FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 3341/05
by Galina Sergeyevna MIRONOVICH and Others
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 20 September 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrA. Kovler,
MrsE. Steiner,
MrK. Hajiyev,
MrD. Spielmann, judges,
and Mr A. Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 15 November 2004,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants – a family of four, Mr Mironovich Gennadiy Vladimirovich, Mrs Mironovich Galina Sergeyevna, Mr Mironovich Yuriy Gennadievich and Ms Mironovich Tatyana Gennadievna – are Russian nationals who were born in 1962, 1959, 1987, and 1990 respectively and live in Podolsk, the Moscow Region. They were represented before the Court by Ms E. Bugayenko, a lawyer practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were initially represented by Mr P. Laptev, the former Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights, and subsequently by their Representative, Mrs V. Milinchuk.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The application concerns a dispute over a flat, previously owned by V. and S. and later sold to the applicants.
V. and his family lived in a municipal flat. On V.’s request on 10 December 1998 the Podolsk Town Court of the Moscow Region evicted V.’s daughter and grandson from the flat. The judgment was given in the absence of V.’s daughter and grandson. It was not appealed against and became final.
In 2001 V. privatised the flat and became its sole owner.
Later in 2001 he sold the flat to S.
On 21 November 2002 S., in his turn, sold the flat to the applicants.
On an unspecified date a public prosecutor requested the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court to quash the judgment of 10 December 1998, because it had been given in the absence of V.’s daughter and grandson, and because the court had not established the reasons of their absence from the hearing.
On 27 March 2003 the Presidium of the Moscow Regional Court granted the prosecutor’s request, quashed the judgment of 10 December 1998 by way of supervisory review and remitted the case to the Podolsk Town Court for a fresh examination.
V.’s daughter asked the court to let her move in the flat and to cancel its privatisation as well as the subsequent transactions.
The applicants brought a counter action, asking the court to declare them bone fide purchasers.
On 8 December 2003 the Podolsk Town Court granted V.’s daughter’s claims and dismissed the applicants’ counter action.
The applicants appealed, but on 10 February 2004 the Moscow Regional Court refused to examine the appeal in substance and returned the case to the Podolsk Town Court for an additional judgment as to the restitution that had to be applied to the parties of the above transactions.
On 12 April 2004 the Podolsk Town Court delivered an additional judgment, by which it obliged S. to pay the applicants 910,000 Russian roubles (approximately 26,380 euros).
On 18 May 2004 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgments of 8 December 2003 and 12 April 2004 on appeal.
V.’s daughter sued the applicants for eviction.
On 27 December 2004 the Podolsk Town Court granted her claim.
On 16 March 2005 the Moscow Regional Court upheld the judgment on appeal.
The applicants claimed that S. had not returned the judgment debt and had no claimable assets.
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the violation of their property rights. In particular, they claimed that the quashing of the judgment of 1998 had taken place outside the one-year statutory time-limit provided for by the domestic legislation in force at the material time and violated the principle of legal certainty. The applicants further claimed that the interference had not served a legitimate purpose in either public or general interest and had not been proportionate.
Finally, they complained under Article 6 of the Convention about a breach of the principle of legal certainty.
THE LAW
On 30 May 2006 the application was communicated to the Government.
On 19 October 2006 the Government’s observations on the admissibility and merits of the application were received.
The Court asked the applicants to submit their written observations by 20 December 2006.
On 21 November 2006 the English version of the Government’s observations was forwarded to the applicants. The time-limit for the submission of the applicants’ observations remained unaffected.
As the applicants’ observations on the admissibility and merits had not been received by 20 December 2006, on 19 April 2007 the applicants were advised by registered mail that the failure to submit observations might result in the strike-out of the application.
On 14 June 2007 the Court received a letter from the applicants’ representative which read as follows:
“In reply to your letter of 19 April 2007, I consider it necessary to inform you that the applicants are no longer interested in pursuing their application in view of the fact that the judgment of the Podolsk Town Court of 8 December 2003, by which the applicants’ rights were violated, had been quashed.
Upon the fresh examination of the case the court dismissed V.’s daughter’s claims, granted the applicants’ counter action and declared them bone fide purchasers. Therefore, the applicants’ rights were restored and they do not intend to pursue their application before the European Court of Human Rights.”
The Court recalls Article 37 of the Convention which, in the relevant part, reads as follows:
“1. The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that
(a) the applicant does not intend to pursue his application;
...
However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.”
It follows from the letter of the applicants’ representative that the applicants do not intend to pursue their application. The Court considers that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols does not require it to continue the examination of the case.
In these circumstances it considers that Article 29 § 3 of the Convention should no longer apply to the case and it should be struck out of the list in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and to strike the application out of its list of cases.
André WampachChristos Rozakis
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy