Communicated on 15 May 2018
FIRST SECTION
Application no. 69291/12
Ekaterini PELEKI
against Greece
lodged on 22 October 2012
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
In May 2007 the Hellenic Public Real-Estate Corporation (Κτηματική Εταιρία Δημοσίου – ΚΕΔ) and the Holy and Great Monastery of Vatopedi signed a deed by which they agreed to exchange two pieces of land. By the said deed, the Holy and Great Monastery of Vatopedi became owner of a piece of land measuring 860,8 hectares situated near Ouranoupoli in Chalkidiki.
The applicant was the notary before whom the deed was signed.
In disciplinary proceedings against her, a disciplinary penalty (temporary cessation of functions) was imposed on her, on account of the fact that the land was protected under law no. 3028/2002 “for the protection of antiquities and of the cultural heritage in general” and, therefore, its transfer was not possible. According to the applicant, the public prosecutor at the Disciplinary Council of First-Instance, after having made his submissions, did not retire at the end of the hearing but participated in the deliberations. She complains under Article 6 about the disciplinary proceedings conducted against her.
QUESTIONS tO THE PARTIES
1. Does Article 6 of the Convention apply to the disciplinary proceedings conducted against the applicant under its civil limb (see Durand v. France (dec.), no. 10212/07, 31 January 2012) or under its criminal limb, as argued by the applicant?
2. Was the obligation to give reasons for its decisions and judgments violated by the Court of Cassation in its judgment no. 916/2012 given the manner in which it replied to the applicant’s complaint about the refusal of the Disciplinary Council of First-Instance to give an opportunity to her lawyers to make oral pleadings?
3. Having regard to:
a) the applicant’s complaint that her attorneys were not able to make oral pleadings after the public prosecutor’s submissions before the Disciplinary Council of First-Instance and
b) the applicant’s complaint about the participation of the public prosecutor in the deliberations of the Disciplinary Council of First-Instance,
did the applicant have a fair hearing, as required by Article 6 of the Convention? In particular, were the principles of equality of arms and of adversarial procedure observed in the present case?
4. Assuming that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable under its criminal limb:
(a) were the proceedings against the applicant fair within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 having regard to the repeated changes to the charges against her?
(b) was the applicant informed in sufficient detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against her, as required by Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention? Was the applicant afforded adequate time and facilities to prepare her defence, as required by Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention?
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy