FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 25881/09
INTEL TRADE D.O.O.
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 27 November 2012 as a Committee composed of:
Elisabeth Steiner, President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 April 2009,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant company Intel Trade d.o.o. is a limited liability company incorporated under Croatian law, which has its registered office in Opatija. It is represented before the Court by Mr G. Marčan, a lawyer practising in Rijeka.
2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Civil proceedings
4. On 23 May 2005 the applicant company brought a civil action in the Split Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Splitu) against Mr S.L. seeking payment of a certain sum of money on the basis of a promissory note (zadužnica). However, the applicant company’s statement of claim indicated the Zagreb Municipal Court (Općinski sud u Zagrebu) as the competent court.
5. Therefore, on 3 June 2005 the Split Municipal Court forwarded the case to the Zagreb Municipal Court.
6. Following an objection by the defendant, on 22 August 2005 the Zagreb Municipal Court found that it had no territorial jurisdiction in the case and returned it back to the Split Municipal Court.
7. On 4 April, 23 May, 5 October and 5 December 2005 the applicant company urged the Split Municipal Court to schedule a hearing.
8. On 19 October 2009 the Split Municipal Court delivered a decision declaring the applicant company’s action inadmissible. That court held that the applicant company had no legal interest to bring a civil action because the promissory note in its possession constituted an enforcement title on the basis of which it could have directly instituted enforcement proceedings.
9. Since neither party appealed against that decision it became final on 2 December 2009.
2. The proceedings following the applicant’s request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time
10. Meanwhile, on 27 February 2007 the applicant company lodged a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (zahtjev za zaštitu prava na suđenje u razumnom roku) with the Split County Court (Županijski sud u Splitu).
11. On 3 October 2007 the Split County Court dismissed the applicant company’s request as unfounded.
12. On 17 January 2008 the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske) dismissed the applicant company’s appeal and upheld the Split County Court’s decision.
13. The applicant company then lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske), which dismissed it on 9 October 2008.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
14. The relevant provisions of the Courts Act (Zakon o sudovima, Official Gazette nos. 150/05, 16/07 and 113/08), governing the request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, as the remedy for the length of judicial proceedings in Croatia, are set out in Praunsperger v. Croatia, no. 16553/08, § 21, 22 April 2010.
COMPLAINTS
15. The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the above civil proceedings and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the excessive length of those proceedings had also violated its right to peaceful enjoyment of its possessions.
THE LAW
A. Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
16. The applicant company complained that the length of the above civil proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
17. The Government disputed the admissibility of this complaint on three grounds. They argued that the applicant company abused the right of application, that it could not be considered a victim of the violation complained of, and that, in any event, the complaint was manifestly ill-founded.
18. The Court does not find it necessary to examine all the Government’s objections, because this complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
19. The Court observes at the outset that the applicant company availed itself of an effective domestic remedy for the length of proceedings in Croatia – a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time (see Pavić v. Croatia, no. 21846/08, § 36, 28 January 2010) – and that the domestic courts dismissed its request. In these circumstances, the Court is required to verify whether the way in which those courts interpreted and applied the relevant provisions of the domestic law produced consequences that are consistent with the principles of the Convention, as interpreted in the light of the Court’s case-law. In doing so, the Court has to examine the period which was subject to the domestic courts’ scrutiny. If the decisions of the domestic courts are consistent with Convention principles, the Court will, when examining the question of exhaustion of domestic remedies, refrain from dealing with the length of the proceedings subsequent to that period. Otherwise, a genuine examination of the total length is warranted (see Kozlica v. Croatia, no. 29182/03, § 23, 2 November 2006).
20. In this connection the Court notes that at the time when the Split County Court dismissed the applicant company’s request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time on 3 October 2007, the civil proceedings complained of had been pending for some two years and four months at one level of jurisdiction.
21. The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities and what was at stake for the applicant), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that in that period the length of proceedings complained of cannot be considered unreasonable.
22. It follows that the applicant company’s complaint, in so far it concerns the period which was subject to the domestic courts’ scrutiny, is inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded under Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
23. To the extent that the applicant company’s complaint relates to the subsequent period of some two years and two months, the Court observes that the applicant company could have lodged a second request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, which would have enabled the domestic courts to examine the overall length of the proceedings taking that period into account (see Juravić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 3806/03, 24 October 2006). However, the applicant company failed to do so.
24. It follows that this part of the applicant company’s complaint is inadmissible under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
B. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
25. The applicant company further complained that the length of the above civil proceedings was also in breach of its right to peacefully enjoy its possessions. It relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
26. The Court considers that the above finding concerning the applicant company’s length complaint applies with equal force to its complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
27. It follows that this complaint is also inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 1 and 3 (a) of the Convention as manifestly ill-founded and for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
André WampachElisabeth Steiner
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy