FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 32637/21
PASSUS PROSPERUS D.O.O.
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 13 May 2026 as a Committee composed of:
Artūrs Kučs, President,
Davor Derenčinović,
Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 32637/21) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 18 June 2021 by Passus Prosperus d.o.o. (“the applicant company”), a limited liability company incorporated under Croatian law, which has its registered office in Zagreb and was represented by Ms V. Drenški Lasan, a lawyer practising in Zagreb;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the confiscation of a significant amount of money from the applicant company as proceeds of crime in criminal proceedings against its sole founder and director.
2. In 2012 the State Attorney’s Office indicted the applicant company’s sole founder and director at the time, S.V., on charges of abuse of trust in economic transactions to the detriment of the D. company, of which she had likewise been the sole director, but not the sole shareholder. The indictment stated that S.V. had concluded, without authorisation, multiple short-term loan agreements between the D. company, herself and the applicant company, transferring to herself and the applicant company approximately 265,000 euros (EUR) despite being aware that there would be no repayment.
3. The indictment stated that S.V. had thereby obtained illicit pecuniary gain. It also stated that a financial expert had established during the investigation that, out of the total sum transferred to S.V. and the applicant company, EUR 152,000 had gone to S.V. personally, and that neither S.V. nor the applicant company had repaid the amounts loaned.
4. In 2014 the Zagreb County Court acquitted S.V., but in 2015 the Supreme Court quashed that judgment and remitted the case for retrial.
5. At a hearing held on 20 January 2017 before the Velika Gorica County Court, which was acting as the trial court, the prosecution amended the indictment by specifying that S.V. had transferred EUR 152,000 to herself, thereby obtaining illicit pecuniary gain in that amount, and EUR 106,000 to the applicant company.
6. The prosecutor explained that the indictment had been amended to align with the financial expert’s findings. S.V. and her attorney stated that she understood the amended indictment and that they did not wish to request a postponement of the hearing to prepare the defence in the light of it.
7. After taking all the evidence, the court heard S.V. as the accused. She argued that she had been authorised to transfer the sums, that she had intended to repay them, that in any event the D. company had owed her money, and that she had thus offset her claim against her debt. She was questioned by her attorney, the prosecution, and the president of the trial panel. After confirming to the president of the trial panel that she was still the director of the applicant company, S.V. was also heard as the applicant company’s representative. She stated that the applicant company had returned all loaned sums to the D. company.
8. In their concluding remarks, the prosecution proposed to confiscate as proceeds of crime EUR 152,000 from S.V. and EUR 106,000 from the applicant company.
9. At a hearing held on 2 March 2017, S.V. maintained her defence and stated that she had no further evidence to propose and nothing further to add. The court concluded the hearing.
10. On 7 March 2017 the Velika Gorica County Court found S.V. guilty as charged and ordered that the sums specified by the prosecution be confiscated from her and the applicant company.
11. The applicant company, represented by an attorney, appealed against that judgment. It argued that the trial court had failed to inform it of its rights as a third party under Article 558 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court had thus failed to allow the applicant company to appoint a representative, be heard, propose evidence, question the accused and defend its interests. It also argued that the financial expert had failed to examine the documentation indicating that the applicant company had settled all its debts. S.V. likewise appealed, advancing the same breaches of procedure in respect of the applicant company.
12. On 5 June 2020 the Supreme Court, acting as the appellate court, held a session, during which the applicant company’s attorney presented the appeal.
13. On the same day the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. It held that, even though the trial court had failed to properly apply Article 558 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to procedural safeguards for third parties, this had not affected the lawfulness of the judgment since the accused (as the applicant company’s sole founder and director at the time) had had a shared interest with it and had been able to effectively participate in the proceedings. It further found no basis for the arguments that S.V. had been authorised to make the transfers in question or perform a set‑off, or that the loans had been repaid.
14. On 24 February 2021 the Constitutional Court dismissed a subsequent constitutional complaint lodged by the applicant company.
15. Before the Court, the applicant company complained that it had not been given an opportunity to effectively participate in the criminal proceedings and that the domestic courts had failed to assess whether it had acquired the pecuniary gain in good faith, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention16. The Court reiterates its well-established case-law that, in cases such as the present one, Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is applicable under its civil head (see Silickienė v. Lithuania, no. 20496/02, §§ 45-46, 10 April 2012, and Yldirim v. Italy (dec.), no. 38602/02, ECHR 2003-IV).
17. The Court further notes that the domestic courts determined the applicant company’s civil rights without its being invited to take part in the proceedings before the trial court. Under section 2(5) of the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime Act, as in force at the time, a person from whom proceeds were being confiscated should have the status of a party to the proceedings.
18. At the same time, the Court cannot ignore that (i) the accused was the applicant company’s sole founder and director at the time, (ii) the accusation from the outset concerned the accused’s alleged unlawful transfers of money to herself and the applicant company, and (iii) the expert report established the amounts transferred and the fact that they had not been repaid by S.V. or the applicant company (see paragraphs 2 and 3 above).
19. In such circumstances, the applicant company could have reasonably foreseen that the pecuniary gain, which had been unlawfully acquired for it by its sole founder and director, would be confiscated from it. At the same time, neither S.V. nor the applicant company itself took any action to seek to be officially involved in the proceedings before the trial court, in particular after the amendment of the indictment on 20 January 2017 (see paragraphs 5‑9 above).
20. The Court further notes that S.V. presented the argument that the money obtained by her and the applicant company had not been obtained through crime, but that the trial court was not persuaded (see paragraphs 7 and 10 above). The applicant company has not pointed to any further arguments or evidence that could have been adduced on its behalf in the proceedings before the trial court, had it been a party to those proceedings.
21. Moreover, at the appellate stage the applicant company was represented by an attorney and had ample opportunity to present its arguments on points of fact and law. The Supreme Court examined and responded to the applicant company’s arguments in the light of the evidence and concluded that the obtained pecuniary gain constituted proceeds of the accused’s criminal activity (see paragraphs 11-13 above).
22. The Court reiterates that, as a general principle, persons whose property is confiscated should be formally granted the status of parties to the proceedings in which the confiscation is ordered, but that de facto affording them a reasonable and sufficient opportunity to adequately protect their interests may be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Silickienė, cited above, § 50).
23. Having regard to the considerations in paragraphs 18-21 above, the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention24. According to the Court’s well-established case-law, a confiscation order amounts to an interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (see Sun v. Russia, no. 31004/02, § 24, 5 February 2009; Silickienė, cited above, § 61; and Ünsped Paket Servisi SaN. Ve TiC. A.Ş. v. Bulgaria, no. 3503/08, § 39, 13 October 2015). Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is therefore applicable in the present case.
25. The Court next notes that the applicant company raised its property complaint with the Constitutional Court in a manner which leaves no doubt that the same complaint has subsequently been submitted to the Court (compare Radobuljac v. Croatia (no. 2), no. 38785/18, § 31, 17 June 2025, and contrast Hernadi v. Croatia (dec.), no. 29998/15, §§ 90-94, 3 September 2019).
26. In such a situation, the applicant company was not required to pursue the other avenues of redress referred to by the Government (such as to ask the authorities to write off the debt stemming from the confiscation order or to allow it to pay the debt in instalments, or to seek damages from S.V.), even assuming their effectiveness (see Radelić v. Croatia, no. 12432/22, §§ 29-33, 13 May 2025; see also Ünsped Paket Servisi SaN. Ve TiC. A.Ş., cited above, § 32). The Court thus dismisses the Government’s non‑exhaustion objections.
27. The Court also dismisses the Government’s objections regarding victim status and the alleged lack of a significant disadvantage because, even though the applicant company has not yet settled the debt, the statutory deadline for its forceful collection is far from expiring.
28. The Court further reiterates that, while confiscation involves a deprivation of possessions, it constitutes control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Veits v. Estonia, no. 12951/11, § 70, 15 January 2015, and the case‑law references cited therein).
29. The Court finds that the impugned measure was prescribed by law (Article 77 of the Criminal Code) and was in line with the general interest of the community (see Silickienė, § 65, and Veits, § 71, both cited above).
30. As regards the proportionality of the measure, the Court finds that a fair balance was struck between the legitimate aim and the applicant company’s fundamental rights, and that there were sufficient procedural guarantees in place.
31. Specifically, even though the applicant company was not charged with or convicted of any offence related to the confiscated money, the domestic courts established that the money had been acquired for it by S.V. through crime. Having regard to S.V.’s role as the applicant company’s sole founder and director at the time, the fact that the domestic courts implicitly held that in such circumstances the applicant company could not rely on bona fide ownership did not amount to a disproportionate interference with the applicant company’s property rights. The domestic courts examined and rejected with sufficient reasoning the arguments to the effect that the money had not been obtained through criminal activity (see paragraphs 10 and 13 above).
32. Furthermore, without repeating its findings under Article 6 § 1, the Court finds that the fact that the applicant company was not properly involved in the proceedings before the trial court did not, in the particular circumstances of the present case, upset the fair balance between the protection of the right to property and the requirements of the general interest (compare Veits, cited above, § 74, and contrast Ünsped Paket Servisi SaN. Ve TiC. A.Ş., cited above, §§ 46-47, where no procedure was available to the applicant company to put its case before the domestic authorities).
33. It follows that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 must likewise be rejected as manifestly ill‑founded, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 4 June 2026.
Liv Tigerstedt Artūrs Kučs
Deputy Registrar President