THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 26507/95
by Edith MÜLLER, Ingrid FEICHTER, Dagmar FRÖHLICH, Sabine BECHTOLD, Bernhard BÖCKLE and Thomas KÜHNE
against Austria
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) sitting on 23 November 1999 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrJ.-P. Costa,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrW. Fuhrmann,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrK. Traja,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze, judges,
andMrsS. Dollé, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 27 January 1995 by Edith MÜLLER, Ingrid FEICHTER, Dagmar FRÖHLICH, Sabine BECHTOLD, Bernhard BÖCKLE And Thomas Kühne against Austria and registered on 14 February 1995 under file no. 26507/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
All the applicants are Austrian citizens. The first, second, fifth and sixth applicant live in Meiningen, the third applicant in Koblach and the fourth applicant in Rankweil (Vorarlberg - Austria). They are represented before the Court by Mr W.L. Weh, a lawyer practising in Bregenz (Austria).
A. Particular circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
The applicants all own agricultural land registered in the Rankweil land register (Grundbuch).
On 19 January 1993 the Regional Road Administration (Landesstrassenverwaltung) of Vorarlberg filed a request with the Vorarlberg Regional Government (Landesregierung) for the expropriation of land owned by the applicants for the purpose of the construction of a regional road (Landesstrasse), the L 52. The L 52 is partly a new regional road intended as a bypass (Umfahrung) for the municipalities of Rankweil.
On 26 January 1993 the Regional Government's Office (Amt der Landesregierung) scheduled an oral hearing for 15 February 1993 and invited the applicants to attend. They were further informed that the plans for the construction project were available for inspection at the Rankweil Municipal Office (Gemeindeamt).
On 15 February 1993 the hearing took place on site. The proposed route (Trasse) of the road project had been marked in the landscape. This route was inspected in the presence of the parties and official experts (Amtssachverständige) on road construction, environmental protection, road traffic and land valuation. These experts presented their reports. The applicants' lawyer proposed several alternative routes, which were considered more convenient. Thereupon the experts were questioned as to the pros and cons of these proposals. The applicants' lawyer then asked the authority to obtain a further report by an expert on road traffic in order to show that the number of accidents on the existing road was low. He also submitted a report of H.K., a private expert on road traffic, drawn up in 1986, according to which the construction of the new road was not necessary. He requested the authority to grant him a time-limit of six months for the presentation of further expert reports. The hearing was adjourned to the next day.
On 16 February 1993 the expert on road construction and the expert on road traffic supplemented their reports. Thereupon the hearing was closed and the parties were informed that they could file further submissions within two months of the service on them of the transcripts of the hearing. After the expiry of that time-limit a written decision would be taken.
On 30 April 1993 the applicants' lawyer submitted the preliminary draft of a report by H.K. of February 1993. He stated that the expert needed further time to study all the relevant documents. A request was made for an extension of the time-limit for the submission of his report until the end of June 1993. The Regional Road Administration objected to this request.
On 24 May 1993 the Regional Government decided on the expropriation by, inter alia, transferring ownership of 1284 square metres of land jointly owned by the first, second, third and fourth applicants, and 103 square metres of land owned by the fifth applicant, to the Regional Road Administration. It also ordered that 34 square metres of land owned by the fifth applicant and 29 square metres owned by the sixth applicant could be temporarily used until the construction works were finished. Furthermore, the Regional Government fixed the amounts of compensation to be paid to the landowners concerned. The applicants' request for reimbursement of their legal costs was rejected. The Regional Road Administration was ordered to pay the procedural costs, including the fees charged by the experts.
The authority found that in 1985 the Regional Government had issued a decree (Verordnung), published in the Regional Law Gazette (Landesgesetzblatt) as no. 43/1985, which provided for the construction of the L 52. The purpose of this project was to divert through-traffic from the Rankweil-Brederis built up area, and to connect the commercial zone (Gewerbegebiet) on the outskirts to the national and international traffic networks. Under Section 44 of the Regional Road Act, expropriation is permissible only if it is not possible to construct or retain a section of a highway which is more suitable from the point of view of traffic requirements, environmental protection and its financial implications. The authority therefore had to examine whether there existed a more advantageous alternative to the route proposed by the Regional Road Administration which nevertheless met the criteria mentioned in Section 44 of the Regional Road Act.
The authority noted that the applicants had submitted a preliminary report by the traffic expert H.K. This private expert had not submitted a complete report although he had had ample time at his disposal. The transcripts of the hearing had been served on the applicants' lawyer on 2 March 1993 and this expert had been familiar with the matter since he had already previously submitted an expert report for the applicants, and in 1992 had drawn up another report for other land owners concerning the same construction project. The request for an extension of the time-limit for a fuller report from this person had, therefore, to be rejected. The authority then discussed the conclusions drawn by H.K. and rejected them as unfounded. Furthermore, it examined the advantages and disadvantages of the sixteen alternative routes proposed in the light of the reports made by the various experts and the objections raised by the parties. After considering all points of view, the route proposed by the Road Administration was held to be the most convenient one.
The request for reimbursement of legal costs was refused, the authority finding that the administrative procedure in general did not provide for such reimbursement and there were no other explicit legal provisions permitting this.
On 7 July 1993 the applicants filed a complaint with the Constitutional Court. Invoking Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicants argued that Section 44 of the Regional Road Act was unconstitutional because it did not explicitly mention the interests of agriculture as one of the elements to be taken into account. They further argued that decree no. 43/1985 of the Regional Government was unlawful in that it was not based on a reasonable overall plan for the entire road. The applicants also submitted that the Administrative Court could not be considered a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As regards the refusal to award reimbursement of legal fees, the applicants argued that the provisions of the Regional Road Act were unconstitutional as they did not allow for such a claim.
On 28 September 1993 the Constitutional Court decided not to entertain the applicants' complaint as it did not have sufficient prospect of success. It referred to its case- law according to which Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to expropriation proceedings. Furthermore, it referred to its case-law according to which a decree, providing for the construction of a regional road, was lawful if the deciding body had examined whether the planning criteria mentioned in the law had been met and had sufficiently documented the factual basis for its decision. In this respect it indicated that the Court of Audit, which had also investigated the planning of the L 52, had not found any unlawfulness. Moreover, the alleged violations resulted, at most, from the erroneous application of an ordinary law (einfaches Gesetz) and their examination did not involve any constitutional considerations. Finally, it held that the case did not fall outside the Administrative Court's jurisdiction. In a separate decision of 27 October 1993 the Constitutional Court referred the case to the Administrative Court.
On 7 December 1993 the applicants supplemented their complaint to the Administrative Court and requested an oral hearing.
On 23 June 1994 the Administrative Court held an oral hearing in which the applicants' lawyer, representatives of the Regional Government and representatives of the Regional Road Administration participated. According to the transcript of the hearing, the applicants' lawyer requested the Administrative Court to inspect the location in the presence of experts appointed by it. The applicants' lawyer argued further that the proceedings were unfair because the applicants had to bear the costs of their legal representation. In his view, Article 6 of the Convention required that these sums be borne by the body requesting the expropriation. He referred to Section 44 of the Railway Expropriation Act (Eisenbahnenteignungsgesetz) which, as interpreted by the Austrian Courts, provided that the costs of legal representation of persons threatened by expropriation had to be borne by those who requested the expropriation.
The Administrative Court dismissed the request for the taking of evidence. It referred to Section 41 of the Administrative Court Act which required the Administrative Court to examine the contested decision on the basis of the facts found by the respondent authority, and thus did not allow for the raising of new issues which had not previously been dealt with by the administrative authorities (Neuerungsverbot). In the court's view the applicants had had ample opportunity in the preceding administrative proceedings to have supplemented the factual basis of the administrative decision taken. Moreover, such a procedural rule did not infringe Article 6 of the Convention as the European Court of Human Rights had stated in its Zumtobel v. Austria judgment of 12 September 1993 (Series A no. 268-A).
On the same day the Administrative Court dismissed the applicants' complaint. Referring to Section 44 of the Regional Road Act, the Administrative Court noted that, in the expropriation proceedings, the Regional Government had been obliged to examine the necessity of the road construction project. This it had done when it had carefully examined numerous alternative routes, including a “zero alternative”, and had reached the conclusion that only the route proposed by the Regional Road Administration best complied with the aims set out in Section 44 § 1 of the Regional Road Act. The applicants had not succeeded in showing that any other route, proposed by the experts or by themselves, was better suited.
As regards the draft expert opinion of H.K., the Administrative Court noted that this report essentially stated that the road construction project was not necessary. According to this expert, precedence over the construction of new roads should be given to strengthening local structures in order to make people less dependent on cars. The Administrative Court found that this was a rather abstract proposal which was interesting and worth considering, but it had nothing to do with the assessment of a specific road construction project under Section 44 of the Regional Road Act. According to the Administrative Court, it was not the task of the judiciary to correct decisions on general policy issues; its only task was to examine whether decisions taken by administrative authorities were lawful.
As regards a complaint that the official expert for landscape protection lacked independence, the Administrative Court found that the mere fact that an expert was an employee of the Region of Vorarlberg was not in itself sufficient to raise doubts as to the independence and impartiality of the expert. Moreover, the expert at issue had stated in the proceedings that, from the point of view of landscape protection, the “zero alternative” was the preferable one. It was the Regional Government which found, weighing the landscape protection factor against the other interests involved, that the proposed route was the best solution. In any event, the applicants did have the possibility to submit reports drafted by experts of their choice, but they had not done so.
As regards the claim for reimbursement of the legal costs of the expropriation proceedings, the Administrative Court referred to its previous case-law in which it had stated that the Regional Road Act did not contain any reference to the (Federal) Railway Expropriation Act. Thus, provisions of the Railway Expropriation Act, also applicable to Federal roads and motorways, which might have been more advantageous for the applicants, were not applicable to regional road expropriations as in the present case. Instead, Section 74 § 1 of the General Administrative Procedure Act was applicable and required each party to administrative proceedings to bear their own costs (“Jeder Beteiligte hat die ihm im Verwaltungsverfahren erwachsenden Kosten selbst zu bestreiten”). Insofar as the applicants' lawyer had relied at the hearing on Article 6 of the Convention, the Administrative Court found that this provision afforded a certain margin of appreciation to Member States regarding the rules on reimbursement of procedural costs. It did not require reimbursement of such costs irrespective of whether the proceedings had been successful.
As to the applicants' submission that the findings of fact by the Regional Government were wrong, being based on reports of experts who had not been independent because they were employees of the Region of Vorarlberg, the Administrative Court found that this argument was not sufficient to show that the contested decision was based on wrong facts. In the administrative proceedings an inspection of the location had taken place in which the experts had gathered the factual elements on which they had based their reports (Befund). The applicants' lawyer, who had been present, had had the possibility to challenge the expert findings by pointing out that their assessment of the facts did not coincide with the on-site reality. Also at the hearing on 15 and 16 February 1993, the lawyer had had ample opportunity to point out any shortcomings in the expert reports. It had not been appropriate to obtain, in the proceedings before the Administrative Court, further reports by experts appointed by the Administrative Court because its task was to examine whether an administrative decision was unlawful, or whether a procedural irregularity had occurred, and not simply to repeat the taking of evidence carried out by the respondent authority.
B.Relevant domestic law
a. Expropriation for road construction
In Vorarlberg, expropriation for the purpose of constructing a regional road can take place only after the Regional Government has issued a decree giving a brief description of the route of the highway and stating its approximate length (Article 5 of the Regional Road Act). Landowners who are affected by the measure can, once the plan has been made public, contest its appropriateness before the administrative authorities, and then challenge the decree before the Constitutional Court.
Such an expropriation is permissible only if it is not possible to construct or retain a section of highway which is more suitable from the point of view of traffic requirements, environmental protection and the financial implications (Article 44 (1) of the Regional Road Act).
b. Complaints to the Administrative Court
Under Article 130 of the Federal Constitution, the Administrative Court has jurisdiction to hear, inter alia, complaints alleging that an administrative decision is unlawful.
Article 41 (1) of the Administrative Court Act (Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetz) reads as follows:
"In so far as the Administrative Court does not find any unlawfulness deriving from the respondent authority's lack of jurisdiction or from breaches of procedural rules (Article 42 (2), sub-paragraphs 2 and 3) ..., it must examine the contested decision on the basis of the facts found by the respondent authority and with reference to the complaints put forward ... If it considers that reasons which have not yet been notified to one of the parties might be decisive for ruling on [one of these complaints] ..., it must hear the parties on this point and adjourn the proceedings if necessary."
Under Article 42 (2) of the Administrative Court Act,
"The Administrative Court shall quash the impugned decision:
1. if it is unlawful by reason of its content,
2. [or] because the respondent authority lacked jurisdiction,
3. [or] on account of a breach of procedural rules, in that
(a) the respondent authority has made findings of fact which are, in an important respect, contradicted by the case file, or
(b) the facts require further investigation on an important point, or
(c) procedural rules have been disregarded, compliance with which could have led to a different decision by the respondent authority."
COMPLAINTS
1.The applicants complain, under Article 6 of the Convention, that the proceedings before the Administrative Court concerning the expropriation order against them were unfair. They submit that the Administrative Court had not conducted the proceedings in a serious manner because the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 28 September 1993, had stated that Article 6 of the Convention was not applicable to expropriation proceedings, and because at the time of the hearing the road at issue had already been built. Furthermore, the Administrative Court refused to take the evidence the applicants had requested. They also submit that the Constitutional Court failed to examine properly the Regional Government's decree providing for the construction of the L52 regional road.
2.The applicants also complain that they were discriminated against, because, being persons threatened with expropriation for the construction of a regional road rather than a Federal road, they were not reimbursed their lawyer's fees incurred in the expropriation proceedings. They submit that the principle of fair proceedings would require such reimbursement. They rely on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, read in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1.The applicants complain that the expropriation proceedings against them were unfair. They rely on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, insofar as relevant reads as follows:
“1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”
As regards the applicability of this provision to the proceedings at issue, the Court observes that they concerned the expropriation of land owned by the applicants. In its previous case-law the Court has accepted that disputes concerning such matters involve a determination of an applicant's civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention (see the Bodén v. Sweden judgment of 27 October 1987, Series A no. 125-B, pp. 39-41, §§ 28-32, and the Zumtobel v. Austria judgment of 12 September 1993, Series A no. 268-A, p. 13-14, §§ 31-32). Article 6 § 1 of the Convention therefore applies to the proceedings at issue in the present case.
The applicants submit that the Administrative Court did not conduct the proceedings in a serious manner and refused to take the evidence they had requested at the court hearing on 23 June 1994.
The Court observes that in the hearing before the Administrative Court the applicants' lawyer requested an inspection of the location in the presence of court-appointed experts. The Administrative Court dismissed this request, basing its decision on Section 41 of the Administrative Court Act which provides that the Administrative Court examines a complaint on the basis of the facts found by the respondent authority, and does not allow new issues to be raised which have not previously been dealt with by the administrative authorities (Neuerungsverbot). The Administrative Court did not state that it refused the evidence requested by the applicants because it found it irrelevant; rather it considered that it was prevented from repeating the steps taken by the administrative authority because it had to examine the impugned decision on the basis of the facts established by the Regional Government.
Having regard to the reasons invoked by the Administrative Court, the Court finds that the essence of the complaint, as in the Zumtobel v. Austria case, is whether the Administrative Court could be considered to be a court with full jurisdiction and, thus, a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
In this respect the Court recalls its finding in the above-mentioned Zumtobel case that the Administrative Court fulfils the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in matters which are not exclusively within the discretion of administrative authorities and where the Administrative Court considers the submissions on their merits point by point, without ever having to decline jurisdiction in replying to them or ascertaining various facts (see the Zumtobel v. Austria judgment, pp. 13-14, §§ 31-32.). The Court recalls further that in proceedings concerning expropriation of land under the Vorarlberg Regional Road Act, the subject matter of such proceedings do not fall exclusively within the discretion of the administrative authorities (op. cit., p. 13, § 31).
This approach has, in the meantime, been confirmed in the Bryan v. the United Kingdom judgment of 22 November 1995 (Series A no. 335-A, p. 17, §§ 44-45). There the Court found no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, although the appeal to the High Court lodged by Mr Bryan against an enforcement notice, being on "points of law", was not capable of embracing all aspects of the impugned administrative decision. In particular, there was no rehearing, as such, of the original appeal submitted to the inspector; the High Court could not substitute its own decision on the merits for that of the inspector and its jurisdiction over the facts was limited. The Court found that in assessing the sufficiency of the review available, it was necessary to have regard to, inter alia, the subject matter of the decision appealed against, the manner in which that decision was arrived at, and the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of appeal (op. cit., p. 17, §§ 44-45).
In the present case the subject matter of the dispute was the expropriation of land for the purpose of the construction of a regional road. Such decisions taken by administrative authorities on grounds of expediency involve policy issues such as the planning of road traffic and environmental protection. In such specialised areas of law, a review of the contested decision by an appeal tribunal which cannot substitute its own findings of fact for those of the administrative authority can reasonably be expected, and is also frequently a feature in the systems of judicial control of administrative decisions found throughout Council of Europe Member States (see the Bryan v. the United Kingdom judgment, loc. cit., p. 18, § 47). Moreover, the decision contested by the applicants before the Administrative Court was taken in quasi-judicial proceedings. On 15 and 16 February 1993 on-site hearings took place before the Regional Government Office in the presence of experts and the applicants' lawyer. He was given the opportunity to state the applicants' position and to question the experts. The applicants were also granted the opportunity to submit their own expert reports. The applicants did not do so within the prescribed time-limit, merely submitting a preliminary draft prepared by expert H.K. The authority did not reject this preliminary draft but dealt with the arguments contained therein. The Administrative Court also held a hearing on the applicants' complaint against this decision. It refused, however, to repeat the proceedings already conducted by the Regional Government's Office.
In these circumstances, the Court finds that the scope of review of the Administrative Court was sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, notwithstanding that the Administrative Court was constrained to examine the complaint on the basis of facts found by the administrative authorities and declined to allow new evidence to be adduced which had not been previously considered by these authorities. The fact that the road had meanwhile been built or that the Constitutional Court, on the basis of its previous case-law, had found that Article 6 of the Convention was inapplicable to expropriation proceedings, have no bearing on these conclusions.
As regards the applicants' submission that the Constitutional Court had not sufficiently examined the lawfulness of the Government's decree providing for the construction of the L52 regional road, the Court recalls that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention obliges the courts to give reasons for their judgments. However, this provision cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Nor are the Convention organs called upon to examine whether arguments have been adequately met (see the Van de Hurk v. Netherlands judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, p. 20, § 61, and the Ruiz Torija v. Spain judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303- A, p. 12, § 29).
The Court observes that the Constitutional Court referred to its case-law according to which a decree providing for the construction of a regional road was lawful if the deciding body had examined whether the planning criteria mentioned in the law had been met and had sufficiently documented the factual basis for its decision. In this respect it indicated that the Court of Audit, which had also investigated the planning of the L 52, had not found any unlawfulness. The Court, therefore, concludes that the Constitutional Court did give sufficient reasons for its decision. Accordingly, in this respect, there is also no appearance of a violation of the applicants' rights under Article 6 of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
2.The applicants complain that they were discriminated against because, being persons threatened with expropriation for the construction of a regional road rather than a Federal road, they were not reimbursed their lawyer's fees incurred in the expropriation proceedings.
The Court finds that this complaint falls to be considered under Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 1 Protocol No. 1.
Article 14 of the Convention reads as follows:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The relevant part of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest ... .”
The Court recalls that Article 14 complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to "the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of such provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous - there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the latter (see the Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 23, § 50, and the Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany judgment of 18 July 1994, Series A no. 291-B, p. 32, § 22). Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 guarantees the right of property. It aims at securing the peaceful enjoyment of existing possessions. A future income constitutes a "possession" only if it has been earned or where an enforceable claim exists (see the Marckx v. Belgium judgment, loc. cit.; the van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment 23 November 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 23, § 48; No. 10438/83, Dec. 3.10.84, D.R. 41, p. 226; No. 11628/85, Dec. 9.5.86, D.R. 47, p. 270).
Even assuming that the applicants' claim for the reimbursement of their lawyer's fees during the expropriation proceedings falls within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court finds that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded for the following reasons.
The Court recalls that Article 14 safeguards individuals placed in analogous situations from discrimination (see the Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment, op. cit., p. 22, § 46). A difference in treatment is discriminatory for the purpose of Article 14 if it has no objective or reasonable justification, that is if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (see the Petrovic v. Austria judgment of 27 March 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-II, § 30). Moreover the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether, and to what extent, differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment (see the Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany judgment op.cit., and the The National and Provincial Building Society and others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 23 October 1997, Reports 1997-VII, p. 2356, § 88).
The Court notes first that, under the Austrian General Administrative Procedure Act, it is the rule that every party to administrative proceedings must bear their own costs. From this rule the Railway Expropriation Act, to which the applicants referred in the domestic proceedings and which also applies to expropriations for the construction of Federal roads and motorways, makes an exception, and provides that owners of land threatened by such expropriations are entitled to the reimbursement of their legal costs.
The Court observes that the construction of the main roads in the national network and the related expropriations, usually involving numerous procedural steps and expert opinions across a broad variety of fields, lead to particularly complex proceedings in which, as a consequence, legal advice is especially important and costly. The Court finds that it comes within the margin of appreciation afforded to Contracting States that in such proceedings provision may be made for the reimbursement of the legal fees of the expropriated person. The legislature's decision not to grant the same benefit to land owners expropriated for regional road constructions, which are not normally so complex, constitutes a regulation of general application which appears neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, and which does not involve a breach of Article 14 of the Convention.
The Court concludes that there is no appearance of a violation of the applicants' rights under Article 14 of the Convention, taken together with Article 1 Protocol No. 1.
It follows that also this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
S. DolléN.Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy