his spleen and ongoing psychological consequences. B.A. was shot dead by police upon their arrival at the scene.
3. The Scottish police subsequently carried out an investigation into the events of 26 June 2020.
4. In the United Kingdom the appropriate mechanism for discharging non-criminal elements of the State’s Article 2 investigatory obligation is an inquest in England and Wales, and in Scotland an investigation by the Scottish Fatalities Investigation Unit (“SFIU”) followed, if necessary, by a Fatal Accidents Inquiry (“FAI”). At the date of lodging the present application, the SFIU had commenced an investigation but it had not decided whether to hold an FAI and it could not indicate when this decision might be taken.
5. The applicant brought judicial review proceedings seeking an order to bring about an Article 3 compliant investigation. On 20 July 2022 the High Court dismissed his claim. The court did not consider it arguable that the State was in breach either of its positive obligation under Article 3 to have in place an adequate regulatory framework or of the operational duty to protect. Consequently, it did not consider that the duty to investigate under Article 3 of the Convention had been triggered. Even if that was not correct, it held that the SFIU was capable of satisfying that duty. As any underlying failings on the part of the Home Office that resulted in the applicant’s injuries were also relevant to the circumstances that resulted in B.A.’s death, discharging the Article 2 investigatory obligation in respect of the latter would necessarily discharge any Article 3 investigatory obligation which arose in respect of the former. If the SFIU failed to comply with its obligations the applicant would have a remedy under section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”).
6. On 18 November 2022 the Court of Appeal refused permission to appeal.
7. The Court gave notice of the application to the respondent Government on 12 March 2024.
8. On 21 June 2024 the Lord Advocate – who is responsible for the investigation of all sudden, unexpected, and unexplained deaths in Scotland – announced that she considered it to be in the public interest to hold an FAI (see paragraph 4 above) into the death of B.A., which would “examine the full circumstances surrounding this tragic incident”.
9. By notice dated 27 December 2024 (“the First Notice”), the Procurator Fiscal identified the persons and bodies that the Crown considered may have an interest in the FAI. Those individuals included the applicant, together with the other victims of B.A.’s attack. In a letter to the applicant’s solicitors the Procurator Fiscal confirmed that an interested party was:
“...entitled to be heard at FAI hearings, to bring forward their own evidence and witnesses, to lead such evidence at the evidential part of the FAI and to question the witnesses of other parties, and to deliver submissions to, or otherwise make requests of, the FAI Sheriff within the bounds of FAI procedure. Interested parties are not required to be legally represented, albeit self-representing parties are rare.”
10. The First Notice also listed amongst those who might have an interest:
The Secretary of State for the Home Department, the Home Office;
The holder of the Home Office contract for asylum accommodation and support services in Scotland;
The facilitator of hotel acquisition and associated services;
The Park Inn by Radisson UK Limited;
The holder of the Home Office contract for asylum advice and assistance;
the local National Health Service Board; and
Glasgow City Council.
11. Moreover, the formal intimation of proceedings signed on 16 January 2025 identified the following areas of evidence which the Crown anticipated would be considered in the FAI:
“The background circumstances of the deceased from arrival in Scotland on 14 February 2020 leading to the incident, including:
The assessment for any vulnerabilities or healthcare issues by the relevant authorities, ...;
The healthcare provision offered to the deceased, including the deceased’s mental wellbeing and assessments thereof;
The housing and support services offered to the deceased, including the provision of hotel accommodation in April 2020;
The interactions of the deceased with the Home Office in relation to the Voluntary Returns Service;
The interactions of the deceased with wellbeing and support services, ...;
The manner in which authorities, ... dealt with reports in relation to threatening behaviours by the deceased on 25 and 26 June 2020, ...”.
12. By letter dated 17 January 2025, the SFIU sent the applicant a copy of the formal intimation of proceedings and informed him that a preliminary hearing in the FAI would take place on 11 March 2025. The applicant was also advised that he might be eligible for legal aid. The applicant’s representative responded by giving formal notification of his intention to participate.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
13. In his application lodged with the Court on 17 March 2023, the applicant complained that the respondent Government was in breach of its procedural obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to carry out an effective investigation into the incident on 26 June 2020.
The parties’ submissions14. In light of the ongoing FAI, the Government argued that the applicant had not exhausted his domestic remedies in respect of any arguable breach of Article 3 of the Convention. The statutory purpose of an FAI (which was principally conducted by the Procurator Fiscal and presided over by a Sheriff, who was an independent judicial office holder) was to establish the circumstances of the death and to consider what steps (if any) might be taken to prevent other deaths in similar circumstances. In this regard, a Sheriff conducting an FAI must apply the same principles that apply to inquests in England and Wales. An FAI concludes by the Sheriff issuing a Determination recording the facts found proved concerning the circumstances of the death. The Determination may also make recommendations for steps which might prevent other deaths in similar circumstances. The SFIU was a public body, bound by the HRA, and it would be open to the applicant to seek judicial review of decisions (or delays in decision-making) by reference to his Convention rights.
15. The applicant submitted that he could not rely on his Article 3 rights in the FAI as the High Court had held that the investigatory obligation under that Article had not been triggered (see paragraph 5 above). It was his contention that only a bespoke inquiry that could properly investigate matters which affected his rights would satisfy the State’s Article 3 investigatory duty.
The Court’s conclusions on admissibility16. The relevant principles concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies are set out in Vučković and Others v. Serbia ((preliminary objection) [GC], nos. 17153/11 and 29 others, §§ 69, 70, 74 and 77, 25 March 2014).
17. In the context of the investigatory obligation under Article 3 of the Convention, it is the duty of the applicant to lodge an application with the Court as soon as he realises, or ought to have realised, that the investigation in question is not effective (see, for example, Mocanu and Others v. Romania [GC], nos. 10865/09 and 2 others, § 264, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). When the present application was introduced, the SFIU had not decided whether to hold an FAI and could not indicate when such a decision might be taken (see paragraph 4 above). Therefore, the applicant cannot be faulted for introducing the application when he did. Nonetheless, in cases concerning the effectiveness of investigations the Court’s consideration of whether domestic remedies have been exhausted cannot be made in disregard of relevant developments since the application’s introduction (see Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 15367/14 and 13 others, § 302, 21 January 2021). On the contrary, the Court has consistently held that when examining such a complaint it can take into account facts which have occurred after the lodging of the application which are directly related to those covered by it (see, for example, Merabishvili v. Georgia [GC], no. 72508/13, §§ 249-51, 28 November 2017, and Shmorgunov and Others, ibid.). Consequently, given the Lord Advocate’s decision of 21 June 2024 to hold an FAI (see paragraph 8 above), the Court must determine whether that inquiry is capable of providing the applicant with a remedy for any arguable breach of Article 3 in the present case.
18. In Scotland, FAIs serve the same purpose as inquests in England and Wales (see paragraph 4 above), which the Court has acknowledged play an important role in discharging the State’s investigatory duty under Article 2 (see Gribben v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 28864/18, § 118, 25 January 2022). The same principles apply to both (compare paragraph 14 above); FAIs, like inquests, must comply with the procedural requirements of Article 2 (see McCaughey and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 43098/09, § 127, ECHR 2013). While it is true that the focus of an FAI, like the focus of an inquest, will be on the fatality that triggered it, as the High Court held (see paragraph 5 above), an inquiry into the broader circumstances of B.A.’s death will also cast light on the circumstances in which the applicant was stabbed. The two are closely intertwined.
19. Indeed, all the evidence currently points to the FAI taking a broad approach, encompassing all the factors that may have contributed to the violent attack by B.A. on 26 June 2020 (see paragraphs 10 and 11 above). Furthermore, the applicant will be able to participate fully in the FAI (see paragraphs 9 and 14 above) and he is entitled to seek legal aid for this purpose (see paragraph 12 above). The extent to which the applicant could rely on his Article 3 rights in the FAI is unclear, in the light of the High Court’s finding that the investigatory duty under that Article had not been triggered (see paragraph 5 above). Nevertheless, this would only have relevance in the event that the SFIU failed to comply with any Convention obligations it might owe to the applicant, and cannot, in and of itself, absolve the applicant from the requirement to exhaust this remedy.
20. While the applicant has raised concerns that delay may prevent witnesses from transient populations like asylum-seekers and hotel staff taking part, he has not identified any essential witnesses who are no longer available to attend. It is therefore too early to say whether the FAI would be deprived, by virtue of any delay, of its ability to establish the facts and otherwise satisfy any investigatory duty that might arise under Articles 2 and/or 3 of the Convention.
21. Consequently, the Court is satisfied that the ongoing FAI offers the applicant an effective remedy for any arguable breach of his Article 3 rights. In reaching this conclusion, it has not been necessary for the Court to determine whether the Article 3 investigatory duty was triggered by the facts of the case.
22. Accordingly, the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 is premature and thus inadmissible on the ground that domestic remedies have not yet been exhausted within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention; and the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. However, should the applicant be dissatisfied in the future with the progress or outcome of the domestic procedure, it would be open to him to reintroduce his complaint under Article 3 of the Convention once domestic remedies have been exhausted.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 25 June 2026.
Dorothee von Arnim Jovan Ilievski
Deputy Registrar President