MITEV v. BULGARIA

FIRST SECTION

FINAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 40063/98
by Iavor MITEV
against Bulgaria

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 30 January 2003 as a Chamber composed of

MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrG. Bonello,
MrE. Levits,
MrsS. Botoucharova,
MrV. Zagrebelsky,
MrsE. Steiner, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 23 October 1997,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having regard to the partial decision of 21 November 2000,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Bulgarian national who was born in 1967 and lives in Sofia. He was represented before the Court by Mr V. Vasilev, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The respondent Government were represented by Mrs G. Samaras, of the Ministry of Justice.

A.  The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.

During the relevant period the applicant, who was addicted to drugs, was charged on numerous counts of theft. The charges concerned thefts of electric appliances, small amounts of money, small religious ceremonial objects, food, cigarettes and objects of higher value, such as icons and antiquities. More than twenty separate investigations were launched in relation to those thefts. Some of the investigations were initially instituted against an unknown perpetrator whereas in others the applicant, either alone or together with other persons, was named as the suspected perpetrator from the outset.

In the course of the ensuing criminal proceedings the investigations were grouped. Two sets of such grouped proceedings are relevant to the present application: one concerning petty thefts and the second concerning icons and antiquities.

1.  Criminal proceedings on charges of petty thefts (1993-2000)

These included eight investigations and four summary investigations, instituted between 1993 and 1996. The applicant was charged for the first time on 26 October 1993 in respect of one of the investigations. Later charges were brought in the remainder and eventually the twelve files were joined.

During the investigations, between 1993 and 1996, the applicant and other suspected or accused persons were interrogated numerous times, forty‑four witnesses were questioned, fifteen on-site visits were made, nine searches were undertaken and numerous expert reports were commissioned and examined (psychiatric reports, finger-print reports and accounting reports).

Approximately one third of these acts of investigation concerned charges under which the applicant was eventually convicted. The remainder concerned charges in respect of which the applicant was later acquitted.

On 27 October 1994 the competent prosecutor referred the case back to the investigator as there had been irregularities and discrepancies. The investigator concluded his work on 15 June 1995.

On 20 February 1996 the Sofia Prosecutor’s Office submitted an indictment to the Sofia District Court.

On 18 March 1996 the Sofia District Court, noting that there had been breaches of procedural rules and discrepancies as regards the value of some of the stolen objects, referred the case back to the prosecutor.

On 20 February 1997 the prosecutor submitted a fresh indictment.

On 28 February 1997 the District Court, noting that some of the defects of the indictment had not been remedied despite the instructions given in the decision of 18 March 1996 and pointing to other discrepancies, referred the case back to the prosecutor.

On 22 January 1998 the prosecutor again submitted an indictment.

On 6 February 1998 the Sofia District Court, noting that certain procedural rules concerning the modification of the charges had not been observed, referred the case back to the prosecutor once more.

The final version of the indictment was submitted on 19 February 1998. It concerned sixteen counts of theft allegedly committed by the applicant and two other persons.

Throughout the judicial proceedings the applicant and his lawyer regularly appeared when summoned and did not cause any of the adjournments.

The first hearing was held on 13 May 1998. The court noted that one of the co-accused persons was not legally represented whereas legal representation was mandatory in view of the contradictory interests of the three accused persons. As a result, the hearing was adjourned.

It resumed on 10 June 1998 but had to be adjourned as one of the accused persons had not appeared. The court ordered his arrest.

On 14 July 1998 the hearing proceeded with the questioning of the three accused persons. Several experts and witnesses were also heard. As some of the witnesses had not appeared, the case was adjourned.

At the next hearing, held on 12 October 1998, several witnesses were heard. Others had not appeared, which necessitated an adjournment.

The hearing scheduled for 10 November 1998 could not proceed as one of the applicant’s co-accused was ill.

When the hearing resumed on 7 December 1998 several witnesses were heard but an adjournment was again necessary as other witnesses had not appeared.

The next hearing took place on 11 February 1999. Several witnesses were heard. The failure of one witness to appear prompted another adjournment.

Throughout the relevant period the Sofia District Court sought police assistance for the establishment of the addresses of witnesses.

On 29 March 1999, at the last hearing, the Sofia District Court acquitted the applicant on nine of the charges and convicted him on the remaining seven. He was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended.

On 27 April 1999 the applicant appealed to the Sofia City Court.

The Sofia City Court listed a hearing for 13 December 1999 which, however, could not proceed as one of the accused persons did not appear.

The hearing took place on 10 April 2000.

On 12 June 2000 the Sofia City Court delivered its judgment. It accepted the applicant’s argument that the case should be treated as one concerning a continuing criminal activity and modified the conviction accordingly while upholding the sentence.

2.  Criminal proceedings on charges of theft of icons and antiquities (1992-pending)

This second group of proceedings commenced on 26 November 1992 when the applicant was arrested and charged with theft. Other files, concerning separate thefts were opened between 1992 and 1995. The applicant was charged with having stolen icons and antiquities.

During the preliminary investigation ten files concerning separate thefts were joined. Eventually, however, the indictment only concerned four thefts, the other charges having been dropped.

Some of the investigations launched in 1992, 1993 and 1994 were suspended soon after their beginning as the perpetrators were unknown at the time. They resumed in 1996, when the applicant and other persons were charged.

In the course of the investigations many witnesses were heard, several accused persons, including the applicant were questioned, on-site visits and searches were made and expert reports were commissioned and examined. Apparently, only a part of those investigation acts concerned charges eventually retained. According to the applicant, the relevant investigation activity was limited to the questioning of eleven witnesses, three confrontations, six expert reports, four on-site visits and one search.

On 13 March 1997 the investigator completed his work and submitted the file to the competent prosecutor.

On 23 April 1997 the prosecutor ordered additional investigation. Those were finalised on 1 August 1997.

After having decided to drop one of the charges, on 10 December 1997 the prosecutor again referred the case back to the investigator who complied with the instructions and submitted a revised report on 19 March 1998.

On 26 June 1998 the prosecutor submitted an indictment to the Sofia City Court against three accused persons, including the applicant.

Throughout the judicial proceedings before the Sofia City Court the applicant and his lawyer regularly appeared when summoned and did not cause any of the adjournments.

The first hearing before the Sofia City Court, acting as a trial court, was listed for 13 November 1998 but could not proceed as one of the accused persons had not been summoned.

On 10 December 1998 and 13 January 1999 the trial could not begin as no ex officio lawyer had appeared for one of the accused, despite the court’s repeated requests to the Sofia Bar.

The hearing scheduled for 9 March 1999 could not proceed as one of the accused persons could not be brought from prison owing to his ill health.

The trial eventually began on 5 May 1999. On that day the Sofia City Court heard the accused persons and the witnesses who had appeared. As some of the witnesses had not shown up, the hearing was adjourned until 15 June 1999.

On that day another adjournment was ordered as certain witnesses and experts had not appeared.

The hearing could not proceed on 13 October 1999 as one of the accused persons, a prisoner, was not brought to the courtroom: the Minister of Justice had imposed a five-days ban on transfers of prisoners in view of municipal elections during that period.

On 12 November and 13 December 1999 the hearing was again adjourned as the lawyers of two of the accused persons had not appeared, apparently owing to ill health.

Throughout the relevant period the Sofia City Court sought police assistance for the establishment of the addresses of witnesses.

The last hearing took place on 23 December 1999. On that day the Sofia City Court convicted the applicant in respect of three thefts and acquitted him in respect of the forth alleged theft. He was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment.

The two other accused persons were also convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment.

Both the applicant and the prosecution appealed to the Sofia Appellate Court.

The applicant’s whereabouts were unknown until 15 December 2000 when he was arrested on new charges.

As a result of the applicant’s address being unknown, the Sofia Appellate Court could not proceed with the case until January 2001.

A hearing was listed for 30 March 2001 but was adjourned as one of the other accused persons was not legally represented. It appears that he was unable to continue paying his lawyer, which necessitated the appointment of an ex officio counsel and therefore an adjournment.

On an unspecified date in 2001 the Sofia Appellate Court held a hearing which was however adjourned as the report on the value of the stolen objects had not  been submitted.

On 8 March 2002, having received the experts’ opinion that the value of the icons could not be determined, the Sofia Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the Sofia City Court of 23 December 1999 and referred the case to the preliminary investigation stage of the proceedings. The reasons included a number of discrepancies concerning the value of the stolen objects which affected the legal characterisation of the charges, insufficient reasoning and reliance on inadmissible evidence.

The case is pending at the preliminary investigation stage.

3.  The applicant’s remand in custody

On 26 November 1992 the applicant was arrested and remanded in custody on one of the charges which eventually resulted in the criminal case concerning thefts of icons and antiquities. On 11 January 1993 the applicant was released on bail.

On 26 October 1993 the applicant was arrested and detained pending trial in the framework of the group of case files which eventually resulted in the petty thefts case against him. On 8 April 1994 he was released on bail.

On 5 August 1994 the applicant was again arrested in the framework of the same set of case files, charged with additional counts of theft and placed under pre-trial detention.

On 17 October 1994 the applicant’s petition for release was dismissed by a prosecutor.

On 5 January 1995 another petition for release was dismissed on grounds that the applicant had continued his criminal activity after his release on 8 April 1994 and that therefore there existed a danger of re-offending.

On 27 August 1996 a request for release submitted by the applicant was dismissed by a district prosecutor. That decision was upheld on 23 September 1996 by a regional prosecutor. The applicant’s ensuing appeal was dismissed on 9 October 1996 by the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office. The decision stated, inter alia, that the applicant was charged with numerous serious crimes and that there were other criminal proceedings pending against him. Therefore detention was mandatory under Article 152 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

On 11 March and again on 24 April 1997 the applicant submitted to the Sofia District Court, through the prison administration, appeals against his detention. He obtained registration numbers under the outgoing correspondence register of the prison. The applicant was never notified of any examination or decision on his appeals.

On 12 August 1997 the applicant appealed to the Sofia District Court against his pre-trial detention. He relied, inter alia, on a legislative amendment, in force since 12 August 1997, according to which pre-trial detention pending the preliminary investigation could not exceed one or two years, depending on the gravity of the charges.

The District Court held a hearing on 25 September 1997 and ordered the applicant’s unconditional release. The District Court stated, inter alia, that the applicant had been diagnosed as suffering from addiction to drugs and was in need of medical treatment. Furthermore, all evidence in the case had been collected.

Despite the District Court’s decision of 25 September 1997 the applicant was only released on 23 October 1997 owing to a misunderstanding concerning the different cases pending against him.

In particular, during a certain period of time, the petty thefts case had been dealt with under investigation file number 965/94. The applicant’s initial detention order of 5 August 1994 carried that reference. When later another file, no. 415A/96, had been added to the set, the latter number had become the number of the joint file. In his appeal to the District Court of 12 August 1997 the applicant had referred to file number 415A/96, which also figured in the District Court’s decision of 25 September 1997 ordering his release.

That decision was transmitted to the prison administration on 25 September 1997. The prison administration, apparently noting that there existed a detention order under investigation case number 965/94 and considering that that was a separate case, concluded that the applicant should remain in pre-trial detention. No written document was issued in this respect.

On 17 October 1997 the applicant submitted a complaint to the District Court stating that he was still in detention. He also stated that the two file numbers concerned the same case. The complaint was registered at the District Court on 21 October 1997.

On 23 October 1997 the District Court wrote to the prison administration clarifying the matter. The applicant was released on the same day.

On an unspecified date the applicant brought one or two civil actions against the prosecuting authorities and the Sofia District Court claiming damages for his allegedly unlawful detention between August and October 1997. As of 2001 the proceedings were pending, several hearings having been held by the Sofia City Court.

B.  Relevant domestic law and practice

1.  Grounds for pre-trial detention: the general rules (Article 152 §§ 1 and 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and the authorities’ approach

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as worded at the material time, provided as follows:

“(1)  Detention pending trial shall be ordered [in cases where the charges concern] a serious intentional offence.

(2)  In cases falling under paragraph 1 [detention pending trial] may be dispensed with if there is no danger of the accused’s absconding, obstructing the investigation, or committing further offences.”

According to Article 93 § 7 of the Penal Code a “serious” offence is one punishable by more than five years’ imprisonment.

The Supreme Court’s practice at the relevant time (which has since become obsolete as a result of the amendments in force since 1 January 2000) was to construe Article 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as requiring that a person charged with a serious intentional offence had to be remanded in custody. An exception was only possible, in accordance with Article 152 § 2, where it was clear and beyond doubt that any danger of absconding or reoffending was objectively excluded, for example, if the accused was seriously ill, elderly, or already detained on other grounds, such as serving a sentence (Decision no. 1 of 4 May1992, case no. 1/92, II Chamber, Bulletin 1992/93, p. 172; Decision no. 4 of 21 February 1995, case no. 76/95, II Chamber; Decision no. 78 of 6 November 1995, case no. 768/95, II Chamber; Decision no. 24, case no. 268/95, I Chamber, Bulletin 1995, p. 149).

In some other decisions, the Supreme Court nevertheless embarked on an analysis of the particular facts to justify findings that there existed a danger of absconding or of offending (Decision No. 76 of 25.07.1997, case no. 507/97 II Chamber, Bulletin no. 9-10/97, p. 5; Decision no. 107 of 27.05.1998, case no. 257/98, II Chamber, Bulletin no. 3-4/98, p. 12).

2.  Mandatory detention under Article 152 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

That provision, as in force at the relevant time and until 11 August 1997, when it was repealed, was worded as follows:

“The exception set out in paragraph 2 [of Article 152] shall not be applicable when another preliminary investigation is pending against the detainee as well as in the cases of recidivism.”

On 21 March 1997 the Supreme Court of Cassation examined a request by the Chief Public Prosecutor for an interpretative decision on Article 152 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Supreme Court of Cassation considered that Article 152 § 3 of the Code was incompatible with the Constitution, the Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It therefore decided to submit the matter to the Constitutional Court which is competent to rule on the compatibility of legislation with the Constitution and international treaties. Eventually, the Constitutional Court did not decide on the merits as the impugned provision was repealed with effect from 12 August 1997.

3.  Time-limits for detention pending the preliminary investigation

By virtue of the same amendment which repealed the mandatory pre-trial detention, as of 12 August 1997 the new paragraph 3 of Article 152 introduced a time-limit for pre-trial detention pending the preliminary investigation: one or two years, depending on the gravity of the charges.

It appears that there were divergent judicial decisions as to the moment from which the newly introduced time-limits started running.

On 21 October 1997 a further amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure stated that those time-limits started to run as from the date of the entry into force of the new paragraph 3 of Article 152.

COMPLAINTS

1.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that he was not brought before a judge or an officer exercising judicial functions on any of the three occasions when he was arrested and remanded in custody.

2.  He also complained under Article 5 § 3 that his detention was unjustified and excessively lengthy.

3.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his detention between 25 September 1997, when his release was ordered, and 23 October 1997, when he was actually released, had been unlawful.

4.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that two of his judicial appeals against his detention were never examined. He also submitted that his third appeal to the Sofia District Court had been examined forty-five days after its submission.

5.  The applicant complained under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that Bulgarian law does not provide for an enforceable right to obtain compensation in cases of violations of Article 5, the State Responsibility for Damage Act being very limited in scope.

6.  The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the alleged excessive length of the criminal proceedings against him

7.  The applicant also complained under Article 13 that he did not have an effective remedy in respect of the alleged violations of the Convention in his case.

THE LAW

1.  Complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that upon each of his three arrests the applicant was not brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power

The applicant relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention which provides, insofar as relevant:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power ...”

The Government did not comment.

As regards the applicant’s arrests on 26 November 1992 and 26 October 1993, the Court notes that the alleged violations of his right to be brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power concerned continuing situations which came to an end not later than 11 January 1993 and 8 April 1994 respectively, the dates on which the applicant was released on bail. In these circumstances the six months’ time limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention started to run on 11 January 1993 and 8 April 1994 respectively (see, Hristov v. Bulgaria (dec.), no. 35436/97, 19 September 2000, unreported). As the present application was introduced on 23 October 1997, the above complaint, insofar as it concerns the applicant’s arrests on 26 November 1992 and 26 October 1993, must be rejected as being out of time, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.

As regards the applicant’s arrest on 5 August 1994, the Court notes that he first appeared before a judge on 25 September 1997 and therefore finds that he complied with the six months’ time limit under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention by introducing his application on 23 October 1997. The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that this part of the application raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

2.  Complaint under Article 5 § 3 in respect of the justification and the length of the applicant’s pre-trial detention

The applicant relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention which provides, in so far as relevant:

“Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”

The Government stated first that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as during the relevant period he had appealed only once before the competent prosecutor and had been released by decision of the District Court in the proceedings concerning his first and only judicial appeal against detention. The applicant’s allegation that he had previously tried to submit two judicial appeals in 1997 had been unproven, no such appeals having been registered at the Sofia District Court.

The applicant replied that regardless of the number of appeals the authorities were under an obligation to review periodically his continuing pre-trial detention.

The Court observes that during the relevant period the applicant appealed six times against his detention. He submitted appeals to the competent prosecutors and to the courts. The fact that his two judicial appeals of March and April 1997 sent through the prison administration did not reach the District Court cannot be held against him. The Government’s above objection is therefore dismissed.

The Government stated, in the alternative, that the proceedings were procedurally and factually complex. The charges concerned numerous thefts committed by several persons in different places, time and circumstances. That required the examination of many witnesses, on-site visits, searches and expert reports. Some witnesses could not be found and had to be summoned repeatedly. The courts did everything possible to establish their addresses and limit the length of the proceedings. Certain delays were caused by the other accused persons and their lawyers.

Therefore, in the Government’s view objective difficulties which cannot be attributed to the authorities explained the length of the proceedings and of the applicant’s detention pending trial. Further, the applicant never protested against the adjournments and never requested shorter intervals between hearings. In any event, the intervals between the hearings were reasonable.

The applicant replied that the present case was an illustration of a widespread vicious practice according to which, in an effort to improve their statistics, the police and the investigation and prosecution authorities, having arrested a petty offender, would systematically charge him in respect of additional offences committed by unknown perpetrators. Even though no conviction would follow as regards part of the charges as no link would be found between the arrested person and some of the offences, the police, as well as the investigation and prosecution authorities, would report the cases as “resolved”, the alleged perpetrator having been charged, indicted and put on trial. Moreover, in public discussions the courts would then be blamed for having returned cases and acquitted “criminals” and would be accused of being soft on crime.

In the applicant’s view the above practice was the main cause of the inordinate delays in his case. He was found guilty on only a part of the charges. Furthermore, there were numerous procedural deficiencies in the investigation and factual discrepancies in the indictments which resulted in repeated returns of the case from the courts back to the investigation stage. In some cases the investigation and prosecution authorities had failed to abide by the instructions of the trial court.

The applicant further stated that the failure of the authorities to summon witnesses and secure their appearance had caused serious delay. A number of procedural errors were imputable to the trial court. At the same time, the applicant had not been responsible for any delay.

Finally, the applicant maintained that upon the entry into force on 12 August 1997 of the legislative amendment introducing time-limits on detention he should have been released automatically as he had already spent more than three years in custody.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

3.  Complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the applicant’s detention between 25 September and 23 October 1997

The applicant stated that his detention for more than a week following the District Court’s decision to release him was unlawful and contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. That provision, insofar as relevant, reads as follows:

“1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

...

(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so ...”

The Government stated that the authorities were not responsible for the delay in the applicant’s release following the District Court’s decision of 25 September 1997 to release him. Since the prison administration had been aware of several investigations against the applicant, it had not been unreasonable to conclude that the District Court’s release order had only concerned one of them and had not required any reaction as long as there existed a separate detention order.

The applicant stated that he should not bear the consequences of the chaos in the investigators’ file numbers.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

4.  Complaints under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention

The applicant complained that two of his judicial appeals against detention were never examined and that his third appeal was not examined speedily. Article 5 § 4 provides:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

The Government stated that there was no conclusive proof of the applicant having submitted appeals in March and April 1997. They did not comment on the remainder of the complaints.

The applicant maintained that his appeals of March and April 1997 were never examined and that his appeal of 12 August 1997 was not dealt with speedily.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaints raise serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established.

5.  Complaint under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention

The applicant submitted that Bulgarian law does not provide for an enforceable right to compensation in cases of violations of Article 5 of the Convention. He relied on its paragraph 5, which provides:

“Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation.”

The Government did not comment.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

6.  Complaint under Article 6 § 1  of the Convention of the length of the proceedings

Article 6 § 1 provides, insofar as relevant:

“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Government referred to their submissions under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention and added that in the second case against the applicant, that concerning thefts of icons and antiquities, he had been responsible for a delay in the appellate proceedings as in 2000 he had not indicated his address.

In reply the applicant reiterated his submissions under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

7.  Complaints under Article 13 of the Convention of lack of effective remedies in respect of the alleged violations of the applicant’s rights and, in particular, in respect of the right to a trial within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention

Article 13 provides:

“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”

The Government did not comment.

The Court considers, in the light of the parties’ submissions, that the complaint raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which should depend on an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case, the applicant’s complaints that upon his arrest on 5 August 1994 he was not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power (Article 5 § 3), that his detention was unjustified and excessively lengthy (Article 5 § 3), that his detention between 25 September and 23 October 1997 was unlawful (Article 5 § 1), that two of his judicial appeals against detention were never examined and the third was not examined speedily (Article 5 § 4), that Bulgarian law does not provide for an enforceable right to compensation in cases of violations of Article 5 (Article 5 § 5), that the criminal proceedings against the applicant were excessively lengthy (Article 6 § 1) and that he did not have effective remedies in respect of the alleged violations of the Convention in his case (Article 13);

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

Søren NielsenChristos Rozakis
              Deputy RegistrarPresident

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