Communicated on 17 April 2014
THIRD SECTION
Application no. 33392/12
Peter PALUDA
against Slovakia
lodged on 24 May 2012
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicant, Mr Peter Paluda, is a Slovak national, who was born in 1959 and lives in Bratislava.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is a Supreme Court judge.
In a decision of 8 September 2009 the Judicial Council of the Slovak Republic initiated disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. The applicant was accused of having committed a serious disciplinary offence by failing to comply with his duties, such as abstaining from behaviour which might cast doubt on respectability of judicial office, abiding by principles of judicial ethics and enhancing good reputation of the judiciary. In particular, reference was made to the facts that the applicant (i) had filed a criminal complaint in which he accused the President of the Supreme Court of abuse of authority, and (ii) had publicly stated that the distribution of cases at the Supreme Court had been modified with a view to allowing the President of the Supreme Court to influence the outcome of proceedings. The Judicial Council’s decision proposed that the Supreme Court (disciplinary court) should sanction the applicant by his revocation as a judge.
On 8 September 2009 the Judicial Council further decided to suspend the applicant in the exercise of his function with immediate effect. That measure entailed, ex lege, a 50% reduction in his salary for the duration of the disciplinary proceedings with two years as a maximum.
On 2 November 2009 the applicant complained to the Constitutional Court that the decision to suspend him as a judge ran contrary to, inter alia, Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and their constitutional equivalents.
On 25 November 2009 the Constitutional Court rejected the complaint as being premature. Reference was made to the fact that the applicant had challenged the decision of 8 September 2009 before both the Judicial Council and an administrative court. Those authorities had not yet decided on those remedies.
In a letter of 27 January 2010 the President of the Judicial Council informed the applicant that the law did not allow the Judicial Council to review the decision in issue upon the applicant’s initiative. The letter further stated that the decision was reviewable by ordinary courts.
On 13 May 2010 the Bratislava Regional Court discontinued the proceedings on the applicant’s action for review of the Judicial Council’s decision. It held that that decision was of a preliminary nature and did not determine with final effect the applicant’s rights. It was therefore excluded from judicial review under Article 248(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
On 23 February 2011 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s decision. It held that the decision to suspend the applicant as a judge was a preliminary measure. As such it had no bearing on the applicant’s fundamental rights and freedoms which would justify its judicial review.
On 17 June 2011 the applicant lodged his second complaint to the Constitutional Court. He alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention with reference to the ordinary courts’ above decisions on his claim.
In accordance with a legislative amendment which took effect on 1 May 2011, the Minister of Justice became a party to pending disciplinary proceedings against judges which had been initiated by the Judicial Council.
On 9 May 2011 the Minister of Justice withdrew the motion for disciplining the applicant. On that ground the Supreme Court (disciplinary court) discontinued the disciplinary proceedings on 13 May 2011.
On 7 December 2011 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s complaint of 17 June 2011 inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded. It held that the Supreme Court had given relevant reasons for its decision which was not arbitrary or otherwise contrary to the applicant’s right to a fair hearing.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. Code of Civil Procedure
Pursuant to Article 248(a), civil courts cannot review any decisions by administrative authorities which are of a preliminary nature or govern the procedure.
2. The Judges and Assessors Act 2000 (Law no. 385/2000)
Section 22(1)-(9) governs the suspension of a judge in the exercise of his office the duration of which, in case of introduction of disciplinary proceedings, cannot exceed two years. As from the final effect of the relevant decision the judge concerned is entitled to 30% of his basic salary, with possible increase up to a maximum of 50% where he or she has dependent children. A suspended judge may not stay at the workplace with the exception of time which is necessary for asserting rights related to his or her personal office.
Where a disciplinary court decides on a motion for disciplining a judge, his or her preliminary suspension comes to an end automatically with the exception of cases where the judge concerned was sanctioned by revocation from the post. In cases where the disciplinary court’s decision does not involve the aforesaid sanction, the judge concerned is entitled to reimbursement of the withdrawn part of the salary.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that his right to a fair hearing by a tribunal was breached as a result of the domestic courts’ refusal to examine his action concerning the decision to suspend him in the exercise of his office as a judge.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Was Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applicable to the proceedings in the present case (see also Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, §§ 79-86, ECHR 2009, and Mercieca and Others v. Malta, no. 21974/07, §§ 31-35, 14 June 2011)?
2. If so, did the applicant have a fair hearing, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, was the applicant’s right of access to a court respected?
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy