SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 33696/96
by N.L. and M.P.
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 22 June 2000 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrB. Conforti,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler, judges,
andMrE. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 29 March 1996 and registered on 7 November 1996,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are both Italian nationals, born respectively in 1953 and 1955 and living in Milan.
They are represented before the Court by Mr Nicola Sardi, a lawyer practising in Milan.
A.The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Milan, which they had let to M.A.
In a registered letter of 16 January 1989, the applicants informed the tenant that they intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 30 June 1990 and asked her to vacate the premises by that date.
In a writ served on the tenant on 28 February 1990, the applicants reiterated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate.
By a decision of 28 March 1990, which was made enforceable on 25 June 1990, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 30 June 1991.
On 5 June and again on 13 September 1991, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 3 July 1991, the applicants made a statutory declaration that they urgently required the premises as accommodation for themselves.
On 4 December 1991, they served notice on the tenant informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 13 December 1991.
Between 13 December 1991 and 7 January 1997 the bailiff made 25 attempts to recover possession, on 13 December 1991, 16 March 1992, 14 April 1992, 18 June 1992, 21 September 1992, 10 December 1992, 16 February 1993, 22 April 1993, 22 June 1993, 20 September 1993, 25 November 1993, 15 February 1994, 10 May 1994, 20 September 1994, 29 November 1994, 23 February 1995, 15 May 1995, 20 July 1995, 26 September 1995, 30 November 1995, 15 February 1996, 30 April 1996, 15 July 1996, 21 November 1996 and 7 January 1997.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
At the end of January 1997, the tenant vacated the premises.
B.Relevant domestic law
The relevant domestic law is described in the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, 28.7.99, §§ 18-35, ECHR-V.
COMPLAINT
The applicants complain under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
THE LAW
The applicants complain about the duration of the eviction proceedings. Article 6 of the Convention, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations …, everyone is entitled to a … hearing within a reasonable time by [a] … tribunal ...”
The Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The applicants argue that the length of the enforcement proceedings is excessive and that the impossibility to enforce the order for possession during almost seven years amounts to a violation of their right to a court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy