SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no.37007/97
by Fiorenza PITTINI
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 4 October 2001 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrG. Bonello,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrsM. Tsatsa-Nikolovska,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler, judges,
MrsM. Del Tufo, ad hoc judge,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 5 March 1997 and registered on 23 July 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1927 and living in Sesto Fiorentino. She is represented before the Court by Mr L. Kowalski, a lawyer practising in Pordenone.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:
P.L.Z., G.Z. and S.Z. were the owners of an apartment in Florence, which they had let to G.G.
In a writ served on the tenant on 17 November 1986, they communicated their intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Florence Magistrate.
By a decision of 11 December 1986, which was made enforceable on 23 March 1988, the Florence Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1988.
On 8 October 1987, the applicant became the owner of the apartment.
On 8 April 1988, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 28 December 1990, the applicant made a statutory declaration that she urgently required the premises as accommodation for herself.
On 4 March 1991, the tenant having died in the meantime, she served notice on the latter’s cohabiting daughter, requiring her to vacate the premises.
On 28 March 1991, the applicant served notice on her informing her that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 17 May 1991.
Between 17 May 1991 and 23 May 1995, the bailiff made eight attempts to recover possession.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was never granted the assistance of the police in enforcing the order for possession.
On an unspecified date of 1998, the tenant’s daughter spontaneously vacated the apartment ant the applicant repossessed the premises.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that her inability to recover possession of her apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the duration of the eviction proceedings resulted in a denial of her right of access to a court.
The Government argue that the arrangements for staggering the police assistance were an administrative issue, entirely separate from and independent of the judicial process and therefore outside the scope of Article 6.
The Court recalls that it has already held that Article 6 of the Convention is applicable to the tenants eviction proceedings (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 62-63, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
On the merits, the Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government maintain that the delay in providing the assistance of the police is justified by the protection of the public interest.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy