AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 32683/96
by Elena NEMANOVÁ
against the Slovak Republic
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 14 January 1998, the following members being present:
MM J.-C. GEUS, President
M.A. NOWICKI
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
Mrs G.H. THUNE
MM F. MARTINEZ
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 29 March 1996 by
Elena NEMANOVÁ against the Slovak Republic and registered on 21 August
1996 under file No. 32683/96;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Slovak national born in 1909. She is retired
and resides in Banská Bystrica.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
The applicant owned a three-storey house comprising several flats
in Banská Bystrica. On 25 May 1976 the applicant requested that the
local tax in respect of the house be reduced. On 24 June 1976 the
National Committee (Národny vybor) in Banská Bystrica dismissed the
request. It noted that the applicant had had an opportunity to sell
the house.
In a letter of 2 June 1976 addressed to the National Committee
in Banská Bystrica the applicant stated, inter alia, that the
maintenance of the house caused considerable difficulties to her and
that she had therefore decided to sell it to the Slovak Television.
She requested, with reference to Section 13 para. 2 of Regulation
No. 47/1969 (see the "Relevant domestic law" below), that an exception
be granted and the permissible compensation for her house be increased
up to 455,638 Czechoslovak crowns. The applicant explained that the
amount of the compensation she requested had been established on the
basis of an expert opinion and that the Slovak Television was prepared
to pay it to her.
On 29 June 1976 the applicant signed a contract by which she sold
her house to the Slovak Television.
In his opinion of 12 August 1976, elaborated at the request of
Slovak Television, an expert stated that the real value of the
applicant's house was 1,640,077 Czechoslovak crowns.
On 18 November 1976 the National Committee in Banská Bystrica
agreed that the sale price be increased to 436,745 Czechoslovak crowns.
On 19 November 1976 the contract was amended accordingly.
On 2 June 1993 the applicant requested before the Banská Bystrica
District Court (Okresny súd) that the contract of 29 June 1976 be
declared void. She claimed that she had signed the contract under
pressure which had been exercised upon her by representatives of
political and State authorities and that the sale price had not
corresponded to the real value of the house.
A witness confirmed that a representative of the National
Committee had told the applicant that selling the house had become a
political necessity for her and that if she refused to sell it, it
would be transferred to State ownership under Law No. 71/1959. The
witness further confirmed that subsequently the applicant had explained
to him that the pressure had made her depressed and that she had had
no other possibility but to sell the house.
Another witness, the applicant's doctor, stated that she had been
present when a representative of the National Committee had insisted
that the applicant sell the house. The applicant had suggested that
another house be chosen, claimed that she had no other place to live
and finally burst into tears.
A third witness stated that the applicant had been threatened
with dispossession and removal from the town should she refuse to sell
the house and that she had been charged high local taxes.
The former president of the National Committee in Banská Bystrica
stated that the representative of the National Committee who had
allegedly exercised pressure on the applicant had not been in charge
of the sale of the house. Another witness stated that an acquaintance
of the applicant had informed him about the applicant's wish to live
in a flat as she had had difficulties in maintaining the house.
The District Court requested a second expert opinion as regards
the compensation paid to the applicant. The second expert evaluated
the compensation to which the applicant had been entitled at 437,274
Slovak crowns.
On 26 June 1995 the District Court found that the applicant had
not concluded the contract under pressure as the representative of the
National Committee who had allegedly forced her to sell the house had
not been in charge of the sale. The court further held that even if
the contract had been concluded under pressure, the applicant could
have revoked it within three years after its conclusion.
As to the sale price, the District Court noted that it had been
fixed in accordance with the relevant rules then in force and in
conformity with an expert opinion which had been later confirmed by a
second expert. The applicant's action was declared manifestly ill-
founded.
The applicant appealed. She challenged the statements of the
witnesses who had alleged that the representative of the National
Committee in Banská Bystrica in question had not been in charge of the
sale and that the she had expressed her wish not to live in the house.
The applicant further claimed that it was irrelevant for which
price she had sold the house as the very fact that she had sold it
under pressure was sufficient for declaring the contract void. She
submitted that the political climate of Czechoslovakia in the mid-
seventies had rendered it impossible for her to revoke the contract
within three years. Finally, the applicant requested that leave to
appeal on points of law should be granted to her in case the appellate
court dismissed her appeal.
On 5 October 1995 the Banská Bystrica Regional Court (Krajsky
súd) upheld the District Court's judgment.
In the Regional Court's view, the fact that a representative of
the National Committee had informed the applicant that the flat would
be taken away from her under Law No. 71/1959 if she failed to sell it
could not be considered as undue pressure as the possibility of
expropriating real property had always been provided for in Slovak law.
The Regional Court also referred to the applicant's statements made in
her letter of 2 June 1976 and held that the applicant had concluded the
contract of her free will.
The Regional Court further recalled that by its decision of 18
November 1976 the National Committee had agreed, upon a request lodged
by the Slovak Television, that the sale price be increased to 436,745
Czechoslovak crowns pursuant to Regulation No. 47/1969. Furthermore,
the second expert opinion had confirmed that the sale price conformed
to the relevant regulations. Finally, the Regional Court noted that
the applicant could have revoked the contract within an extinctive
period of three years.
On 12 November 1995 the applicant complained that in its judgment
of 5 October 1995 the Regional Court had not dealt with her request
that leave to appeal on points of law be granted to her. On
22 November 1995 the president of the Regional Court's chamber informed
the applicant that the court had not granted the applicant's request
as it considered that the decision in her case had not concerned an
issue of exceptional legal importance within the meaning of Section 238
para. 2 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. She further pointed out
that the assessment of the importance of a case in this respect was
within the discretionary power of the court.
On 30 January 1996 the Minister of Justice refused to lodge an
appeal on points of law on the applicant's behalf.
B. The relevant domestic law
Law No. 71/1959 on Measures Concerning Certain Houses in Private
Ownership provided for appropriate maintenance of privately owned
houses comprising flats rented to individuals. It entitled national
committees to carry out necessary maintenance of such houses even if
the owner disagreed. If the owner failed to pay compensation for the
maintenance and his debt in this respect exceeded two thirds of the
value of the house prior to the repairs, the competent national
committee was entitled to transfer the house into State ownership.
Regulation No. 47/1969 governed the prices of buildings owned by
individuals and compensation in case of their expropriation. Under
Section 13 para. 2 national committees were entitled to agree
compensation to amounts of up to the value of a family house the
surface of which does not exceed 120 square metres.
Section 37 para. 1 of the Civil Code provides that, in order to
be valid, a legal act has to be carried out freely, with serious
intention, clearly and certainly.
Pursuant to Section 399 para. 1 of the Civil Code, as in force
at the relevant period, the sale price agreed between the parties could
not exceed the maximum permissible price under the price regulations
in force.
Section 238 para. 2 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides
that an appeal on points of law is permissible if an appellate court,
in its judgment by which a first instance judgment was upheld,
expressly states that an appeal on points of law can be lodged as the
decision in question is of exceptional legal importance.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains about the dismissal of her request that
the contract of 29 June 1976 be declared void and about the Regional
Court's failure to examine her request for leave to appeal on points
of law. She alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention
and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains about the courts' decisions in her case
and about the refusal to grant leave to appeal on points of law to her.
She alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention which provides, insofar as relevant, as follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...
everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law."
...
As to the applicant's complaint that the courts refused to
declare void the contract by which she had sold her house, the
Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the
Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the
obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention. In
particular, it is not competent to deal with applications concerning
errors of law or fact allegedly committed by the competent national
authorities, to whom it falls, in the first place, to interpret and
apply domestic law. The Commission is not competent to look into
allegations concerning such errors except where, and to the extent
that, they seem likely to have entailed a possible violation of any of
the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (see, e.g.,
No. 25062/94, Dec. 18.10.95, D.R. 83-A, pp. 77, 86).
In the present case the courts concluded, on the basis of the
evidence before them, that the applicant had not been put under undue
pressure that would justify declaring the contract in question void.
In particular, the District Court relied on the evidence of the
former president of the National Committee in Banská Bystrica according
to which the person who had allegedly exercised pressure on the
applicant had not been in charge of the sale of her house.
The Regional Court found, with reference to the applicant's
letter of 2 June 1976 indicating that the applicant had had
difficulties in maintaining the house and that she had wished to sell
it to the Slovak Television, that the applicant had not concluded the
contract under pressure. In the Regional Court's view, the fact that
a representative of the National Committee in Banská Bystrica had
informed her that the flat would be taken away from her under Law
No. 71/1959 if she failed to sell it could not be considered as undue
pressure as Slovak law had always provided for expropriation of real
property.
Finally, both courts dealing with the applicant's claim found
that the sale price had been fixed on the basis of an expert opinion
and had conformed to the price regulations then in force. This fact
was confirmed by a second expert opinion submitted at the request of
the District Court.
The Commission considers that the reasons on which the courts
based their above decisions are sufficient to exclude the assumption
that the evaluation of the evidence had been arbitrary. Furthermore,
the Commission has before it no information that would indicate that
the proceedings leading to the decisions complained of did not conform
to the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
To the extent that the applicant complains that she was not
granted leave to appeal on points of law and that the Regional Court
failed to state its reason for the dismissal of her request in this
respect, the Commission notes that under Section 238 para. 2 (a) of the
Code of Civil Procedure an appellate court may, when it confirms a
first instance judgment, grant leave to appeal on points of law to the
parties in the proceedings if it considers that the case raises an
issue of exceptional legal importance.
Such a decision falls within the discretionary power of appellate
courts and, accordingly, Slovak law did not entitle the applicant to
lodge an appeal on points of law on her own accord. Furthermore, the
Commission notes that Slovak law neither sets specific criteria for
assessment of the importance of a question of law, nor provides that
the courts' considerations in this respect shall be set out in the
judgments rendered by them. Finally, the Commission recalls that
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention does not guarantee the
right of appeal to a higher court (see No. 13135/87, Dec. 4.7.88,
D.R. 56, pp. 268, 274).
In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the
Regional Court's refusal to grant the applicant's request for leave to
appeal on points of law and its failure to state the reasons for such
a decision did not interfere with the applicant's rights under
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant further alleges a violation of her property rights
in that she had been forced to sell her house and that the courts
refused to declare the contract on the sale void. She invokes
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which provides as follows:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary
to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
or penalties."
The Commission recalls that it can examine applications only to
the extent that they relate to events occurring after the Convention
entered into force with respect to the relevant Contracting Party. The
Commission found earlier that it has jurisdiction to examine
applications against the Slovak Republic concerning matters which are
subsequent to 18 March 1992, i.e. the date when the Convention was
ratified by the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (see
No. 23131/93, Dec. 4.3.96, D.R. 85-B, pp. 65, 78 and 79).
The Commission notes that the applicant sold her house in 1976,
i.e. long before the aforementioned date. Therefore, the Commission
lacks temporal jurisdiction to examine the circumstances under which
the applicant concluded the contract in question. In this regard, the
Commission recalls that deprivation of property or another right in rem
is in principle an instantaneous act and does not produce a continuing
situation of "deprivation of a right" (see No. 7742/76, Dec. 7.7.78,
D.R. 14, p. 146; No. 23131/93, decision cited above, p. 79).
In the judicial proceedings subsequent to the entry into force
of the Convention with respect to the Slovak Republic the applicant
requested that the contract in question be declared void on the ground
that she had not concluded it of her free will. In fact, under Section
37 of the Civil Code, for a legal act to be valid, it has to be
carried out, inter alia, freely. However, the courts established, for
reasons expressly stated in their judgments, that the applicant had not
concluded the contract under pressure and the Commission has found
above that this decision was not arbitrary.
Thus the relevant domestic law, as interpreted and applied by
Slovak courts, did not entitle the applicant to have the contract
declared void. Her claim in this respect cannot, therefore, be
considered as a "possession" within the meaning of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court HR, Pressos
Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium judgment of 20 November
1995, Series A no. 332, p. 21, para. 31; No. 23131/93, decision cited
above, p. 65). The Commission further recalls that Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) applies only to existing possessions and it does
not guarantee any right to acquire property (see No. 11628/85, Dec.
9.5.86, D.R. 47, p. 271, with further references).
It follows that this part of the application falls outside the
scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and must be rejected as
being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the
Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER J.-C. GEUS
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy