FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 4566/07
by Dominic MINTOFF and Others
against Malta
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 26 June 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrL. Garlicki,
MsL. Mijović,
MrJ. Šikuta,
MrsP. Hirvelä, judges,
and Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 23 January 2007,
Having regard to the decision to grant priority to the above application under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants, Mr Dominic Mintoff, Ms Anna Mckenna and Ms Yana Mintoff Bland are Maltese nationals who were born in 1916, 1949 and 1951 respectively. The first two applicants live in Malta and the third applicant lives in Texas, United States. They are represented before the Court by Dr Ian Refalo and Dr John Vassallo, lawyers practising in Valetta, Malta.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
1. Background to the case
The first applicant is a former leader of the Malta Labour Party and a former Prime Minister of Malta, and the second and third applicants are his children. They are joint owners of a residence in Delimara in an undeveloped coastal area of Malta.
In 1987 the nationalist government, ordered the construction of a new power station. Consequently, it selected and legally expropriated a site in Delimara, approximately 5 metres from the applicants' property.
At the relevant time, the first applicant objected to the proposed power station on the ground that it would pollute his property and render it unusable. Unsuccessfully, he submitted to the authorities proposals for a number of alternative locations and suggestions as to how the power station could be constructed in order to minimise the damage to his property.
In 1992/1993 the power station began operating. Due to the resulting noise and pollution the applicants had to leave their residence and move to their other house in Tarxien.
The abandonment of the property meant that it became subject to a number of break-ins during which movables and furniture were stolen. Since then the first applicant has been unsuccessfully endeavouring to recover the possession of two other properties, situated in Marsaxlokk, which he had intended for storage purposes, and which had been in his possession for more than fifty years but to which road access had been denied.
2. Proceedings before the constitutional courts
On 19 July 1994 the first applicant and his wife instituted proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction, alleging a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, in respect of their property in Delimara.
On 11 August 1995 the Civil Court found a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention. Despite the fact that the property had not been formally expropriated and that therefore the claimants had not received compensation, they had been deprived of the enjoyment of their property to the extent that they could not use it as a residence due to the noise and toxic emissions, and there had therefore been a de facto expropriation. Moreover, the property had suffered a dramatic depreciation in value. The court considered that although the State had had the right to decide where and when to build the power station, which was undoubtedly in the public interest, it was essential that a fair balance be struck between the general interests of the community and individual rights and this could not be achieved if the claimants were made to suffer an excessive burden. The Civil Court deferred the proceedings for further submissions in respect of an adequate remedy.
Both parties appealed.
On 30 April 1996 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. However, it did not determine the amount of compensation. It remitted the case to the Civil Court, with a view to reaching a friendly settlement.
A number of meetings were held over the next three years but no agreement was reached between the parties, in particular because the planning authority failed to approve building permits for any of the sites which were suggested as replacements for the expropriated property. Numerous hearings took place, evidence was heard, various pleadings were made by the first applicant's lawyers, who were replaced regularly, and various court-appointed technical architects, including additional architects as requested by the first applicant, submitted their evaluations. The parties drew up at least two signed private deeds of agreement.
On 30 August 2004, the Civil Court declared the deeds of agreement between the parties null and void as they had not been done by means of a public deed as required by law and it went on to determine the issue of compensation. It emphasised, that his status as a former politician should neither create an advantage for nor prejudice the first applicant, whose rights had to be respected. It awarded him 360,000 Maltese liras (MLT – approximately 864,000 euros (EUR)), having taken into consideration the fact that the applicant and his wife had been suffering a continuous violation since 1992 (when the power station was built), the inconvenience caused to them, the fact that the first applicant, in using the property in the exercise of his duties as Prime Minister, had rendered it of historical interest, the agreements which the parties had attempted to reach and the fact that the property would remain in the applicant and his wife's possession even though it was unfit for habitation and that its value had greatly diminished. However, it refused to consider the damage caused to movables kept in the property and other damage suffered by them (see Part 3 below) as these were irrelevant, since this was a case concerning adequate compensation and not damages. It further rejected as unsubstantiated the first applicant's submission that he had been offered a sum of over MLT 1,000,000 (approximately 2,400,000 EUR) in compensation, an offer he had refused. It also held that the payments which had already been made to him in 1998 and 2002 amounting to MTL 212,950 (approximately EUR 511,080) should be deducted from the sum awarded.
Both parties appealed. The first applicant's children (the second and third applicants) were granted leave to pursue the application in the first applicant's late wife's stead. In particular the applicants claimed that the remedy granted had not been adequate and that the sum awarded was too low. Particular reference was made to the first applicant's prominent public position, the continuous breach they were suffering, the inconveniences suffered in relation to their other properties, the estimates of the property's value, the failure to provide an alternative property, the fact that the amounts already paid had to be deducted, the offer of MLT 1,000,000 (approximately 2,400,000 EUR) which they had received and that allegedly had not been taken into consideration by the court, and the length of the proceedings.
They further alleged that during the appeal proceedings it had transpired that in similar proceedings, namely, B. vs. Commissioner of Lands, the valuation provided by the court-appointed architects was much in excess of that provided in the applicants' case. However, it does not appear from the Constitutional Court's judgment that this argument was raised before it.
On 28 July 2006 the Constitutional Court upheld the reasons given by the first-instance court and the consequent award of compensation. It affirmed that the applicants had the right to be reimbursed the value of the residence which had been rendered uninhabitable. It re-examined the estimates of the value of the property in 1991/92 before the power station was constructed, provided by the court appointed experts and the additional experts, amounting to MTL 95,400 and MTL 130,000 respectively (approximately EUR 228,960 and EUR 312,000) and the estimated value of the property in 1997 had the power station not been constructed, which amounted to MLT 220,000 (approximately EUR 528,000). It took account of the fact that the applicants had had to bear various inconveniences and the delay in granting the remedy, notwithstanding that part of the delay was due to the applicants' intermittent filing of irrelevant notes and depositions. It further considered that between 1998 and 2002 the sum of MTL 212,950 (approximately EUR 511,080) had already been paid to the applicants, the first payment amounting to MTL 128,000 (approximately EUR 307,200) in 1998. All this could be considered together only by determining a sum arbitrio boni viri which the first court had correctly done.
3. Pending the above proceedings
By 2004, the first applicant, who was living in his other house in Tarxien, was contacted by Enemalta Corporation (one of the parties to the above-mentioned proceedings) and the Water Services Corporation, which have a joint debt collecting procedure, for payment of outstanding water and electricity bills relating to the house in Tarxien, amounting to a few hundred Maltese Liras.
Given that the applicants had already been declared to be owed compensation from the Government and Enemalta Corporation and that his utilities were being provided intermittently and suffered from numerous faults, the first applicant refused to pay the bills. As a result, on 2 November 2004 the utilities supply was cut off and was restored only when third parties paid the bill, against the first applicant's wishes.
When the water supply was restored, the pressure was initially too high and caused the pipes to burst, effectively depriving the first applicant of access to clean water, thus rendering his property in Tarxien uninhabitable too.
With respect to the property in Delimara, apart from noise and smoke emissions, further damage was caused by flooding, affecting the roofs and the electrical installations, and causing an infestation of rats. Historical documents and other possessions were also damaged and since no public funds were available to cover the necessary repairs, the insurance company which would not pay damages unless such works were done, threatened to withdraw insurance cover completely.
4. Constitutional proceedings in respect of the property in Tarxien
On 29 March 2005 the applicants instituted proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional and “conventional” jurisdiction against the respondents, inter alia, Enemalta Corporation and the Water Services Corporation regarding damage to their Tarxien property. They invoked Articles 1, 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and requested the court to provide them with an adequate remedy.
On 29 March 2006 the Civil Court rejected the applicants' claims, in part because the respondent had been incorrectly cited and for the rest it declined from exercising its constitutional jurisdiction on the ground that the applicants had not made use of the ordinary remedies available to them.
On 10 April 2006 the applicants appealed. By a judgment of 20 June 2006 the Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance judgment.
The applicants make reference to a set of legal proceedings in relation to the reinstatement of the Tarxien property, but it is not clear whether these are in fact the same proceedings as are mentioned above or new proceedings and if they are new proceedings whether they have terminated.
