Information Note on the Court’s case-law 197
June 2016
Papaioannou v. Greece - 18880/15
Judgment 2.6.2016 [Section I]
Article 6
Administrative proceedings
Article 6-1
Access to court
Appeal dismissed by Supreme Administrative Court for lack of clear and detailed evidence that statutory conditions of admissibility were met: no violation
Facts – A statutory provision added in 2010 to the Code governing the Supreme Administrative Court required, for an appeal thereto to be admissible, that it be stated in the notice of appeal either that there was no previous case-law of that court on the relevant question or that the grounds of the judgment appealed against were at odds with the judgments of the country’s three supreme courts.
In October 2012 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court against a judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal, before which he had been unsuccessful. Pursuant to the above-mentioned law, he observed in a specific section of his appeal that there was no precedent of the supreme court dealing with the relevant question. He further argued that the statutory provision breached the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, because it raised case-law to the rank of a source of law by requiring, as a condition of admissibility for an appeal on points of law, divergence from the case-law of the Greek supreme courts and lower administrative courts.
In December 2014 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed his appeal on the ground that the admissibility conditions under the statutory provisions in question were not satisfied.
Law – Article 6 § 1: The law in question sought to change the procedure before the Supreme Administrative Court, to speed up proceedings before it and clear its back-log. Its aim was to enable the Supreme Administrative Court to rule promptly on cases raising issues of general interest and thus to ensure the rapid creation of case-law that could be followed by the lower administrative courts in similar cases. These were legitimate aims for the purpose of enabling that court to operate efficiently.
In order for an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court to be admissible, the new provision required the appellant to show precisely and in detail, in the notice of appeal, either that there was no case-law concerning the legal question at issue, or that that each of the grounds of appeal raised a specific legal question that was decisive for the resolution of the dispute and that the legal aspect of that resolution was inconsistent with the well-established case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court, another supreme court or a final decision of the lower administrative courts. The provision was already the subject of a significant body of case-law of the Supreme Administrative Court, which had clarified its meaning. Consequently, the formalities for lodging an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court were clear and foreseeable, and were such as to ensure the principle of legal certainty.
In the present case, the question raised by the applicant as to the constitutionality of the relevant provision had already been resolved and was the subject of abundant case-law. The judgment in which the Supreme Administrative Court had ruled on the constitutionality of the provision had been delivered three months before the applicant lodged his appeal. As to the applicant’s argument about the lack of precedent, it had been formulated in a laconic manner, without giving a clear explanation as to which question – of a legal nature in particular – had not been covered by previous case-law.
Having regard to the specificity of the Supreme Administrative Court’s role in ensuring the consistency of case-law, the imposition of stricter admissibility conditions for proceedings before that court could be accepted. Moreover, to subject the admissibility of an appeal to the existence of objective circumstances that had to be demonstrated by the appellant, as provided for by law and interpreted by the administrative courts, was not, as such, disproportionate or in breach of the right of access to the Supreme Administrative Court.
The applicant had thus not been deprived of the essence of his right of access to a court. The limitations in question pursued a legitimate aim and a reasonable relationship between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised had been maintained in their application. Accordingly, the applicant had not sustained a disproportionate limitation of his right of access to a court, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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