Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 137
January 2011
Paksas v. Lithuania [GC] - 34932/04
Judgment 6.1.2011 [GC]
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
Stand for election
Permanent ineligibility of impeached President to stand for election to parliamentary office: violation
Facts – The applicant is a former President of Lithuania who was removed from office by Parliament following impeachment proceedings for committing a gross violation of the Constitution. The Constitutional Court found that, while in office as President, the applicant had, unlawfully and for his own personal ends, granted Lithuanian citizenship to a Russian businessman, disclosed a State secret to the latter and exploited his own status to exert undue influence on a private company for the benefit of close acquaintances. In April 2004 the Central Electoral Committee found that there was nothing to prevent the applicant from standing in the presidential election called as a result of his removal from office. However, on 4 May 2004 Parliament amended the Presidential Elections Act by inserting a provision to the effect that a person who had been removed from office in impeachment proceedings could not be elected President until a period of five years had expired. As a result, the Central Electoral Committee ultimately refused to register the applicant as a candidate. The Constitutional Court subsequently ruled on 25 May 2004 that the disqualification resulting from the statutory amendment was compatible with the Constitution, but that subjecting it to a time-limit was unconstitutional. On 15 July 2004 Parliament passed an amendment to the Parliamentary Elections Act, to the effect that anyone who had been removed from office following impeachment proceedings was disqualified from being a member of parliament.
Law – Article 3 of Protocol No. 1
(a) Admissibility – Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, which secured the right to free elections, applied only to the election of the “legislature”. Accordingly, in so far as the applicant’s complaint related to his removal from office or disqualification from standing for the presidency, it was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and hence inadmissible. However, it was admissible ratione materiae in so far as it related to his inability to stand for election to Parliament.
(b) Merits – The applicant had suffered interference with the exercise of his right to stand for election, having been deprived of any possibility of running as a parliamentary candidate. The interference had been in accordance with the law and had pursued the aim of preserving the democratic order. Without underplaying the seriousness of the applicant’s alleged conduct in relation to his constitutional obligations or questioning the principle of his removal from office as President, the interference had had significant consequences as he had been barred not only from being a member of parliament but also from holding any other office for which it was necessary to take an oath in accordance with the Constitution. Lithuania’s position in this area constituted an exception in Europe since, in the majority of the Council of Europe’s member States, impeachment had no direct effects on the electoral rights of the person concerned, or there were no direct consequences for the exercise of the right to stand in parliamentary elections, or the permissible restrictions required a specific judicial decision and were subject to a time-limit. In assessing the proportionality of such a measure, decisive weight should be attached to the existence of a time-limit and the possibility of reviewing the measure in question. The need to provide for a review was, moreover, linked to the fact that consideration should be given to the historical and political context in the State concerned. Since that context would undoubtedly evolve, not least in terms of the perceptions which voters might have of the circumstances that had led to the introduction of such a general restriction, the initial justification for the restriction could subside with the passing of time. In the present case, however, not only was the restriction unlimited in time, but the rule on which it was based was set in constitutional stone. The applicant’s disqualification from standing from election accordingly carried a connotation of immutability that was hard to reconcile with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. Moreover, the fact that the legislative process whereby the measure was introduced had been strongly influenced by the specific circumstances was an additional indication of the disproportionate nature of the restriction. All these factors, especially the permanent and irreversible nature of the applicant’s disqualification from holding parliamentary office, led the Court to conclude that the restriction was disproportionate.
Conclusion: violation (fourteenvotes tothree).
Article 41: Finding of a violation constituted sufficient just satisfaction in respect of any non-pecuniary damage.
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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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