Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 152
May 2012
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi (ÖDP) v. Turkey - 7819/03
Judgment 10.5.2012
Article 14
Discrimination
Refusal of financial aid to political party on grounds that it had not received the statutory minimum number of votes (7%) required to be eligible for aid:no violation
Facts – The applicant party was authorised to take part in the 1999 municipal and parliamentary elections. On that occasion, it applied for the financial assistance available to political parties under the Constitution. Its request was refused on the ground that it did not fulfil the conditions set out in the legislation, namely holding a seat in Parliament already or having obtained at least 7% of the votes cast in previous elections. The applicant party challenged this decision before the administrative court, arguing that it was difficult to carry out political activities and campaigns without the necessary financial resources and that the refusal to grant it financial aid was contrary to the principle of non-discrimination. This complaint was dismissed in 1999 on the ground that the applicant party did not meet the legal conditions for receiving financial aid. That judgment was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court in 2002. Before the European Court the applicant party considered that the decision to refuse to grant it financial aid had placed it at a disadvantage in the 1999, 2002 and 2007 elections, in which it had obtained 0.8%, 0.34% and 0.15% respectively of the valid votes cast.
Law – Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1: The refusal to grant financial aid had had the consequence of making it more complicated for the applicant party to disseminate its political opinions at national level than was the case for parties which received such assistance. The applicant party had thus been treated differently in the exercise of its electoral rights. The public funding of political parties was a means of preventing corruption and avoiding excessive dependence on private donors. An examination of the systems applied in the majority of European countries suggested that grants were made on the basis of two systems: on a strictly equal basis or under the principle of equitable funding. In the latter case, a minimum level of electoral support was almost always required, in order to avoid an excessive upsurge in candidacies. None of the texts adopted by Council of Europe bodies concerning political parties in a democratic system described as unreasonable the requirement, imposed by national legislation on parties which received public funding, to enjoy a minimum level of electoral support, nor did they lay down specific levels for such support. It appeared from reports by certain specialised institutions that, on the one hand, it was necessary to ensure that the threshold set was not excessively high, so as not to infringe political pluralism and the rights of small parties and, on the other, that the formula for awarding funds should not be such as to enable the two main parties to monopolise the receipt of public resources.
The public funding of political parties under a system of equitable funding requiring a minimum level of electoral support pursued a legitimate aim, namely that of strengthening pluralist democracy while avoiding excessive and dysfunctional fragmentation of the candidacies. The minimum level of representativeness required in Turkey from parties claiming public funding was the highest in Europe (7%). Nonetheless, during the periods in question, this threshold had not had the effect of creating a monopoly of financial aid to the political parties represented in Parliament. In addition, the applicant party’s results in the 1999, 2002 and 2007 parliamentary elections were significantly lower than 7% and would not have allowed it to obtain funding in several other European states. The applicant party had not shown that it enjoyed sufficient support from the Turkish electorate to assert that it had significant representativeness. Finally, the State provided other forms of public support to political parties, including tax exemptions in respect of some of their income and the allocation of broadcasting time during electoral campaigns. The applicant party had benefited from those forms of corrective public support. The system for awarding financial aid was proportionate, taking into account its scope and the attendant compensatory measures. In consequence, the refusal to grant direct financial aid to the applicant party on the ground that it had not achieved the minimum level of representativeness required by law, namely 7%, had had an objective and reasonable basis. It had not impaired the very essence of the right to the free expression of the will of the people.
Conclusion: no violation (five votes to two).
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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