AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 12175/86
by P. H. and
H. H.
against the United Kingdom
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 12 May 1988, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
G. SPERDUTI
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
G. BATLINER
H. VANDENBERGHE
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 4 September
1985 by P. H. and H. H. against the United Kingdom and registered on
22 May 1986 under file No. 12175/86;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The first applicant, Ms. P. H. is a British citizen, born in
1948, and resident in London. She is a press and broadcasting
secretary by profession. In the 1983 general election she was a
parliamentary candidate for the Labour Party.
The second applicant, Ms. H. H. is a British citizen, born in
1950 and resident in London. She is a solicitor and Labour Member of
Parliament.
Both applicants are represented, in the proceedings before the
Commission, by Ms. Madeleine Colvin, Legal Officer, National Council
for Civil Liberties (NCCL).
The application arises out of the alleged surveillance of the
applicants by a branch of the Security Service (MI5). The facts as
submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.
The first applicant was General Secretary of the NCCL between
September 1983 and May 1984. The second applicant was employed as
legal officer by the NCCL from 1978 until 1982.
The NCCL is an unincorporated association whose aim is to
assist in the maintenance of civil liberties, including freedom of
speech, propaganda and assembly. The Council advances measures for
the recovery and enlargement of such liberties in the United Kingdom.
Pursuant to its Constitution, the Council is a non-party and
non-denominational organisation. In order to achieve its aims the
Council takes steps such as briefing and lobbying members of
Parliament, submitting evidence to official enquiries, conducting
research, issuing publications, and taking test cases to local and
international courts. It sometimes sends impartial observers to
monitor demonstrations as part of its functions to defend the right of
freedom of assembly, but it does not sponsor or organise
demonstrations of any kind.
The United Kingdom Government established for the exclusive
purpose of the Defence of the Realm a Security Service which has
direct access to the Prime Minister. The division of that service
responsible for monitoring and combating internal subversion is known
as MI5. The activities of the Security Service are governed by the
published Directive of the Home Secretary to the Director-General of
the Service, a Crown Servant, dated 24 September 1952 ("the
Directive") as follows:
"1. In your appointment as Director-General of the Security
Service you will be responsible to the Home Secretary
personally. The Security Service is not, however, a part of
the Home Office. On appropriate occasion you will have
right of direct access to the Prime Minister.
2. The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of
the country. Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a
whole, from external and internal dangers arising from
attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of
persons and organisations whether directed from within or
without the country, which may be judged to be subversive to
the State.
3. You will take special care to see that the work of the
Security Service is strictly limited to what is necessary
for the purposes of this task.
4. It is essential that the Security Service should be kept
absolutely free from any political bias or influence and
nothing should be done that might lend colour to any
suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any
particular section of the community, or with any other
matter than the Defence of the Realm as a whole.
5. No enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any
Government Department unless you are satisfied that an
important public interest bearing on the Defence of the
Realm, as defined in paragraph 2, is at stake.
6. You and your staff will maintain the well-established
convention whereby Ministers do not concern themselves with
the detailed information which may be obtained by the
Security Service in particular cases, but are furnished with
such information only as may be necessary for the
determination of any issue on which guidance is sought."
Members of the Security Service are public officials but
unlike, for example, police officers, immigration officers or officers
of HM Customs and Excise, they have conferred on them no special
powers whether under any law or by virtue of the Directive. Members
of the Service are Crown Servants, subject to the disciplinary control
of the Crown but are otherwise in no position different from private
citizens. Their activities are constrained by the criminal law and
the law of torts in the same way as the activities of citizens
generally are so constrained. They are thus liable to criminal
prosecution and civil proceedings in the same manner as ordinary
citizens.
As revealed by a former officer of MI5 on a television
programme broadcast on 8 March 1985 and in an affidavit dated and
sworn for the purposes of judicial review proceedings in another case
both applicants were classified as subversive and as communist
sympathisers due to their prominent participation in the activities of
the National Council for Civil Liberties.
The applicants claim that these "grave libels" were published
within MI5 and were available for publication to other agencies with
whom MI5 has a relationship. For example, the file concerning the
second applicant would have been sent to the Cabinet Office on her
election as an M.P. and would be used to assess her fitness for
inclusion on parliamentary committees dealing with highly classified
information. The files relating to the applicants recorded details of
passport applications, data from surveillance by local police Special
Branches and special agents, and references to them or by them picked
up under warrants issued in relation to other persons directly subject
to telephone or mail intercepts. Such intercepts, in the second
applicant's case, are likely to include confidential conversations
which she, as a practising solicitor, had with certain of her clients.
