SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 18293/03
by Algis PELECKAS
against Lithuania
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting
on 6 November 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
MrsF. Tulkens, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrR. Türmen,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze,
MrV. Zagrebelsky,
MrsD. Jočienė,
MrD. Popović, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 31 May 2003,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together.
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Algis Peleckas, is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1960 and lives in the Alytus region. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Baltutytė.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is a veterinary doctor. On 10 February 2000, while driving to his work place in the countryside, the applicant was stopped by two policemen, MN and ST. The policemen asked for the applicant’s papers. Having established that the applicant had no driving licence, MN took the wheel of the applicant’s car. ST followed him in the police car, with the applicant sitting in the back seat. They drove several kilometres and stopped on a side road in the countryside.
1. The applicant’s version of the events
The applicant presented the following account of the subsequent events:
The policemen asked the applicant to take an alcohol test. The applicant requested that they replace the tip of the alcotest (breath-analyser), as it might have been used by another person. This request allegedly infuriated the policemen. It appears that the applicant nonetheless took the test, and he was found not to be under the influence of alcohol.
MN made a written record of an administrative offence, warning the applicant that he would be fined in the amount of LTL 1,000 (about EUR 290) for driving without a licence. The applicant having commented on the allegedly disproportionate amount of the fine, ST hit him on the neck.
The applicant jumped out of the police car, attempting to escape. The policemen pursued him and apprehended him by using tear-gas. The applicant was then brought to the ground by a strong blow to the face by ST. The policemen then continued to beat the applicant by kicking him on his thighs, elbows, chest, back, abdomen and crotch. The policemen having subsequently handcuffed the applicant while he was lying face-down on the ground, ST sat on him and inflicted several blows to his head. At the same time, MN kicked his thigh. The applicant was then taken to the police station, where the policemen continued beating him.
After the applicant’s release from the police station several hours later, he immediately went to the hospital where he was treated.
Upon the applicant’s request, on 14 February 2000, he was examined by a medical expert. The expert found a scratch on the applicant’s vertex
(2×1 mm) and forehead (5×8 mm), bruises on his right cheek (10×5 mm) and left forearm (170×8 mm), and a fracture of his left elbow. The expert noted that the injuries had been made by hard, blunt objects. The fracture resulted in a long-term impairment of the applicant’s health.
On 15 February 2000 the applicant filed a complaint against the police, alleging ill-treatment. On the same date the prosecution took his statement and ordered an expert medical examination, which took from 21 February 2000 to 13 March 2000. The expert mentioned the same injuries as those in the examination of 14 February 2000, noting in addition that the applicant had a scratch on his upper lip.
The expert opined that the injuries had been made by at least five impacts or blows. He could not unequivocally identify the mechanism whereby the injuries had been incurred. He noted that the fracture of the applicant’s elbow and the bruise on his left forearm could have resulted either from kicking or twisting the applicant’s arms behind his back, or by him falling on the ground and hitting his arm against a hard surface. The scratch on the applicant’s forehead could also have been the result of the applicant hitting the ground with his head.
On 21 March 2000 criminal proceedings were instituted against ST, who was charged with abuse of office (Article 287 § 1 of the Criminal Code), by causing the applicant medium bodily harm. In particular, ST was suspected of having kicked the applicant while he was lying on the ground, and having hit the applicant on his head. The applicant took part in the proceedings as the victim. He did not claim pecuniary or non-pecuniary damages.
The charges brought against MN were withdrawn, there being no indication of a crime having been committed by him. The applicant did not appeal against that decision, and MN then took part in the other proceedings as a witness, along with several other eyewitnesses to the events.
From 23 May to 30 June 2000, the medical expert examination was repeated upon the initiative of the prosecution. The expert mentioned the same injuries as those determined at the last examination and reiterated that the injuries had been made by no less than five impacts or blows. He further explained that the scratches on the applicant’s forehead, vertex and lip, as well as the bruises on his right cheek, could have been caused either by the administration of blows or by the applicant hitting himself against hard objects. As to the fracture of his elbow, the expert opined that it was ‘unlikely’ that it could have been the outcome of hitting or falling, but had ‘most likely’ occurred when the arm of the applicant had been twisted behind his back in order to handcuff him. The bruise on his left forearm could have appeared after the tissue of the elbow had been injured by the fracture.
On 8 August 2000 the prosecutor requested the applicant to undergo a psychiatric examination, referring to the possibility that, during the incident, he might have suffered epileptic seizures. The applicant was brought to the clinic, but the examination did not take place due to the absence of a qualified expert. Eventually, no examination was carried out, as the applicant refused to report to the clinic.
The investigation into the incident included the questioning of more than 38 witnesses, several confrontations, the on-site verification of evidence, the examination of the police car allegedly damaged by the applicant’s resistance and other measures.
On 5 March 2001 the Alytus District Court acquitted ST, holding that his actions had not gone beyond those necessary in the circumstances. It accepted the version of the events given by the policemen. In particular, it was established that the applicant had been the first to attack ST, hitting him on the nape of the neck while sitting in the back seat of the police car. ST’s version was corroborated by the medical evidence that he had sustained a bruise as a result. Thus, it was considered that the applicant had himself provoked the use of force by the policemen, who had then taken the applicant out of the car and had attempted to handcuff him, the applicant having actively resisted the lawful arrest. The applicant’s resistance warranted the use by the policemen of the “special measures” foreseen in Article 43 of the Police Act, in order to handcuff him. The court then referred to the experts’ conclusion that the fracture of the applicant’s elbow could have occurred as a result of his arms being pulled and twisted backwards for handcuffing. The bruises on his face and head could have been the result of the applicant actively resisting the police, whilst falling down and hitting himself against a hard surface. The court did not find it established that the applicant had been kicked or hit while lying on the ground or after being handcuffed. The court also took account of the video recording, taken by the CCTV camera in the police station, showing the applicant’s continued resistance. The court’s conclusions were essentially based on the submissions of the accused officer, ST, as well as those of MN.
The applicant and the prosecutor appealed. On 1 May 2001 the Kaunas Regional Court rejected their appeal. The court noted that the applicant had been the first to have recourse to violence, the subsequent use of force by ST being the consequence of the applicant’s aggressive behaviour. The court also held that there was no evidence that ST had purposefully injured or tortured the applicant when trying to handcuff him. It further reiterated the lower court’s conclusions as to the origin of the applicant’s injuries. Finally, the court noted that the different version of the incident given by other witnesses might have been distorted by their emotional reaction to the events.
The Office of the General Prosecutor and the applicant lodged cassation appeals. The prosecution argued in particular that the policemen’s version, according to which the applicant had assaulted ST, was not credible. The applicant had been sober, he had not disputed the fact of driving without a licence, and he had cooperated with the policemen while they wrote up the administrative offence. Moreover, the applicant had been alone. Therefore it was highly dubious that he could have assaulted two policemen. The courts had unreasonably dismissed the submissions of three independent witnesses, and based their conclusions on the allegations of ST and MN, ignoring the fact that they both had a clear interest in the outcome of the proceedings.
On 23 October 2001 the Supreme Court quashed the appellate decision, remitting the case for a new examination by the appeal court. The Supreme Court noted inter alia:
“[T]he trial court unconditionally believed only the version of the defendant and his colleague, and dismissed the submissions of other witnesses on the ground that they had been contradictory. However, no essential contradictions were specified ...
The courts failed to assess fully whether the policeman had overstepped the legitimate limits of the use of force. Article 5 of the Police Act authorises the use of force against persons who refuse to submit to the lawful requirements of the police. Force can be used only insofar as it is necessary to execute a professional duty, and only after all other possible means have proved themselves to be ineffective. Article 41 of the same law authorises the use of “special measures” (specialiosios priemonės) only in order to stop an activity giving rise to a danger to society, or to an arrest, bringing the person engaged in such activities to the police station. “Special measures” may be used only having regard to the nature of the offence, the personality of the offender and the particular circumstances of the situation. There is also an obligation to make efforts to avoid severe consequences, as well as to warn the person before using such measures against him. The courts did not consider the actions of ST in the light of the requirements of the above law, or those of the Rules on Road Traffic Police [of 26 March 1999]; the courts failed to give reasons for their conclusions regarding the right to use force, its aims and limits.
[The applicant and ST] gave different accounts of the events that led to the fight. If ST’s version - that the applicant had violently resisted police demands - were accepted as truth ... there is no doubt that criminal proceedings should have been instituted against him. However, that was not the case. Nor was [the applicant] held liable for an administrative violation ...
The court of first instance acknowledged that force had been used against the applicant by ST, in the form of applying “special measures”. However, the courts had failed to specify which particular measures had been used. ST had submitted ... that he had only pushed the applicant to the ground once, had twisted his arms behind his back, and had put the handcuffs on with the assistance of MN. This ... use of force clearly contradicts the evidence given by the medical experts, who had established that the injuries to the applicant had been caused by way of no less than five blows.
The fracture of the elbow might have been caused ... by twisting the arm behind the applicant’s back and putting on the handcuffs. The applicant had also sustained other injuries. However, the courts failed to give a reasonable explanation as to the way in which the other injuries may have been caused. Assuming [the truth of] ST’s version that he had only brought the applicant down once, it remains unclear how a wide scratch on the applicant’s vertex and the injuries [elsewhere on his body] were caused, as they must have originated from separate actions. [The applicant’s version of the cause of those injuries] does not contradict the submissions of witnesses. Still, the court refused to believe them, and dismissed their submissions without giving a reasonable explanation, notwithstanding the fact that none of those witnesses had had any interest in giving false evidence.”
On 3 June 2002 the Kaunas Regional Court examined the case at the appeal level, upholding ST’s acquittal. On 10 December 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. The courts concluded that the applicant had assaulted ST by hitting him on the nape of the neck, and that the policemen had properly exercised their right to use force. Moreover, it was deemed highly improbable that ST could have hit the applicant while he was in the back of the police car.
The courts recognised that ST had not used excessive force, and that the applicant had not been beaten after being forced to the ground and handcuffed. They concluded that the evidence had been insufficient to establish ST’s guilt. The submissions of the applicant were considered incoherent and unreliable. While the applicant had stated during his early questioning that he had been hit and kicked on various parts of his body, subsequently he had adjusted his version in accordance with the results of the expert examinations. The evidence given by other independent witnesses was also dismissed as being too incoherent to be relied on.
2. The version of events established by the domestic courts
The following version of the events of 10 February 2000 and their legal assessment were established by the courts.
The applicant used violence against ST in the police car, while the latter was performing his official duty. He refused to obey the order to get out of the car. When the policemen were trying to take him out by force, the applicant was kicking with his legs, breaking a door-handle. Nor did he yield after being taken out of the car. Instead, he grabbed the policemen’s clothes and attempting to hit MN in the face. He was thus brought down close to the police car, his hands being twisted behind his back, and he was handcuffed. As a result, the applicant sustained bodily injuries. ST did not cause any injury deliberately, other than to effect the applicant’s submission. The use of combat action (kovinių veiksmų panaudojimas) in these circumstances was provoked by the unlawful actions of the applicant. There were no other measures which the officers could have employed in view of the applicant’s resistance. In these circumstances, ST did not exceed his authority as a police officer.
The courts also explained the origin of the injuries sustained by the applicant in the following way:
(a) The scratch on the applicant’s vertex (2×1 mm) must have resulted from the applicant hitting his head on the ground during the conflict; it may not have been the outcome of direct blows with a fist, as alleged by the applicant, because in that case he would have sustained larger bruises.
(b) While the experts were not able to give a definite answer as to the origin of the fracture of the applicant’s elbow, they admitted that it may have been the result of ST and MN twisting his arms behind his back in order to handcuff him. The version of the applicant being kicked was thus dismissed.
(c) The bruises on the applicant’s cheek (10×5 mm) and forehead
(5×8 mm) could also have been the result of the applicant having been forced to the ground, in the course of his resistance to the policemen while they were trying to handcuff him. This version did not contradict the results of the medical examinations. Thus the applicant’s allegation that he had suffered direct blows to his face was refuted.
(d) Insofar as the applicant had alleged that he had been hit and kicked on other parts of the body, no signs of other blows were detected in support of these submissions.
It appears that no charges were brought against the applicant for his refusal to submit to the lawful requirements of the police, despite the fact that a report to this effect had been filed by officers ST and MN right after the incident.
B. Relevant domestic law
Article 5 of the Police Act as applicable at the material time provided:
“... If the demands of a police officer are not complied with, the officer shall have the right to use force (panaudoti prievartą), but only to the extent necessary to perform his/her official duties and only after all measures of persuasion have proved to be ineffective. ...”
Article 34 of that Act envisaged the right of the police officer to order the offenders to discontinue their unlawful activities, failing which and provided all measures of persuasion were exhausted, the use of force was permitted.
Article 41 of the Police Act further stated:
“...The police shall use special measures ..., in order to discontinue actions that endanger the public or to apprehend a perpetrator of such actions and bring him/her to the police station. ...
When using special measures ... an officer shall take into account the nature of the offence, the personal features of the offender and other particular circumstances of the situation. ... [T]he police officers shall try to avoid detrimental consequences.
Before using special measures ..., and if the circumstances allow, the person concerned shall be given a warning ...”
Article 43 of the Police Act listed as “special measures”, inter alia, handcuffs, combat action (kovinių veiksmų panaudojimas) and gas. It specified that:
“The police shall have the right to use handcuffs in order to apprehend the perpetrator of dangerous actions and to take him/her to the police station, when there are grounds to believe that he/she can resist or try to evade the arrest.
Handcuffs can be used when ... the actions of a person cause danger to him/herself or other people.
Combat actions can be used in order to detain a person who has committed dangerous actions or to take him/her to the police station, when such a person resists arrest or tries to evade it, as well as in cases where an offender intentionally refuses to obey the lawful requirements or resists the lawful actions of the police. ...
Gas can be used [inter alia] during the arrest ...”
Article 287 § 1 of the Criminal Code as then in force punished abuse of office.
COMPLAINTS
1. Under Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant complained that he had been beaten up by the police and suffered serious injuries as a result.
2. Under Article 6 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the proceedings had been unfair as the courts had been biased, and that they had reached arbitrary conclusions.
3. The applicant also complained that he had experienced less favourable treatment than the policemen in the course of the criminal proceedings, in contravention of Article 14 of the Convention. He alleged in particular that he had been obliged to undergo a psychiatric examination, and that some pre-trial questioning had lasted for up to six hours.
4. Finally, without invoking any Article of the Convention or its Protocols, the applicant complained about the disappearance of the sum of LTL 500 (approximately EUR 147) from his car after it had been searched by the police following the incident of 10 February 2000.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained that the treatment to which he had been subjected by the police officers constituted inhuman and degrading treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, according to which:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
1. The parties’ submissions
The Government alleged that the application was inadmissible as the applicant had failed to observe the six-month time limit. They further argued that the case was in any event inadmissible as the force used against the applicant had not attained the minimum level of severity falling within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention.
In the alternative, they argued that the use of force had been lawful and justified, having been a necessary response to the applicant’s own conduct. In particular, the policemen had reacted to a provocative attack from the applicant by ordering him to get out of the car, and then trying to subdue him as he attempted to escape and resist. The officers had thus acted with the intention of effecting a lawful arrest and had had recourse to force only to a necessary extent. The force used had been proportionate, and the origin of the injuries had been explained in the court decisions, based on forensic expert examinations. The courts had analysed the testimonies supporting the applicant’s version of the events, but had found them unreliable because of various contradictions and incoherencies.
The applicant contested these submissions. He denied having resisted the police officers. Moreover, he reiterated that the violence against him had continued after he had been subdued, and that the beating had been deliberate. His arrest had been purposeless as he had not subsequently been charged with resisting the lawful orders of the police.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Applicable principles
According to the Court’s case-law, Article 3 does not prohibit the use of force for effecting an arrest. However, force may only be used if it is indispensable and must not be excessive (see, among others, Klaas v. Germany, judgment of 22 September 1993, Series A no. 269, p. 17, § 30; Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462/95, §§ 68-78, ECHR 2000-XII; Altay v. Turkey, no. 22279/93, § 54, 22 May 2001; Hulki Güneş v. Turkey, no. 28490/95, § 70, 19 June 2003; Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222/99, §§ 52 and 53, 30 September 2004; Günaydın v. Turkey, no. 27526/95, §§ 30-32, 13 October 2005; Ivan Vasilev v. Bulgaria, no. 48130/99, § 63,
12 April 2007).
As regards the assessment of evidence, the Court has generally applied the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt” (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, pp. 64-65, § 161). Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see, e.g., Zelilof v. Greece, no. 17060/03, § 44, 24 May 2007).
However, the Court has consistently held that, where domestic proceedings have taken place, it is not its task to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic courts and, as a general rule, it is for those courts to assess the evidence before them (see Klaas, cited above, § 29). Although the Court is not bound by the findings of domestic courts, in normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the findings of fact reached by those courts (see Matko
v. Slovenia, no. 43393/98, § 100, 2 November 2006).
Nevertheless, the acquittal of police officers by a national court bound by the presumption of innocence and by the manner in which domestic law regulates the use of force by State agents, does not absolve the State from its responsibility under the Convention (Ribitsch v. Austria, judgment
of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 336, p. 26, § 34). The Court must scrutinise the alleged breach of Article 3 with heightened vigilance, because this provision prohibits inhuman treatment in absolute terms, irrespective of the victim’s conduct (ibid., p. 24, § 32; also see Ivan Vasilev, cited above,
§ 64).
(b) Application of those principles in the present case
As regards the Government’s submission under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Court notes that the application was lodged on 31 May 2003, that is less than five months after the final decision had been taken. Their objection is therefore rejected.
Next, the Court finds it established that, during his arrest, the applicant sustained injury, including a fractured elbow and a number of scratches and bruises. In view of the seriousness of these injuries, the Court accepts that the treatment of the applicant by the police could fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The Court is therefore called upon to determine whether the force used by the police was necessary and proportionate.
Differing versions of how the applicant actually sustained injury were put forward by the applicant and the Government, who referred to the findings of the domestic court.
First, the parties disagree as to who initiated the incident. Whereas the applicant alleged that the tussle had started as a result of the overreaction of Officer ST to his comments, the Government maintained the version supported by the domestic courts that the applicant had himself provoked the use of force by hitting ST. Next, the applicant argued that Officer ST had intentionally hit and kicked him, even after he had been brought down to the ground and restrained. By contrast, the Government reiterated the domestic courts’ findings that the applicant had suffered injury during the wrestle with ST.
The Court observes that the injuries sustained by the applicant appear to be consistent with either of these accounts. The domestic courts, however, supported the police version, finding that the applicant had been injured while resisting lawful arrest, and that no excessive force had been used. In reaching their decisions, the courts had the benefit of seeing and hearing the various witnesses and evaluating their credibility, as well as the other evidence. There is no indication of arbitrariness in the domestic courts’ conclusions.
The Court takes into account the applicant’s argument that no charges for disobeying police orders were brought against him. Whilst this element indeed might cause scepticism, the Court cannot conclude that it is enough to cast doubt on the Government’s version of the events, particularly as the applicant’s conduct was subjected to close scrutiny by the criminal courts in the prosecution of ST.
The Court thus observes that no cogent elements have been provided which could call into question the findings of the national courts and support the applicant’s complaints. Accordingly, the Court is unable to find, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the applicant’s allegations as to the unnecessary use of force by the police are substantiated (see Klaas
v. Germany, cited above, §§ 30 and 31; also see, mutatis mutandis, Assenov, cited above, § 92; Jasar v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
no 69908/01, §§ 53-54, 15 February 2007).
It follows that the applicant’s complaint based on the substantive limb of Article 3 must be dismissed as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant complained that the courts had been biased in favour of the police and, therefore, they had failed to reach their conclusions based on an objective assessment of the evidence. The Court considers that these complaints fall to be examined under the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention, cited above.
1. The parties’ submissions
The Government submitted that the investigation had commenced immediately after the complaint had been lodged by the applicant. The inquiry had been thorough and had included two medical expert examinations, the hearing of 38 witnesses, inter alia those who had testified in the applicant’s favour, an on-site verification of evidence and many other investigatory measures. There had been no contradictions in the results of the expert examinations, and the courts had reached reasoned conclusions, dismissing as incoherent witness testimony in the applicant’s favour. Finally, the investigation had been completed without delay.
The applicant submitted that the decision to undertake repeated expert examinations had been deliberately aimed at obtaining results more favourable to the police. He contested the expert conclusions as to the origin of the large bruise on his forearm. The applicant also questioned the courts’ findings for being based mainly on the evidence supporting the police version of events. He alleged that the courts had been too ready to dismiss the submissions of the independent eye-witnesses.
2. The Court’s assessment
(a) Applicable principles
The Court recalls that Article 3 ensures the right to a thorough and effective domestic investigation of any credible assertion of ill-treatment, leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for such conduct (see Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgements and Decisions 1998-VIII, p. 3288, § 102; Labita
v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 131, ECHR 2000-IV; Matko, cited above,
§ 84).
The investigation must be effective in the sense that it is capable of leading to a determination of whether the force used by the police was or was not justified in the circumstances (Matko, cited above, § 85).
It must also be thorough. This means that the authorities must make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or base their decisions. They must take all reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence (Matko, cited above, § 86).
Finally, the investigation must be expeditious. In cases under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention, where the effectiveness of the official investigation was at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time (see, among others, Labita, cited above, § 133; Matko, cited above, § 87).
(b) Application of those principles in the present case
In the present case, the criminal proceedings were brought against the police officers implicated in the events, although the charges against MN were subsequently dropped in view of the lack of any indication that he had committed a criminal act. The Court further notes that during the investigation 38 people, including the policemen involved as well as all the independent eye-witnesses to the incident, were questioned. Two separate expert opinions were produced, preceded by an expert examination carried out upon the applicant’s request. The applicant did not question before the domestic courts the independence or competence of the experts appointed by the prosecution. In any event, the Court observes that the results of all the expert examinations were similar. Overall, it is hard to see what other investigative measures could have been undertaken, or what was omitted from the investigation.
The case was then examined by the courts at three levels of jurisdiction, including a remittal to the appellate instance. When remitting the case
on 23 October 2001, the Supreme Court made a detailed assessment of the shortcomings in the courts’ reasoning and pointed out the aspects which needed further clarification. These directions were duly followed in the subsequent court decisions. ST was eventually acquitted because of the lack of unequivocal evidence of his guilt.
The Court further notes that the investigation was opened promptly after receipt of the applicant’s complaint on 15 February 2000, and the final decision was taken on 10 December 2002 - i.e. within slightly less than 2 years and 10 months. That period may be considered acceptable, given the absence of any indication that the domestic authorities were inactive, and the different levels of jurisdiction involved (see, mutatis mutandis, Berliński v. Poland, nos. 27715/95 and 30209/96, § 69, 20 June 2002; also see, by contrast, Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 133, ECHR 2000-IV).
Against this background, the Court concludes that the investigation into the applicant’s allegations of ill-treatment was thorough and effective. It follows that the applicant’s complaints about the proceedings are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
3. To the extent that the applicant’s complaints were brought under Article 6 of the Convention, they must be dismissed as being incompatible ratione materiae with that provision, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. The Court recalls in this respect that Article 6 does not guarantee the right, as such, to have criminal proceedings instituted against other persons (see, e.g., Chizhov v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 6962/02, 6 May 2003). Nor was Article 6 applicable under its civil head, given that the applicant did not pursue any civil claim.
4. The applicant further alleged that his procedural position had been less favourable than that of the police, as he had been referred for a psychiatric examination and had been subjected to lengthy questioning. He invoked Article 14 of the Convention.
Even assuming that this Article 14 complaint could be linked to the procedural limb of Article 3 of the Convention, it should in any event be dismissed for failure to exhaust domestic remedies - the applicant did not raise the matter before the domestic courts.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4.
5. Finally, the applicant alleged that the police had been responsible for the disappearance of the money which had been in his car. However, he did not bring a separate complaint in this respect before the domestic courts.
Accordingly, this complaint must also be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
Having regard to the above conclusions, the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention to the case should be discontinued.
For these reasons, the Court by a majority
Declares the application inadmissible.
S. DolléF. Tulkens
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy