FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 35999/97
by Aaro PIETILÄINEN
against Finland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 5 March 2002 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrA. Pastor Ridruejo,
MrJ. Makarczyk,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrR. Maruste,
MrS. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 29 April 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Aaro Pietiläinen, is a Finnish national, who was born in 1943 and lives in Laukaa. He is represented before the Court by Mr Tuomo Tapper, a lawyer practising in Jyväskylä. The respondent Government are represented by their Agents, Mr Holger Rotkirch, Director General for Legal Affairs, and Mr Arto Kosonen, Director, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 5 January 1987 criminal investigations were instituted against the applicant who was taken into police custody the same day in respect of, inter alia, alleged tax frauds. He was released on 16 January 1987.
On 10 May 1990 Finland ratified the Convention.
On 5 July and 31 August 1990 the applicant was summoned to appear before the Helsinki City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätt, as from 1 December 1993 Helsinki District Court, käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt) indicted for several aggravated tax frauds. The alleged offences concerned import of parts of vehicles and failure to pay relevant tax for them. The first hearing before the District Court was held on 14 November 1990. The complainants and one of the four defendants, MI, had not yet been summoned. The Public Prosecutor charged the applicant with ten aggravated tax frauds, some of which he had allegedly committed together with other defendants, including MI. The applicant’s lawyer asked to be allowed to reply to the charges later. At the request of the Public Prosecutor the case was adjourned until 3 April 1991.
At the second hearing on 3 April 1991 the applicant denied all the charges. Concerning the alleged offences in complicity with MI, the applicant stressed MI’s role in the events and his greater knowledge of the subject. Two complainants and the defendant MI had still not been summoned. At the request of the Public Prosecutor and the National Board of Customs, which was one of the complainants, the case was adjourned until 29 May 1991.
At the third hearing on 29 May 1991 the National Board of Customs submitted claims for damages. The applicant’s lawyer denied the claims and said he would revert to the question of damages in a later hearing. The defendant MI had still not been summoned to appear before the City Court. The Public Prosecutor requested an adjournment in order to have MI summoned and to submit further clarification to certain questions. His request was not opposed. The next hearing was ordered to be on 16 October 1991.
At the fourth hearing on 16 October 1991 the applicant was heard in person. His lawyer also clarified the reply to the claims of the National Board of Customs. The Public Prosecutor stated that MI had not yet been contacted and requested an adjournment in order to have him summoned. The applicant left the request for an adjournment to the City Court’s discretion. The case was adjourned until 4 December 1991.
At the fifth hearing on 4 December 1991 the Public Prosecutor stated that MI had still not been summoned and requested a further adjournment. The applicant left the request to the City Court’s discretion. The case was adjourned until 13 May 1992.
At the sixth hearing on 13 May 1992 the Public Prosecutor requested the case to be adjourned until further notice since MI’s place of residence was not known. The applicant left the case to be decided for his part. The City Court considered that it was necessary to hear MI before giving a decision on the charges against the applicant. Furthermore, the National Board of Customs had not yet given its decision concerning the appeals against the post-clearance decisions. The City Court, therefore, adjourned the case until further notice of the date of the next hearing would be given.
The National Board of Customs and the Supreme Administrative Court gave decisions concerning the appeals against the post-clearance decisions on 20 April 1993 and 15 December 1993 respectively.
In March 1994 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Chancellor of Justice (oikeuskansleri, justitiekansler). The complaint concerned the City Court’s decision to adjourn his case until further notice.
The seventh hearing before the District Court (the former City Court) was held on 31 August 1994. MI had been summoned but he was absent from the hearing. At the request of the Public Prosecutor, which was not objected to, the case was adjourned until 21 September 1994.
At the eighth hearing on 21 September 1994 MI appeared before the District Court to reply to the charges. He and the applicant were examined as regards their complicity in the alleged offences. At the request of MI, which was not objected to, the case was adjourned until 9 November 1994.
At the last hearing on 9 November 1994 the applicant submitted that the length of the proceedings should be taken into account when assessing his possible punishment. The District Court convicted the applicant of a repetitive offence, consisting of four tax frauds, an aggravated tax fraud and aiding and abetting in two tax frauds and in two aggravated tax frauds, and sentenced him to six months’ suspended imprisonment. In the reasoning for the sentence the length of the proceedings was not mentioned.
On 17 October 1995 the Deputy Chancellor of Justice (apulaisoikeus-kansleri, justitiekanslersadjoint) gave his decision on the applicant’s complaint, finding no breach of official duties on the part of the City Court’s members or of the Public Prosecutor nor any reason to take further measures in the matter.
The Public Prosecutor and the defendants appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätt). The applicant requested, inter alia, that the length of the proceedings should be taken into consideration when assessing his sentence. On 4 June 1996 the Court of Appeal, as regards the applicant, upheld the District Court’s decision without giving any further reasons.
The applicant sought leave to appeal from the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) renewing his request that the length of the proceedings be taken into account in the assessment of his sentence. On 26 November 1996 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law as in force at the relevant time
Chapter 16, Section 4, Subsection 1 (30.4.1987/452), of the Code of Judicial Procedure (oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken) provided:
“When a party requests an adjournment in order to submit further evidence or for some other reason, the case must be adjourned, if the court finds grounds for it. The date for a new hearing must be set at the same time. A court cannot adjourn a case of its own motion unless necessary under particular circumstances. ...”
As from 1 December 1993 the rules concerning adjournment of cases were amended (amendment 22.7.1991/1052). As regards criminal cases, the above-mentioned provision of law remained essentially unchanged. Furthermore, Chapter 16, Section 5, of the Code of Judicial Procedure provided:
“When it is important to wait for a decision of another tribunal or some other body before a decision is given in a pending case, or when some other long-lasting impediment exists, a court may order that the hearing of the case will not be pursued until that obstacle ceases to exist.”
According to Chapter 14, Section 7a (19.4.1991/708), of the Code of Judicial Procedure, which came into force on 1 April 1992, charges against defendants accused of committing the same offence must, in principle, be tried together.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings in his case exceeded a reasonable time.
THE LAW
The applicant’s complaint relates to the length of the proceedings, which began on 5 May 1987 when the applicant was taken into police custody and the criminal investigation against him was commenced. According to the applicant, the period to be taken into account within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention began on 10 May 1990 when the Convention entered into force with respect to Finland. The proceedings ended on 26 November 1996 with the Supreme Court’s decision not to grant the applicant leave to appeal. The applicant submits that the length of proceedings to be taken into account therefore lasted six years six months and sixteen days.
According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government, according to whom the proceedings at issue began on 5 July 1990, reject the allegation.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy