Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 135
November 2010
P.V. v. Spain - 35159/09
Judgment 30.11.2010 [Section III]
Article 14
Discrimination
Restriction on transsexual’s access to her child: no violation
Facts – The applicant is a male-to-female transsexual. Prior to her gender reassignment, she had been married and had a son. In 2002 a judge granted a decree for the couple’s separation and approved the amicable agreement they had concluded, by which custody of the child was awarded to the mother and parental responsibility to both parents jointly, and contact arrangements were made for the father. In 2004 the applicant’s former wife sought to have the father deprived of parental responsibility and to have the contact arrangements suspended, alleging among other things that the applicant was undergoing treatment with a view to gender reassignment. The first-instance judge decided only to restrict the contact arrangements; that decision was upheld by the Audiencia Provincial. In 2008 an amparo appeal by the applicant was dismissed.
Law – Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14: The applicant’s transsexualism was what had prompted the former wife to bring proceedings to amend the arrangements made at the time of their separation. Transsexualism was indisputably covered by Article 14. In their decisions, the national courts had emphasised that the applicant’s transsexualism was not the reason why the initial contact arrangements had been restricted. They had taken into account her emotional instability and the risk that it might be passed on to the child – aged six at the start of the domestic proceedings – and disturb his psychological balance. The Constitutional Court, for example, had referred to an undoubted risk to the child’s mental well-being and the development of his personality, in view of his age. The applicant’s lack of emotional stability had been noted in a psychological expert report produced at the first-instance judge’s request; she had voluntarily undergone the assessment and had not challenged its results in due time. In addition, the first-instance judge had not deprived the applicant either of parental responsibility or of contact, as the mother had requested, but had made new contact arrangements on a gradual and reviewable basis, in accordance with the recommendations made in the expert report. The domestic courts’ reasoning suggested that the applicant’s transsexualism had not been the decisive factor in the decision to amend the initial contact arrangements. The child’s best interests had prevailed, leading the courts to choose a more restrictive arrangement that would allow the child to become gradually accustomed to his father’s gender reassignment. That conclusion was supported by the fact that the contact arrangements had twice been extended in 2006, although there had been no change in the applicant’s gender status during that period.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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