5. The current situation
According to the applicants' submissions of 23 January 2007, both their houses remain uninhabitable. Moreover, according to their communication, dated 9 April 2007, the first applicant has ongoing problems with his telephone line and does not receive regular post, and as a result, his Telecare telephone service - which he alleges is being tampered with - his correspondence with banks and his receipt of payments due and timely court notifications are adversely affected. Lastly, they allege that the garden of the Tarxien property has been invaded by wild cats and that the local council has not taken any steps to resolve this problem.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. The remedies provided by law
Under Maltese law, a person alleging a breach of human rights as guaranteed by the European Convention Act or the Constitution of Malta may, without prejudice to any other remedy with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, apply to the Civil Court (First Hall) for redress. The latter's practice and procedures are governed by the Maltese Rules of Court.
In respect of an action for damages in tort or quasi-tort, section 1045 of the Civil Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta, regarding the measure of damages, reads as follows:
“(1) The damage which is to be made good by the person responsible in accordance with the foregoing provisions shall consist in the actual loss which the act shall have directly caused to the injured party, in the expenses which the latter may have been compelled to incur in consequence of the damage, in the loss of actual wages or other earnings, and in the loss of future earnings arising from any permanent incapacity, total or partial, which the act may have caused.”
2. The proceedings in B. vs. Commissioner of Lands
Mr B. owned property (a residential home and adjacent land) in Delimara which in 1993 had been expropriated for the construction of the said power station. He had been offered MTL 107,000 (approximately EUR 256,800) in compensation, which he contested as being inadequate. In the meantime building work had begun on the land contiguous to his property and as a result he suffered damage over a number of years. Pending proceedings regarding the determination of adequate compensation, he was informed that his property was no longer required by the authorities and was asked to sign a disclaimer of responsibility towards them in respect of it, which he refused to sign.
On an unspecified date Mr B. instituted proceedings before the Civil Court (First Hall) in its ordinary jurisdiction. He claimed that he had sustained damage both to his quality of life and to the value of his property, which remained in his possession, and that the authorities were liable for damages, this being without prejudice to any other remedy available to him for the determination of a violation of his fundamental rights under the European Convention on Human Rights.
On 6 June 2002 the Civil Court found in favour of Mr B. and concluded that the authorities' actions had been abusive and illegal and in violation of his rights as property owner. Consequently, it held the authorities liable for damages and deferred the proceedings for the determination of compensation.
On 31 January 2007 the Civil Court held that in accordance with section 1045 of the Civil Code, damage had to be assessed according to the estimated value of the property had the power station not been built which corresponded to MLT 750,000 (approximately EUR 1,800,000), and its actual value, namely MLT 200,000 (approximately EUR 480,000). Consequently it awarded Mr B. MLT 550,000 (approximately EUR 1,320,000) in damages.
According to the Maltese Court Services website, in February 2007 an appeal was lodged and the case is currently pending before the Court of Appeal (Civil, superior jurisdiction).
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.1 and a violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 13 as the Constitutional Court failed to provide an adequate remedy for the upheld violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in that it established the amount to be granted arbitrio boni viri, without taking into consideration the legal interest due and other relevant factors, inter alia, the frustration of the first applicant who had been forced to move out of his residence into another residence which had then also been rendered uninhabitable, and the delay in the proceedings, which resulted in ongoing damage to the property and movables therein. Moreover, the Constitutional Court's judgment was discriminatory in so far as it awarded compensation to the applicants on the basis of valuations carried out in 1992 as opposed to that of others in similar situations whose valuations were carried out in 1997.
THE LAW
Invoking Article 13 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.1, the applicants alleged that the violation of their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property found in their case was not redressed in an effective manner, as the Constitutional Court had awarded only MLT 360,000 (approximately EUR 864,000) by way of just satisfaction. They further argued that the domestic courts had discriminated against them on political grounds, contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, in so far as this award was much lower than that awarded in a similar case.
The relevant part of Article 1 Protocol No.1, reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.”
Under Article 13 of the Convention,
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
Under Article 14 of the Convention,
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
A. The complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
The Court considers it appropriate to examine first the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.1.
The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees, in substance, the right to property and comprises three distinct rules (see, for example, Sporrong and Lönnroth v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 24, § 61). The first, which is expressed in the first sentence of the first paragraph and is of a general nature, lays down the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions. The third, contained in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.
However, the rules are not “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property. They must be construed in the light of the general principle laid down in the first rule (see, for example, Air Canada v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 5 May 1995, Series A no. 316-A, p. 15, §§ 29 and 30).
A taking of property within this second rule can be justified only if it is shown, inter alia, to be “in the public interest” and “subject to the conditions provided for by law”. Moreover, any interference with the property must also satisfy the requirement of proportionality. As the Court has repeatedly stated, a fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights, the search for such a fair balance being inherent in the whole of the Convention. The requisite balance will not be struck where the person concerned bears an individual and excessive burden (see Sporrong and Lönnroth, cited above, pp. 26-28, §§ 69-74, and Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 78, ECHR 1999-VII). The Court also reiterates that in the area of land development and town planning the Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in order to implement their town and country planning policies. Nevertheless, in the exercise of its power of review the Court must determine whether the requisite balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the 'applicants' right of property (see Abdilla v. Malta (dec.), no 38244/03, 3 November 2005). Compensation terms under the relevant legislation are material to the assessment whether the contested measure respects the requisite fair balance and, notably, whether it imposes a disproportionate burden on the applicants (see Jahn and Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and 72552/01, § 94, 30 June 2005). In this connection, the Court has already found that the taking of property without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute a disproportionate interference (see The Holy Monasteries, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 301-A, p. 35, § 71).
Having regard to the domestic judgments delivered in the present case, the Court holds that it is not required to consider the lawfulness and purpose of the interference, as the applicants' complaint concerns only the compensation awarded. It will therefore determine in the context of the proportionality of the interference, whether the compensation awarded in the instant case was such as to render the interference disproportionate.
The Court notes that the sum of MLT 360,000 (approximately EUR 864,000) granted cannot be considered derisory.
On the basis of estimates carried out by the domestic court-appointed architects and additional architects, when the violation was upheld, had the power station not been built the property would have been worth MTL 220,000. The Court reiterates that it is in the first place for the national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret domestic law and that the Court will not substitute its own interpretation for theirs in the absence of arbitrariness (see Tejedor García v. Spain, judgment of 16 December 1997, Reports 1997-VIII, p. 2796, § 31). The same applies in respect of calculating values of land and property (see Panagiotou v. Greece (dec.), no. 38361/03, 3 November 2005). Moreover, the applicants have not submitted any other valuations contradicting the ones used by the domestic courts.
The Court observes that the entire value of the property was evidently covered in the award made to the applicants and was exceeded by approximately MTL 140,000 (approximately EUR 336,000), which would appear from the Constitutional Court's judgment to have included, inter alia, just satisfaction for the inconvenience caused to the applicants since 1992 and an increase in value due to the fact that the first applicant had rendered the property historical in using it in the exercise of his duties.
Moreover, the Court notes that the first applicant had already been paid MTL 212,950 (approximately EUR 511,080), that is, more than half of the total compensation, before the actual amount had been established. The amounts paid could also have accrued interest as from 1998, the date when the first payment had been made. The Court is of the view that this must have mitigated the effects of the delay in making the final payment (see, mutatis mutandis, Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 50, § 169) which, moreover, as found by the Constitutional Court was partly due to the applicants' irrelevant submissions. Apart from this, the Court notes that part of the delay had also been due to the negotiation procedures, which, though ultimately not successful had not been futile and that the time element had not been unreasonable.
Furthermore, it had to be kept in mind that even though it was unfit for habitation and its value had diminished immensely, the property remained in the applicants' possession.
As to the damage caused to movables kept in the property and other damage suffered, the Court notes that it was open to the applicants to bring an action in tort against the relevant parties.
In so far as the applicant expected the sum to include the damage to the property in Tarxien, the Court notes that these were the subject of another set of concurrent proceedings. It further considers that the conditions created in the Tarxien property were not related to the de facto expropriation of the Delimara residence. The first applicant's decision not to pay the relevant bills, which resulted in further damage to his current residence, could have no bearing on the compensation awarded by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, in so far as the Tarxien property could be the subject of a separate complaint, the Court reiterates that Article 35 § 1 provides that the six-month period runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion (see Walker v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34979/97, Reports 2000-I), which in relation to the Tarxien property was delivered on 20 June 2006 and therefore more than six months before the lodging of this application with the Court. No other evidence has been provided in respect of any new proceedings which might have been undertaken in this connection. It follows that this complaint would be inadmissible for non-compliance with the six-month rule set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, and would be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
Having regard to all the foregoing factors, the Court concludes that the compensation awarded to the applicants did not upset the fair balance between the opposing interests as they did not have to bear a disproportionate or excessive burden.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Consequently, it must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 thereof.
B. The complaint under Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No.1
In the light of the conclusions above and consequently the absence of an arguable claim under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention, Article 13 is not engaged (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, § 52). Consequently, the complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
C. The complaint under Article 14 of the Convention
As to the complaint under Article 14, the Court does not deem it necessary to determine whether the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies in so far as the complaint would in any case be inadmissible for the following reasons.
The Court reiterates that Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms” safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions – and to this extent it is autonomous – there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see, among many other authorities, Van Raalte v. the Netherlands, judgment of 21 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, p. 184, § 33, and Petrovic v. Austria, judgment of 27 March 1998, Reports 1998-II, p. 585, § 22).
As the facts at issue fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Article 14 is therefore applicable in the instant case.
The Court reiterates that discrimination means treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations (see Willis v. the United Kingdom, no. 36042/97, § 48, ECHR 2002-IV). However, not every difference in treatment will amount to a violation of Article 14. It must be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation enjoy preferential treatment and that this distinction is discriminatory (see Unal Tekeli v. Turkey, no. 29865/96, § 49, 16 November 2004).
The Court also points out that the grounds on which those differences of treatment are based are relevant in the context of Article 14. However, the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination as set out in Article 14 is not exhaustive (see Rasmussen v Denmark, judgment of 28 November 1984, Series A no. 87, p. 13, § 34 in fine)
The Court notes that both the applicants' and Mr B.'s properties were affected by the power station. However, both parties undertook different types of proceedings to seek redress for their situation. While the applicants undertook constitutional proceedings complaining of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention, Mr B. instituted an action for damages, without prejudice to any further claims under the Convention or Constitution. Under Maltese law, an action for damages is regulated by section 1045 of the Civil Code, whose provisions were applied in Mr B.'s case for the quantification of damages. A different method of calculation was applied in the applicants' case, it being a constitutional set of proceedings under the relevant European Convention Act provisions. The Court further notes that the proceedings in respect of Mr B. are not final and therefore even if the proceedings had been the same, no comparison could be made at this stage.
Consequently, the Court finds that the applicants cannot be held to be persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation to that of Mr B.
Moreover, the Court notes that the judgment in respect of Mr B. refers to a house and adjacent plots of land, as opposed to the applicants' property which consisted solely of a house. The applicants failed to provide evidence that the properties in question were indeed comparable in size, nor did they provide the Court with any other technical expert reports or valuations on their property to show that they deserved to receive a higher amount of compensation or that any other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation had enjoyed preferential treatment. Moreover, the applicants have failed to substantiate their submission that any treatment they have been subjected to was influenced in any way by the fact that the first applicant was a former Prime Minister. The Court therefore concludes that the applicants have failed to substantiate their allegation that they were discriminated against.
Consequently, the Court finds that there does not appear to have been any discrimination contrary to Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
D. Other complaints
In so far as it may be deduced that the applicants complain about the authorities' actions in respect of any other properties, or their failure to deal with other problems related, inter alia, to services, the Court observes that the applicants have neither clearly formulated such complaints nor substantiated them by means of clear facts or documents.
The Court reiterates that, under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. Article 35 § 1 requires that the complaints intended to be made subsequently before the Court should have been made, at least in substance, to the appropriate domestic body (see Aksoy v. Turkey, judgment of 18 December 1996, Reports 1996-VI, pp. 2275-76, §§ 51-52).
The Court notes that it does not appear that the applicants have initiated any proceedings or provided the Court with any documents to show that they made any complaint before the domestic courts in their constitutional jurisdiction in respect of any issues or properties other than those in Delimara and Tarxien or to show that any such proceedings have terminated.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
T.L. EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy