FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 50014/15
Zvonimir PERŠA
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 8 March 2022 as a Committee composed of:
Péter Paczolay, President,
Alena Poláčková,
Davor Derenčinović, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 50014/15) against Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 2 October 2015 by a Croatian national, Mr Zvonimir Perša, who was born in 1953 and lives in Zagreb (“the applicant”);
the decision to give notice of the complaint concerning the applicant’s property rights to the Croatian Government (“the Government”), represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik, and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the allegedly unreasonable costs of civil proceedings, which the applicant was ordered to pay as a result of his litigation against the State.
2. In the period between 1990 and 1998 the applicant, who is a lawyer, deposited his savings with company S. (“the company”). In 1998 the company’s accounts were frozen because of unpaid debts. In 2005 the Zagreb Commercial Court opened and immediately closed the summary bankruptcy proceedings against the company because its funds were insufficient to cover even the costs of the bankruptcy proceedings. Shortly afterwards the company was removed from the register of commercial companies. Consequently, the applicant lost his savings.
3. On 7 July 2009 the applicant, represented by a lawyer, brought a civil action against the State seeking damages in the amount of 427,549.25 Croatian kunas (HRK – approximately 57,000 euros (EUR)). He argued that the State had been liable for his loss because it had failed to supervise the company’s activities in the period before 1998. Had it done so, he would not have deposited his savings with the company.
4. On 28 April 2010 the Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. That judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court on 13 May 2014. The national courts found that even though there had been certain irregularities in the operation of the relevant State authorities responsible for supervising the company’s activities, there had not been a sufficient causal link between those irregularities and the pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant – who himself had not been sufficiently cautious when depositing his savings – so as to render the State liable for his losses.
5. The applicant was also ordered to pay the State HRK 15,000 (approximately EUR 2,000) in costs of proceedings for the State’s representation by the State Attorney’s Office.
6. The applicant’s subsequent constitutional complaint was dismissed on 19 March 2015. That decision was served on him on 13 April 2015.
7. The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the costs of proceedings that he had been ordered to pay to the State had been excessive and in breach of his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
8. The Court considers it unnecessary to address the Government’s preliminary objections in the case, as the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
9. The relevant general principles concerning unreasonably high costs of proceedings have been summarised in Čolić v. Croatia (no. 49083/18, §§ 39‑44, 18 November 2021), Cindrić and Bešlić v. Croatia (no. 72152/13, §§ 91-109, 6 September 2016), and Klauz v. Croatia (no. 28963/10, §§ 76-85, 18 July 2013).
10. The Court has previously held that unreasonable costs of proceedings may indeed raise an issue under the Convention primarily in cases in which a party succeeds with the grounds of the civil claim, but not with its entire amount and where the costs of proceedings thus “consume” a large portion or even the entirety of the financial award in the case (see Čolić, § 46, and Klauz, § 76, both cited above). The Court has further accepted that high litigation costs may exceptionally also raise an issue in cases in which a party has been completely unsuccessful with the grounds of the claim, in situations where that party could for some reason not predict his or her own prospects of success (see, Čolić, cited above, § 47).
11. In the present case, the applicant’s order to pay the State’s representation by the State Attorney’s Office amounted to an interference with his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possession and was in accordance with the law (see Cindrić and Bešlić, cited above, §§ 92-93). It also pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the proper administration of justice and protecting the rights of others (ibid., § 96).
12. As to whether the applicant had been able to predict the outcome of his case, the Court notes that almost a year and a half before he brought his civil action, the Supreme Court had delivered a decision in a very similar case from which it was clear that the applicant’s claim was ill-founded. What is more, the same reasoning was confirmed in several subsequent Supreme Court decisions, all delivered before the applicant brought his civil action (see, a contrario, Cindrić and Bešlić, cited above, §§ 106-07). Therefore, the applicant, who was himself a lawyer and was represented by another lawyer, could not have been unaware that his claim lacked reasonable prospects of success and the risks involved in bringing such an action.
13. Consequently, the applicant’s case did not concern a situation in which his claim had been well-founded, but the amount of costs awarded to his opponent had been so excessive that it “consumed” the successful part of his claim (contrast Čolić, cited above, §§ 49-51, and Klauz, cited above, §§ 91-93). Nor did it concern a situation where the domestic courts’ jurisprudence had been unclear at the time of bringing his action (contrast Cindrić and Bešlić, cited above, §§ 106-07).
14. In addition, the Court notes that the amount of the costs of the proceedings to be paid by the applicant does not appear unreasonably high compared to the value of the subject matter of the dispute (see paragraph 5 above). Finally, the applicant did not show that paying the amount ordered by the national courts in respect of costs had been particularly burdensome for him given his financial situation (see, a contrario, Cindrić and Bešlić, cited above, § 109).
15. It follows that this application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 31 March 2022.
Liv Tigerstedt Péter Paczolay
Deputy Registrar President