Communicated on 3 March 2016
FIRST SECTION
Application no. 76286/14
Josef PAŘÍZEK
against the Czech Republic
lodged on 28 November 2014
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Josef Pařízek, is a Czech national, who was born in 1975 and lives in Olesnice. He is represented before the Court by Mr T. Kliegr.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
3. On 13 October 1995 the applicant became the tenant of a flat in a tenement house owned at that time by the Prague Building Administration, Ltd. (Pražská správa nemovitostí, s.r.o.). The monthly rent, calculated under a rent-control scheme, was fixed at 297 Czech korunas (CZK) (11 euros (EUR)). The tenancy agreement stipulated, inter alia:
“The tenant undertakes to pay to the landlord a monthly rent and make advance payment for services ..., which may be modified on the basis of valid decrees and in line with an increase in prices for services connected to the maintenance of the building.”
4. On 12 November 1999 the Prague Building Administration, Ltd. sold the tenement house to a new landlord.
5. On 1 July 2002 the controlled rent was increased to CZK 900 (EUR 33).
6. On 5 August 2003 the landlord brought an action against the applicant, seeking to have the above stipulation in the tenancy agreement declared null and void and to obtain an order for the applicant to pay a monthly rent of CZK 4,500 (EUR 166) from 1 April 2003. In support of his action, the landlord submitted an expert opinion which, in respect of the landlord’s expenses for the maintenance and reparations of the building, established the following:
“It concerns the annual expenses for reparations and maintenance buildings ... Usually we use average expenses on the basis of proved expenses for several years. However, it may be a situation when the landlord of the building very expensively repaired during recent years, so the costs during the last few years are high, on the other hand it is obvious that in coming years further expenses will not be necessary, so the average regarding the last years would be unsuitably, disproportionately high and it would decrease the price of the building.
On the contrary, there can be a situation when the landlord did not carry out any preventive reparation and maintenance during the last years, the maintenance is neglected ... In that case low expenses would disproportionately increase the earning value, the landlord would initially have to spend the higher that average expenses.
It seems therefore suitable to use the average expenses which ... are in principle ...about 0,5 to 1,5 % from the reproductive price of the building. As it concerns the future expenses ..., so for their estimate will be necessary ... to take into account the current condition of the maintenance of the object, in respect of a very well maintained object, when in the nearest years, it will not be necessary to carry out the more substantial maintenance, it will be used the lower value ... and, by contrast, in respect of an object poorly maintained, the higher value.
In our concrete case the expert opted, taking into account the poor state of the building, for the value at the top limit 1,5 % from the reproductive price.
The calculation:
The reproductive price of this flat is fixed at CZK 801,960
801,960 *0,015 =CZK 12,029,40”
7. In a judgment of 17 March 2004 the Pardubice District Court (okresní soud) dismissed the landlord’s action.
8. On 5 October 2004 the Hradec Králové Regional Court (krajský soud) upheld that judgment and the reasoning of the lower court.
9. In a decision of 22 September 2005 the Supreme Court (Nejvyšší soud) dismissed an appeal on points of law by the landlord.
10. In a judgment (nález) of 21 March 2006 the Constitutional Court, ruling on a constitutional appeal by the landlord, quashed the decision of the Supreme Court. It stated, in particular:
“... the question of the constitutional conformity of Article 696 § 1 of the Civil Code was examined by the Plenary of the Constitutional Court in its judgment of 28 February 2006, no. Pl. ÚS 20/05 ... In that judgment [the Plenary] found ... that it was unconstitutional that the legislature had not reacted to the successive repeal of legal regulations which governed the rent-control scheme and allowed an unconstitutional situation to persist ...
...
The Plenary of the Constitutional Court set out an obligation for general courts ... ‘to decide on rent increases, depending on local conditions, in order to avoid ... any discrimination’.
[Moreover], in judgment no. IV. ÚS 611/05 ... the Constitutional Court even more explicitly imposed an obligation on the courts to protect the fundamental rights of an individual by judicial law-making.
The Constitutional Court stated in that judgment that the rent control [restricts] property rights and that this is only permitted if it is provided for by law, pursues a legitimate aim in the form of a concrete, constitutionally approved public interest and satisfies the principle of proportionality. ‘A property right may be restricted ... by law but, in respect of setting rents, no such law exists as the normative regulations for rent control were successively repealed by the Constitutional Court. ...’
It is impossible to accept such an interpretation of previous judgments by which the Constitutional Court found the content and form of rent controls to be unconstitutional and repealed the relevant legal regulations ... The objective of [those] judgments ... was to eliminate ... unconstitutional restrictions on the property rights of landlords, and not to de facto freeze ... the unconstitutional violations of those property rights...
The Constitutional Court therefore concluded that ‘general courts should fulfil the condition laid down in Article 4 § 2 [of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, hereinafter ‘the Charter’], by which a restriction of fundamental rights must be provided for by law; when the legislature remains inactive, the courts should fill the lacuna in the legal system by their case-law. In those circumstances, it is possible to consider such law to be law in the material sense. The general courts cannot deny the protection of fundamental rights by referring to the lacuna in the legal system. On the contrary, they are obliged to provide such protection.’ ...
...
Undoubtedly, in the present case, the general courts ... did not fulfil their obligation to ensure the protection of rights, or, more precisely, fundamental rights. ... and therefore breached Article 36 § 1 and Article 11 § 1 of the Charter.”
11. Subsequently, on 31 October 2006 the Supreme Court quashed the lower courts’ judgments.
12. On 21 December 2006 the applicant became the owner of the flat concerned.
13. In the ensuing proceedings in the District Court, the landlord altered his claim to seek to order the applicant to pay a monthly rent of CZK 4,500 (EUR 166) for the period from 1 April 2003 to 21 December 2006. However, the District Court dismissed his action on 27 June 2007 and on 25 October 2007 the Regional Court upheld that judgment.
14. On 2 March 2011 the Constitutional Court quashed the Regional Court’s judgment in respect of the rent payment for the period from 6 August 2003 to 20 December 2006. It held, inter alia:
“... In [opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 27/09 of 28 April 2009] ... the Constitutional Court stated that general courts could decide on a rent increase for the period up to 31 December 2006, but could not do this for the period before the beginning of a [legal] action ... A rent increase for periods from 1 January 2007 cannot be granted either because unilateral rent increases are allowed from that date by section 3(2) of Act no. 107/2006. Referring to the above conclusions of the Opinion of the Plenary of the Constitutional Court, the general courts did not err when they dismissed the [landlord’s] action seeking to make the [applicant] pay an increased rent for the period before the action was brought, that is, from 1 April 2003 to 5 August 2003. ...
The situation is, however, different as regards the dismissal of the action in respect of the [landlord’s] claim that the [applicant] should pay an increased rent for the period from 6 August 2003 to 21 December 2006 (from the bringing of the action to the day when the applicant was no longer the tenant of the flat concerned). ... Accordingly, the conclusion of the general courts that a decision to oblige someone to pay a usual amount of rent can only relate to the time after the delivery of a judgment does not conform to the constitution and violates the [landlord]’s fundamental rights, as set out in Article 11 § 1 and Article 36 § 1 of the Charter. ...”
15. On 28 April 2011 the Regional Court quashed the relevant part of the District Court’s judgment of 27 June 2007 and returned the case to the District Court ordering it to appoint an expert in order to establish the amount of an usual rent and to decide on the landlord’s action to determine the market rent in respect of the flat at issue for the period from 6 August 2003 to 21 December 2006.
16. The landlord later amended his claim again, seeking to be paid a monthly rent of CZK 4,494 (EUR 166) for the period from 6 August to 31 December 2003, CZK 5,248 (EUR 194) for 1 January to 31 December 2004, CZK 5,036 (EUR 186) for 1 January to December 2005 and CZK 5,543 (EUR 205) for 1 January to 20 December 2006.
17. On 11 October 2011 an expert in economy drew his opinion in which it established the usual monthly rent of the flat concerned as follows: CZK 4,909 (EUR 181) for the period from 6 August to 31 December 2003, CZK 5,732 (EUR 212) for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2004, CZK 5,501 (EUR 203) for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2005 and CZK 6,055 (EUR 224) for the period from 1 January to 21 December 2006).
18. On 8 July 2012 the expert submitted an amendment to his expert report in which established that the market monthly rent decreased by 8.45% taking into account that the flat had been heated by a local gas heating system. He calculated the monthly rent as follows: CZK 4,494 (EUR 166) for the period from 6 August to 31 December 2003, CZK 5,248 (EUR 194) for the period from 1 January too 31 December 2004, CZK 5,036 (EUR 186) and CZK 5,543 (EUR 205) for the period from 1 January to 21 December 2006.
19. In a judgment of 31 July 2012 the District Court granted the landlord’s claim, ordering the applicant to pay the outstanding rent and making reference to Constitutional Court opinion no. Pl. ÚS-st. 27/09 of 28 April 2009. It noted the expert report submitted by the landlord, according to which the usual rent in that area in 2004 was CZK 4,500 (EUR 166), an amount which did not cover legitimate maintenance costs. The court also took into account the expert report, the amendment to it and a statement by the expert in economy appointed by the court. It found to be proved that during the period from 6 August to 31 December 2003 the usual monthly rent payable for the flat in question was CZK 4,494 (EUR 166), in 2004 it was CZK 5,248 (EUR 194), in 2005 it was CZK 5,036 (EUR 186) and from 1 January to 21 December 2006 it was CZK 5,543 (EUR 205). The expert in economy explained before the court the comparative method which he had used in drawing up his report: he had compared the flat in question with others of its type and took account of the number of rooms, the total surface area, what equipment it had, as well as its location and the type of heating. In reply to the applicant’s objections against the latter expert report, including the assertion that the controlled rent was sufficient to cover the landlord’s maintenance costs and to receive profit, the court noted, inter alia, that the conclusions of the expert appointed by the court corresponded to the expert report submitted by the landlord; it therefore rejected the applicant’s proposal for an auditing expert report. Developing further its reasoning, the court finally noted that it did not divert from the case-law of the Constitutional Court and that it decided in conformity with the well-established practice of general courts.
20. On 20 December 2012 the Regional Court, following an appeal by the applicant, upheld the District Court’s judgment.
21. On 27 March 2013 the applicant appealed on points of law claiming, in particular, that the lower courts had incorrectly considered his case in that they had erroneously interpreted the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court expressed in the present case. While he shared the opinion of the landlord that the rent for the period from 6 August 2003 to 21 December 2006 should be determined by the court, he did not agree to hike the rent from the controlled rent to the usual rent. According to him, the court was not empowered to determine the rent for the whole relevant period of time on the amount which would correspond to the usual rent.
22. On 19 September 2013 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law. It held, in particular:
“In the reasoning of judgment of 28 February 2006, no. Pl 20/05, published under no. 252/2006, the Constitutional Court stated, besides other things, that general courts, despite the absence of concrete legal regulations, must decide on rent increase depending on local conditions in a way [avoiding] discriminations ... The [Constitutional Court] did not offer a concrete decision-making method ... but recalled that it is necessary to avoid an arbitrariness, decisions must be based on the rational reasoning and on a thorough assessment of all circumstances of the case, ... applying the established constitutionally conforming judicial practice. The Constitutional Court reached a similar legal opinion in judgment no. IV. ÚS 611/05 of 8 February 2006, as well as in judgment no. I. ÚS 717/05 of 21 March 2006 which was referred to by [the applicant]. These legal conclusions were also shared by the Supreme Court, e.g. in judgments no. 26 Cdo 32/2006 of 7 July 2006, no. 26 Cdo 1039/2006 of 31 August 2006, no. 26 Cdo 1924/2006 of 10 October 2006 and no. 26 Cdo 3663/2007 of 29 October 2008. The appellate court went along with the opinion of the court of first instance which, when assessing the rent based itself on the expert opinion (which fixed the so called usual rent), properly dealt with the objections of [the applicant], weighed all the circumstances of the case and sufficiently justified its [findings]. ...”
23. On 12 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal in which he alleged a violation of his right to judicial protection and his property rights. He claimed, inter alia, that the Supreme Court had wrongly rejected his points of law. First, his appeal did satisfy the admissibility criteria under Article 237 § 1 b) of the Code of Civil Procedure then in force, which allowed an appeal of law against an appellate court’s judgment reply to the applicant’s objections against the latter expert report, including the assertion that the controlled rent was sufficient to cover the landlord’s maintenance costs and to receive profit, the court noted, inter alia, that the conclusions of the expert appointed by the court corresponded to the expert report submitted by the landlord; it therefore rejected the applicant’s proposal for an auditing expert report. Developing further its reasoning, the court finally noted that it did not divert from the case-law of the Constitutional Court and that it decided in conformity with the well-established practice of general courts.
24. On 27 March 2013 the applicant appealed on points of law claiming, in particular, that the lower courts had incorrectly considered his case in that they had erroneously interpreted the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court expressed in the present case. While he shared the opinion of the landlord that the rent for the period from 6 August 2003 to 21 December 2006 should be determined by the court, he did not agree to hike the rent from the controlled rent to the usual rent. According to him, the court was not empowered to determine the rent for the whole relevant period of time on the amount which would correspond to the usual rent.
25. On 19 September 2013 the Supreme Court rejected an appeal by the applicant on points of law. It held, in particular:
“In the reasoning of judgment of 28 February 2006, no. Pl 20/05, published under no. 252/2006, the Constitutional Court stated, besides other things, that general courts, despite the absence of concrete legal regulations, must decide on rent increase depending on local conditions in a way [avoiding] discriminations ... The [Constitutional Court] did not offer a concrete decision-making method ... but recalled that it is necessary to avoid an arbitrariness, decisions must be based on the rational reasoning and on a thorough assessment of all circumstances of the case, ... applying the established constitutionally conforming judicial practice. The Constitutional Court reached a similar legal opinion in judgment no. IV. ÚS 611/05 of 8 February 2006, as well as in judgment no. I. ÚS 717/05 of 21 March 2006 which was referred to by [the applicant]. These legal conclusions were also shared by the Supreme Court, e.g. in judgments no. 26 Cdo 32/2006 of 7 July 2006, no. 26 Cdo 1039/2006 of 31 August 2006, no. 26 Cdo 1924/2006 of 10 October 2006 and no. 26 Cdo 3663/2007 of 29 October 2008. The appellate court went along with the opinion of the court of first instance which, when assessing the rent based itself on the expert opinion (which fixed the so called usual rent), properly dealt with the objections of [the applicant], weighed all the circumstances of the case and sufficiently justified its [findings]. ...”
26. On 12 December 2013 the applicant lodged a constitutional appeal in which he alleged a violation of his right to judicial protection and his property rights. He claimed, inter alia, that the Supreme Court had wrongly rejected his points of law. First, his appeal did satisfy the admissibility criteria under Article 237 § 1 b) of the Code of Civil Procedure then in force, which allowed an appeal of law against an appellate court’s judgment which upheld the first instance judgment which had differed from the previous judgment because the first instance court had been bound by a legal opinion of the appellate court. According to the applicant, the Regional Court, in its decision of 28 April 2011 expressed the binding opinion that the landlord’s claim to determine the rent for the relevant period as the usual rent was justified.
27. Alternatively, his appeal on points of law was admissible under Article 237 § 1 c) of the Code of Civil Procedure then in force which allowed the appeal on points of law which was not admissible under Article 237 § 1 b), if a high court found that an impugned decision raised a question of crucial legal importance. According to the applicant, such a question was raised before the Supreme Court which was called to specify which criteria should be applied by the general courts and to which extent when they determined the increase in rent. The applicant maintained that the Supreme Court, having examined this question and its different aspects, did not follow its own case-law (judgments no. 26 Cdo 4403/2011 of 20 February 2013, no. 22 Cdo 367/2012 of 23 April 2013 and no. 22 Cdo 3188/2012 of 23 October 2013).
28. In a decision (usnesení) of 30 May 2014 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional appeal as being manifestly ill-founded. It stated, in particular:
“... the applicant challenges ... the judgments of the District and Regional Courts which are, according to [him], in contradiction with the basic principles which emerged from the case-law of the Constitutional Court regarding the rent control issue, which [deals with] the determination of an amount of the rent which would respect the requirement of fair balance between the rights of the applicant and [the landlord] and their proportional protection.
The Constitutional Court recalls in this connection that if a constitutional appeal is directed against a decision delivered in court proceedings, it is not ... important whether its material inaccuracy is challenged.
The Constitutional Court finds ... that both courts dealt with the applicant’s claims in a wholly relevant manner and gave adequate reasons for their ... legal opinions ... It is therefore possible to rely on them; at least it is valid – and important in a constitutional review – that decisive legal opinions of the ordinary courts are defensible and, in contrast, it is not important that it is possible to challenge them, as the applicant does extensively in his constitutional appeal. ...”
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
29. The relevant domestic law and practice are described in the decision in the case of Vomočil and Art 38, a.s. v the Czech Republic ((dec.), nos. 38817/04 and 1458/07, §§ 21-26, 5 March 2013), and in the judgment in the case of R & L, s.r.o. and Others v. the Czech Republic (nos. 37926/05, 25784/09, 36002/09, 44410/09 and 65546/09, § 42 and Annex II, 3 July 2014).
30. In addition to the quotations of judgment no. Pl. ÚS 8/02 of 20 November 2002 (see paragraphs 92-102 of Annex II of R & L, cited above), the Constitutional Court also pointed out:
“[In] 2000 the Constitutional Court [still] ... supposed that until the end of 2001 at the latest, [the] unconstitutional and unlawful interference with the position of landlords would be eliminated by a follow-up legislative regulation to Article 696 § 1 of [the Civil Code] in form of a law on rent which would allow autonomous and genuine market development of rents but, at the same time, an effective protection of tenants as customers against price leaps and disproportionate requirements of landlords. ...]. This did not happen. ...”
31. In its judgment no. Cdo 26 4403/2011 of 20 February 2013 which concerned the decision making of courts regarding the increase in rent, the Supreme Court established that during the period until 31 December 2006, when there had been no regulation permitting the unilateral rent increase, general courts could intervene into the content of a tenancy and decide on rent increase only until the introduction of an action. It also stated that the amount of the increased rent did not have to correspond to the usual rent in the given locality (market rent). In this respect, the Supreme Court referred to the Constitutional Court’s judgments (no. Pl. ÚS 20/05 of 28 February 2006 and no. I. ÚS 489/05 of 6 April 2006) in which the Constitutional Court had stated, inter alia, that the amount of a rent should have corresponded to the local conditions in order to avoid any discrimination between landlords (but also tenants) of flats under the rent control scheme and landlords (tenants) of flats under the market rent. Moreover, the courts must avoid any arbitrariness, their decisions must be based on a rational line of reasoning and on a thorough weighing of all circumstances. The court stated, in particular:
“When a landlord turn to a court with an action for rent increase (before 1 January 2007), it does not mean that the court must always fix the rent corresponding to a usual price (so-called market rent).
Whereas it is not possible to take into account the social situation of a concrete tenant ..., the Constitutional Court repeatedly recalled ... that the decision making regarding the rent increase represents the socially delicate matter and that, when deciding on rent increase, a general court, by its constitutive decision, completes the objective law. In its decisions ... the Constitutional Court notes that the amount of rent should correspond to local conditions in order to avoid any discrimination between landlords (but also tenants) of flats under the rent-control scheme and landlords (tenants) of flats under the so-called market rent.
These conclusions cannot be interpreted in a way enabling the court to fix the rent ... mechanically in an amount corresponding to “market rent”. The Constitutional Court ... underlined, that the court when determining the amount of rent must avoid any arbitrariness, its decision must be based on a rational argumentation and thorough consideration of all circumstances of the case, on the use of natural principles and customs of the civil life, conclusions of the legal theory and on the established constitutionally conformed judicial practice.”
32. In its judgment no. 22 Cdo 367/2012 of 23 April 2013, which concerned landlords’ right to compensation against the State, under Article 11 § 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, for limitation of their property rights by the rent-control scheme, the Supreme Court stated that a landlord is entitled to compensation if the controlled rent in local conditions with regard to other circumstances do not enable the landlord to cover even expenses invested into maintenance and reparation of immovable properties within a reasonable period of time and to obtain an adequate profit. Such a compensation must necessary correspond to the difference between the usual and controlled rent. The Supreme Court held, in particular:
“... The basis for the examination of the question whether the filing of a claim for limitation of property right is conditioned by the submission of an action for rent increase against a tenant, are conclusions expressed in operative part no. II of the Plenary opinion according to which the aforesaid claim has the subsidiary character in respect of the period from the introduction of the action for rent increase.
...
In assessing the intensity of the restriction of property rights is necessary to start with the premise underlying the ... case law of the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights. The entitlement to compensation for the limitation of property rights does not arise in case of any restrictions on ownership rights ... but only when the restriction reaches such intensity that the very essence of ownership is affected. In case of rent-control the given intensity exists especially when the regulated rent, for longer period does not correspond to the expenses spent for maintenance and reparation of the building as well as the adequate profit which would guarantee the return of invested financial means within a reasonable time, where the limitation of the landlord is not compensated by the State.
...
The Constitutional Court in its plenary opinion concluded that the very unconstitutional nature of the rent control does not mean that in each case it reached the intensity of the limitations reached such an extent that the right of the landlord to the peaceful enjoyment of his property was violated. ... [In] each case it is necessary to examine whether the rent-control limited the landlord to such an extent that his fundamental right to own property was impaired.
...
If the compensation for the limitation of the property right shall reflect the circumstances of every single case ..., courts, when assessing the amount of this compensation ..., cannot avoid establishing the concrete amount of costs for the maintenance and reparations of [houses] ...
It is also necessary to take into consideration how big part of the landlord’s house was ... under the rent-control scheme. If it was only a small part of the floor space, whereas from the remaining flats or commercial premises, the landlord obtained the incomes in the form of “market rent” which assured the sufficient return to cover the expenses for the maintenance and reparations of the house as well as the reasonable profit, it is not, in principle, to consider the limitation of his property right as intensive and it is necessary to take this fact into account. The similar argumentation can be used in case when the landlord was limited by the rent control scheme only for a short period of time . [i.e. a few months].
...
... The compensation is not granted in all restrictions of property right, but only when the restriction is sufficiently intense; in case of rent-control primarily when the restriction does not allow landlords to cover even the expenses spent for the maintenance and reparations of their houses and [to obtain] an adequate profit allowing the return of their investments within an appropriate timeframe. ...
... The starting point in respect of decisive criteria to determine the amount of compensation will be, besides the intensity of the interference with ... property rights, ... costs reasonably invested for the maintenance and reparations of the house ... and adequate profit enabling the landlord to recover his investments within an adequate period of time. It is clear that these elements will always necessarily based on concrete findings in individual situations of every single case.
...
The conclusion I. expressed in the Plenary opinion (‘the increase in rent for the period 1. 1. 2007 could not be granted because from that date a unilateral increase in rent is admitted by Article 3 para. 2 of Act no. 107/2006’) presumes that the amount of rent determined by Act no. 107/2006 meets the requirements of constitutionality. A reference criterion for compensation for the limitation of property rights should be taken an amount of rent ... the landlord could reach under Act no. 107/2006 from 1 January 2007. Granting a higher compensation would lead to the conclusion that the total monthly amount obtained by the landlord in connection with the use of the flat (i.e. a total of the collected regulated rent and the compensation for the limitation of the property rights) until 31 December 2006 would be higher than the rent which the landlord ... could obtain from 1 January 2007.
...”
33. In judgment no. 22 Cdo 3188/2012 of 23 October 2013, the Supreme Court dealt with a question of creation of the right to compensation for limitation of property rights. It held in particular that that right of a landlord does not come into existence upon a court decision establishing the duty of the State to pay such a compensation but as a consequence of the unconstitutional rent control and, therefore, by the impossibility to collect adequate rents. The Supreme Court also noted that compensation shall only be awarded when landlords were unable to cover costs of maintenance and reparation of their tenement houses and to receive a reasonable profit allowing the return of their investments within a reasonable time.
COMPLAINTS
34. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the Constitutional Court had failed to address his argument concerning the inconsistency in the established practice of the Supreme Court in similar cases. He referred to two decisions of that judicial body (nos. 22 Cdo 3188/2012 and 26 Cdo 4403/2011), according to which the courts could retroactively increase the rent only if there was evidence of real maintenance costs. However, the applicant presented the substantial evidence that the maintenance costs had been below the original rent and that the landlord had made 100% profit.
35. The applicant further complained that as a result of the court decisions adopted in his case, by which the rent had been increased both retroactively and contrary to the principle of proportionality, he had been deprived of a considerable amount of his property. By deciding in his favour several times, the national courts had created a legitimate expectation for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
36. Finally, relying on Article 14 of the Convention, the applicant submitted that he had been subjected to unequal treatment before the law, especially in the proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court which failed to address most of his arguments. He referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court, where the defendant was the State and where the Supreme Court had rendered a judgment in the State’s favour containing detailed reasons (no. 22 Cdo 3188/2012). The applicant had relied on the same reasoning, but his appeal on points of law had been dismissed by the Supreme Court, which had deviated from its previous case-law and indeed had not even mentioned that case-law.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has there been an interference with the applicant’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?
2. If so, was that interference necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest? In particular, did that interference impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant?
3. Was the applicant provided with procedural guarantees affording him a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the domestic courts for the purpose of effectively challenging the measures interfering with his rights guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?
4. Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of his civil rights and obligations, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?
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