THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 44934/98
by John MURDOCK
against the United Kingdom
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section) sitting on 25 January 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
SirNicolas Bratza,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrP. Kūris,
MrW. Fuhrmann,
MrsH.S. Greve,
MrK. Traja, judges,
andMrsS. Dollé, Section Registrar;
Having regard to Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 21 August 1998 by John Murdock against the United Kingdom and registered on 11 December 1998 under file no. 44934/98;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 49 of the Rules of Court;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1995 and currently serving a life sentence in Maghaberry Prison, Northern Ireland.
A.Particular circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant was convicted in a jury trial for a murder committed on 6 October 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment. The murder was not connected with the conflict in Northern Ireland.
Following the Good Friday Peace Agreement, which was part of the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland, the Government passed the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, which includes provisions permitting the early release on licence of eligible prisoners convicted of scheduled offences (those offences defined in emergency legislation enacted in response to terrorism).
B.Relevant domestic law and practice
Pursuant to the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998, a prisoner who has committed scheduled offences (offences tried under emergency legislation relating to terrorism), is no longer the supporter of an organisation concerned in terrorism, on release would not be likely to support such an organisation or become involved in acts of terrorism and would not be a danger to the public, may apply to Sentence Review Commissioners, for a declaration that he is eligible for release (section 3). Where life prisoners are concerned, the Commissioners, when granting a declaration must specify a day which they believe marks the completion of about two thirds of the period which he would have been likely to spend in prison, which date is to be taken as the date of release, with certain exceptions (section 6).
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains that he is subject to discriminatory treatment as persons convicted of scheduled offences benefit from special accelerated release procedures. He considers that not all persons serving scheduled offences were paramilitaries and refers to three prisoners sentenced in a Diplock court (without jury) who committed a sectarian offence unconnected with a terrorist organisation.
THE LAW
The applicant complains of discrimination in that he does not benefit from accelerated release procedures applicable to scheduled offenders, convicted under the emergency provisions implemented in respect of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Article 14 of the Convention provides:
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The case-law of the Convention organs establishes that it is not every difference in treatment which constitutes discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 of the Convention. It must be established that other persons in an analogous or relevantly similar situation enjoy preferential treatment and that there is no reasonable or objective justification for this distinction (see eg. the Van der Mussele judgment of 21 November 1983, Series A no. 70, p. 22, § 46; Fredin v Sweden (No. 1) judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 19, § 60).
However, even assuming that, as a prisoner convicted of an offence unconnected with terrorism, the applicant has been subject to a difference of treatment in that he is not able to benefit from the new release procedures, the Court recalls that whether a difference in treatment constitutes discrimination in the sense of Article 14 of the Convention depends on whether or not there exists an objective and reasonable justification. This requires that the difference pursues a legitimate aim and that there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised. In this assessment of whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment, Contracting States enjoy a margin of appreciation which will vary according to the circumstances, subject-matter and background (see eg. Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, pp. 66-67, § 177).
Having regard to the above, the Court recalls that the 1998 Act was passed as part of the ongoing peace process in Northern Ireland which seeks to bring an end to the conflict in that region. There is a clear connection between that peace process and the application of release procedures to persons convicted of offences related to that conflict. While the applicant submits that not all persons dealt with under the emergency provisions were paramilitaries, he does describe them as having committed sectarian offences, namely, offences linked to the enmity directed at different sectors of the Northern Ireland community, which may also be regarded as linked to the conflict. The Court is accordingly not satisfied that there is any arbitrary application of the relevant provisions to different prisoners. It also notes that the new provisions are subject to specific conditions, including the factor of risk and that the prisoners have served at least two thirds of their anticipated sentence, and therefore are not automatically applicable to scheduled offenders.
The Court further notes the sensitive nature of the ongoing peace process and the complexity of the security situation which it seeks to resolve. Consequently, it would accord to the Government a wide margin of appreciation in the measures perceived as necessary in the pursuit of that process. In light of the above considerations, the Court concludes that the alleged difference is treatment may be justified as a proportionate measure with objective and reasonable justification. It follows that the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
S. DolléJ.-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
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