PATOČKA v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 17796/20
Miroslav PATOČKA
against the Czech Republic

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 30 May 2024 as a Committee composed of:

 Mārtiņš Mits, President,
 María Elósegui,
 Kateřina Šimáčková, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 17796/20) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 3 April 2020 by a Czech national, Mr Miroslav Patočka (“the applicant”), who was born in 1961, lives in Prague and was represented by Ms H. Kordová Marvanová, a lawyer practising in Prague;

the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Czech Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Mr P. Konůpka, of the Ministry of Justice, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;

the parties’ observations;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The application mainly concerns the applicant’s right of access to a court, the proceedings brought by him against the State having been discontinued at the appellate stage following his failure to pay court fees (Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1).

2.  On 20 June 2007 the applicant sued the State for damages (approximately 470,000 euros (EUR) at that time), relying on the State Liability Act (Law no. 82/1998) and claiming that his property rights had been violated due to the rent-control scheme put in place by the State, which had prevented him from charging adequate rent for tenement flats in his ownership between 2002 and 2006. The applicant was not asked to pay any court fees for his action.

3.  On 7 April 2015 the first-instance court granted the applicant’s action in part, awarding him approximately EUR 3,200 for the period from 28 June 2004 (prior to that date, the applicant’s claims were declared time‑barred) until 2 June 2006 (after that date, the applicant should have sought to increase the rents primarily through an action against the tenants). Regarding the legal characterisation of the claim, the court relied on the plenary opinion of the Constitutional Court no. Pl. ÚS-st. 27/09 of 28 April 2009 (published on 18 May 2009) indicating that landlords’ claims for damages against the State, stemming from the rent-control scheme and the long-lasting unconstitutional inactivity of the Parliament, were to be assessed under Article 11 § 4 of the Czech Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms guaranteeing a right to compensation for a forced restriction of property rights (see also R & L, s.r.o. and Others v. the Czech Republic, nos. 37926/05 and 4 others, Annex II, §§ 136-139, 3 July 2014).

4.  Following his appeal filed in October 2015, the applicant was invited to pay court fees amounting to 5% of the amount sought, approximately EUR 24,805 at that time, on the ground that his claim was to be assessed as a sui generis claim for compensation for under Article 11 § 4 of the Charter, and not as a claim for damages under the State Liability Act.

5.  The applicant did not ask for an exemption but rather requested a new decision stating that he was not obliged to pay the fees since the proceedings were governed by the State Liability Act.

6.  On 17 December 2015 the appellate proceedings were discontinued due to the applicant’s failure to pay the fees; since the applicant’s claim was to be assessed under Article 11 § 4 of the Charter, the fees were to be calculated pursuant to the Court Fees Act, that is on the basis of a set statutory percentage of the sum at stake in the proceedings.

7.  The Supreme Court then dismissed an appeal on points of law by the applicant, endorsing the above conclusions as compliant with its established case-law (e.g. decisions no. 26 Cdo 1269/2014 of 23 July 2014 and no. 26 Cdo 5180/2015 of 10 February 2016).

8.  On 8 October 2019 (no. I. US 1254/18) the Constitutional Court dismissed a constitutional appeal by the applicant as manifestly ill-founded, stating that the courts’ conclusions were neither arbitrary nor surprising given that the relevant case-law had been aligned by the Supreme Court.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

9.  Relying on Article 6 § 1, the applicant complained about the decision to discontinue the proceedings on his appeal, claiming that, pursuant to the Court Fees Act in force at the relevant time, all types of proceedings for compensation for damage caused in the exercise of public authority by an irregularity in a decision or the conduct of the proceedings were exempted from court fees and not only those brought under Law no. 82/1998. The court’s characterisation of his claim as sui generis, to be assessed under Article 11 § 4 of the Charter and subject to court fees, was therefore clearly contra legem. He underlined in this respect that he had not been asked to pay any court fees for his original action, which was in line with the established practice of lower courts until the Supreme Court’s decision of 23 July 2014 (see paragraphs 7 above and 12 below). The applicant asserted that it was because the court fees, the payment of which was required pursuant to that new, unforeseeable and arbitrary interpretation of the law, were disproportionate and discriminatory that he refused to pay them when invited to do so in the appellate proceedings, not because he could not afford to pay them.

10.  The Government contended that the present case did not stem from a sudden change in the law or case-law, as alleged by the applicant. It rather followed from a clarification of the issue of the payment of court fees in proceedings concerning damages under Article 11 § 4 of the Charter. Indeed, following the plenary opinion of the Constitutional Court of 28 April 2009 concerning the legal characterisation of such claims (see paragraph 3 above), both the latter court (decision no. II. ÚS 4524/12 of 27 June 2013) and the Supreme Court (decision no. 26 Cdo 1269/2014 of 23 July 2014 and several others issued prior to October 2015) stated that such proceedings were not exempted from court fees since the State’s liability did not stem from an irregular decision or misconduct.

11.  The Court reiterates that the general principles regarding the right of access to a court, as guaranteed by Article 6 § 1, were set out in a number of its previous judgments (see, for instance, Kreuz v. Poland, no. 28249/95, § 52, ECHR 2001‑VI, and Zubac v. Croatia [GC], no. 40160/12, §§ 76-79, 5 April 2018). In sum, the Court has considered that various limitations, including financial, on the individual’s access to a court are compatible with Article 6 § 1 only if they pursue a legitimate aim and there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the legitimate aim sought (see Kreuz, cited above, § 55). In determining whether or not an applicant enjoyed his right of access to a court, the Court takes into account the amount of the fees, including the applicant’s ability to pay them, their ratio to the claim which was allowed by the domestic courts, the phase of the proceedings at which that restriction was imposed, the foreseeability of such fees when they are imposed at the end of the proceedings, and whether the court fee system at issue afforded a sufficient degree of flexibility to allow a party to benefit from an exemption from the payment of court fees (see, for example, Podbielski and PPU Polpure v. Poland, no. 39199/98, § 64, 26 July 2005 Chorbadzhiyski and Krasteva v. Bulgaria, no. 54991/10, § 60, 2 April 2020).

12.  In the present case, the Court observes, as does the Government, that at the time when the applicant was invited to pay the fees for his appeal, there existed a clear case-law of the highest domestic courts following up on the Constitutional Court’s plenary opinion of 28 April 2009, which confirmed that court fees were due in the proceedings such as those brought by the applicant (see paragraph 10 above). Such a requirement should thus have been foreseeable to the applicant. Indeed, the Court has held that with regard to procedural rules it is reasonable for domestic courts to apply the tempus regit actum principle (see, for example, with reference to new regulations on time-limits for appeals, Mione v. Italy (dec.), no. 7856/02, 12 February 2004, and Rasnik v. Italy (dec.), no. 45989/06, 10 July 2007).

13.  Furthermore, it is not disputed by the parties that, had the applicant been at least partially successful with his appeal, the court fees in question would have been refunded to him. In this respect, the Court notes that the applicant did not claim that he could not afford to pay the fees nor that the system was not sufficiently flexible to allow him to benefit from a full or partial exemption from that payment (compare with Chorbadzhiyski and Krasteva, cited above, § 64).

14.  The Court also observes that the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to a court was preserved because his case had been examined on the merits by the first-instance court. Also, in the light of the reasoning of the latter’s judgment referring to the statutory limitation and the possibility to claim rent increases against the tenants, the applicant could have adjusted his claim downwards, which would have reduced the court fees that were dependent on the amount in dispute. Furthermore, once the appellate proceedings had been discontinued for the applicant’s failure to pay the court fees, the applicant could still have obtained the discontinuation decision to be set aside if he had paid the fees by the end of the time-limit set for the appeal against that decision.

15.  Lastly, the Court notes that since the applicant’s appeal had not been examined on the merits, it remains unknown what would be the final amount of damages awarded to the applicant and, consequently, their ratio to the appellate court fees.

16.  In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that the domestic courts’ decisions on the applicant’s obligation to pay the appellate court fees do not appear arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable when interpreting the relevant legislation and that the court fees he was ordered to pay did not constitute a disproportionate restriction that had impaired the very essence of the applicant’s right of access to court.

17.  It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

18.  The applicant further complained that his right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been breached as a consequence of the discontinuation of the proceedings for damages at the appellate stage.

19.  The Court observes, that, as noted above, the fact that the applicant’s appeal was not examined on the merits was due to his non-compliance with the obligation to pay the court fees. Thus, as the applicant did not fulfil the formal criteria of lodging an appeal against the first-instance judgment dismissing in part his claim for damages, this complaint must be rejected on the ground that the effective remedy available under domestic law was not exhausted as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.

20.  The applicant also raised a complaint under Article 13 of the Convention. However, having regard to the conclusions which it has reached above, the Court finds that this complaint is unsubstantiated and must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 20 June 2024.

 Martina Keller Mārtiņš Mits
 Deputy Registrar President