Avis juridique important
Order of the Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) of 14 January 2002. - Association contre l'horaire d'été (ACHE) v Council of the European Union and European Parliament. - Case T-84/01.
European Court reports 2002 Page II-00099
Summary
Parties
Grounds
Decision on costs
Operative part
Actions for annulment - Natural or legal persons - Measures of direct and individual concern to them - Decision taken in the guise of a directive - Action brought by an association - Conditions - Inadmissible
(Art. 230, fourth para., EC)
Summary$$Although the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC does not deal expressly with the admissibility of actions for annulment brought against a directive, that fact alone is insufficient for such actions to be declared inadmissible. It must be examined whether the contested directive is none the less a decision of direct and individual concern to the applicant, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, even though that decision has been taken in the guise of a directive. The Community institutions cannot exclude, merely by the choice of the form of the act in question, the judicial protection afforded to individuals under that provision of the Treaty.
Persons other than the addressees may claim that a decision is of direct concern to them, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, only if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, or by reason of factual circumstances which differentiate them from all other persons and thereby distinguish them individually in the same way as the person addressed.
An association formed for the protection of the collective interests of a category of persons cannot be considered to be individually concerned for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC by a measure affecting the general interests of that category, and is therefore not entitled to bring an action for annulment where its members may not do so individually. However, the existence of special circumstances, such as the part taken by an association in the procedure leading up to the adoption of an act under Article 230 EC, may support the admissibility of an action brought by an association whose members are not directly and individually concerned by that act.
( see paras 23-25 )
PartiesIn Case T-84/01,
Association contre l'heure d'été (ACHE), formerly Association contre l'horaire d'été (ACHE), having its headquarters in Marly-le-Roy (France), represented by C. Lepage, lawyer,
applicant,
v
European Parliament, represented by C. Pennera and M. Goméz-Leal, acting as Agents, with an address for service in Luxembourg,
and
Council of the European Union, represented by A. Lopes Sabino, acting as Agent,
defendants,
APPLICATION for the annulment of Directive 2000/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 January 2001 on summer time arrangements (OJ 2001 L 31, p. 21),
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (Second Chamber),
composed of: R.M. Moura Ramos, President, J. Pirrung and A.W.H. Meij, Judges,
Registrar: H. Jung,
makes the following
Order
GroundsLegal framework and procedure
1 By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 1 April 2001 the applicant, an association formed to draw the attention of the public to the drawbacks arising from changing the clocks and to bring about the abolition of summer time, brought an action under the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC seeking annulment of Directive 2000/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 January 2001 on summer time arrangements (OJ 2001 L 31, p. 21).
2 The purpose of that directive is to harmonise the dates for the beginning and end of the summer time period between the Member States. The second recital in the preamble to the directive states that, given that the Member States apply summer time arrangements, it is important for the functioning of the internal market that a common date and time for the beginning and end of the summer time period be fixed throughout the Community.
3 Article 7 of the directive provides that Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this directive by 31 December 2001 at the latest. ...
4 By separate documents lodged at the Registry of the Court of First Instance on 25 June and 13 July 2001, the Parliament and the Council each raised an objection to admissibility under Article 114(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
5 On 26 September 2001 the applicant lodged its reply, containing its observations on the objections to admissibility, at the Registry of the Court of First Instance.
Forms of order sought
6 The applicant claims that the Court should:
- reject the objection to admissibility;
- annul Directive 2000/84/EC;
- order the defendants to pay the costs.
7 The Parliament contends that the Court should:
- declare the action inadmissible, without going into the substance of the case;
- order the applicant to pay the costs.
8 The Council contends that the Court should:
- dismiss the action as inadmissible;
- if the objection to admissibility is rejected, dismiss the application on the ground that it is unfounded;
- order the applicant to pay the costs of the case.
Law
9 Article 114(1) of the Rules of Procedure provides that, if a party so requests, the Court may decide on admissibility without going into the substance of the case. Under Article 114(3), the remainder of the proceedings are to be oral, unless the Court otherwise decides. In the present case the Court has obtained sufficient information from its consideration of the documents in the case to rule on the application without opening the oral procedure.
Arguments of the parties
10 The Parliament pleads, first of all, in support of its objection to admissibility, the fact that at the time the action was brought the applicant had neither locus standi nor legal personality. Moreover, the Parliament submits that there is nothing to indicate that the applicant's situation was rectified within the period prescribed for proceedings to be instituted which, according to case-law, renders the action inadmissible (Case 50/84 Bensider and Others v Commission [1984] ECR 3991, paragraph 8).
11 The Parliament further asserts that at the time Directive 2000/84 was adopted the applicant did not yet have legal personality, since its statutes are dated 31 March 2001. Since it was not in existence at the date on which the directive was adopted the applicant cannot claim that it is a legal person to which the directive is of direct and individual concern.
12 Moreover, in the view of the Parliament, Directive 2000/84 is not in any case of direct concern to the applicant since even though Member States do not have any discretion with regard to the adoption of national implementing measures this does not automatically mean that those provisions are of direct concern to the applicant. Since the directive at issue merely sets a common date and time for the beginning and end of the summer time period it cannot by itself affect the legal position of the applicant. The directive does not impose any specific obligation on the applicant and does not affect any right enjoyed by the applicant before the directive was adopted.
13 Lastly, the Parliament contends that the directive is not of individual concern to the applicant. Referring to the order of the Court of Justice of 23 November 1995 in Case C-10/95 P Asocarne v Council [1995] ECR I-4149, paragraph 41, and to the order of the Court of First Instance of 26 March 1999 in Case T-114/96 Biscuiterie-confiserie LOR and Confiserie du Tech v Commission [1999] ECR II-913, paragraph 30, the Parliament considers that a legislative measure can be of individual concern to the applicant only where it affects the latter's specific rights. As regards the setting of dates for the beginning and end of the summer time period, the applicant cannot rely on the existence of a specific right or special circumstances which would support any individual interest distinct from that which could be claimed by any other person.
14 The Council refers first of all to the nature of Directive 2000/84. It points out in this regard that the directive is a measure of general scope, which is addressed to all the Member States and which affects all natural and legal persons in the same way throughout the Community. Thus, Directive 2000/84 shows all the characteristics of a directive and may not therefore in principle be challenged by an individual.
15 The Council goes on to argue that, in any event, it is only where the conditions laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC are met that an individual may challenge a directive. The Council contends that the provisions of Directive 2000/84 are of neither direct nor individual concern to the applicant.
16 In order to establish that the applicant is not directly affected the Council refers to the judgment in Joined Cases T-172/98 and T-175/98 to T-177/98 Salamander and Others v Parliament and Council [2000] ECR II-2487, paragraph 52, in which the Court held that the condition that an individual must be directly concerned by the contested Community measure means that the measure must directly affect his legal situation and leave no discretion to the addressees of that measure, who are entrusted with the task of implementing it. According to the Council, since Directive 2000/84 does not impose any obligation on the applicant it is not of direct concern to it.
17 The Council goes on to point out that the applicant is not individually concerned. In that regard it observes that Directive 2000/84 does not affect the applicant in a manner which differentiates it from any other person and distinguishes it individually in the same way as the addressee of a measure. The directive produces legal effects generally and in the abstract and it concerns the applicant no less and no more than any other natural or legal person. The fact that allegedly harm has been or will be suffered cannot alone suffice to confer locus standi on an applicant, since such harm may affect, generally and in the abstract, a large number of persons who cannot be determined in advance in a way which distinguishes them individually in the same way as the addressee of a decision (order of 9 August 1995 in Case T-585/93 Greenpeace and Others v Commission [1995] ECR II-2205, paragraph 51).
18 The applicant claims that, contrary to what is stated by the European Parliament, it was founded in 1983. The statement of amendment, published in the Journal officiel de la République française of 26 May 2001, from which it appears, in particular, that the applicant's name was changed to Association contre l'heure d'été has no effect on either the legal personality or the capacity to bring proceedings of the applicant, since it has possessed both since it was founded in 1983.
19 The applicant argues that according to established case-law, and in particular the order in Greenpeace and Others v Commission, cited above, associations do have locus standi before the Court of First Instance.
20 It also considers that a directive can be relied on by an individual in the context of an action for annulment where the decision taken is of direct and individual concern to the applicant (judgments of the Court of Justice in Case C-358/89 Extramet Industrie v Council [1991] ECR I-2501 and in Case C-309/89 Codorniu v Council [1994] ECR I-1853, paragraph 19; order of the Court of First Instance of 11 January 1995 in Case T-116/94 Cassa nazionale di previdenza ed assistenza a favore degli avvocati e procuratori v Council [1995] ECR II-1, paragraph 26).
21 In order to establish that Directive 2000/84 is of direct concern to it the applicant points out that the Member States have no discretion when adopting national measures in order to implement the directive. Where a contested act requires no State implementing measures in order for it to apply in domestic law it is considered to be of direct concern to individuals (Case 88/76 Exportation des sucres v Commission [1977] ECR 709 and Case 138/79 Roquette Frères v Council [1980] ECR 3333).
22 To support the claim that it is individually concerned, the applicant contends in essence that it was created in order to combat the introduction of arrangements for changing the time in summer and that it brings together all the persons and trade associations which dispute the change to summer time. By that fact alone, it cannot but have a direct and sufficient interest to bring proceedings against Directive 2000/84, the object of which is to extend the time change.
Findings of the Court
23 It should be noted first of all that although the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC does not deal expressly with the admissibility of actions for annulment brought against a directive, it is clear none the less from the case-law of the Court of Justice that that fact alone is insufficient for such actions to be declared inadmissible. Thus, in its order in Asocarne v Council, cited above, the Court, having found that the contested act was a directive, considered whether it was none the less a decision of direct and individual concern to the applicant, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, even though that decision had been taken in the guise of a directive. The Community institutions cannot exclude, merely by the choice of the form of the act in question, the judicial protection afforded to individuals under that provision of the Treaty (see, in particular, order of 30 September 1997 in Case T-122/96 Federolio v Commission [1997] ECR II-1559, paragraph 50).
24 It has been consistently held that persons other than the addressees may claim that a decision is of direct concern to them, within the meaning of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC, only if that decision affects them by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, or by reason of factual circumstances which differentiate them from all other persons and thereby distinguish them individually in the same way as the person addressed (see in particular Case 25/62 Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95, 107, and Case T-135/96 UEAPME v Council [1998] ECR II-2335, paragraph 69).
25 Furthermore, according to case-law, an association formed for the protection of the collective interests of a category of persons cannot be considered to be individually concerned for the purposes of the fourth paragraph of Article 230 EC by a measure affecting the general interests of that category, and is therefore not entitled to bring an action for annulment where its members may not do so individually (see in particular order in Greenpeace and Others v Commission, cited above, paragraph 59 and the case-law cited). However, the Court has held that the existence of special circumstances, such as the part taken by an association in the procedure leading up to the adoption of an act under Article 230 EC, may support the admissibility of an action brought by an association whose members are not directly and individually concerned by that act (see in particular Joined Cases 67/85, 68/85 and 70/85 Van der Kooy and Others v Commission [1988] ECR 219, paragraphs 21 to 24).
26 In the present case the applicant neither shows nor contends that its members are affected by Directive 2000/84 by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them, or by reason of factual circumstances which differentiate them from all other persons and thereby distinguish them individually in the same way as the person addressed. Nor does it show or contend that there are any special circumstances supporting the admissibility of its action even though its members are not directly or individually concerned by that directive.
27 In those circumstances, and without there being any need to examine the other arguments put forward by the Parliament and the Council, it must be concluded that the action is inadmissible.
Decision on costsCosts
28 Under Article 87(2) of the Rules of Procedure, the unsuccessful party is to be ordered to pay the costs if they have been applied for in the successful party's pleadings. Since the applicant has been unsuccessful it must be ordered to pay the costs, as applied for by the Parliament and the Council.
Operative partOn those grounds,
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Second Chamber)
hereby orders:
1. The application is dismissed as inadmissible.
2. The applicant shall bear the costs.
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