EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
FIRST CHAMBER
Application No. 20251/92
Giacomo Pantano
against
Italy
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 10 September 1997)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I.INTRODUCTION
(paras. 1-15)1
A.The application
(paras. 2-4)1
B.The proceedings
(paras. 5-10)1
C.The present Report
(paras. 11-15)2
II.ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
(paras. 16-34)3
A.The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 16-30)3
B.Relevant domestic law
(paras. 31-34)4
III.OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
(paras. 35-77)6
A.Complaints declared admissible
(para. 35)6
B.Points at issue
(para. 36)6
C.As regards Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 of the Convention
(paras. 37-67)6
CONCLUSION
(para. 68)11
D.As regards Article 13 of the Convention
(paras. 69-74)11
CONCLUSION
(para. 75)11
E.Recapitulation
(paras. 76-77)12
APPENDIX:DECISION OF THE COMMISSION AS TO
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE APPLICATION13
I.INTRODUCTION
1.The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European
Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.
A.The application
2.The applicant is a U.S. citizen, born in 1960 and resident in New York. He
was represented before the Commission by Mr. Ernesto Fiorillo.
3.The application is directed against Italy. The respondent Government were
represented by Mr. Umberto Leanza, Head of the Diplomatic Legal Service,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4.The case concerns the restriction on the use of the applicant's land and
the absence of a remedy therefor. The applicant invokes Article 1 of Protocol
no. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with
Article 1 of Protocol no. 1.
B.The proceedings
5.The application was introduced on 31 January 1992 and registered on 3 July
1992.
6.On 17 May 1995 the Commission (First Chamber) decided, pursuant to Rule 48
para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the
respondent Government and to invite the parties to submit written observations
on its admissibility and merits.
7.The Government were invited to submit their observations before 8
September 1995. At the Government's request dated 8 September 1995, the time-
limit was extended until 9 October 1995. No further extension of the time-limit
was requested.
8.On 5 March 1996, in the absence of the Government's observations, the
Commission declared admissible the applicant's complaints under Articles 1 of
Protocol no. 1 and 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of
Protocol no. 1. It declared inadmissible the remainder of the application.
9.The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility was sent to the
parties on 18 March 1996 and they were invited to submit their observations on
the substance of the complaints declared admissible. The applicant submitted
observations on 19 April 1996, to which the Government replied on 20 May 1996.
10.After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance
with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the
disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement. In the
light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis
on which such a settlement can be effected.
C.The present Report
11.The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission (First Chamber) in
pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the
following members being present:
Mrs.J. LIDDY, President
MM.M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENI?
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs.M. HION
Mr.R. NICOLINI
12.The text of this Report was adopted on 10 September 1997 by the Commission
and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,
in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
13.The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:
(i)to establish the facts, and
(ii)to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach
by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention.
14.The Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application is
annexed hereto.
15.The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents
lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.
II.ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A.The particular circumstances of the case
16.The applicant was the owner of about 17,000 sq. m. of land in Villaggio
Zafferia di Messina, in Sicily.
17.In 1970 the Municipality of Messina adopted a land-use plan (Piano di Zona
"Santa Lucia"), according to which the applicant's land was partly intended for
the construction of low-cost and social housing and partly for public green
space. Both purposes implied a prohibition on construction.
18.In 1978 the new town-planning scheme (Piano Regolatore) for Messina was
adopted; it contained the same restriction on the use of land and it had a
validity of ten years.
19.On 28 August 1986 the Administrative Court of Appeal of Sicily (Consiglio
di Giustizia Amministrativa per la Regione Siciliana) annulled the order for
possession issued by the Municipality of Messina with regard to the plots of
land of certain of the applicant's neighbours' in pursuance of the Santa Lucia
land-use plan. The Court held that since a land-use plan amounts to secondary
legislation, such a plan must relate to land covered by primary town-planning
legislation ("strumento urbanistico primario"), which consists of town-planning
schemes and building plans. The Court then found that the "Santa Lucia" land-use
plan could not be considered as covered by the Messina town-planning scheme
which was in force at the time of its adoption ("Piano Borzi'"); the "Santa
Lucia" plan, in fact, related to an area which was situated about fifteen
kilometres away from the area subject to the town-planning scheme. The Court
concluded that the "Santa Lucia" land-use plan was null and void; it followed
that the restriction on the use of land, thereby imposed, was also null and
void.
20.On 9 June 1989 the Messina Town Council adopted a change in the land-use
plan ("variante") and further appointed the cooperatives responsible for
carrying out the construction works for the council houses; on 27 December 1990
it adopted another change and subsequently amended, on 30 April 1991, the terms
of the appointment of the cooperatives. None of these decisions was ever served
on the applicant, nor did he otherwise get to know about them.
21. On 27 June 1991 the applicant, having learned about the above mentioned
decisions by the Town Council, applied to the Sicilian Regional Administrative
Court, seeking an order quashing all the said decisions on grounds that the
validity of the 1970 land-use plan had expired and that in any event the Town
Council had not validly sat on the occasion of those decisions. The parties have
failed to inform the Commission about the outcome of these proceedings.
22.In 1991, the applicant received an offer from a private construction
company for his plot of land, provided that all the decisions taken by the
Municipality with a view to enforcing the land-use plan were revoked. For this
purpose, in November 1991 the applicant served a notice on the Municipality,
requiring it either to revoke all the decisions taken since 1989 with a view to
enforcing the restriction imposed on the area, or to appear before a Public
Notary in order to buy his plot of land at the market price. The Municipality
neither replied to the notice, nor appeared before the Public Notary for the
sale within the twenty five days' time-limit laid down therein; the construction
company withdrew its offer.
23.On 19 May and 12 June 1992 the Municipality and three cooperatives ("X",
"Y" and "Z") entered into contract with a view to building council houses on the
applicant's plot of land.
24.On 13 August 1992, the Municipality decided to commence the relevant
expropriation proceedings.
25.By decision of 26 March 1993, served on the applicant on 19 April 1993,
the Municipality of Messina issued an order under an expedited procedure
("occupazione d'urgenza"), for the possession of 13,340 sq. m. of his land with
a view to expropriating it. The land was eventually occupied on 17 May 1993. The
expropriation was to be carried out within a period of five years.
26.On 19 May 1993, the applicant summoned the Municipality of Messina as well
as the three cooperatives selected for his plot of land to appear before the
Sicilian Regional Administrative Court, seeking the immediate suspension and the
nullification of the decisions of 9 June 1989, 27 December 1990, 30 April 1991
as well as of those of 19 May and 12 June 1992, and that of 26 March 1993. The
applicant maintained that the restriction on the use of his land as imposed by
the 1970 land-use plan had expired on 31 December 1985 or at the latest on 31
December 1988, that the changes of 9 June 1989 and 27 December 1990 could thus
not validly reinstate the building ban and that therefore the order for
possession issued on 26 March 1993 - an order that moreover did not state any
valid grounds for the expropriation - was null and void. The appointment of the
cooperatives responsible for the carrying out of the construction works was also
alleged to be null and void.
27.By interim measure of 6 July 1993, the Administrative Court suspended the
effect of all the said decisions; proceedings on the merits are still pending.
28.On 26 May 1993 the applicant summoned the Messina Town Council to appear
before the Messina Court of Appeal seeking that the latter fix and award him the
amount to be paid by the Municipality by way of compensation for the interim
occupation of his land.
29.By a deed of 7 December 1993, the applicant sold to cooperative "X" 5,861
sq. m. of the plot against the payment of 439,575,000 Italian lire.
30.By a judgment delivered on 6 March 1995, the Messina Court of Appeal
awarded the applicant 133,400,000 lire per year of occupation of his land until
the final expropriation plus statutory interest. The applicant was also awarded
7.515.500 lire for lawyers' fees and expenses. The judgment was filed with the
Registry on 6 May 1995 and became final on 26 July 1995.
B.Relevant domestic law
Legislative provisions
31.Section 2 para. 1 of Sicilian Regional Law no. 15 of 20 April 1991
extended until 31 December 1992 the validity of those restrictions on the use of
land contained in primary town planning legislation, whose validity had already
elapsed. Para. 2 extended until 31 December 1992 the validity of the
restrictions on the use of land which would expire before that date.
32.Section 3 imposed on the Municipalities concerned the obligation to adopt
or amend, within twelve months of the entering into force of Law 15/91, the
town-planning scheme in conformity with the restrictions on the use of land as
extended by Section 2.
Case-Law
33.Interpreting Section 2 paras. 1 and 2 of Regional Law no. 15 of 30 April
1991, the Constitutional Court held in its judgment (no. 186) of 23 April 1993
that, by extending the validity of restrictions on the use of land, the Sicilian
legislature has given preference, as between the owners' interest and the
general interest in the extension of such restrictions on the use of land, to
this latter interest. Given the limited validity of this extension and the
simultaneous obligations imposed on the Municipalities, the choice of the
legislature was not unreasonable, even as regards restrictions on the use of
land whose validity had already elapsed, and could not be impugned by the
Constitutional Court.
34.In its judgment no. 82 of 29 April 1982, the Constitutional Court held
inter alia that restrictions on the use of land are compatible with the
protection of private property afforded by the Italian Constitution, provided
that either they are adequately compensated for or they are imposed for a
limited duration.
III.OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A.Complaints declared admissible
35.The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's complaint that his
right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions has been breached on the
ground of the duration of the allegedly unlawful restriction on the use of his
land and in particular on the ground of the conduct of the Municipality of
Messina after the expiry of the building ban, which culminated in the allegedly
unlawful occupation of his land, and the applicant's complaint that he did not
have available any remedy in relation to the actions of the administrative
authorities prior to the occupation of his land.
B.Points at issue
36.Accordingly, the points at issue in the present case are whether there has
been a violation of:
-Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention in relation to
the length of the period during which the prohibition on construction affecting
the applicant's land was in force and to the conduct of the administrative
authorities which culminated in the occupation of the applicant's land, and
-Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention as regards the lack of any
effective remedy in relation to the actions of the administrative authorities.
C.As regards Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention
37.Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention provides as follows:
"Every natural and legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right
of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of
taxes or other contributions or penalties".
38.The applicant alleges a breach of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) on
account of the unlawfulness of the building ban, which has been in force since
1970, and on account of the conduct of the Municipality of Messina which,
disregarding the acknowledged nullity of the building ban, proceeded to the
occupation thereof under an expedited procedure with a view to expropriating it.
39. The Commission observes that the building ban at issue was imposed on the
applicant's plot of land first in 1970 through the adoption of the "Santa Lucia"
land-use plan and later in 1978 through a town-planning scheme. In 1986 the
land-use plan was retrospectively annulled. In 1988, the validity of the town-
planning scheme expired. Nevertheless, in 1989 the Messina town council started
to enforce the 1970 land-use plan without the applicant knowing it until 1991,
when the latter received an offer to buy his plot of land; the potential
purchaser was eventually discouraged by the conduct of the Town Council, which
appeared to be aiming at expropriating it. On 17 May 1993 the applicant's estate
was eventually occupied by the Municipality with a view to building council
houses thereon, and building works are currently being carried out.
40. Insofar as the applicant's complaint relates to a period for which the
Commission is competent within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention, the Commission notes that only in 1989 did the Municipality commence
the informal steps in preparation for the expropriation; however, the applicant
was admittedly not aware thereof until June 1991 (cf. para. 6 above).
41.The Commission observes that before June 1991 the applicant was under the
impression that his property was free from any restriction on the use of land
after the annulment of the land-use plan in 1986 or its expiry in 1988; however,
he made no attempt whatever to dispose of his property.
Accordingly, the Commission considers that the applicant was not affected
by the maintenance in force of the building ban and by the conduct of the
Municipality until he first tried to sell his property in June 1991.
42.The Commission will therefore examine the applicant's complaint only in
relation to the period after June 1991. It will distinguish between a period up
to 17 May 1993, during which the applicant's land was threatened with
expropriation by the Municipality of Messina although allegedly formally free
from any ban, and a period after 17 May 1993, when the applicant's land was
occupied under an expedited procedure with a view to expropriating it.
The applicable rule
43.Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) guarantees in substance the right to
property. It comprises three distinct rules. The first, which is expressed in
the first sentence of the first paragraph and is of a general nature, lays down
the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, in the second
sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects
it to certain conditions. The third, contained in the second paragraph,
recognises that Contracting States are entitled, amongst other things, to
control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three
rules are not "distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third
rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to
peaceful enjoyment of property, and should therefore be construed in the light
of the general principle laid down in the first rule (see Eur. Court HR, Pressos
Compania Naviera SA and others v. Belgium judgment of 20 November 1995, Series A
no. 332, para. 33 with further reference).
44.The applicant argues that the existence of this building ban coupled with
the conduct of the administrative authorities adversely affected the value and
use of the property so that it amounted to a deprivation of possessions within
the meaning of the second sentence of the second paragraph.
45.The Government made no observations on this point.
46.With reference to the period between June 1991 and 17 May 1993, the
Commission observes that, although the applicant's right to dispose of his
property may have been affected by the situation complained of, his property
right, as such, remained intact. The Commission observes in this respect that
although it may have become more difficult for the applicant to sell his
property, the possibility of selling subsisted: in particular, the Commission
considers that the mere fact that a single offer to buy the applicant's land was
eventually withdrawn on grounds that the Town Council had not revoked its
decisions leading to its expropriation does not suffice in itself to demonstrate
the impossibility of selling the land.
The Commission considers therefore that the effects of the situation
complained of up to 17 May 1993 were not such that they can be assimilated to a
deprivation of possessions. Accordingly, no issue arises under the second
sentence of the first paragraph.
47.As concerns the period after 17 May 1993, the Commission observes that the
Court has previously held that in an analogous situation the occupation under an
expedited procedure of the applicant's plot of land with a view to expropriating
it amounted to a deprivation of possessions within the meaning of the second
sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) (cf. Eur.
Court HR, Zubani v. Italy judgment of 7 August 1996, to be published in Reports
of Judgments and Decisions for 1996, para. 45). However, the Commission observes
that in the present case the applicant could and indeed did dispose of his land
even after its occupation and the commencement of the construction works: in
fact, in December 1993 the applicant sold part of his land to the cooperatives
responsible for carrying out the construction works. Nothing indicates that the
applicant cannot also sell the remainder of his land to the relevant
cooperatives.
The Commission therefore considers that, even after 17 May 1993, the
applicant's property right remained intact (cf. Eur. Court HR, Sporrong and
Lönnroth v. Sweden judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52, p. 24, para.
63). Accordingly, no issue arises under the second sentence of the first
paragraph.
48.The Commission further considers that the measures taken in respect of the
applicant's land did not have the purpose of controlling the use thereof. The
Commission therefore finds that the interference at issue cannot be regarded as
a measure of control of the use of property within the meaning of the second
paragraph.
49.In conclusion, the Commission considers that the situation complained of
in the present case must be examined under the first sentence of the first
paragraph.
The compliance with the first sentence of the first paragraph
50. According to the applicant, the informal and formal proceedings aiming at
expropriating his land were based on the wrong assumption that the prohibition
on construction was still in force. The applicant therefore alleges that there
was no legal basis for the interference at issue.
51. The respondent Government have replied that Regional Law no. 15 of 20
April 1991 had extended the validity of restrictions on the use of land - even
if already expired - until 31 December 1992. This extension applied to the
building ban imposed by the 1970 land-use plan as well as to the building ban
reinstated by the 1978 town-planning scheme. The interference at issue was thus
in accordance with the law.
52. The Commission notes that the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the
conduct of the Municipality of Messina before the administrative courts first in
June 1991 and then in May 1993, raising the question of the alleged expiry of
the building ban contained in the 1970 land-use plan; the applicant did not
raise any issue in respect of the building ban imposed through the town-planning
scheme. The Commission underlines that both parties, although explicitly
requested to inform the Commission in detail about these proceedings, have
failed to do so.
53. The Commission can neither guess nor anticipate the domestic courts'
finding as to the existence or lawfulness of a building ban and, as a
consequence, as to the existence of a legal basis for the proceedings aiming at
expropriating the applicant's land. Without prejudging a possible reexamination
of the matter should the domestic courts eventually rule that there was no such
legal basis, the Commission will therefore examine this complaint on the
assumption that the interference at issue was in fact lawful, being in
conformity with the legislation and case-law cited by the Government.
54.The Commission must next determine whether a fair balance was struck
between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the
protection of the individual's fundamental rights (see, inter alia, the above
mentioned Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment, p. 26, para. 69).
55.As regards the period between June 1991 and 17 May 1993, the applicant,
relying on the James and Lithgow judgments, claims that the interference at
issue was disproportionate to the aims pursued; in particular, he underlines
that he is not entitled to any compensation for the financial prejudice he
suffered in connection with the prolonged building ban, and this notwithstanding
the fact that he is a non-national and should therefore be entitled to a
stronger protection of his property rights.
56.The Government point out that the Constitutional Court has held in its
judgment (No. 186) of 23 April 1993 that, by extending the validity of the
restrictions on the use of land, the Sicilian legislature has given preference,
as between the owners' interest and the general interest in the extension of
such restrictions on the use of land, to this latter interest and that, given
the limited validity of this extension and the simultaneous obligations imposed
on the Municipalities to adopt the relevant schemes, the choice of the
legislature was not unreasonable and could not be impugned.
57.The Government further refer to a judgment of the Constitutional Court
(No. 82 of 29 April 1982) in which the latter held that restrictions on the use
of land are compatible with the protection of private property afforded by the
Italian Constitution, provided that either they are imposed for a limited
duration or they are adequately compensated for. In the present case, the
legislature has imposed the restrictions at issue for a limited period of time -
a period of less than two years - so that the fact that the applicant is not
entitled to any compensation does not raise any issue as regards the respect for
his property rights. In any event, the Government argue that the applicant could
continue to dispose of his land - although subject to the prohibition on
construction - so that he had not suffered any significant financial prejudice
for which he might want to seek compensation.
58.The Commission is satisfied that the interference at issue pursued an aim
consonant with the general interest, namely the construction of housing for
disadvantaged persons.
59.The Commission is not unmindful of the adverse effects of the situation
complained of on the applicant's property. However, it considers that the
applicant has failed to submit any evidence supporting his allegations that the
value of his land has been so substantially diminished as to result in an unfair
balancing of interests (cf. No. 21343/93, Dec. 10.10.94, D.R. 79, p. 34; No.
10537/83, Comm. Report 16.7.87, D.R. 61, p. 17, para. 68).
60.The Commission underlines, in regard to the applicant's allegation that he
should be entitled to a stronger protection as he is a non-national, that the
reference to the general principles of international law is contained in the
second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-1), which is not
applicable in the present case.
61.As to the period after 17 May 1993, the applicant argues that even though
the proceedings aiming at the expropriation are unlawful, as will be the
expropriation itself, he is not entitled to the restitution of his land because,
according to Italian law, once the construction works have been commenced it is
considered that the land has been subjected to an "irreversible transformation"
in the public interest; furthermore, he refers to a recent law (no. 549/95)
according to which compensation for illegal expropriation does not cover the
market value of the land.
62. The Government did not submit any observations on this point.
63.The Commission accepts that the applicant is likely to have been
permanently deprived of the chance of regaining possession of his land even if
he is eventually successful in the proceedings concerning the nullification of
the expropriation procedure, and that his only recourse will be to seek
compensation. However, the Commission recalls that the Court has previously
stated that "compensation for (such) loss ... can only constitute adequate
reparation where it also takes into account the damage arising from the length
of the deprivation. It must moreover be paid within a reasonable time." (cf.
Eur. Court HR, Guillemin v. France judgment of 21 February 1997, to be published
in Reports of judgments and Decisions for 1997, para. 54).
64. The Commission notes that it appears from the documents submitted by the
Government - the applicant having omitted to inform the Commission of this fact
- that as a result of the proceedings brought by the applicant before the
Messina Court of Appeal on 26 May 1993, the applicant is entitled to the payment
of 133,400,000 lira plus statutory interest per year, commencing on 17 May 1993
and continuing until the date of final expropriation, by way of reparation for
the occupation of his land. The Commission underlines that the Municipality has
to proceed to make the payments after each year of occupation.
65. Furthermore, the Commission notes that in its judgment of 6 March 1995 the
Messina Court of Appeal has fixed the value of the applicant's land at
1,334,000,000 lira and that it does not appear that the applicant has challenged
such amount.
66.In the light of these considerations, the Commission concludes that no
such adverse effects which could render the balancing of interests unfair have
been shown to exist as a result of the occupation of the applicant's plot of
land with a view to expropriating it.
67.It follows that the whole situation of which the applicant complains did
not infringe his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, as
guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1).
CONCLUSION
68.The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has
been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.
D.As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention
69.In his application, the applicant alleged in addition a violation of
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention on account of the impossibility for him
to challenge the conduct of the administrative authorities.
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides that:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
70. In his observations, the applicant alleges instead a violation of Article
13 (Art. 13) on account of the impossibility for him to obtain compensation for
the prohibition of construction on his land.
71. The Commission considers in the first place that the applicant does not
intend to pursue the original complaint; accordingly, it finds that it is not
necessary to proceed to its examination.
72. As concerns the complaint as presented by the applicant in his
observations, the Commission observes that it has already examined and rejected
the substance of this complaint in respect of access to court in the
admissibility decision.
73.It further observes that the same question has been addressed by the
parties and by the Commission itself when considering the proportionality aspect
of the interference with the applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol no.
1 (P1-1).
74. The Commission considers therefore that the impossibility for the
applicant to obtain compensation for the financial prejudice caused by the
building ban does not raise any separate issue under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention.
CONCLUSION
75.The Commission concludes, unanimously, that it is not necessary to examine
the complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
E.Recapitulation
76.The Commission concludes, unanimously, that in the present case there has
been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.
77.The Commission concludes, unanimously, that it is not necessary to examine
the complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.
M.F. BUQUICCHIOJ. LIDDY
SecretaryPresident
to the First Chamberof the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy