Communicated on 20 February 2015
SECOND SECTION
Application no. 57774/13
MIRACLE EUROPE KFT
against Hungary
lodged on 5 September 2013
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Miracle Europe Kft, is a limited liability company registered under Hungarian law, with its seat in Budapest. It is represented before the Court by Mr D. Karsai, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
In a dispute concerning a construction project envisaged in public procurement, in January 2012 the applicant company brought an action in damages against a university.
On 16 February 2012 the head of the national judiciary assigned the case to the Zalaegerszeg High Court, deviating from the normal rules of geographical competence by virtue of a legal provision allowing for such measures for the sake of judicial economy (see below). It was observed that the otherwise competent Budapest High Court’s workload was excessive.
The Zalaegerszeg High Court dismissed the claim, and that decision was confirmed by the Pécs Court of Appeal on 18 September 2012. On 7 September 2013 the Kúria (the Supreme Court) upheld these decisions. The courts held in essence that the applicant company’s perception according to which the university had unlawfully backed out of the investment contract (namely, the construction of a dormitory) was nothing more than a misconception of the law and a tendentious interpretation of the circumstances, and that the facts of the case did not reveal any compensation liability on the respondent’s side, for want of unlawfulness.
The applicant’s motion to the Constitutional Court, including a complaint about the assignment of the case to the Zalaegerszeg High Court, was declared inadmissible on 24 June 2013.
B. Relevant domestic law
Section 62 of Act no. CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of the Judiciary (enacted on 3 December 2011) provides:
“(1) The President of the National Judicial Office may exceptionally designate a court other than the geographically competent one (provided that the two have the same competence) to deal with a case, if the case – or a group of cases received by the [originally competent] court in a given period – cannot be heard within a reasonable time in any other way on account of the exceptional and disproportionate workload of the [originally competent] court, provided that such a designation does not impose a disproportionate burden on the designated court.
(2) Such a designation can be initiated by the president of the court of appeal or of the high court or by the Attorney General within 15 days from the receipt of the case.
(3) In the motion to initiate the designation, the reasons for which the case ... cannot be heard within a reasonable time must be outlined, together with such information on staffing and case influx as proves the exceptional and disproportionate workload of the [originally competent] court.”
COMPLAINT
Under Article 6 § 1, the applicant complains that the designated court was not a ‘tribunal established by law’.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. What exactly were the legal, factual or organisational criteria for reassigning cases in application of section 62 (1) of Act no. CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of the Judiciary?
2. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of its civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see DMD GROUP, a.s., v. Slovakia, no. 19334/03, §§ 62 to 72, 5 October 2010)? In particular, can the designated court which dealt with its case be regarded as ‘an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?
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