P.V. v. SWITZERLAND



                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 31814/96

                      by P. V.

                      against Switzerland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 20 May 1998, the following members being present:

           MM    J.-C. GEUS, President

                 S. TRECHSEL

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H. DANELIUS

           Mrs   G.H. THUNE

           MM    F. MARTINEZ

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

                 E.A. ALKEMA

                 A. ARABADJIEV

           Ms    M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 1 April 1996 by

P. V. against Switzerland and registered on 11 June 1996 under file

No. 31814/96;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant, a Swiss citizen born in 1971, is a postal employee

residing in Rümlang in Switzerland.  Before the Commission he is

represented by Mr E. Schönenberger, a lawyer practising in Rümlang in

Switzerland.

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

      The applicant was remanded in custody on three occasions for a

period of altogether 38 days, i.e. on 30 June 1988 and 18 July 1989 and

8 January 1990 on suspicion of theft.  The Zürich District Attorney's

Office (Bezirksanwaltschaft) then filed a bill of indictment against

the applicant with the Zürich District Court (Bezirksgericht).

      In two decisions of 18 February 1991 and 19 August 1993 the Court

of Appeal (Obergericht) of the Canton of Zürich found that the

imposition of detention on remand on the applicant breached Article 5

para. 3 of the Convention in the light of the Convention organs' case-

law as to the role of the District Attorney in the Canton of Zürich

(see Eur. Court HR, Jutta Huber v. Switzerland judgment of 23 October

1990, Series A no. 188).

      It appears that the applicant was eventually convicted of the

offence of theft, though the detention on remand imposed on him was

deducted from the prison sentence.

      On 8 March 1991 the applicant filed a request for compensation

of 25,000 Swiss Francs (CHF) which the Government (Regierungsrat) of

the Canton of Zürich dismissed on 9 October 1991.

      On 30 September 1992 the applicant filed an action with the

Zürich District Court, arguing that the Government had breached

Article 5 para. 5 of the Convention and claiming compensation of

25,000 CHF.

      The applicant also filed a request for exemption from court fees

and for legal aid (unentgeltliche Prozessführung und Rechtsvertretung).

However, in view of appeal proceedings pending in the parallel case of

A.R., the applicant filed a request for the adjournment of the

proceedings which was granted on 16 October 1992.

      After the Federal Court gave its decision in the separate

proceedings on 2 February 1993, proceedings concerning the applicant

were resumed before the District Court.

      On 25 May 1993 the District Court rejected the applicant's action

for compensation as being insufficiently substantiated and withdrew his

entitlement to legal aid.

      The applicant's appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on

26 April 1994.  However, his plea of nullity was upheld by the Court

of Cassation on 26 July 1994.

      Proceedings were resumed before the District Court which on

19 December 1994 dismissed the applicant's action.  It considered that

the applicant would have been remanded in custody even if detention had

been imposed in accordance with Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention.

The Court found that the applicant had not sufficiently demonstrated

immaterial damage, and that the determination of a breach of Article 5

para. 3 of the Convention sufficed as satisfaction within the meaning

of Article 5 para. 5 of the Convention.

      Upon the applicant's appeal, the Court of Appeal on 10 April 1995

dismissed his request for legal aid and imposed advance legal costs on

the applicant.  The latter failed to pay the costs whereupon the appeal

was rejected on 8 June 1995.

      The applicant's plea of nullity was dismissed by the Court of

Cassation on 6 September 1995.

      On 14 September 1995 the applicant filed a public law appeal

which the Federal Court dismissed on 24 January 1996.

      In its decision the Federal Court upheld the views of the

previous courts insofar as they had declared the applicant's complaints

inadmissible under Article 5 para. 5 of the Convention.  The Federal

Court nevertheless found that the complaint would in any event also be

unfounded.

      Thus, while it was undisputed that the applicant had been

remanded in custody in breach of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention,

this breach had already been formally determined, and the period of

detention on remand had been deducted from the prison sentence.  Both

the District Court and the Court of Appeal had found that this sufficed

as satisfaction within the meaning of Article 5 para. 5 of the

Convention.  The applicant had not shown why the mere determination of

unlawfulness did not suffice in his case.

      The Federal Court further found that the previous courts had not

breached Article 13 of the Convention when rejecting the applicant's

appeals on procedural grounds.

      The Federal Court then dealt with the applicant's complaint under

Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention about the undue length of the

proceedings.  The decision stated:

      "When examining the length of the proceedings, it can be assumed

      that the matter was not particularly complex and not of

      particular importance for the applicant.  The latter employed,

      in an admissible manner, remedies at his disposal during the

      various phases of the proceedings.  This brought about a delay

      for which the authorities cannot be made responsible.  The

      procedural conduct of the applicant amounts to an aggravating

      circumstance.  He contributed to the delays in the substantial

      examination of the case by filing insufficiently substantiated

      statements in respect of purely procedural decisions.  The

      procedure was adjourned for a period of about six months in view

      of a request of the applicant.  On the whole, the length of

      proceedings of hardly three years until the substantial decision

      of the District Court cannot be regarded as exceeding the time-

      limit envisaged in Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.  The

      appeal is therefore also in this respect unfounded ..."

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 5 of the Convention

that his claim for compensation for unlawful detention on remand was

dismissed by the Swiss courts.

2.    Under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention the applicant complains

of the undue length of the proceedings.  Nearly three years elapsed

until the District Court decided a simple claim.

3.    Under Article 13 of the Convention the applicant complains that

the courts did not freely examine his complaint of a breach of human

rights.  In his view, the rights of Article 13 override all domestic

procedural requirements.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the

Convention that his claim for compensation for unlawful detention on

remand was dismissed by the Swiss courts.

      Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention states:

      "Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in

      contravention of the provisions of this Article shall have an

      enforceable right to compensation."

      The Commission recalls the Convention organs' case-law according

to which Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the Convention is complied

with where it is possible to apply for compensation in respect of a

deprivation of liberty effected in conditions contrary to paragraphs

1-4.  It does not prohibit the Contracting States from making the award

of compensation dependent upon the ability of the person concerned to

show damage resulting from the breach.  Thus, no issue as to

compensation will arise where there is no pecuniary or non-pecuniary

damage to compensate (see Eur. Court HR, Wassink v. the Netherlands

judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 185-A, p. 14, para. 38).

      In the present case, detention on remand was imposed on the

applicant in respect of which the Swiss authorities later considered

that it breached Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

      It is true that the applicant then unsuccessfully requested

compensation amounting to 25,000 CHF.

      However, in the Commission's opinion it does not appear

unreasonable if the various courts refused the applicant's request as

the determination of the unlawfulness of his detention sufficed as

satisfaction within the meaning of Article 5 para. 5 (Art. 5-5) of the

Convention, as the detention on remand imposed on the applicant had

been deducted from his prison sentence, and as the applicant had not

sufficiently demonstrated any damages he had suffered.

      Moreover, the applicant has failed also before the Commission to

give any indication as to the nature and amount of the material or

immaterial damages incurred.

      It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-

founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    Under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention the

applicant complains of the undue length of the proceedings.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention states, insofar

as relevant:

      "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...

      everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time

      ..."

      In the present case, the applicant filed his action with the

Zürich District Court on 30 September 1992.  The Federal Court in last

resort dismissed his public law appeal on 24 January 1996.

      The proceedings to be examined under Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention therefore lasted three years, three months

and 25 days.

      The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length of

the proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular

circumstances of the case and having regard in particular to the

complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the

relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant (see Eur.

Court HR, Duclos v. France judgment of 17 December 1996, Reports of

Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI, p. 2180 et seq., paras. 55 and 77).

      The Commission has applied these criteria to the present case.

It considers at the outset that the proceedings, concerning

compensation for unlawful detention on remand, could not be regarded

as being complex.

      Moreover, the applicant did not unduly contribute to the length

of the proceedings.

      As regards the conduct of the authorities, the Commission

considers that, after the decision of the Federal Court of 2 February

1993, the District Court gave its decision on 25 May 1993.  This

decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal on 26 April 1994, i.e.

within less than a year, though it was quashed by the Court of

Cassation on 26 July 1994.

      The District Court again gave its decision on 19 December 1994.

Thereafter, the proceedings were again conducted speedily.  Thus, the

Court of Appeal gave its decision on 8 June 1995, the Court of

Cassation on 6 September 1995, and the Federal Court on 24 January

1996.

      Finally, it cannot be said that the outcome of these proceedings

was of particular importance for the applicant within the meaning of

the Convention organs' case-law (see Eur. Court HR, Duclos v. France

judgment, loc. cit., p. 2186, para. 77).

      Making an overall assessment of the proceedings, the Commission

finds that there is no indication of any periods of delay attributable

to the authorities which would exceed the requirement of a "reasonable

time" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the

Convention.

      It follows that this complaint is also manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    Under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention the applicant

complains that the courts did not freely examine his complaint of a

breach of human rights.

      Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention states:

      "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

      Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

      national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been

      committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

      The Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention requires a remedy in domestic law only in respect of

grievances which can be regarded as "arguable" in terms of the

Convention (see Eur. Court HR, Powell and Rayner v. United Kingdom

judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 172, p. 14, para. 31).

      In the present case, the Commission has just found that the

complaints under Article 5 para. 5 and Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 5-5, 6-1) of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded.  The

Commission finds that the applicant's submissions in this respect do

not raise any prima facie issue under the Convention.  As a result, no

arguable claim can be maintained in respect of a violation of these

provisions.

      It follows that the remainder of the application is also

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

   M.-T. SCHOEPFER                              J.-C. GEUS

      Secretary                                  President

to the Second Chamber                      of the Second Chamber

 

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