Published on 23 June 2025
FIFTH SECTION
Application no. 24201/17
Igor Volodymyrovych PANKOV
against Ukraine
lodged on 23 March 2017
communicated on 5 June 2025
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns the police’s decision to annul the applicant’s car registration.
In 2009 the applicant purchased a car already registered in Ukraine from a private individual, becoming its third owner. He re-registered the vehicle in his name with the police, following the applicable procedure, and used it until October 2010. During a routine check that month, the traffic police seized the car and its registration certificate, having established that the vehicle had not been customs cleared. In May 2011, the car’s registration was cancelled on the grounds that it had been originally imported into Ukraine in 2006 under a temporary entry regime and was later sold using a forged registration certificate, without payment of the required customs duty.
Subsequently, following the applicant’s claim, the courts ordered the return of his car but refused to reinstate its registration, finding the applicant’s claim in that regard unfounded. The applicant also unsuccessfully attempted to initiate criminal proceedings against the customs and police officers involved in the customs inspection and registration of the vehicle upon its entry into Ukraine.
On 18 December 2013, following a new claim by the applicant, the Odesa District Administrative Court ordered the traffic police to re-register the vehicle in the applicant’s name, finding, inter alia, that he was a bona fide purchaser who neither knew nor could have known about the unlawful registration of the car by the previous owner. This decision was upheld by the Odesa Administrative Court of Appeal on 18 March 2014. Despite the judgment of the Court of Appeal being enforceable, the traffic police refused to comply and lodged an appeal with the cassation court.
On 15 March 2016 the Higher Administrative Court overturned the lower courts’ decisions and dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held, inter alia, that a vehicle imported into Ukraine cannot be registered unless all customs duties have been paid. If such payments have not been made, the registration must be cancelled regardless of who owns the vehicle – whether the importer or a subsequent purchaser. The Higher Administrative Court further observed that this conclusion aligned with the position previously adopted by the Supreme Court of Ukraine in a decision delivered in 2013.
On 10 January 2017 the Supreme Court of Ukraine declined to admit the case for review on the ground of divergent application of the law, as invoked by the applicant, noting that the issue had already been addressed in a decision delivered in 2013. At that time, the Supreme Court concluded that the actions of the traffic police in refusing to register vehicles imported for permanent use or in cancelling such registration upon establishing non-payment of customs duties or forgery of documents confirming such payment are lawful, regardless of who bears the obligation to pay those duties. The Supreme Court noted that the decision of the Higher Administrative Court in the applicant’s case was consistent with that conclusion (case no. 21-104a13).
The applicant alleges that the annulment of the registration of his car was unlawful and disproportionate, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and that he did not have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy in this regard, in violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has the applicant complied with the six-months’ time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention? In particular, was the application for review to the Supreme Court an effective remedy within the meaning of this provision?
2. Did the unconditional annulment of the car’s registration — which the applicant had acquired in good faith and which had already been registered for years in Ukraine — amount to an interference with his peaceful enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, given that he was thereby prevented from effectively using it? If so, was that interference lawful? Did it strike the requisite fair balance between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection of the applicant’s right to property?
3. Did the applicant have at his disposal an effective domestic remedy for his complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.1, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?