SECOND SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 44965/98
by Dagmar MOLNÁROVÁ and Alžbeta KOCHANOVÁ
against the Slovak Republic
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 6 July 2000 as a Chamber composed of:
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrB. Conforti,
MrG. Bonello,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrA. Kovler, judges,
andMrE. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 21 January 1998 and registered on 22 March 1998,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Slovak nationals, born in 1941 and 1930 respectively.
[Note1]The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
On 12 August 1991 the applicants claimed compensation, under the Extra-Judicial Rehabilitations Act, for property which had been taken away from their late father in 1950. As the administrative authorities failed to grant the claims, the applicants lodged an action with the Michalovce District Court (Okresný súd) on 23 September 1992.
On 6 April 1993 the defendant authority submitted its observations on the applicants‘ claim.
On 11 May 1993 the applicants submitted further documents to the court.
On 5 October 1993 the judge inspected the real property in question in the presence of the parties. She also heard a witness who stated that the applicants‘ father had bought the property in 1940 and that he had reconstructed the buildings situated on it between 1943 and 1945. The witness expressed the view that the property had not been acquired by a bank in 1936 as indicated in the land registry entries.
On 15 December 1993 the District Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of the claims for compensation for movable property as the applicants had withdrawn this part of their action.
At a hearing held on 20 April 1994 the defendant’s representative stated that the documents concerning the withdrawal of the property from the applicants‘ father could not be found in the archives.
On 7 March 1995 the District Court invited the parties to explore the possibility of settling the case. On 18 May 1995 the applicants informed the judge that they were not opposed to her intention to order an expert opinion with a view to evaluating the property should the attempt to settle the case fail. On 29 June 1995 the defendant ministry refused to accept the applicants‘ claims.
On 11 October 1995 the Michalovce District Court dismissed the action. The court had before it a statement of a witness according to which he had been present when the applicants‘ father had purchased the property from an individual in 1940. Other witnesses confirmed that the applicant’s father had run his business in the premises until 1950.
However, the District Court found, on the basis of the documentary evidence available, that the applicants‘ father had never been entered as owner of the property in the land registry and that he had not, therefore, formally acquired its ownership. In particular, he could not have validly bought the property from an individual in 1940 as at that time a bank had been registered as its owner.
In December 1995 the applicants appealed and on 6 March 1996 they submitted further arguments to the appellate court. They contended, in particular, that the District Court had failed to establish the relevant facts and to assess the evidence correctly. They also requested the appellate court to order an expert opinion with a view to establishing the value of the property.
On 7 October 1997 the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd) upheld the first instance judgment. It found that the District Court had established all relevant facts, that its assessment of the evidence was correct and that the reasons for its judgment were comprehensive. The Regional Court decided on the appeal without hearing the applicants. The latter were represented by a lawyer in the proceedings.
On 7 January 1998 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law. They challenged the lower courts’ conclusions and complained that the Regional Court had not appointed an expert with a view to establishing the value of the property.
On 21 April 1998 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) rejected the appeal on points of law. It found that the refusal to order an expert opinion was not a relevant reason for quashing the second instance judgment and held that it lacked jurisdiction to review its merits.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain that the proceedings concerning their case lasted unreasonably long, that the dismissal of their claim was arbitrary and that they were not heard by the Košice Regional Court. They allege a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The applicants further allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in that their claim for compensation was not granted.
THE LAW
1.The applicants complain that the proceedings concerning their case lasted unreasonably long, that the dismissal of their claim was arbitrary and that they were not heard by the Košice Regional Court. They allege a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
a)The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of the complaint about the length of the proceedings. It is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
b)To the extent that the applicants complain that they were not heard by the Košice Regional Court, the Court notes that they failed to raise this issue in their appeal on points of law. They have not, therefore, exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
If follows that this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
c)To the extent that the applicants complain about assessment of the evidence and the result of the proceedings before the national courts, the Court recalls that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties in the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see Garcia Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I).
In the present case the domestic courts found, for reasons expressly set out in their decisions, that the applicants’ claim for compensation could not be granted as their late father had not owned the property in question. In the Court’s view, this conclusion was not arbitrary.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
2.The applicants further allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in that their claim for compensation was rejected.
The domestic courts found that the applicants’ father had not owned the property in question and concluded that under Slovak law the applicants had no right to compensation for its confiscation. The Court found above that this conclusion was not arbitrary.
In these circumstances, the Court considers that the applicants’ claim for compensation did not amount to a “possession” within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, in contrast, Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, no. 17849/91, Series A no. 232, p. 21, § 31, with further references). Accordingly, the facts of the case do not disclose any appearance of an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3.
For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,
DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the applicants’ complaint[Note2] about the length of the proceedings
and, unanimously,
DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
[Note1]Include information obtained from the Government on the Judge Rapporteur’s or Chamber’s request, with indication of this fact, where appropriate.
[Note2]Summarise the complaints without necessarily citing the invoked Convention Articles.
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