The first applicant's file included information about her personal
relationship with a former member of the Communist Party.
The applicants also state that surveillance of both applicants
was continued after they had left the National Council for Civil
Liberties on the basis that they were candidates for elected office.
Such surveillance, it is alleged, might hinder their political career
or other appointment to public office.
By letter dated 29 March 1985 addressed to the General
Secretary of the NCCL, the Home Secretary declined to order an enquiry
into the matters of which the applicants complain and failed to
provide an assurance that they or the NCCL is not a target of secret
surveillance.
The above allegations are neither confirmed nor denied by the
respondent Government. They point out that the policy of successive
Governments of the United Kingdom is not to disclose information about
the operations of the Security Service or to comment on particular
allegations.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain under Article 8 of the Convention that
MI5's surveillance operations have breached the applicants' right to
respect for their private lives. It has involved the recording of
personal information gathered by State agencies, indirect interception
of telephone calls and surveillance by State agents. The applicants
complain that this information appears to include false and libellous
statements, which may have been published to other State agencies.
The applicants submit that there is no legal basis for this
surveillance and that it is not necessary in a democratic society
since they are not subversive or a threat in any way to the State.
Such surveillance is not justified under Article 8 para. 2 of the
Convention.
2. The applicants also complain under Article 10 of the
Convention that the aformentioned surveillance amounts to an
interference with their right to freedom of expression. In this
regard they complain that the assessments made about them by the
Secret Service may be used to damage them in their political or
professional careers. This prospect may have a chilling effect on
their expressions of honest opinion and is a potential reprisal for
exercising their right of free speech.
3. They further complain under Article 11 of the Convention that
their freedom of association is also denied by a state agency which
imposes a special burden on those with whom they associate, namely the
prospect of being designated "subversive" by virtue of the
association.
4. The applicants finally complain under Article 13 of the
Convention that no effective remedy exists in the United Kingdom
before a national authority in respect of the aforementioned
violations. There is no general law of privacy and the security
services are exempted from data protection legislation. There is no
jurisdictional basis in domestic law whereby the applicants can apply
to a court or tribunal to obtain access to their files, correct
misstatements, limit the information collected or control the extent
of its dissemination.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 4 September 1985 and
registered on 22 May 1986. In a decision dated 2 December 1986 the
Commission decided that notice should be given to the respondent
Government of the application and that the Government should be
invited to submit observations on the admissiblity and merits of the
application in so far as it raised issues under Articles 8, 10, 11 and
13 of the Convention. These observations were submitted on 29 May
1987. The applicants' observations in reply were received on
22 December 1987.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES
The respondent Government
The respondent Government note that the operations of the
Security Service, directly concerned as they are with the protection
of national security, are of their very nature secret. It has for
this reason been the consistent policy of successive Governments of
the United Kingdom not to disclose information about the operations of
the Security Service or to comment on particular allegations that are
made about its operations. Consistently with this policy, the
Government neither accept nor deny the facts on which the applicants
rely. Nevertheless, in order to enable the Commission to consider the
questions raised by the application, and for the purposes of these
proceedings only, the submissions of the Government are made on the
basis of the allegations as to fact made by the applicants.
Domestic law and practice
From June to September 1963 Lord Denning, one of the then
most senior Judges of the Supreme Court, at the request of the Prime
Minister, undertook an examination of the operation of the Security
Service in the light of the resignation of the then Secretary of
State for War. At paragraph 239 of his Report dated 16 September 1963
(Cmnd. 2152), Lord Denning, after hearing a considerable body of
evidence, found general approval that the Directive embodied the
correct principles, which principles (inter alia) he summarised as
follows:
"(1) The Head of the Security Service is responsible
directly to the Home Secretary for the efficient and proper
working of the Service and not in the ordinary way to the
Prime Minister.
(2) The Security Service is, however, not a department of
the Home Office. It operates independently under its own
Director-General, but he can and does seek direction and
guidance from the Home Secretary, subject always to the
proviso that its activities must be absolutely free from any
political bias or influence.
(3) The function of the Security Service is to defend the
Realm as a whole from dangers which threaten it as a whole,
such as espionage on behalf of a foreign Power, or internal
organisations subversive of the State. For this purpose, it
must collect information about individuals, and give it to
those concerned. But it must not, even at the behest of a
Minister or Government Department, take part in
investigating the private lives of the individuals except
in a matter bearing on the Defence of the Realm as a whole.
(4) The Head of the Security Service may approach the Prime
Minister himself on matters of supreme importance and
delicacy, but this is not to say that the Prime Minister has
any direct responsiblity for the Security Service. He has
certainly none in day-to-day matters. It would be a
mistake for the Prime Minister to take such responsibility
because he cannot in practice exercise adequate supervision,
and he has not the secretariat for the purposes."
Lord Denning, at paragraph 240 of his Report, noted that "the
result of these principles is that, if the Director-General of the
Security Service is in doubt as to any aspect of his duties - as, for
instance, when he gets information about a Minister or senior public
servant indicating that he may be a security risk - he should take the
responsibility for further action, that is to say, whether to take
steps to eliminate the security risk or to put up with it. If a
mistake is made, it is the Home Secretary who will be responsible to
Parliament."
Article 8 of the Convention and
Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8
In the light of the Court's judgment in the Leander Case
(Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment of 22 March 1987, Series A no.
116) and without prejudice to the merits of the applicants' claims
under this head, the Government do not contest the admissibility of the
applicants' complaint under Article 8 of the Convention or under
Article 13 of the Convention with respect to their claims under
Article 8.
Article 10 of the Convention
The Government point out that the Court in the Leander Case
unanimously held that there had been no interference with the
applicant's freedom to express opinions as protected by Article 10,
holding that it was access to the public service and not freedom of
expression which lay at the heart of the issue before the Court (see
paras. 72 and 73).
It is submitted that the applicants' allegations likewise
disclose no interference with their right to freedom of expression.
The applicants have at all times been free to express opinions whether
of a political nature or otherwise, and no evidence has been adduced
to suggest that the exercise of such freedom has been made subject to
any "formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties" or to any
other interference by a public authority: no evidence has been
adduced to show that any of the alleged measures complained of were
aimed at punishing the applicants for exercising their right to
express political or other opinions (cf. No. 10628/83, Dec. 14.10.85
to be published in D.R. 44). In so far as complaint is made that
public statements or expressions of opinion by the applicants may have
been "noted" or "collected" by the public authorities, it is submitted
that such recording of public statements, even if established as a
matter of fact, would not disclose any relevant interference with the
applicants' right to freedom of expression. In so far as complaint is
made that private expressions of opinion by the applicants have been
similarly noted and collected, consistently with the Commission's
approach in the Leander case, the complaint properly falls in any
event to be considered under Article 8 as an interference with the
applicants' right to respect for private life and not under Article
10, Article 8 being the lex specialis in relation to the
protection of the right to privacy.
In so far as the applicants' complaint under Article 10
relates to the possible use by the public authorities of expressions
of opinion by the applicants if and when considering the applicants
"for positions requiring security clearance", it is submitted that,
consistently with the reasoning of the Court in the Leander case, the
complaint discloses no relevant interference with the applicants'
freedom to express opinions, as protected by Article 10. The
applicants do not allege that they have been refused appointment to
any position requiring security clearance, still less that any such
position has been refused on the basis of opinions expressed by them,
whether publicly or privately, which were unrelated to national
security and irrelevant to their suitability for the post in question.
Nor has any evidence been adduced to show or suggest that, in breach
of the Directive, any position has been refused to an applicant on the
grounds of his or her political or other opinions when such opinions
are irrelevant to national security and to the suitability of the
applicant for the post in question.
In these circumstances the alleged fact that the opinions or
attitudes of an individual might be taken into account in determining
whether to appoint the individual concerned to a position requiring
security clearance does not constitute a relevant interference with
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by
Article 10 para. 1 of the Convention.
Article 11 of the Convention
The Government submit that the substance of the applicants'
complaint under Article 11 of the Convention appears to be that,
through fear of being classified as "subversive" by a public authority,
other individuals might be unwilling to associate with the applicants
in the sense of being unwilling to meet or mix with them socially or
professionally.
The Government first submit that, on its true interpretation,
Article 11 para. 1 does not guarantee a right to associate in this
sense, the Article being concerned with the right to form or be
affiliated with a particular group or organisation (see No. 8317/78,
McFeeley and others v. the United Kingdom, Dec. of 18.5.80, D.R. 20
p. 98, para. 114). This complaint should, therefore, be rejected as
incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.
Even if the right guaranteed by Article 11 included the right
to "associate" with persons of their own choosing, in the sense of
sharing their company, it is submitted that the applicants cannot
claim to be victims of a violation of any such right by reason of the
facts alleged. No complaint is made that any measure of the
Government directly controlled, restricted or interfered with the
right of the applicants to associate freely with persons of their own
choosing: equally it is not suggested by the applicants that any
relevant measure was designed to repress the right of the applicants
to associate with such persons. In these circumstances there exists
no factual basis for the applicants' assertion that their freedom to
associate with others has been interfered with (cf. No. 7729/76, Agee
v. the United Kingdom, Dec. 17.12.76, D.R. 7 p. 164, at p. 174; No.
8118/77, Omkarananda and another v. Switzerland, Dec. 19.3.81, D.R. 25
p. 105 at p. 118). The applicants' claim, even if substantiated on
the facts, that the measures complained of had the indirect effect of
deterring other persons from associating with them is not sufficient
to give rise to any relevant interference with their right to freedom
of association for the purposes of Article 11 of the Convention.
Article 13 of the Convention
The Government submit that the applicants' complaints under
Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded as
being both unsubstantiated on the facts and giving rise to no prima
facie case of an interference with their rights guaranteed by
para. 1 of either Article. In addition, with regard to the complaint
of a breach of Article 11 of the Convention, it is the Government's
submission that the applicants' complaint is incompatible ratione
materiae with the Convention and accordingly does not concern "a right
or freedom guaranteed by the Convention".
In these circumstances the applicants' complaints under
Articles 10 and 11 disclose no arguable claim of a breach of either
Article and this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly
ill-founded.
The Applicants
The applicants point out that the history of NCCL demonstrates
that it has never been a subversive organisation threatening the
safety of the State or intending to undermine or overthrow
Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.
On the contrary they claim that the Council's concern has always been to
uphold the unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom in relation to
individual freedom, and to draw attention to any lapse by Government
agencies in complying with obligations in the field of human rights.
Article 8 of the Convention
The applicants point out that the methods of surveillance
include, inter alia, the keeping of files on which would be placed the
fullest possible personal details, a photograph, information received
from the police special branch in the area in which the applicants
lived, a note of appearances or references to, the applicants,
which appeared in telephone and mail intercepts which were operating
against other individuals or organisations and references to the
applicants which would appear in the reports of MI5 agents.
The applicants state that NCCL has nothing whatsoever to
do with subversion or overthrowing the constitution. It has always
worked within the law in pursuing its various activities. Moreover,
the applicants have never been convicted of a criminal offence nor
deported from any country. It follows that neither the NCCL nor the
applicants individually could be described as "subversive". It is
accordingly submitted that any reliance upon paragraph 2 of Article 8
or Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention cannot justify an interference
with the rights in question.
Article 10 of the Convention
It is submitted that Article 10 of the Convention goes further
than merely outlawing governmental prohibition of the espousal of
certain views when it seeks to safeguard the right of freedom of
expression "without interference by a public authority". It must also
outlaw interference which has the effect in practice of deterring
people from expressing their views. Surveillance by the Secret
Service of certain individuals because of the views that they hold and
express has a "chilling" effect not only on them but on those they
communicate with such that both sets of people will be deterred from
expressing their true opinions and beliefs. This is compounded by the
secrecy surrounding the Security Service such that it is not possible
for an individual to know whether or not he or she is under a form of
covert surveillance. Such a deterrent effect takes two forms.
Firstly, persons with strong views in various matters may feel that
surveillance will hinder their career prospects. It is not necessary
to show that such surveillance does in fact impair their career
prospects. It is enough to show that they genuinely believe that this
could happen. Secondly, they are more generally deterred by the
feeling that their views are "outside of the norm". The
classification of people by the Security Service as "subversive"
presents them as "outside the norm".
In the alternative, the interference with the affairs of the
applicants did amount to a "formality, condition, restriction or
penalty" on the expression of certain views by the applicants. Both
applicants consider that their classification as "subversive" could
have a damaging effect on their careers and future political
ambitions, in particular if either of them should be appointed to a
post in the Prime Minister's Office at some time in the future when
they would require security clearance. Thus in practice they are
penalised for the expression of views which are in accordance with the
principles of the NCCL.
Article 11 of the Convention
The applicants claim an interference with their rights under
this provision in the following respects:
1. that the interference of the Security Service in the
present application defeats the purpose behind the NCCL by
deterring potential supporters from associating with the
applicants. This deterrence is compounded by the secrecy of
the Security Service and the potential effect that
surveillance on the association can have on the potential
careers of members;
2. the potential impact that the surveillance by the
Security Service and the classification as "subversive" will
have on their careeers means that the applicants must make a
choice between the proper functioning of the NCCL and their
own futures. In addition, surveillance by the Security
Service may prevent other potential members from
associating, thereby denying the applicants the right of
effective association. This provision entails not only
a right to associate but also that the association is
allowed to function properly. This was expressly recognised
by the Court in the National Union of Belgian Police case
(Eur. Court H.R., National Union of Belgian Police judgment
of 22 October 1975, Series A no. 19).
Article 13 of the Convention
The applicants note that the Government concede the
admissibility of the present application under Article 13 taken in
conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention. However, it is
submitted that Article 13 is also breached in respect of the
complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention.
They point out that notwithstanding the directive issued by
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe to the Director-General of the Security Service
in September 1952 there exists no machinery by which the applicants
can uphold their rights or even ensure that the guidelines laid down
in that Directive are adhered to by the Security Service.
THE LAW
1. As regards Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
The applicants state that they were the subject of
surveillance by the Security Service, that information concerning
their activities is kept on files maintained by the Security Service
and that by reason of their association with the National Council for
Civil Liberties (NCCL) they were classified as subversives and
communist sympathisers by MI5 (the Security Service). They submit
that the above secret surveillance constitutes an unjustified
interference with their right to respect for private life as
guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. This provision
states as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
The Commission recalls that the European Court of Human Rights
has held in the Leander case that the storing of information
concerning a person's private life in a secret police register amounts
to an interference with the right to respect for private life as
guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (see Eur.
Court H.R., Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p.
22, para. 48).
It further notes that the respondent Government do not contest
the admissibility of the applicants' complaints under this provision.
2. As regards Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention
The applicants complain under these provisions that the secret
surveillance of their activities also constitutes a breach of Articles
10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention.
Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention provides as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This
right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive
and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibiities, may be subject to such
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime,
for the protection of health or morals, for the protection
of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."
In this context the applicants submit inter alia that as a
result of the secret surveillance to which they have been subjected
they and those with whom they are in communication will be deterred
from expressing their true opinions and beliefs. Furthermore, they
contend that being classified as "subversive" by the Security Service
may prejudice their future career prospects and political ambitions
and amounts to a penalty for the expression of particular views. They
stress, in particular, that the activities of NCCL could not in any way
be described as "subversive".
The respondent Government submit inter alia that the
applicants' allegations, even if substantiated, do not amount to an
interference with their freedom of expression guaranteed under this
provision. They point out that the applicants have at all times been
free to express their opinions and that they have failed to adduce any
evidence to show that any of the measures were aimed at punishing the
applicants for expressing their views or that they have actually been
refused any position or appointment on the basis of the opinions
expresssed by them.
Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention reads as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
to freedom of association with others, including the right to
form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
...
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these
rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary
in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent
the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these
rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State."
The applicants complain under this provision that, as a result
of their being labelled "subversive" by the Security Service,
potential supporters of the NCCL may have been inhibited from
associating with the applicants. They also submit that being
classified as "subversives" may have a prejudicial impact on their
careers, thereby obliging the applicants to choose between their
careers and further association with NCCL.
The respondent Government contend firstly that Article 11
para. 1 (Art. 11-1) does not guarantee a right of association in the
sense of meeting or mixing with other people socially and
professionally. Secondly, they maintain that the applicants have not
substantiated their complaint that their freedom to associate with
persons of their own choosing has been, in any respect, controlled or
restricted as a result of the measures of surveillance.
The Commission considers, in the light of the above
submissions and the fact that these complaints are based on the same
facts as the Article 8 (Art. 8) complaint, that the applicants'
complaints under Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention
raise complex issues of law and fact, the determination of which
should depend on an examination of the merits of the complaints.
3. As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in conjunction
with Articles 8, 10 and 11 (Art. 8, 10, 11)
The applicants submit that there exists no effective remedy
under the law of the United Kingdom in respect of their complaints
under Articles 8, 10 and 11 (Art. 8, 10, 11) of the Convention. They
contend that this constitutes a breach of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the
Convention. Insofar as the applicants complain of a breach of Article
13 (Art. 13) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 8),
the Government have conceded the admissibility of the complaint
without prejudice to the merits of the claim. However, they contend
that the remainder of the Article 13 (Art. 13) complaint should be
rejected as manifestly ill-founded since the applicants have not
established any arguable claim of a breach of either Article 10 or 11
(Art. 10, 11) of the Convention.
The Commission considers that this part of the application
also raises difficult questions of law and fact under Article 13
(Art. 13), the determination of which should depend on an examination
of the merits of the application as a whole.
The Commission concludes that the application is, as a whole,
admissible without prejudice to the merits.
For these reasons, the Commission
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE
Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(H. C. KRÜGER) (C. A. NØRGAARD)