FOURTH SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 50533/99
by Tõnu MÕTSNIK
against Estonia
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting on 5 March 2002 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrA. Pastor Ridruejo,
MrJ. Makarczyk,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrR. Maruste,
MrS. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 2 June 1999,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Tõnu Mõtsnik, is an Estonian national, who was born in 1959 and lives in Tallinn.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 1 June 1994 criminal proceedings were initiated by the Tartu police against the applicant on the suspicion of having committed an offence of satisfying his sexual desire in an unnatural manner.
On 25 October 1994 the applicant was formally charged with this offence.
On the same day he was subjected to a preventive measure in the form of an obligation not leave his place of residence.
On 22 November 1994 the applicant was further charged with attempted rape.
On 13 January 1995 the preliminary investigation of the charges was complete.
On 18 January 1995, upon approval of the indictment by the Tartu Public Prosecutor, the applicant’s criminal case-file was sent to the Tartu City Court (Tartu Linnakohus).
On 7 January 1997, by a decision of the City Court judge, the applicant was committed for trial.
On 17 February 1997 the judge ordered the serving of the indictment on the applicant who received it on 4 March 1997.
On 30 June 1997 the applicant notified the City Court of his change of residence.
On 13 October 1997 the City Court summoned the parties and the witnesses to a hearing which was scheduled for 16 December 1997.
On 7 November 1997 the City Court was informed that it had not been possible to serve the summons on the applicant at the address indicated by him in October 1994. Consequently, the hearing was postponed.
On 19 December 1997 the City Court scheduled a new hearing for 12 February 1998.
On 12 February 1998 the hearing was adjourned on account of the absence of the applicant’s lawyer for health reasons.
On the same day the City Court ordered that the applicant be taken into custody. It noted that the applicant had 4 prior convictions and considered that he may re-offend.
The applicant filed an appeal against the order directly with the Tartu Court of Appeal (Tartu Ringkonnakohus) which, on 17 February 1998, forwarded it to the City Court as appeals to a higher court must be presented through a lower court.
On 5 March 1998 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s appeal.
In the meantime, on 18 February 1998, the City Court scheduled a new hearing for 11 March 1998.
On 2 March 1998 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the hearing be adjourned as it was not possible for him to attend. His request was granted.
On 4 May 1998 the applicant complained to the Office of the Chief Public Prosecutor (Riigiprokuratuur) about the delay in examining his case.
On 21 May 1998 the City Court scheduled a hearing for 24‑25 August 1998.
On 26 May 1998 the prosecutor’s office replied to the applicant’s complaint that from 1995 - 1997 the City Court could not examine his case on account of its heavy workload. It also stated the reasons for the postponement of the hearings.
On 20 June 1998 the applicant requested the appointment of a lawyer by the court as he was dissatisfied with the services of the lawyer chosen by him.
The City Court heard the applicant’s case on 24-25 August 1998.
On 24 August 1998 the applicant sought the adjournment of the hearing, arguing that the preliminary investigation had been incomplete and that he did not have a copy of the indictment, which was in the hands of his previous lawyer. He also disputed the legality of the appointment of his new lawyer and requested the removal of the public prosecutor from the case. His requests were dismissed as unfounded.
By a judgment of 26 August 1998 the City Court convicted the applicant of attempted rape and sentenced him to 4 years’ imprisonment. The prison term began running from 12 February 1998, the date on which the applicant was taken into custody.
On 1 September 1998 the applicant lodged an appeal against the City Court judgment, arguing that his trial and conviction had been unlawful. The City Court had infringed procedural time-limits concerning the start of the trial stipulated in Articles 184(1) and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure according to which the court must take a decision to try the accused within 10 days from the seizure of the court, and the trial must start no later than 20 days from the taking of that decision. The applicant pointed out that his criminal case-file arrived in the City Court on 18 January 1995, but the decision committing him for trial was taken only on 7 January 1997.
At the hearing before the Tartu Court of Appeal on 28 October 1998 the applicant also pointed to the delay in examining his case at the first instance court.
By a judgment of 28 October 1998 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the City Court judgment. It admitted that the time-limit for committing the applicant for trial had been exceeded, but found no substantial infringement of procedural law which would have entailed a reversal of the lower court judgment.
On 24 November 1998 the applicant filed an appeal with the Supreme Court (Riigikohus) in which he argued that the 2-year delay in dealing with his case at the trial court was unlawful.
On 9 December 1998 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.
On 31 January 1999 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request to re-open the proceedings.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him lasted too long.
THE LAW
The applicant complains of the length of the criminal proceedings against him. He invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ... ”
The Government submit that the period to be taken into consideration started on 16 April 1996, when Estonia ratified the Convention, and ended with the Supreme Court decision to refuse leave to appeal on 9 December 1998.
They maintain that the case was not particularly complex.
It is argued that the delay in handling the case after its transfer to the City Court was due to the heavy workload of the City Court and the presiding judge. However, from the moment when the applicant was taken into custody on 12 February 1998 the case was dealt with speedily and diligently.
It is contended that the delays occurring after the scheduling of the first hearing were attributable to the applicant and his lawyer. The hearings had to be adjourned three times because of the absence of either one. In addition, the applicant caused certain delays when he sent his appeal against the order concerning his taking into custody directly to the Court of Appeal instead of the court of first instance.
Furthermore, the presentation by the applicant of several unfounded claims to the trial court in August 1998 appears to indicate that the applicant himself was not interested in speedy trial.
In conclusion, the Government concede that the proceedings before the first instance court could have been shorter. However, the overall length of the proceedings at three instances - nearly 2 years and 8 months - cannot be considered to have exceeded the reasonable time requirement. They therefore submit that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded.
The applicant submits that the proceedings, particularly at first instance, lasted too long. He submits that he was not responsible for the postponement of the hearing scheduled for 16 December 1997 as he had informed the trial court of his new address on 30 June 1997. The court, however, had sent a summons at his old address.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of the complaint is required.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy