THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 6977/24
Edmond PANAHORI
against Albania
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 17 March 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Úna Ní Raifeartaigh, President,
Darian Pavli,
Mateja Đurović, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 6977/24) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 1 March 2024 by an Albanian national, Mr Edmond Panahori (“the applicant”), who was born in 1974, is detained in Fier and was represented by Mr A. Syri, a lawyer practising in Berat;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Albanian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, O. Moçka, State Advocate General;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns criminal proceedings against the applicant. The applicant complained about the lack of access to the Constitutional Court and his inability to participate in the proceedings before the Supreme Court.
2. On 19 November 2013, following summary proceedings, the Fier District Court sentenced the applicant to ten years’ imprisonment for murder. On appeal, that sentence was reduced to six years and six months by the Vlora Court of Appeal. On 12 March 2015 the Vlora Prosecutor’s Office lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court arguing that the sentence imposed was too lenient.
3. On 27 March 2015 the applicant, who was in prison at that time, was served with the prosecution’s appeal.
4. On 19 May 2015 the Supreme Court found the prosecution’s appeal admissible.
5. In 2017 the applicant completed serving his sentence in Albania and on 13 May 2017 he moved to Italy.
6. The Supreme Court sent the notification of the date the applicant’s case was to be assessed to the prison where he had been serving the sentence. The prison authorities informed the Supreme Court that the applicant had completed his sentence and was no longer in that prison. The Supreme Court then sent the notification to the applicant’s home address in Mbres village. However, it was not served on the applicant because he no longer lived there.
7. The Supreme Court appointed a lawyer to represent the applicant and decided the case in the applicant’s absence. On 26 July 2021 the Supreme Court quashed the appeal judgment and upheld the first-instance judgment. It was published on its website on 9 November 2021.
8. Upon his return to Albania on 7 May 2023, the applicant was immediately arrested and served with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 26 July 2021.
9. On 31 August 2023 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing that he had learned of the contested Supreme Court’s judgment on 7 May 2023.
10. On 25 October 2023 the Constitutional Court declared the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible as being lodged out of the four-month time-limit, counted from 9 November 2021. The Constitutional Court held that on 27 March 2015 the applicant had been served with the prosecution’s appeal to the Supreme Court, and it was therefore the applicant’s obligation to follow the progress of his case before the Supreme Court and seek information about it. The Constitutional Court did not accept the applicant’s assertion that he had learned of the Supreme Court’s judgment on 7 May 2023 as sufficient evidence that he had indeed learned of the contested judgment on that date.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
Access to the Constitutional Court11. The applicant complained of a breach of his right of access to a court on account of the Constitutional Court’s calculation of the time‑limit for lodging a constitutional complaint.
12. The Court has examined the issue of access to the Constitutional Court due to the calculation of the four-month time-limit, notably in Supergrav Albania Shpk v. Albania, no. 20702/18, 9 May 2023.
13. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was served with the prosecution’s appeal to the Supreme Court on 27 March 2015 (see paragraph 3 above), and was therefore aware that the cassation proceedings were pending before the Supreme Court. However, when the applicant was released from prison in 2017, he did not enquire about his case with the Supreme Court, nor did he provide the Supreme Court with his new address. The Supreme Court, therefore, sent summonses first to the prison, and then to Mbres village, at the only addresses that it had for the applicant on file.
14. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in finding the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible and calculating the time-limit from the date of the Supreme Court judgment cannot be seen as arbitrary. The Constitutional Court rightly considered that, since the applicant had been aware of the pending proceedings before the Supreme Court, it was his duty to follow the course of such proceedings, or at least to provide his updated address to the Supreme Court for any further notifications.
15. In view of the above considerations, the applicant did not act with the basic due diligence required to enable the Supreme Court to send him its summons and final judgment. Therefore, the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the applicable procedural rules in the present case constituted a proportionate limitation on the applicant’s right of access to court, which did not undermine the very essence of that right (compare Johansen v. Germany, no. 17914/10, §§ 46-57, 15 September 2016).
16. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
The applicant’s right to participate in the proceedings before the Supreme Court17. The applicant also complained that his right to participate in the proceedings before the Supreme Court and his right to be notified of its judgment was violated.
18. The Court has accepted the reasoning of the Constitutional Court in declaring the applicant’s constitutional complaint inadmissible. It follows that all other complaints the applicant raised are inadmissible for non‑exhaustion of domestic remedies since the applicant did not comply with the procedural rules for lodging a constitutional complaint.
19. Accordingly, this part of the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 9 April 2026.
Olga Chernishova Úna Ní Raifeartaigh
Deputy Registrar President