THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 33544/08
Artan PERDEDA
against Albania
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 11 October 2022 as a Committee composed of:
Andreas Zünd, President,
Darian Pavli,
Frédéric Krenc, judges,
and Olga Chernishova, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 33544/08) against the Republic of Albania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 2 July 2008 by an Albanian national, Mr Artan Perdeda, who was born in 1972 and lives in Fier (“the applicant”) who was represented by Ms E. Deshati, a lawyer practising in Tirana;
the decision to give notice of the application to the Albanian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Alma Hicka, State Advocate General;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. On 13 April 2000 the applicant was remanded in custody on, inter alia, the criminal charge of murder.
2. On 26 December 2001 he was acquitted by the trial court and released from detention. Following the prosecutor’s appeal, the case was remitted to the trial court.
3. After several remittals, on 10 October 2004 the prosecutor decided to discontinue the proceedings against the applicant.
4. On 22 November 2005 the applicant brought a civil action seeking 3,110,000 Albanian leks (“ALL, approximately 23,900 euros (EUR) at the time), for his “unjust” detention between 13 April 2000 and 26 December 2001 (622 days). He further requested an award of ALL 1,500,000 for tarnishing his honour and reputation.
5. On 16 March 2006 the Fier District Court (“the District Court”) awarded the applicant compensation in the amount of ALL 311,000 (approximately EUR 2,400 at the time) in relation to the period of unjust detention of 622 days, thus awarding the applicant ALL 500 per day. It further awarded the applicant ALL 300,000 (approximately EUR 2,330 at the time) in respect of non-pecuniary damage on account of the applicant’s tarnished reputation. The court, relying on the evidence given by the applicant’s family members, held that the charge against the applicant had given rise, in the public opinion, to suspicions that he was the de facto perpetrator. The ties that the applicant and his family members used to have with neighbours and relatives were severed. The detention tarnished the applicant’s reputation and it prevented him from founding a family.
6. The applicant appealed against the decision. He submitted that the District Court had unjustly considered him unemployed, because he was working as an irregular immigrant in Greece. According to the applicant, the District Court should have awarded him ALL 5,000 per each day of detention.
7. On 30 January 2007 the Vlora Court of Appeal upheld the award made for the “unjust” detention. The Court of Appeal quashed the award made in respect of the applicant’s reputation, for lack of substantiation. It held that the applicant was not able to prove that his detention blemished the reputation and honour of his family or that he was labelled or stigmatised in the social and family environment. His family members did not prove that their ties with other relatives had severed.
8. On 28 February 2007 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court raising the same grounds of appeal.
9. On 12 March 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the appeal since it did not contain any legal grounds as provided for in Article 472 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
Article 5 § 510. The applicant complained that he had not received adequate compensation for his detention. He relied on Article 5 § 5 and Article 8 of the Convention. Having regard to the nature of the applicant’s complaints, the Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of a case, considers that the issues raised in the present case should be examined solely from the perspective of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention (compare D.G. v. Ireland, no. 39474/98, § 110, ECHR 2002-III, and Venskutė v. Lithuania, no. 10645/08, § 83, 11 December 2012).
11. The Court has held that Article 5 § 5 is complied with where it is possible to apply for compensation in respect of deprivation of liberty effected in conditions contrary to paragraphs 1, 2, 3 or 4 (see Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 36760/06, § 182, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2012-I; and Kocamiş and Kurt v. Turkey, no. 227/13, § 38, 25 January 2022). The right to compensation set forth in Article 5 § 5 therefore presupposes that a violation of one of the preceding paragraphs of Article 5 has been established, either by a domestic authority or by the Court (see N.C. v. Italy [GC], no. 24952/94, § 49, ECHR 2002‑X; and Kerem Çiftçi v. Turkey, no. 35205/09, § 37, 21 December 2021). In the present case the national court established that the applicant’s detention had been “unjust” because he had been acquitted of charges against him, and they also noted the long duration of the proceedings that resulted in the applicant’s acquittal. Given that finding of the national courts and that the applicant was in detention for 622 days, which prima facie appears excessive, the Court accepts that the applicant’s detention was contrary to the guarantees of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. It follows that Article 5 § 5 is applicable.
12. As regards an applicant’s victim status, the Court has held that a decision or measure favourable to an applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive the applicant of his or her status as a “victim” unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention. An applicant’s status as a victim of a breach of the Convention may depend on compensation being awarded at domestic level on the basis of the facts about which he or she complains before the Court. The adequacy of that redress falls to be assessed in the light of all the circumstances of the case seen as a whole (see Jurišić v. Croatia, no. 29419/17, § 95, 16 January 2020, with further references).
13. Turning to the present case, the Court observes that the national courts established that the applicant’s detention had been unjust on the ground, inter alia, of its long duration. In the Court’s opinion, such an acknowledgment satisfies the first condition laid down in its case-law in respect of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention.
14. As regards the second condition, the Court notes that the applicant was awarded approximately EUR 2,400 in damages for such unjustified detention (see paragraph 5 above). That compensation is not unreasonable compared to what the Court would have been likely to award in comparable cases under Article 41 of the Convention (see Zehni Doğan v. Turkey, no. 1515/04, § 36, 2 February 2010; Đermanović v. Serbia, no. 48497/06, § 89, 23 February 2010; Degeratu v. Romania, no. 35104/02, § 69, 6 July 2010; Vasilkoski and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 28169/08, § 70, 28 October 2010; Dzhabarov and Others v. Bulgaria, nos. 6095/11 and 2 others, § 91, 31 March 2016; Didov v. Bulgaria, no. 27791/09, § 48, 17 March 2016; and Sahakyan v. Armenia, no. 66256/11, § 40, 10 November 2015). The Court therefore considers that the sum awarded to the applicant can be considered sufficient, and that it therefore constitutes appropriate redress for the violations suffered (see, for the relevant principles, Cocchiarella v. Italy [GC], no. 64886/01, §§ 65-107, ECHR 2006 V). The applicant can thus no longer claim to be a “victim”, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of the alleged violation of his rights under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention.
15. It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 thereof.
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention16. The general principles as regards the length of proceedings are summarised in the case of Frydlender v. France ([GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
17. In the present case the length of the overall proceedings lasted four years, three months and eighteen days, of which three years and twelve days before the Supreme Court.
18. As to the conduct of the applicant, there is nothing to suggest that he contributed to the length of proceedings.
19. As to the conduct of the national courts, there were no delays in the proceedings before the first instance and appeal courts. However, the proceedings before the Supreme Court might appear somewhat lengthy.
20. As to what was at stake for the applicant, the Court notes that his claim for compensation on account of his unjust detention may be considered as an important issue. The proceedings before the first instance and appeal courts were speedily concluded and the applicant’s right to compensation after the adoption of the appeal judgment became enforceable. Therefore, the proceedings before the Supreme Court were no longer decisive for the applicant to obtain the compensation awarded to him.
21. The Court has held that the fairness of proceedings is to be assessed in respect of the proceedings as a whole. While the length of proceedings before the Supreme Court might appear somewhat long, the Court notes that the overall length of four years, three months and eighteen days before three levels of jurisdiction cannot be seen as excessive. Given the overall length of proceedings and the fact that the award of damages to the applicant had become final and therefore enforceable when the Vlora Court of Appeal upheld the first instance judgment, that is to say irrespective of the proceedings before the Supreme Court, the Court is ready to accept that in the particular circumstances of the present case the overall length of proceedings was in compliance with the requirements of a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (compare Süssman v. Germany, no. 20024/92, 16 September 1996; Krasuski v. Poland, no. 61444/00, §§ 57 and 58, 14 June 2005; and Gassner v. Austria, no. 38314/06, §§ 37 and 38, 11 December 2012).
22. Accordingly, this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 10 November 2022.
Olga Chernishova Andreas Zünd
Deputy Registrar President