SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 32664/96
by M.P. and Others
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 7 September 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrB. Conforti,
MrG. Bonello,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrA. Kovler, judges,[Note1]
andMrE. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 24 July 1996 and registered on 20 August 1996,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are Italian nationals, born in 1928, 1921 and 1932 and living in Genova, Florence and Pratovecchio respectively.
A.The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
Mrs C.B.P. was the owner of an apartment in Florence, which she had let to M.R.
In a registered letter of 6 June 1983, Mrs C.B.P informed the tenant that she intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1983 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. In a writ served on the tenant on 30 November 1983, she reiterated her intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.
By a decision of 20 December 1983, which was made enforceable on 28 February 1984, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1984. On 13 March 1986, Mrs C.B.P served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.
On 9 May 1986, the applicants, heirs of Mrs C.B.P, who had died in the meantime, served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 12 June 1986.
Between 12 June 1986 and 15 September 1994, the bailiff made 17 attempts to recover possession, on 12 June 1986, 19 September 1986, 16 January 1987, 25 May 1987, 25 September 1987, 15 February 1988, 20 October 1988, 10 May 1989, 27 November 1989, 22 May 1990, 29 January 1991, 3 October 1991, 14 February 1992, 20 November 1992, 2 July 1993, 25 November 1993 and 15 September 1994. These attempts proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the suspension or the staggering of evictions, the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
On 29 April 1995, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him again to vacate the premises.
On 24 May 1995, they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 23 June 1995.
Between 23 June 1995 and 24 May 1999, the bailiff made 9 attempts to recover possession, on 23 June 1995, 6 March 1996, 29 July 1996, 29 October 1996, 28 February 1997, 16 October 1997, 28 May 1998, 3 December 1998 and 24 May 1999.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as, under the statutory provisions providing for the staggering of evictions, the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
The proceedings are currently pending; the applicants have not recovered possession of their apartment to date.
B.Relevant domestic law
The relevant domestic law is described in the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 18-35, ECHR 1999-V, to be published.
COMPLAINTS
1.The applicants complain about their prolonged inability - through lack of police assistance - to recover possession of their apartment.
2.The applicants further complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicants complain that their inability to recover possession of their apartment amounted to a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
They complain about the duration of the eviction proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal ...”
The applicants argue that the manner in which the Italian Government have dealt with the housing problems has proved ineffective but the Government have failed to find alternatives. As a consequence, they were made to wait fourteen years, but this protracted wait has been useless to the extent that no solution has been found in the meantime to the tenant’s housing problems. This wait is excessive irrespective of whether the applicants were in urgent need of the apartment and amounts to a violation of their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest. The burden imposed on the applicants is not disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursed by the legislation at issue, taking into account in particular that they were not entitled to priority in the grant of police assistance. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
[Note1]Judges names are to be followed by a COMMA and a MANUAL LINE BREAK (Shift+Enter). When inserting names via AltS please remove the substitute judge’s name, if necessary, and the extra paragraph return(s). (There is to be no extra space between the judges’ names and that of the Section Registrar.)
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