AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25852/94
by Robert PLANKA
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
E. KONSTANTINOV
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 28 November 1994
by Robert PLANKA against Austria and registered on 5 December 1994
under file No. 25852/94;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, born in 1961, is an Austrian national. He is
currently detained at a prison in Stein, Lower Austria. In the
proceedings before the Commission he is represented by Mr. R. Soyer,
a lawyer practising in Vienna.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
On 8 November 1993 the applicant was taken into detention on
remand at the Vienna Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für
Strafsachen), inter alia on suspicion of attempted murder. In these and
the following proceedings the applicant was represented by counsel.
On 23 February 1994 the applicant, referring to Article 4
para. 3 (2) of the 1993 amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
waived his right to have a hearing for the review of the detention
order (Haftverhandlung). According to the same provision, the time-
limit for the applicant's detention expired on 28 February 1994, unless
a decision to prolong it was taken (see below, Relevant domestic law).
On 25 February 1994 the investigating judge (Untersuchungs-
richter) made a handwritten note in the file, stating that the
applicant's detention on remand be prolonged.
On 2 March 1994 the applicant's counsel requested that the order
for the prolongation of the detention on remand be served, or
eventually, if such an order had not been issued, that the applicant
be released.
On 3 March 1994 the investigating judge handed over to the
applicant the order prolonging his detention on remand until 25 March
1994. The order stated that the suspicion of attempted murder and a
number of other offences subsisted and that there was a danger of the
applicant's absconding and of his committing further offences. There
is an entry in the file, by which the applicant states the following:
"I confirm with my signature the receipt of the order of 25 February
1994 prolonging the detention on remand and waive my right to appeal
against it" ("Ich bestätige mit meiner Unterschrift die Übernahme des
Beschlusses auf Verlängerung der Untersuchungshaft vom 25.2.1994 und
verzichte auf Beschwerde dagegen").
On 7 March 1994 a copy of the detention order was served on the
applicant's counsel.
On 10 March 1994 the applicant lodged a complaint against this
detention order. He submitted in particular that the time-limit for his
detention on remand had expired on 28 February 1994. However, the order
prolonging his detention had not been issued in time. Thus, his
detention had not been prolonged in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. He, therefore, requested that he be released and
that the court find that his detention since 1 March 1994 had violated
his right to liberty.
On 24 March 1994 the Vienna Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)
rejected the applicant's appeal.
Prior to its decision the court requested observations from the
Senior Public Prosecutor's Office (Oberstaatsanwaltschaft). It
submitted that the applicant's appeal had to be rejected as
inadmissible, as he had made a valid waiver. The applicant in his
observations in reply, submitted that, on 10 March 1994, when he had
requested his counsel to file an appeal he had not been aware that he
had made a waiver. In any case, his waiver, which moreover he wished
to revoke, was not valid. He argued in particular that he had not had
a possibility to consult his counsel at the time he made it.
The court noted that the investigating judge, on 25 February 1994
had prepared a handwritten draft of the decision to prolong the
applicant's detention on remand. On 3 March 1994, i.e. after the time-
limit for the applicant's detention had expired on 28 February 1994,
she had handed over a copy of this decision to the applicant, who
waived his right to appeal against it. As regards the question whether
this waiver was valid, the court found that a waiver could only be made
after the decision in question had been issued. However, this was the
case, as the applicant had received the contested decision on 3 March
1994. Therefore, his appeal had to be rejected as being inadmissible.
On 6 April 1994 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Supreme
Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) under the Fundamental Rights Complaints
Act (Grundrechtsbeschwerdegesetz). He maintained that his right to
liberty had been violated in that his detention had been continued
after 28 February 1994, without a written decision ordering its
prolongation being issued before the end of the time-limit. Further,
the applicant argued that his waiver as regards the appeal against this
order was not valid. He submitted in particular that, if a party was
represented, decisions had to be served on the counsel. As the order
was only served on the applicant's counsel on 7 March 1994, the
applicant, on 3 March 1994, could not validly waive his right to
appeal. Moreover, at that time he had not had any possibility to
consult his counsel. Even assuming that the order had been duly served
on him on 3 March 1994, and that his waiver was valid, his detention
had in any case been unlawful since 1 March 1994.
On 11 May 1994 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's
complaint. The Supreme Court found that the detention order had to be
pronounced to and served on the accused himself. Following the
pronunciation of the said order and service of a copy it, the applicant
had validly waived his right to appeal against it. A complaint under
the Fundamental Rights Complaints Act was only admissible after
exhaustion of the available remedies. If, as in the present case, the
accused had explicitly declared that he did not want to exhaust, a
complaint was inadmissible.
On 29 and 30 June 1994 the Vienna Regional Criminal Court,
sitting as an Assize court (Geschwornengericht), held the trial of the
applicant. The charges concerned inter alia aggravated robbery
(schwerer Raub). The applicant pleaded not guilty. He argued that he
was only guilty of unauthorised use of a vehicle (unbefugter
Fahrzeuggebrauch), as he only wanted to use the car at issue for
escaping but did not want to keep it. Moreover, although he carried a
weapon he did not use it in order to threaten the victim.
At the end of the hearing the presiding judge read out the
questions to the jury. Neither the prosecution nor the defence made a
request for amendments of these questions. Subsequently, the jury
retired to their deliberations room, where they received the
explanation of the relevant law (Rechtsbelehrung) from the presiding
judge.
On 30 June 1994 the Vienna Regional Court, referring to the
jury's verdict, found the applicant inter alia guilty of aggravated
robbery. The court sentenced him to fifteen years' imprisonment.
As regards the question concerning aggravated robbery, the jury
answered it by a majority with "yes", finding that the applicant,
together with an accomplice, had, acting with the intention to enrich
himself unlawfully, by threatening him with a weapon, forced V.C. to
hand over his car to them and had in the same manner attempted to force
V.C. to give them AS 500. Accordingly, the jury answered two further
questions, concerning theft and unauthorized use of a vehicle, which
had been put in case they found the applicant not guilty of robbery,
unanimously with "no".
On 27 September 1994 the applicant lodged a plea of nullity and
an appeal (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde und Berufung) with the Supreme Court
(Oberster Gerichtshof). Under S. 345 para. 1 (8) he submitted in
particular that the explanation of the relevant law had not pointed out
the difference between robbery and unauthorised use of a vehicle, but
only explained the difference between theft and unauthorised use of a
vehicle. Moreover, it had not made it clear that the intention to
enrich oneself unlawfully, was not given if the offender wanted to
return the car. Moreover, it created the wrong impression that
unauthorised use of a vehicle was excluded if the vehicle had been used
for more than a very short period. Finally, as regards the
qualification as aggravated robbery, the explanation of the law had
failed to mention explicitly that the mere carrying of a weapon did not
fulfil the element of "use of a weapon".
On 15 March 1995 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant's plea
of nullity. Upon his appeal, it reduced the sentence to twelve and a
half years' imprisonment.
The Supreme Court found that the explanation of the law had to
be seen in its entirety. It had correctly explained that the difference
between unauthorised use of a vehicle and theft lay in the intention
of the offender, which had to be assessed with a whole range of
criteria including the duration of the use. Thereby it had not created
the impression that unauthorised use of a vehicle only applied to very
short use. Further, it had correctly explained the requirements as
regards the intention to enrich oneself. It had also informed the jury
that theft as well as robbery both required the said intention and in
which respects they differed. Finally, the explanation had also
correctly explained in which cases a robbery was qualified by the use
of a weapon, namely when it served the offender as a means of force or
threat.
B. Relevant domestic law
Provisions concerning detention on remand
The 1993 amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Strafprozeßänderungsgesetz), Federal Law Gazette (Bundesgesetzblatt)
1993/526, introduced a new system of time-limits for detention on
remand (Haftfristen).
Article 4 para. 3 of the above amendment states that the new
version of S. 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies to
decisions ordering or prolonging detention on remand, which have been
taken before 1 January 1994, provided that the accused was still
detained on that day, with the following modifications: the entry into
force of the amendment sets off a two months' time-limit, which expires
on 28 February 1994 (subparagraph 1); the accused may in any case waive
his right to a hearing for the review of the detention order. In this
case the decision concerning his release or the prolongation of the
detention on remand has to be issued in writing.
The relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
entered into force on 1 January 1994, are as follows:
S. 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that decisions
ordering or prolonging detention on remand are only valid within a
certain time-limit, the expiry of which has to be mentioned in the
decision. Before the expiry of the time-limit there must either be a
hearing for the review of the detention order (Haftverhandlung) or the
accused has to be released (paragraph 1).
According to S. 193 para. 5 the investigating judge has to set
a date for a hearing for the review of the detention order without
delay, if the accused requests his release.
Provisions concerning the trial before an Assize Court
S. 310 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the
presiding judge, after the taking of evidence, has to formulate the
questions to be put to the jury. He has to put them in writing as well
as to read them out. A copy of the questions has to be given to the
prosecution and to the defence (paragraph 1). The parties are entitled
to request changes of or additions to the questions (paragraph 3).
According to S. 321 para. 1 the presiding judge has to prepare
in writing the explanation of the relevant law to be given to the jury.
He has to sign it and to add it to the minutes of the trial.
S. 323 para. 1 states that the presiding judge has to give the
jury the explanation of the relevant law in their deliberations room.
If he departs from the written version or makes additions, in
particular to respond to questions of the jury, he has to write them
down and add them to the minutes.
S. 345 para. 1 lays down the specific grounds on which a plea of
nullity may be made against an Assize Court's judgment. They include
the ground that the presiding judge has given the jury an incorrect
explanation of the relevant law (subpara. 8).
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 1 (c) of the
Convention that his detention on remand, as of 1 March 1994, was not
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and, thus, violated
his right to liberty. He submits in particular that the time-limit for
his detention expired on 28 February 1994, while the decision to
prolong it was only served on his counsel on 7 March 1994. Even
assuming that it was duly served on him on 3 March 1994 it was not
given in time.
2. Further the applicant complains about the courts' finding that
he validly waived his right to appeal against the decision to prolong
his detention on remand. He submits that these decisions were unfair
as he did not have a possibility to consult his counsel when he made
his waiver. Further, they denied him an effective remedy as regards his
complaint that his detention was not in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. He invokes Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.
3. The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention and
Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 that the criminal proceedings against him
were unfair and violated his right to have the judgment reviewed by a
higher tribunal. He submits in particular that neither he nor his
counsel could be present when the presiding judge gave the jury the
explanation of the relevant law. Moreover, the said explanation did not
correctly point out the difference between robbery and unauthorised use
of a vehicle. Further, the applicant complains that the judgment does
not contain any reasons, but only refers to the jury's verdict. He
argues that the lack of reasons restricted his possibility to challenge
the judgment in the appeal proceedings, in particular as regards his
conviction for aggravated robbery.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 1 (c)
(Art. 5-1-c) of the Convention that his detention on remand, as of
1 March 1994, was not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by
law and, thus, violated his right to liberty.
In the present case the question arises whether the applicant has
exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention.
The Commission notes that the applicant, on 3 March 1994, upon
receipt of the investigating judge's decision of 25 February 1994
prolonging his detention on remand, made a written waiver of his right
to appeal against this decision. On 10 March 1994 the applicant lodged
an appeal against the said decision with the Vienna Court of Appeal
and, subsequently, a complaint with the Supreme Court under the
Fundamental Rights Complaints Act. He submitted that his right to
liberty had been violated as the prolongation order had not been issued
in time. Further, he claimed that the waiver was invalid. In particular
he argued that the contested prolongation order had to be served on his
counsel. As this had only been the case on 7 March 1994, he could not
validly waive his right to appeal on 3 March 1994. However, the Vienna
Court of Appeal as well as the Supreme Court found that the
investigating judge's decision to prolong his detention on remand had
to be served on the applicant. They noted that the applicant had
received this decision on 3 March 1994, and found that he had validly
waived his right to appeal against it. Accordingly, they rejected the
applicant's appeals as being inadmissible.
The Commission further notes that the applicant has not claimed
that he was not aware of the scope of his waiver, namely that he would
be barred from complaining that the prolongation order was issued
belatedly. It is true that he alleged before the Vienna Court of Appeal
that he was not at all aware of making a waiver. However, the
Commission notes that he did not adduce any reasons to substantiate
this allegation. The Commission finds that it appears unfounded, as the
waiver at issue was done in writing upon receipt of the contested
decision and is worded unequivocally.
In conclusion, the Commission finds that the applicant failed to
exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention.
It follows that this part of the application has to be rejected
in accordance with Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
2. Further the applicant complains about the courts' finding that
he validly waived his right to appeal against the decision to prolong
his detention on remand. He submits that these decisions were unfair
as he did not have a possibility to consult his counsel when he made
his waiver. Further, they denied him an effective remedy as regards his
complaint that his detention was not in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by law. He invokes Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, 13) of the
Convention.
a. As regards Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the Commission
notes that the impugned decisions, while relating to criminal
proceedings against the applicant, exclusively dealt with the question
whether his waiver of his right to appeal against the prolongation of
his detention of remand was valid or not. They did not involve any
finding of guilt and, thus, did not constitute the determination of a
criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention. This provision is consequently not applicable.
b. As regards Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, the Commission
recalls, that, where deprivation of liberty is concerned, Article 5
para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention is a lex specialis in relation to
this provision, the requirements of which are less strict (Eur. Court
H.R. De Jong, Baljet and Van den Brink judgment of 22 May 1984, Series
A no. 77, p. 27, para. 60).
The Commission further recalls that Article 5 para. 4 (Art. 5-4)
does not apply to proceedings concerning the extension of pre-trial
detention (Eur. Court H.R. Toth judgment of 12 December 1991, Series
A no. 224, pp. 23-24, paras. 86-87).
The Commission notes that S. 181 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of
Criminal Procedure provides for a system of regular hearings for the
review of the detention order, which remained open to the applicant.
Moreover, S. 193 para. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that the investigating judge has to set a date for a hearing for the
review of the detention order without delay, whenever a remand prisoner
requests his release. The Commission finds that the proceedings which
the applicant brought before the Vienna Court of Appeal and before the
Supreme Court only related to the prolongation of his detention on
remand. Therefore, they did not fall within the scope of Article 5
para. 4 (Art. 5-4) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible
ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant complains under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2) that the criminal
proceedings against him were unfair and violated his right to have the
judgment reviewed by a higher tribunal.
a. The Commission will first examine the applicant's complaints
under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), which so far as relevant, reads as
follows:
"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...".
The applicant submits in particular that neither he nor his
counsel could be present when the presiding judge gave the jury the
explanation of the relevant law. Thus they could not point out the
difference between robbery and unauthorised use of a vehicle, which
according to the applicant was not sufficiently made clear in the
explanation of the relevant law.
The Commission recalls that the conformity of a trial with the
rules laid down in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) have to be assessed on
the basis of the trial as a whole (cf. No. 13926/88, Dec. 4.10.90,
D.R. 66 p. 209).
The Commission notes that according to S. 321 of the Austrian
Code of Criminal procedure, the presiding judge has to set out the
explanation of the relevant law in writing. It forms part of the
minutes of the trial. He has to give the jury the explanation of the
law in their deliberations room in accordance with S. 323 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. If he departs from the written version or if he
answers additional questions of the jury, he has to enter any of these
changes or additions in the minutes. This provision does not foresee
that either the accused and his counsel or the public prosecutor be
present. Further, the accused may claim in his plea of nullity under
S. 345 para. 1 (8) that the presiding judge has given the jury an
incorrect explanation of the law.
The Commission finds that the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure
provides the accused with a remedy to have a review of the correctness
of the explanation of the law as given to the jury. Moreover, by
requesting that the explanation of the law be prepared in writing and
that any changes which are made in absence of the defence are also
entered in the minutes, it provides the accused with a proper basis for
raising his complaints before the Supreme Court.
In the present case the applicant submitted in his plea of
nullity that the explanation of the law had not correctly pointed out
the difference between robbery and unauthorised use of a vehicle.
However, the Supreme Court, after detailed examination of his
arguments, dismissed his complaint. In these circumstances the
Commission finds that there is no appearance in the file that the
applicant, represented by counsel, could not duly present his defence.
Further, the applicant complains that the Assize Court's judgment
does not contain any reasons, but only refers to the jury's verdict
and, thus, restricted his possibility to challenge the judgment in the
appeal proceedings, in particular as regards his conviction for
aggravated robbery.
The Commission recalls that the absence of reasons in a court
decision may raise an issue concerning the right to a fair trial
guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention,
particularly when an appeal on the merits lies against the decision for
which no reasons are given. However, the extent to which reasons need
be given depends on the circumstances of the case (cf. No. 15957/90,
Dec. 30.3.92, D.R. 72 p. 195).
The Commission finds that the requirement that reasons be given
must be qualified by the specific features of the procedure before an
Assize Court. The Commission notes in the first place that no appeal
lay against the Assize Court's decision on the question of guilt.
The Commission considers that, while the jury may only reply by
"yes" or "no" to the questions put by the presiding judge, these
questions form a framework for the jury's verdict. According to S. 310
para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure these questions are read out
at the trial and the parties are entitled to request changes or
additions, a right of which the defence did not make use in the present
case. The Commission finds that the precision of the questions, which
could be amended at the request of the defence, compensates
sufficiently for the brevity of the jury's replies (cf. No. 15957/90,
Dec. 30.3.92, D.R. 72 p. 195, 199). Moreover, the Commission notes that
the applicant could and actually did lodge a plea of nullity with the
Supreme Court on the ground that the explanation of the relevant law
had incorrectly explained the decisive elements of aggravated robbery.
The Commission, therefore, finds that there is no indication that the
applicant was prevented from submitting detailed grounds for his plea
of nullity to the Supreme Court.
In conclusion, the Commission finds that there is no appearance
that the proceedings against the applicant were contrary to Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention.
b. The Commission will, finally, examine the applicant's complaint
relating to the restricted possibility to challenge the Assize Court's
judgment in the appeal proceedings under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7
(P7-2).
Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-2), so far as relevant, reads as
follows:
"1. Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal
shall have the right to have his conviction or sentence reviewed
by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this right, including the
grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law."
The Commission recalls that the Contracting States may limit the
review by a higher tribunal by virtue of the reference of paragraph 1
of this Article to national law. The rules governing review by a higher
tribunal in the Member States of the Council of Europe limit the review
in certain cases to questions of law or may require the person wishing
to appeal to apply for leave to appeal (cf. No. 19028/91, Dec. 9.9.92,
D.R. 73 p. 239, 241).
As far as the applicant may be understood to complain that the
lack of reasons in the Assize Court's judgment prevented him for having
his conviction reviewed by a higher court, the Commission refers to its
above findings concerning the special features of jury proceedings,
which only allow for a review on questions of law. Further, the
applicant could and actually did appeal against his sentence.
In these circumstances the limitation of the review was in line
with the typical rules governing the procedures before Supreme Court's
which sit only to control the legality of the judgment of the trial
court. The Commission, therefore, finds that the applicant's right to
review satisfied the requirements of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7
(P7-2).
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as
being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy