FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 50000/12
Mario PETEK
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 20 February 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Aleš Pejchal, President,
Armen Harutyunyan,
Jovan Ilievski, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 July 2012,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Mario Petek, is a Croatian national who was born in 1983 and lives in Glina. He was represented before the Court by Mr R. Čogurić, a lawyer practising in Zagreb.
2. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Minor offences proceedings
4. On 4 September 2009 the Ivanić Grad Minor Offences Court found the applicant guilty of road traffic offences, in that on 15 July 2009 he had caused a road accident while driving under the influence of alcohol and had not fastened his seat belt. He was fined 5,500 Croatian kunas (HRK) and a twelve-month driving ban was imposed. That judgment became final on 18 September 2009.
2. Proceedings on indictment
5. On 1 October 2009 the applicant was indicted in the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court on charges of driving under the influence of alcohol on 15 July 2009 and causing a road accident in which one person had suffered grievous bodily injuries resulting in his death.
6. On 9 February 2010 the applicant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, and a driving ban of the same duration was imposed.
7. In a subsequent appeal the applicant did not raise the issue of his being tried twice for the same offence. On 26 April 2010 the Velika Gorica County Court upheld the applicant’s conviction.
8. The applicant then lodged a request for extraordinary review of the final judgment by the Supreme Court. He argued, inter alia, that the ne bis in idem rule had been violated because he had already been convicted of the same offence by the minor offences court. In that respect, the Supreme Court found that the applicant had not been convicted of causing death to a person in the minor offences proceedings, but only of drink-driving and not having fastened his seat belt. The Supreme Court upheld the lower courts’ judgments on 28 September 2010.
9. In a subsequent constitutional complaint the applicant again complained that he had been tried twice for the same offence. It was dismissed by the Constitutional Court on 16 March 2012 on the same grounds as those given by the Supreme Court.
B. Relevant domestic law
10. The relevant part of the Code on Criminal Procedure (Zakon o kaznenom postupku, Official Gazette nos. 152/2008, 76/2009, 80/2011, 91/2012) reads:
Principles of criminal proceedings
Article 12
“(1) No one shall be criminally prosecuted for an offence for which he has been tried and in respect of which a final court judgment has been issued.
...”
Article 452
“A judgment dismissing the charges shall be issued where:
...
5. in respect of the same offence, the accused has already been finally convicted, acquitted, or the proceedings against him have been finally terminated.
...”
Grounds for appeal
Article 469
“There is an infringement of the Criminal Code where [the Code] has been infringed as regards the question of:
...
3. whether there are circumstances which exclude criminal prosecution, and in particular ... whether the case has been finally adjudicated upon;
...”
COMPLAINT
11. The applicant complained under Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention that he had been tried and punished twice for the same offence.
THE LAW
Article 4 of Protocol No. 7
12. The applicant complained that he had been tried and punished twice in respect of the event of 15 July 2009. He relied on Article 4 of Protocol No. 7, the relevant part of which reads as follows:
“1. No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same State for an offence for which he has already been finally acquitted or convicted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of that State.
...”
1. The parties’ arguments
13. The Government argued that the applicant had not properly exhausted domestic remedies, because he had raised the issue of his being tried and punished twice for the first time in his request for extraordinary review of a final judgment, and then also in his constitutional complaint. However, he should have raised that objection as soon as his first conviction had become final, that is to say during the trial before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court, and certainly in his appeal against the first-instance judgment issued in the proceedings on indictment.
14. The applicant maintained that by raising the relevant issue before the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court he had properly exhausted domestic remedies.
2. The Court’s assessment
15. In accordance with Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Court may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted. The purpose of Article 35 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, for example, Gherghina v. Romania [GC] (dec.), no. 42219/07, § 84, 9 July 2015).
16. The obligation to exhaust domestic remedies therefore requires applicants to make normal use of remedies which are available and sufficient in respect of their Convention grievances. The existence of the remedies in question must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. To be effective, a remedy must be capable of remedying directly the impugned state of affairs and must offer reasonable prospects of success (ibid., § 85).
17. The Court notes that the applicant did not raise the issue of his being tried and punished twice either during his trial before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court or in his appeal against the first-instance judgment issued on 9 February 2010. The Court has already held that complaints regarding a lack of fairness in proceedings are best addressed in the proceedings in connection with which such complaints are raised (see Tarbuk v. Croatia, no. 31360/10, § 33, 11 December 2012). The same is true as to the ne bis in idem rule.
18. The Court notes that the ne bis in idem rule is one of the principles of criminal proceedings in Croatia (see Article 12 of the Code on Criminal Procedure, paragraph 10 above). Where, in respect of the same offence, the accused has already been finally convicted or acquitted, or the proceedings against him have been finally terminated, a judgment dismissing the charges is to be issued (see Article 452 of the Code on Criminal Procedure, cited in paragraph 10 above). However, a trial court could hardly know whether an accused had already been finally convicted or acquitted of the same offence unless the defence raised such an objection. Despite the fact that the applicant’s conviction in minor offences proceedings had become final in September 2009 and his trial before the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court lasted until February 2010, the applicant at no time during that period informed the Ivanić Grad Municipal Court of his conviction by the minor offences court.
19. Moreover, an infringement of the ne bis in idem rule is also ground for an appeal against a first-instance judgment. Therefore, there is no doubt that an appeal against the first-instance judgment was a proper remedy for the applicant’s grievances. However, the applicant did not raise that issue in his appeal. Indeed, he raised it for the first time in his request for extraordinary review of the final judgment before the Supreme Court and then in his constitutional complaint.
20. In several cases concerning Croatia the Court has already considered that applicants had properly exhausted domestic remedies by raising the same complaints they raised before the Court throughout the domestic proceedings, and that that was the normal use of the domestic remedies, as required by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see Tarbuk, cited above, § 32; Zrilić v. Croatia, no. 46726/11, §§ 46-48, 3 October 2013; Horvatić v. Croatia, no. 36044/09, § 70, 17 October 2013; and Marić v. Croatia, no. 50132/12, § 53, 12 June 2014). By not complying with these requirements, the applicant in the present case has not properly exhausted domestic remedies.
21. Accordingly, the application must be rejected under Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 15 March 2018.
Renata DegenerAleš Pejchal
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy