Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 76
June 2005
Independent News and Media and Independent Newspapers Ireland Limited v. Ireland - 55120/00
Judgment 16.6.2005 [Section III]
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Highest award ever made by jury in a libel case against a media group, and alleged absence of adequate safeguards against disproportionate awards: no violation
Facts: The applicants are registered companies which form part of the same media group (the second applicant is a wholly owned subsidiary of the first applicant). In December 1992, a national newspaper owned by the second applicant published an article about the political negotiations that were taking place at that time to form a new Government. The article linked one political leader to criminal activities and suggested he supported violent communist oppression and was anti-Semitic. In subsequent legal proceedings, a High Court jury found that the politician had been libelled. The trial judge provided the jury with some general guidance on the question of damages, drawing on previous examples in Irish case‑law. However, neither he nor counsel could suggest an amount, which was entirely up to the jury. Following deliberation, the jury assessed damages at 300,000 IEP, three times higher than the previous maximum award. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that the Irish common law was not inconsistent with either the constitutional guarantee of free speech or Article 10 of the Convention, as the principle of proportionality applied to jury awards. If these were found on appeal to be disproportionate, they would be set aside. For a judge to suggest figures to the jury would be an unjustifiable invasion into the domain of the latter. Each libel case was different and juries must have regard to its particular features. The court found that the amount awarded had not been disproportionate to the injury suffered. One member of the court dissented, arguing that if the trial judge could give guidelines as to the level of damages, it would aid juries in their task without impinging on their exclusive competence to determine whether libel had been committed. She considered that the award should be reduced by half.
Law: Article 10 – The award of damages had constituted an interference with the applicants’ freedom of expression, it had been “prescribed by law” and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the “the reputation and the rights of others”. The Court considered that the Tolstoy Miloslavsky judgment – where its review had been confined to the award assessed by the jury, but not to the jury’s finding of libel – was to be the point of departure in examining this case. The essential question to be answered was whether there had been adequate and effective domestic safeguards, at first instance and on appeal, preventing disproportionately high awards. The applicants maintained that the jury should have received more specific guidance on the level of damages to be awarded at first instance, and that compared to the Tolstoy Miloslavsky case, where a violation of Article 10 was found, the jurors had received less guidance. However, in the present case the trial judge gave the jury two concrete indications, not provided in the Tolstoy Miloslavsky case, as to the level of damages to be awarded. He provided an example of a minor defamation case, thus allowing the jury to assess the relative seriousness of the impugned defamatory article, and then clearly directed to the jury that, if it was to award damages, they would have to be substantial. Thus, the guidance to the jury was somewhat more specific than in the Tolstoy Miloslavsky case. As regards review at second instance, the applicants argued that the Supreme Court had not exercised a stricter review than the inadequate appellate review in the Tolstoy Miloslavsky case. The Court however considered this incorrect, as it was precisely one of the main points of distinction between the two cases. In its appellate review, the Supreme Court had taken into account a number of relevant factors, for example the gravity of the libel, the effect on the politician in question and on his negotiations to form a government at the time of publication, the extent of the publication, the conduct of the first applicant newspaper and the consequent necessity for the politician to endure three long and difficult trials. Having assessed these factors, it concluded that the jury would have been justified in going to the top of the bracket in its damages award. Moreover, the applicants’ allegation that the appellate review had been incapable of remedying the “defects” at first instance (as the first-instance decision maker had not received all relevant information) had not prevented the Supreme Court from carrying out its own assessment of the proportionality of the award. In conclusion, having regard to the circumstances of the case, notably the measure of appellate control, it had not been demonstrated that there had been ineffective or inadequate safeguards against a disproportionate award of the jury in the present case.
Conclusion: no violation (six votes to one).
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy