MOLNÁR v. SLOVAKIA

FIRST SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 42148/21
Richard MOLNÁR
against Slovakia

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 27 February 2025 as a Committee composed of:

 Artūrs Kučs, President,
 Alena Poláčková,
 Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 42148/21) against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 13 August 2021 by a Slovak national, Mr Richard Molnár (“the applicant”), who was born in 1965, lives in Stupava and was represented by Ms M. Lichnerová, a lawyer practising in Bratislava;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The case concerns the applicant’s complaints under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4, Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 and Article 13 of the Convention in the context of his pre-trial detention.

2.  The applicant is a former judge who, together with other current and former members of the judiciary and other individuals, has faced criminal charges in connection with allegations of corrupt behaviour, abuse of official authority and interference with judicial independence. The applicant has been charged with bribery (see also Molnár v. Slovakia, no. 39818/20, §§ 3-4, 16 December 2020).

3.  On 14 March 2020 the applicant was remanded in custody by the Specialised Criminal Court with effect from 9 March 2020 pursuant to Article 71 § 1 (b) and (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (risk of interfering with the course of justice and continuing to engage in criminal activity). On 20 March 2020 the Supreme Court upheld the remand decision.

4.  On 16 June 2020 the Specialised Criminal Court ordered the applicant’s release, following a request made by him on 4 June 2020. On 25 June 2020, following an appeal by the prosecution with suspensive effect, the case was referred to the Supreme Court.

5.  On 2 July 2020 the applicant submitted an objection of bias against Judge K. of the Supreme Court. After learning of the objection, Judge K., while denying any bias on his part, requested to stand down. Under domestic law, when a petitioner submits an objection of bias against a judge, it is initially examined by the same chamber, with the subsequent possibility of having the decision reviewed by another chamber or court if the petitioner is not satisfied with the decision. If a judge requests to stand down, the objection is examined by another chamber of the same court and there is no remedy available to the petitioner. In the present case, the latter situation occurred: on 7 July 2020 a different chamber of the Supreme Court examined Judge K.’s request and decided not to exclude him. As a result, the Supreme Court did not decide on the applicant’s objection.

6.  On 14 July 2020 a chamber of the Supreme Court, including Judge K., overturned the Specialised Criminal Court’s decision on the applicant’s detention and dismissed his request for release, finding the alternatives to detention to be insufficient.

7.  On 21 September 2020 the Specialised Criminal Court extended the applicant’s detention, dismissing at the same time a request for his release dated 24 August 2020.

8.  On 25 September 2020 a chamber of the Supreme Court, including Judge K., decided on a request by Judge Š. to stand down and excluded her from the applicant’s case.

9.  On 8 October 2020 the Supreme Court, no longer including Judge Š., upheld the Specialised Criminal Court’s decision of 21 September 2020.

10.  On 28 January 2021 the Constitutional Court (II. ÚS 428/2020), following a constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant on 12 August 2020, found a violation of his rights under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, quashed the decision of 14 July 2020, remitted the case to the Supreme Court and awarded the applicant 3,000 euros (EUR) as just satisfaction. It also ordered the Supreme Court to reimburse the costs of the applicant’s legal representation in the constitutional proceedings. It did not accept the Supreme Court’s reasoning that the applicant’s objection of bias had not needed to be considered because Judge K.’s own request to stand down had been decided upon and found that the applicant’s procedural rights had been arbitrarily restricted. The Constitutional Court could not examine the Supreme Court’s decision of 7 July 2020 (see paragraph 5 above) because it had not been challenged before it. Since the applicant’s objection had not been heard by the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court considered that his request for release had not yet been fully resolved, resulting in excessive delays in the detention proceedings. The court did not grant the applicant’s request for immediate release, holding that the reasons for his detention were entirely within the competence of the Supreme Court and that the latter’s failure to consider his objection did not affect the lawfulness of his detention.

11.  On 22 February 2021 the Supreme Court eventually granted the applicant’s objection of bias and excluded Judge K. from the applicant’s case.

12.  On 4 March 2021 the Supreme Court released the applicant, replacing his detention with alternatives.

13.  On 26 May 2021 the Constitutional Court (II. ÚS 31/2021) dismissed a second constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant. It found that the Supreme Court’s decision of 8 October 2020 (see paragraph 9 above) had been duly reasoned and free from arbitrariness. In response to an argument raised by the applicant regarding the principle of a “tribunal established by law”, the Constitutional Court, while observing that Judge K. had been excluded on 22 February 2021, found that he had not been involved in the examination of the applicant’s complaint against the Specialised Criminal Court’s decision of 21 September 2020 (see paragraph 7 above), but only in the procedural decision relating to the recusal of Judge Š., who had herself expressed her bias. However, the applicant had not argued that there had been no reasons for the recusal of Judge Š. and that she should not have been excluded, nor had he challenged the relevant decision dated 25 September 2020 by way of a constitutional complaint. The Constitutional Court concluded that the court that had decided on the applicant’s detention had been “established by law”.

14.  The applicant complained, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that the domestic courts had not fully decided on his request for release of 4 June 2020 and had not acceded to his constitutional complaint. He also complained, under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, that Judge K., who had later been excluded from his criminal case, had been a member of the chamber which had decided on the recusal of Judge Š. Furthermore, relying on Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention, he complained that the domestic courts had been inactive from June 2020 until his release on 4 March 2021. Lastly, he complained under Article 13 of the lack of an effective remedy in this regard.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

15.  The Court, being the master of characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers that the complaints, given that they relate to pre-trial detention, fall to be examined under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

16.  It reiterates that an applicant’s status as a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention depends on whether the domestic authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, the alleged infringement of the Convention and, if necessary, provided appropriate redress. Only when these conditions are satisfied does the subsidiary nature of the protective mechanism of the Convention preclude examination of an application (see Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, § 71, ECHR 2006‑V).

17.  In the present case, on 28 January 2021 the Constitutional Court found a violation of Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention on account of the length of the proceedings regarding the applicant’s request for release of 4 June 2020. It awarded him EUR 3,000 as just satisfaction and ordered the Supreme Court to reimburse the costs of his legal representation in the constitutional proceedings. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant can no longer claim to be a “victim” within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention of the alleged violation of Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

18.  It follows that this part of the application is inadmissible for being incompatible ratione personae and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

19.  The Court reiterates that the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 6 § 2 is one of the elements of a fair criminal trial required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In its relevant aspect, it is aimed at preventing the undermining of a fair criminal trial by prejudicial statements made in close connection with those proceedings.

20.  According to the applicant, the decision to exclude Judge Š., which directly affected the composition of the Supreme Court chamber examining his complaint against the Specialised Criminal Court’s decision to deny his request for release from detention, was taken by a chamber including Judge K., who was subsequently excluded. In the applicant’s view, the chamber was therefore unlawfully constituted.

21.  However, the Court notes, as did the Constitutional Court, that the applicant did not challenge the decision to exclude Judge Š. before that court and did not contest the validity of her exclusion, whereas the possible lack of impartiality of Judge K., who ruled on the exclusion of Judge Š., could only have had a direct impact on the correctness of the decision on her alleged bias. For the sake of completeness, the Court adds that neither the Specialised Criminal Court nor the Supreme Court, when deciding on the applicant’s request for release and on the extension of his pre-trial detention, ruled on the applicant’s guilt. Instead, they focused on whether there were grounds for pre-trial detention within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

22.  It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must also be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

23.  The applicant also raised a complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. However, the Court, having declared inadmissible the applicant’s complaints under Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 and Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, concludes that the applicant has no arguable claim for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention (compare Walter v. Italy (dec.), no. 18059/06, 11 July 2006). It follows that the complaint under Article 13 of the Convention must be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 20 March 2025.

 Liv Tigerstedt Artūrs Kučs
 Deputy Registrar President