SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 37846/04
by Mária PINCZE
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on
8 January 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Françoise Tulkens, President,
András Baka,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
Antonella Mularoni,
Danutė Jočienė,
Dragoljub Popović, judges,
Sally Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 13 July 2004,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Mária Pincze, is a Hungarian national who was born in 1958 and lives in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) are represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 29 August 1999 the applicant signed a contract for the purchase of the flat of Cs.Z. and paid the first instalment of the price. The applicant was aware of the fact that a third individual, S.T., enjoyed the beneficial ownership of the flat and that Cs.Z. had obtained ownership by virtue of a life annuity contracted with S.T. Since S.T. was mentally disabled and permanently placed in a mental hospital, he did not actually live in the flat.
In order to finance the transaction, the applicant sold her own flat and requested a loan from her employer.
In October 1999 the applicant requested the Budapest IX District Guardianship Authority to approve the transaction.
In December 1999 the Guardianship Authority refused her request and informed her that the Budapest IX District Government had sued Cs.Z. before the Pest Central District Court because of the breach of the life annuity contract. On 21 December 1999 the applicant, being of the view that it was no longer possible to obtain ownership of the flat, signed a lease with S.T. and moved into the flat with her two children. She received the Guardianship Authority’s approval for the lease on 17 February 2000.
(On 24 May 2002 the District Court established that S.T. had died on 4 February 2000, and that the Hungarian State had inherited ownership of the flat.)
In the meantime, following S.T.’s death, the applicant appealed against the Guardianship Authority’s decision of 17 February 2000, requesting the Authority to approve her original purchase of the flat instead of the lease. The Budapest Administrative Office, acting as a second administrative level, terminated the proceedings on 6 March 2000 in view of the death of S.T. The applicant did not seek judicial review of this decision.
Subsequently, the applicant, considering that the death of S.T. had removed any obstacles to the purchase of the flat, paid the second instalment of the purchase price to Cs.Z.
On 11 May 2000 Cs.Z. forced the applicant to leave the flat, since she had been unable to pay the final instalment of the purchase price. The applicant did not initiate any proceedings in order to challenge Cs.Z.’s action. Since then she has been renting another flat, being unable to buy a new one.
On 20 October 2000 the applicant brought an action in compensation before the Pest Central District Court against the individuals, lawyers and State officials who had been a party to, or otherwise involved in, the abovementioned proceedings. The District Court transferred the case to the competent Budapest Regional Court.
On 19 June 2001 the Regional Court held a hearing.
On 28 October 2002 the Regional Court partly found for the applicant and awarded her 1,862,009 Hungarian forints (approximately 7,385 euros) plus accrued interest in compensation. The Regional Court relied on documentary evidence and the testimony of the parties.
On appeal, on 17 September 2003 the Budapest Appellate Court upheld the first-instance decision in substance. This decision was served on the applicant in January 2004.
On 10 February 2004 the applicant requested the execution of the final decision. On 19 July 2004 the Budapest Regional Court ordered the enforcement. On 27 May 2005 the bailiff informed the applicant of the suspension of the proceedings since the debtor did not possess any executable property. However, on 5 October 2005 the sum awarded was paid to the applicant.
B. The relevant domestic law
Act no. 4 of 1959 on the Civil Code
Section 188
“(1) Those who have been deprived of their possessions without justified reason or are being disturbed therein (illicit power), are entitled to the protection of possession.”
Section 191
“(1) Those who have been deprived of their possessions or are being disturbed in their enjoyment thereof may request the restoration of the original state of possession, or the termination of the disturbance, from a Notary within one year.”
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained that the proceedings have lasted an unreasonably long time and that her property rights were violated in that she was unable to recover her outstanding claims in due time, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Moreover, under Article 13 of the Convention, the applicant submitted that she had no effective remedy before a national authority by virtue of which she could accelerate the proceedings. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant also complained of the outcome and unfairness of the proceedings. Lastly, relying on Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant complained that she had lost her home in the course of the proceedings.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained that the civil proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time. She invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in its relevant parts, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government contested that argument.
The Court observes that the period to be taken into consideration began on 20 October 2000 and ended on 5 October 2005. It thus lasted somewhat less than five years for two levels of jurisdiction, followed by the enforcement phase.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II).
In the circumstances, the Court considers that, no particular period of inactivity being imputable to the authorities, the overall length did not exceed “a reasonable time”. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
2. Moreover, concerning the outcome and alleged unfairness of the proceedings, the Court notes that these complaints are essentially of a fourth-instance nature: there is no indication in the case file that the domestic courts lacked impartiality or that the proceedings were otherwise unfair or arbitrary. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3, and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
3. As regard the applicant’s complaint concerning Article 8 of the Convention, the Court observes that that she failed to seek judicial review of the decision of the Budapest Administrative Office. Moreover, she also failed to request the Notary of the Budapest IX District Municipality to protect her possessions (birtokvédelem) under sections 188 and 191 of the Civil Code, or to challenge Cs.Z.’s eviction claim before a court. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention.
4. As to the issues under Article 13 of the Convention, the Court notes that, having found the applicant’s length complaint to be wholly unfounded, she has no arguable claim to a remedy for that complaint under Article 13 (see Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 15, § 33). Accordingly this part of the application should also to be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
5. Lastly, the Court notes that the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention is closely linked to that concerning the length of proceedings under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which has already been examined above (point 1). It considers that the circumstances of the present case do not call for a separate examination of any property issue arising from the latter complaint.
In view of the above conclusions, it is appropriate to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention to the case.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Sally DolléFrançoise Tulkens
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy