Published on 27 April 2026
THIRD SECTION
Application no. 15889/23
Nikolay Plamenov NEDELCHEV and
Vladislava Aleksandrova TSARIGRADSKA
against Bulgaria
lodged on 17 March 2023
communicated on 7 April 2026
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. Mr Nikolay Nedelchev (the first applicant) is a civil-society activist who has been active since 2017. He has since 2019 participated in many public protests related to the functioning of the Bulgarian judicial system.
2. Ms Vladislava Tsarigradska (the second applicant) is a judge. She has since 2021 been a member of the managing board of the Bulgarian Judges Association (the main professional organisation of the country’s judges). She has on many occasions since 2019 expressed publicly her views about various issues relating to the functioning of the Bulgarian judicial system.
3. In mid-2021, the then caretaker Minister of Internal Affairs stated publicly that several authorities had been covertly intercepting “nearly round the clock” the communications of many people, including politicians and civil-society activists, who had taken part in a prolonged series of protests against the previous government and the Chief Prosecutor held in the second half of 2020 and early 2021.
4. Based on that information, on 20 August 2021 the first applicant asked the National Bureau for the Oversight of Special Means of Surveillance (“the National Bureau” or “the Bureau”; for details about that body, see Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 70078/12, §§ 14-16 and 108-24, 11 January 2022) to check whether he had been placed under covert surveillance at any point since 1 June 2020. On 23 September 2021, the Bureau replied that its investigations “had not revealed an unlawful use of special means of surveillance”. Considering that the Bureau’s investigation had been restricted by an instruction issued by the Chief Prosecutor in 2015 about the manner in which the Bureau was to be provided access to materials held by the prosecuting authorities in the course of its inspections (see Ekimdzhiev and Others, cited above, § 119), the first applicant sought judicial review of that instruction. The Supreme Administrative Court refused to examine his claim.
5. On 14 February 2023, the second applicant likewise asked the National Bureau to check whether she had been placed under covert surveillance at any point since 2019 (in particular, whether her mobile telephone line had been tapped; whether her email, Viber, WhatsApp or Facebook communications had been intercepted; whether her home, car, office or courtroom had been placed under surveillance; and whether she had been placed under such surveillance indirectly, via the surveillance of relatives, friends or contacts of hers). She cited a number of facts leading her to believe that this could have been the case. On 23 February 2023, the Bureau informed the second applicant that it would carry out an investigation pursuant to her complaint and inform her if it found that special means of surveillance had been used unlawfully with respect to her.
6. Both applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention that the system of covert surveillance in Bulgaria, of which they say they are potential victims, in particular in view of their profiles, does not meet the requirements of Article 8 of the Convention. They also complain that they do not have an effective remedy in that respect, in breach of Article 13 of the Convention.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Was the alleged interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 8 of the Convention resulting from the existence in Bulgaria of legislation permitting covert surveillance “in accordance with the law” and “necessary in a democratic society” within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 (see Ekimdzhiev and Others v. Bulgaria, no. 70078/12, §§ 294-359, 11 January 2022)?
2. In particular, does the capacity of the second applicant as a judge require that heightened safeguards be made available to her in respect of covert surveillance, in particular in the light of her allegations that judges in Bulgaria are being disproportionately targeted by such surveillance, predominantly for ulterior purposes?
3. Do the applicants have at their disposal an effective domestic remedy with respect to the alleged breach of their rights under Article 8 of the Convention, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?