Application No. 12366/86
Antero RIEME
against
SWEDEN
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
(adopted on 2 October 1990)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
I. INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-14) ........................... 1
A. The application
(paras. 2-4) .................................... 1
B. The proceedings
(paras. 5-10) .................................... 1
C. The present Report
(paras. 11-14) ................................... 2
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 15-37) ............ 3
A. The particular circumstances of the case
(paras. 15-28) ................................... 3
B. Relevant domestic law
(paras. 29-37) ................................... 8
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 38-67) ............. 11
A. Complaint declared admissible (para. 38) ......... 11
B. Point at issue
(para. 39) ....................................... 11
C. Article 8 of the Convention
(paras. 40-66) ................................... 11
a. Complaints and submissions (para. 41) ........ 11
b. Whether there was an interference with
the applicant's right to respect for his
family life (paras. 42-45) .................. 11
c. Whether the interference was in accordance
with the law (paras. 46-52) ................. 12
d. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate
aim (para. 53) .............................. 13
e. Whether the interference was "necessary in a
democratic society" (paras. 54-66) .......... 13
D. Conclusion (para. 67) ........................... 17
Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. Danelius joined by
MM. J.A. Frowein, E. Busuttil and F. Martinez ............ 18
Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. G. Schermers ................ 19
Concurring opinion of Mrs. G. H. Thune .................... 20
Concurring opinion of Mrs. J. Liddy ....................... 21
Concurring opinion of Mr. L. Loucaides .................... 22
APPENDIX I : HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS .................. 23
APPENDIX II: DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ............... 25
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the
European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the
Commission.
A. The application
2. The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1940 and resident
at Tumba. He is represented before the Commission by Mr. Lennart
Hane, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.
3. The application is directed against Sweden. The Government
are represented by their Agent, Mr. Hans Corell, Ambassador,
Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.
4. The case relates to the public care and the prohibition on
removal from the foster home of the applicant's daughter and it raises
issues under Article 8 of the Convention.
B. The proceedings
5. The application was introduced on 28 July 1986 and registered
on 1 September 1986. The Commission decided on 6 October 1987, in
accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give
notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite
them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of
the application with regard to the complaints under Article 8 of the
Convention.
The Government's observations were dated 26 February 1988 and
the applicant's observations in reply were dated 26 April 1988.
6. On 4 December 1988 the Commission decided to invite the parties
to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.
At the hearing, which was held on 5 July 1989, the applicant
was represented by Mr. Lennart Hane. The applicant and his wife were
also present at the hearing.
The Government were represented by their Agent, Ambassador
Hans Corell and as advisers Mr. Leif Lindgren, legal adviser at the
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, and Mr. Pär Boqvist, legal
adviser at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
7. Following the hearing the Commission, on 5 July 1989, declared
the application inadmissible with regard to certain complaints under
Article 6 of the Convention and admissible with regard to the
remaining complaints, mainly under Article 8 of the Convention.
8. On 10 October 1989 the text of the decision on admissibility
was communicated to the parties who were invited to submit any
additional observations or further evidence they wished to put before
the Commission. The applicant submitted observations by letter dated 20
November 1989 and the Government by letters dated 24 November 1989 and
9 January 1990.
9. On 17 March 1989 the Commission decided that legal aid
should be granted to the applicant.
10. After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in
accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, placed
itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a
friendly settlement of the case. In the light of the parties'
reactions the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which a
friendly settlement can be effected.
C. The present Report
11. The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in
pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and
votes in plenary session, the following members being present:
MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President
F. ERMACORA
E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
Mr. L. LOUCAIDES
The text of the Report was adopted by the Commission on
2 October 1990 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in
accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.
12. The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1
of the Convention, is
(1) to establish the facts, and
(2) to state an opinion as to whether the facts found
disclose a breach by the State concerned of its
obligations under the Convention.
13. A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before
the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's
decision on the admissibility of the application forms Appendix II.
14. The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the
documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.
II. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS
A. The particular circumstances of the case
15. The applicant has a daughter, Susanne, together with Mrs. AJ.
Susanne was born on 28 October 1976. Mrs. AJ had the legal custody of
Susanne from her birth. When Susanne was eleven months old, the
Southern Social District Council (södra sociala distriktsnämnden;
hereafter "the Social Council") of Södertälje, on 26 September 1977,
decided that the daughter should be taken into care pursuant to
Sections 25(a) and 29 of the 1960 Child Welfare Act (barnavårdslagen).
Shortly thereafter Susanne was placed in a foster home. She lived in
this foster home until the autumn of 1989. Thereafter she has lived
with the applicant.
16. On 30 November 1981 the applicant instituted civil proceedings
before the District Court (tingsrätten) of Södertälje requesting that
the custody of Susanne be transferred to him. By a judgment of
28 September 1983 the District Court ordered that the legal custody of
Susanne be transferred to the applicant.
In the judgment the Court stated inter alia as follows:
"As a background to the reasoning which will follow, the
Court expresses the opinion that there appear to be very
strong reasons not now - nor maybe in the reasonably near
future - to move Susanne from the home where she has stayed
in good conditions since a tender age. It is apparent that
Susanne is well settled in the foster home, and that she is
secure and at home there and regards the foster family as
her own home. Consequently, the placement in the home appears
to be compatible with her best interests ...
...
(The applicant) shows an active interest in Susanne. In any
case during the last years he has endeavoured to keep
contact with her and to meet her. It cannot be denied that
(the applicant's) endeavours may appear unwise for an
outsider in view of her best interests. However, the
District Court considers that unreasonably high demands on
insight cannot be put in this respect. (The applicant's)
wish to take care of the girl himself appears nevertheless
natural and his attitude is certainly shared by many
although it does not fully correspond to a modern view on
children and their needs.
As has been said before, a transfer of the custody of
Susanne to (the applicant) would not lead to the termination
of the placement in the foster home. On the other hand, he
would be given a possibility to have the issue legally
examined in the light of the changes in the child's and his own
conditions which may occur in the future. Furthermore, a
transfer could stimulate further contacts between (the
applicant) and his daughter which, in the long run, would be
valuable to her. The Social Council can see to it that such
contacts do not conflict with the child's best interests."
17. Mrs. AJ appealed against the judgment to the Svea Court of
Appeal (Svea hovrätt), which on 21 June 1984 confirmed the judgment of
the District Court. This judgment acquired legal force.
18. On 19 October 1983 the applicant submitted a request to the
Social Council that the public care of Susanne be terminated. The
Social Council held a hearing at which the applicant, his wife and his
representative were present. The applicant claimed that the Council
should decide about the applicant's right of access to his daughter
at regular intervals. On 16 October 1984 the Social Council
decided to terminate the public care of Susanne and, pursuant to
Section 28 of the Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen), to prohibit
the applicant from taking Susanne away from the foster home, on the
ground that there was a risk which was not of a minor character that
Susanne's mental health would be harmed if she were separated from the
foster home. No decision was made with regard to the claim for
access regulation.
19. The decision of the Council was based on a report, submitted
to it by the social welfare officers responsible for the matter. A
psychiatric opinion by an authorised psychologist, Jarkko Rantanen,
and a senior physician, Dr. Sari Granström, both at the Institution
for Child and Youth Psychiatry in Stockholm (PBU), is appended to the
report. It contains the following statement :
"A change of home for Susanne would mean many anguishing
changes for her, for instance the loss of objects of
security (her foster parents and foster siblings), loss of
friends at home and at school, loss of a familiar
environment and daily routines, etc. At the same time it
would mean that all the new things she would need to be
acquainted with, for instance new friends, a new school and a
new physical environment, new daily routines, etc. would be
heavy stress factors that her insufficient inner structure
would scarcely be able to cope with in a satisfactory way.
She would also lose the ego support from secure adults (her
foster parents) that she still needs. She has not yet been
able to develop an equivalent relationship with her natural
father and his wife. Her chances of mastering everyday life
and of being able to develop would thus be rendered more
difficult in two ways: on the one hand her insufficient
ego functions would be confronted with an unreasonable
adaptation task through too many changes at one time and, on
the other, much support required for her ego development
would be taken away from her immediately when facing such
strains. Susanne has shown that she has a tendency to react
with her body to significant changes. A probable consequence
of a move would be that the psychosomatic problems she has
today, enuresis, would be aggravated, for example by her
starting to wet herself during the day too. Another
probable consequential psychosomatic symptom is recurring
stomach pains. There is also a risk of increased reserve
and depression.
A move to Susanne's natural father requires that the
relationship between him, his present wife and Susanne be
developed and deepened. Furthermore, it requires that
Susanne be sufficiently mature for the move to be discussed
with her, with its advantages and disadvantages and related
feelings of loss and sorrow, which has as yet proved
impossible in her case according to the investigation at
PBU. As a consequence, Susanne should be allowed to
continue to develop and mature within the family frame that
has been her home for more than six years. This also means,
in our opinion, that she should not be subjected to new
examinations connected with her return home within the next
few years, but Susanne's contact with her father needs to be
continued and developed in collaboration with her foster
parents. The regular contact between Susanne and her
natural father has meant that Susanne has been able
to create psychological childhood ties with her biological
origin. If this development, which has already begun, shall
have a chance to continue, Susanne's natural father needs a
great deal of support in order to be capable of maintaining
and further developing his contact with his daughter based on
the daughter's needs."
20. The applicant appealed against the prohibition on removal to
the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of
Stockholm. The Court held a hearing in camera on 22 January 1985 at
which hearing the applicant and his wife were present and represented
by counsel. The foster parents were heard as witnesses at the request
of the applicant. Furthermore, at the request of the Social Council,
the chief doctor Sari Granström and the psychologist Jarkko Rantanen
were heard. In the judgment dated 25 January 1985, the County
Administrative Court rejected the applicant's appeal and stated as
follows in its reasons:
"The Social Council has decided to terminate the care of
Susanne. It follows that (the applicant's) personal
circumstances do not as such constitute an obstacle to
sending the girl home. (The applicant) is of the opinion
that Susanne is not at ease in the foster home which is
sometimes expressed in her bashful attitude towards other
children.
The Social Council has alleged that a removal of Susanne
would involve a risk of harm to her mental health which is
not of a minor character. The Council has relied on a child
psychiatric opinion by Sari Granström and Jarkko Rantanen.
The information given in the opinion has been confirmed by
them at the hearing. It suggests that an immediate removal
of Susanne would involve the serious consequences alleged by
the Social Council, i.e. that Susanne - who is a sensitive,
fragile, and vulnerable girl - will lose her security and
show psychosomatic symptoms such as enuresis - bedwetting -
and stomach pains as well as depressive tendencies. In
addition, it must be recalled that the placement in the
foster home - where Susanne apparently feels safe and at
home in all respects - must be assessed to be entirely
compatible with her best interests. Against this
background, bringing the child home must at present be
considered to involve a risk which is not of a minor
character. When balancing this risk against the interests of
the custodian - for which the Court, as such, has great
sympathy - the County Administrative Court finds the
preponderant reasons to be in favour of letting Susanne,
until further notice, stay in the (foster home)."
21. The applicant appealed against the judgment to the
Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm.
22. In submissions to the Administrative Court of Appeal dated 3
June 1985 the Social Council stated inter alia:
"The Council has the greatest understanding and respect for
(the applicant's) longing for Susanne. However, it is first
and foremost Susanne's best interest we must see to and we
consider it to be (the applicant's) right and duty towards
Susanne, by way of a slowly and successively developed
contact, to create a close relation to her which will make
them feel a really mutual security together. Thereafter
Susanne should of course return home. It is impossible to
calculate how long this will take. It would create great
legal insecurity for Susanne if a fixed time limit were
set."
23. In a memorandum of 14 June 1985 also addressed to the
Administrative Court of Appeal, the responsible social secretary
stated that Susanne, at her own request, stayed over night with the
applicant three times during the last two months and that Susanne had
said that she wished to continue to meet her father every second week
and stay over night only one night to begin with.
24. By a judgment of 2 August 1985, the Administrative Court of
Appeal rejected the appeal. In its reasons, the Court stated as
follows:
"The aim of the provisions of Section 28 of the Social
Services Act is to safeguard the best interests of the
child. Among the circumstances which must be considered
in that context are the age of the child, its abilities and
emotional ties. Furthermore regard must be had, inter
alia, to the child's own wishes and the time that the
child has been cared for in the home from which it is
supposed to be removed.
(Susanne) has been cared for in the foster home since
October 1977 and thus for the major part of her life.
She is considered to be a sensitive child and has had
certain psychosomatic symptoms. After the County
Administrative Court's examination of the question of
the removal of Susanne, it appears that the relationship
between Susanne and (the applicant) has developed in a
favourable manner. The Administrative Court of Appeal
finds, however, that an enforced removal still involves
a risk of harming Susanne's mental health, a risk which
is not of a minor character. The request to lift the
prohibition against taking Susanne away from the foster home
cannot therefore be granted. The question as to when
the prohibition can be lifted is dependent upon how the
contacts between (the applicant) and Susanne will develop in
the future. The Administrative Court of Appeal finds that
the prohibition cannot at present be limited in time."
25. The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court
(regeringsrätten) which, on 26 March 1986, refused leave to appeal.
26. As from May 1986 Susanne stayed overnight every second
week-end with the applicant and his wife. In the summers of 1986 and
1987 she spent parts of her holidays with them. She also stayed with
the applicant about one week during Christmas 1987, Easter 1988 and
New Year 1988-1989. In a memorandum dated 15 December 1987 the Social
Council stated as follows:
"The measures which have been taken to bring about more
frequent contacts and a possible transfer have essentially
been to support Susanne and the foster home in order to make
the visits and the holidays with the father as natural as
possible. In addition, the foster home ... has received
support to take initiative to better contact with the
father. Susanne's own will is considered to be of great
importance and her feelings of the contact with the father
have been monitored regularly. Susanne is mature for her
age and has more and more been able to express her own will
to the foster home and the father. Consequently, her own
wishes about how the contact with the father should be
arranged have been decisive. More frequent contacts and a
possible transfer to the father are allowed to develop in
the girl's speed. Antero Rieme has since the autumn of 1985
declined contact with the social authorities. As the father
has previously said that he is prepared to cut off the
contact with the daughter, the social authorities have found
it of great importance to point out that it is important
that he maintains the contact with Susanne, not least
for her own sake. As the social authorities have no contact
with Antero Rieme there are obstacles to work actively for a
better relation between him and the foster home, which with
the support of the social authorities invite the father to
talks and contacts. In view of Susanne's age and maturity
the social authorities have paid the greatest attention to
her own will. Susanne has since the age of one year stayed
in the foster home and has strong emotional bonds with the
foster parents. The continued development of the contacts
between Susanne and the father must therefore follow her own
speed and a transfer shall take place when she so wishes."
27. On 1 September 1989 the applicant requested that the
prohibition on removal be terminated. An investigation was made by
the Social Administration. In the report dated 25 October 1989 to the
Social Council the following is said:
"Susanne is a sensitive child who earlier showed
psychosomatic symptoms such as bed wetting, stomach pains
and head ache. These troubles have disappeared some years
ago.
In 1985 Susanne started to stay over night with her father
some night and from 1986 she has regularly stayed with him
every second week-end. She has also been on holiday with
the father and his wife and has spent some school holidays
with them. Susanne has said that she has been satisfied
with the contact she has had and that she wished to stay
with (the foster parents). The contact with the father has
developed in the girl's own speed. She herself indicated
when she has felt herself ready to stay over night and go on
holiday with the father. This summer Susanne has been on
holiday with the Rieme couple and has, as from the
school-start in August 1989, on probation, stayed with them
after agreement between the father, the foster home and
Susanne. She still attends her school in Södertälje, which
according to herself is very important for her.
The contact between (the foster parents) and (the applicant)
has been very tense over the years and they have for long
periods not had any contact at all. Susanne has had a
difficult task to go between the families. She seems to
have managed and shows that she is attached to both her
couples of parents. The two families now co-operate in
Susanne's best interests about her living and the future
contacts with the foster home. Susanne has no contact with
her natural mother.
...
Antero and Anita Rieme have shown that they take great
account of Susanne's wishes and they have great
understanding for the girl's difficulties to move from the
foster home where she has grown up...
Summary and assesment
Susanne is a 13 year old girl who has been in a foster home
since she was one year old. She has had frequent, and
successively increasing contacts with her father, Antero
Rieme, and his wife, Anita. Since the end of August 1989
Susanne is staying with the Riemes and she sees her foster
parents as often as she wishes. Both families co-operate in
her best interests. It is important that Antero Rieme is
now also given the factual care of Susanne. Both families
have every possibility to plan in the best interests of
Susanne. The present status of the girl is good, she is
attached to both families and attention is being paid to her
wishes. Therefore, the prohibition on removal ought to be
terminated."
28. On 20 November 1989 the Social Council terminated the
prohibition on removal.
B. Relevant domestic law
29. Provisions regulating the custody of a child appear in the
Parental Code (föräldrabalken). A decision on the taking of a child
into public care does not affect the legal status of the parent or
parents as custodians, even though they cannot exercise all their
rights and obligations as custodians in the same way as other parents.
Similarly, a decision on the custody of a child does not affect a
public care order or a prohibition on removal. A care order or a
prohibition on removal can only be issued by the social authorities
and the administrative courts. A decision to alter a parent's legal
status as a custodian can only be made by a court order issued by an
ordinary court.
30. Since 1 January 1982 the basic rules on public responsibility
for young persons are laid down in the Social Services Act. This Act
contains provisions regarding supportive and preventive measures taken
with the approval and consent of the individuals concerned. Decisions
which had been taken under the 1960 Child Welfare Act, and which were
still in force on 31 December 1981, were considered to be decisions
taken under the new legislation, whether it be the Social Services Act
or the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons
(lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga; hereinafter "the
1980 Act"). As from 1 July 1990 the relevant legislation has been
amended (cf. para. 37 below). The following account concerns the law
as it was in force at the relevant time.
31. The 1980 Act is concerned with cases where the parents do not
give their consent to the necessary measures. Under Section 1 paras. 1
and 2 of the 1980 Act compulsory care may be provided for a young
person, inter alia, if the lack of care for him or any other
condition in the home entails a danger to his health or development.
32. According to Section 5 of the 1980 Act, the Social Council is
obliged to monitor carefully the care of young persons who are in care
under the Act and "the Council shall decide to terminate care under the
Act when such care is no longer necessary".
33. The Social Council may issue a prohibition on removal under
Section 28 of the Social Services Act, which reads as follows:
(Swedish)
"Socialnämnden får för viss tid eller tills vidare förbjuda
den som har vårdnaden om en underårig att ta denne från ett
hem som avses i 25 §, om det finns risk som inte är ringa för
att barnets kroppsliga eller själsliga hälsa skadas om det
skiljs från hemmet.
Om det finns sannolika skäl för att en sådan risk föreligger
men den behövliga utredningen inte har kunnat slutföras,
får ett tillfälligt förbud meddelas att gälla i avvaktan
på att ärendet kan slutligt avgöras, dock högst fyra veckor.
Ett förbud enligt denna paragraf hindrar inte att barnet
skiljs från hemmet på grund av ett beslut enligt 21 kap.
föräldrabalken."
(English translation)
"The Social Council may for a certain period of time or
until further notice prohibit the guardian of a minor
from taking the minor from a home referred to in Section 25
(i.e. a foster home), if there is a risk, which is not of
a minor nature, of harming the child's physical or mental
health if the child is separated from that home.
If there are reasonable grounds for assuming that there is
such a risk, although the necessary investigations have
not been completed, a temporary prohibition may be issued
for a maximum period of four weeks, pending the final
decision in the matter.
A prohibition issued under this Section does not prevent
a removal of the child from the home on the basis of a
decision under Chapter 21 of the Parental Code."
34. Section 28 of the Act does not apply to children who are being
cared for in foster homes under Section 1 of the 1980 Act. As long as
such care continues, the right of the guardian to determine the
domicile of the child is suspended. That right is in principle
returned to the guardian if the public care of the child is
terminated. However, that right may be further suspended by a
prohibition on removal under Section 28 of the Social Services Act.
35. The travaux préparatoires of the Act (Government Bill 1979/
80:1, p. 541) state that only a passing disturbance or other
occasional disadvantage to the child is not a sufficient ground for
issuing a prohibition on removal. Among the elements which shall be
considered are the age of the child, the degree of development,
character and emotional ties. The time the child has been cared for
away from the parents must also be taken into account as well as the
living conditions the child has and the conditions it will come to,
and parents' contacts with the child during the period they have been
separated. An important element which must be considered in connection
with a possible decision on the prohibition on removal is the child's
own preference. If the child has reached the age of 15 years, its
preference must not be opposed without good reasons. The child's
preferences can be of importance in considering the risk of harm to
the child as a result of a removal.
36. The Standing Social Committee of the Parliament stated in its
report (SoU 1979/80:44, p. 78), inter alia, that a prohibition might
be issued if removal could involve a risk of damage to the child's
physical or mental health. The Committee stressed that the provision
was aimed at safeguarding the best interests of the child and that
those interests must prevail whenever they conflict with the
guardian's interest in deciding the domicile of the child. The
Committee pointed out that a separation generally involves a risk of
harm to the child. Repeated transfers and transfers which take place
after a long time, when the child has developed strong links with the
foster home, should thus not be accepted without good reasons. The
child's need for secure relations and living conditions must be
decisive in any decision on these questions.
37. On 1 July 1990 a new Act with Special Provisions on the Care
of Young Persons entered into force. The provisions relating to
prohibitions on removal have been transferred from the Social Services
Act to the new Act. The County Administrative Court shall, at the
request of the Social Council, decide on issues concerning a
prohibition on removal. The conditions for issuing a prohibition are
said to be the same as in Section 28 of the Social Services Act (para.
33) although the text now reads that "a prohibition may be issued if
there is an apparent risk (påtaglig risk) that the young person's
health and development will be harmed if he is separated from the
home". The Social Council shall, at least every three months, examine
whether the prohibition is still required. It may also decide on
questions of the parents' access to the child during the prohibition
on removal.
III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION
A. Complaint declared admissible
38. The Commission has declared admissible the applicant's
complaint that he has been the victim of a violation of his right to
respect for family life as a result of the long duration of the
prohibition for him from removing his daughter from the foster home.
B. Point at issue
39. The issue to be determined is whether there has been a
violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
C. Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention
40. Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority
with the exercise of this right except such as is in
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic
society in the interests of national security, public safety
or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others."
a. Complaints and submissions
41. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention on the ground that his reunification with his daughter has
been unreasonably delayed. He submits that he initiated proceedings
in 1981 to obtain custody of his daughter and only recently has his
daughter been returned. The protracted proceedings and in particular
the maintenance in force of the prohibition on removal from 16 October
1984 until 20 November 1989 were not justified under Article 8 (Art. 8).
The applicant also invokes Article 17 (Art. 17) of the Convention
in support of his application. The Government submit that, although
the prohibition on removal constituted an interference with the
applicant's right under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1), it was justified
under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
The development of the case and the return of the daughter show that
the measures taken by the social authorities have achieved their aim.
b. Whether there was an interference with the applicant's right
to respect for his family life
42. The Commission recalls that the mutual enjoyment by parent and
child of each other's company constitutes a fundamental element of
family life and that the family relationship is not terminated by
reason of the fact that the child has been taken into public care or is
in a foster home under a prohibition on removal (see e.g. Eur. Court
H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A. no. 130, p. 29,
para. 59, and Eriksson judgment of 22 June 1989, Series A. no. 156, p.
24, para. 58). Furthermore, in proceedings which relate to a parent's
future relations with his child and concern a fundamental element of
family life, an effective respect for family life requires that the
questions involved are determined solely in the light of all relevant
considerations and not by the mere passage of time (cf. Eur. Court
H.R., H. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no
120-B, p. 64, para. 90).
43. The Commission recalls that the applicant obtained the legal
custody of his daughter on 28 September 1983 following the District
Court's judgment. In principle, the applicant was then entitled to
take care of his daughter. However, at that time the daughter was in
the foster home under a care order which remained in force until 16
October 1984 when the Social Council - following the applicant's
request of 19 October 1983 - lifted the care order. On the same day
the Social Council issued a prohibition on removal which remained in
force until 20 November 1989, i.e. for over five years and one month.
44. The Commission finds that these facts constitute an
interference with the applicant's right to respect for his family life
guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (cf.
above-mentioned Eriksson judgment, p. 24, para. 58).
45. Consequently, it must be examined whether the interference was
justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the
Convention. In order to be justified under this provision an
interference must satisfy three conditions: it must be "in accordance
with the law", it must pursue one of the aims enumerated in Article 8
para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it must be "necessary in a democratic society"
for that aim.
c. Whether the interference was "in accordance with the law"
46. The phrase "in accordance with the law" has been analysed by
the Convention organs on several occasions. The Commission recalls
the following general principles.
47. The word "law" covers both written and unwritten law. It
refers primarily to domestic law and the phrase means that any
interference must be based on such law. However the phrase includes
two requirements which go beyond simple compliance with the domestic
law. These requirements relate to the quality of the law and can be
summarised under the headings "accessibility" and "foreseeability".
Moreover, there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law
against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights
safeguarded by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1). A law which confers a
discretion on the authorities must indicate the scope and manner of
exercise of any such discretion with sufficient clarity to afford the
necessary protection (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Sunday Times judgment of
26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, pp. 30-33, paras. 47 - 52 and the
above-mentioned Eriksson judgment, p. 24, para. 59).
48. The applicant submits that the interference was not "in
accordance with the law", whereas the Government submit that it was in
accordance with Swedish law.
49. The Commission first notes that under the case-law of the
Convention organs the relevant provisions of the 1980 Act and the
Social Services Act regarding public care and prohibition on
removal must be considered to satisfy the requirements under Article 8
para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention as to accessibility and
foreseeability (see above-mentioned Olsson judgment, p. 30, para. 62
and Eriksson judgment, p. 24, paras. 59-60).
50. Consequently, the issue which arises regarding conformity with
the law does not concern the quality of the applicable Swedish law but
is limited to the question whether the prohibition on removal was
consistent with that law. Here, it is recalled that the Commission's
power to review compliance with domestic law is limited : it is in the
first place for the national courts to interpret and apply that law
(see above-mentioned Eriksson judgment, p. 25, para. 62).
51. The Commission notes that the prohibition on removal was
imposed by the Social Council without any limitation in time. On the
applicant's appeal this decision was confirmed first by the County
Administrative Court and then by the Administrative Court of Appeal.
The decision to prohibit removal was consequently taken after a full
examination carried out successively by the Social Council, the County
Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal. The
Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.
52. Having examined, in particular, the judgments of the County
Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal, the
Commission finds no indication that the issuing of the prohibition on
removal and the maintenance in force of that prohibition was contrary
to Swedish law. It is satisfied that the prohibition was "in
accordance with the law" for the purpose of Article 8 para. 2
(Art. 8-2) of the Convention.
d. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim
53. The Commission finds that the prohibition on removal was aimed
at protecting the interests of the child, which interests fall within
the expressions "the protection of health" and "the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others", which are both legitimate aims under
Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).
e. Whether the interference was "necessary in a democractic society"
54. "Necessary" in this context requires that the interference
corresponds to a "pressing social need". It is for the national
authorities to make the initial assessment of the necessity of a given
interference. In the Court's view the national authorities have a
"margin of appreciation" in making this assessment but the decisions of
the domestic authorities are subject to a review by the Convention
organs (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976,
Series A no. 24, pp. 22-24, paras. 48-50).
55. Furthermore, an interference with a Convention right cannot be
regarded as "necessary in a democratic society" unless it is
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R.,
Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 25, para. 58).
When deciding whether an interference is necessary the Convention
organs cannot confine themselves to considering the impugned decisions
in isolation, but must look at them in the light of the case as a
whole. They must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the
interference are "relevant and sufficient" (cf. above-mentioned Olsson
judgment, pp. 31-32, paras. 67-68). When examining these questions
they should take into account that Article 8 (Art. 8) includes a procedural
requirement that in child-care cases the parents must have been
sufficiently involved in the decision-making process (see Eur. Court
H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A
no. 121, p. 29, para. 64).
56. The Convention organs have previously been seised with cases
concerning the necessity of a prohibition on removal, notably the
above-mentioned Eriksson case and the Nyberg case (Comm. Report 15.3.90,
Nyberg v. Sweden to be published in Eur. Court H.R., Series A
no. 181-B). In the Eriksson case the Court made the following
statement (pp. 21-22, paras. 70-71):
"70. The original decision to prohibit Mrs Eriksson from
removing her daughter from the foster home may well, in the
circumstances of the case and having regard to the margin of
appreciation accorded to the Contracting States in this
area, be said to satisfy this requirement.
71. In cases like the present a mother's right to
respect for family life under Article 8 (Art. 8) includes a right to
the taking of measures with a view to her being reunited with
her child. The care order had been lifted, and there was no
doubt as to the suitability of Mrs Eriksson to take care of
children or of the conditions in her home (see paragraph 20
above). The Social Council's decision of 21 January 1983
(see paragraph 12 above (c) above) made it clear that once
the care order was no longer in force, the aim was the
reuniting of parent and child. Furthermore the Supreme
Administrative Court stated, in its judgment of 11 October 1984
(see paragraph 22 above), that '[i]rrespective of the
duration of the prohibition the [Social Council] is obliged
to see to it that appropriate measures aimed at reuniting
parents and child are taken without delay'.
However, it appears that under Swedish law Mrs Eriksson did
not, after the lifting of the care order, have any
enforceable visiting rights while the prohibition on removal
was in force. Furthermore, and in particular on account of
the restrictions on access, she was in fact denied the
opportunity to meet with her daughter to an extent and in
circumstances likely to promote the aim of reuniting them or
even the positive development of their relationship. In
this situation she has not been able to have the prohibition
on removal lifted. The resulting stress on the relations
between the applicants and the uncertainty with regard to
Lisa's future have already continued for more than six
years, causing great anguish to both applicants.
The Government admitted that the system as implemented had
failed on this occasion, but argued that situations such as
the present could not be prevented whatever system would
have been applied, as all depended on the persons involved.
The Court recognises that difficulties may arise in
consequence of the termination of public care of young
children, especially where the child has been taken into
care at a very young age and has spent many years away from
his natural parents' home. However, the unsatisfactory
situation that has ensued in the present case seems to a
large extent to stem from the failure to ensure any
meaningful access between mother and daughter with a view to
reuniting them.
Having regard to the foregoing and notwithstanding Sweden's
margin of appreciation, the Court concludes that the severe
and lasting restrictions on access combined with the long
duration of the prohibition on removal are not proportionate
to the legitimate aims pursued."
57. In the same case, the Commission made the following general
statements (Comm. Report 14.7.88, Eriksson v. Sweden, Eur. Court H.R.,
Series A no. 156, pp. 43, 44 and 46):
"207. The Commission recalls that a prohibition on removal
is a measure which may be applied in a situation where no
reproaches are levelled against the natural parents, but
where the interests of the child, who may have lived for a
long time in a foster home, militate in favour of a
transitional period before the child is actually returned to
its natural parents. A prohibition on removal is thus meant
to be a temporary measure. The temporary nature of a
prohibition on removal may also explain that there are no
legal provisions allowing for regulations of the parent's
right of access. According to the Government the legislator
has not foreseen that a prohibition on removal will remain
in force for a long period.
...
211. The Commission considers that once a decision to
return a child to its natural parents has been taken it must
be in the interests of all parties involved that such a
decision is implemented as quickly as possible. A
prohibition on removal temporarily suspends the removal of
the child and is therefore, although it may be justified
during a transitional period, a measure which by its very
nature is likely to increase the tension between those
involved in the transfer of the child, notably the child,
the foster parents and the natural parents. If such a
situation prevails for a long time there is a great risk
that, as time goes by, the conflicts will increase and that
it gradually will become more difficult to establish the
close relationship between the child and his or her natural
parent which is a necessary condition for the transfer.
...
220. Moreover, the Commission considers that the
uncertainty about Lisa's future which has prevailed ever
since January 1983, when it was decided to terminate the
care order and to issue a prohibition on removal, was in
itself unsatisfactory and potentially harmful to all the
parties concerned, in particular to Lisa. The Commission is
of the opinion that it was not in Lisa's interests to leave
the question of her future open and uncertain for so many
years."
58. As to the present case, the Commission has already noted that
the prohibition on removal was based on successive examinations by the
Social Council, the County Administrative Court and the Administrative
Court of Appeal. The applicant was, in the Commission's view,
sufficiently involved in the decision-making process for the purposes
of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
59. With regard to the reasons on which the prohibition on removal
was based, the Commission notes the courts' finding that there was a
risk which was not of a minor nature that Susanne's health and
development would be jeopardised if she were to move from the foster
home immediately. This reason for the decision to prohibit the
applicant from removing the daughter from the foster home was, in the
Commission's opinion, clearly "relevant" and, having regard to the
margin of appreciation of the Contracting States and to the procedures
followed, the Commission finds that the courts had, in March 1986,
"sufficient" reasons for considering that it was necessary to maintain
the prohibition on removal.
60. The Commission must however also examine whether it was
necessary to maintain the prohibition on removal in force until 20
November 1989. In this respect, it is recalled that Article 8
(Art. 8) includes a right for the applicant to the taking of measures
with a view to being reunited with his child (cf. above-mentioned
Eriksson judgment, p. 21, para. 71). It should also be recalled that
the Social Council was under a duty to see to it that appropriate
measures were taken without delay with a view to reuniting the
applicant and his daughter.
61. In the Eriksson and Nyberg cases a significant feature was
that the social authorities did not actively, through access
arrangements, promote a reunification of the parent and child, but
rather acted against such a reunification. The present case is
similar in that the social authorities have not actively promoted a
reunification, but it is different in that there is no indication that
the social authorities have actively acted against a reunification;
nor is there any specific complaint that the access arrangements have
been inadequate. There are also other similarities. Thus, in the
present case as well tense relations between the foster parents and
the natural parent contributed to making the reunification more
difficult. Moreover, as in the Eriksson case, heavy reliance has been
placed on the child's wishes.
62. As regards the length of the present prohibition on removal,
the Commission recalls that it remained in force for five years and
one month. In the Nyberg case it applied for one year and two and a
half months while, in the Eriksson case, the prohibition had been
maintained for more than six years and four months when the European
Court delivered judgment.
63. The Commission further recalls that the prohibition on removal
is a temporary measure intended to apply only during a transitional
period. The daughter had lived in the foster home since she was one
year old. The care order was lifted when she was eight years and
replaced by a prohibition on removal which applied until she was 13
years of age. To issue and maintain such a prohibition in force for
five years in regard to a child of that age can only be justified in
very special circumstances. The fact that the child has been in a
foster home as long as seven years and from such an early age are
elements weighing in favour of a longer transitional period than
otherwise.
64. Nevertheless, account must also be taken of the fact that,
during the long prohibition on removal, the applicant has not had
any possibility of securing a regulation and increase of his access to
Susanne, other than by asking for a termination of the prohibition.
It is understandable if the applicant has not wished to engage himself
and Susanne in further proceedings having already been involved in
different proceedings from November 1981 until March 1986. As a
result the applicant has been left at the discretion of the social
authority without being able to obtain a legal determination of his
right of access. It is recalled that no decision was made in respect
of his claim for access regulations (cf. para. 18).
65. In sum, the present case is characterised by a lack of
activity by the Social Council. This inactivity can hardly be
reconciled with the legal duty of the Social Council to actively
promote a reunification as soon as a prohibition on removal has been
issued. In view of the fact that the applicant has in the same period
not had any legal possibility to successively develop his access, the
Commission finds that the lack of activity of the Social Council made
the interference disproportionate to the aim pursued.
66. In all these circumstances, the Commission arrives at the
conclusion that it cannot be said that it was "necessary in a
democratic society", irrespective of Sweden's margin of appreciation,
to maintain the prohibition in force for the whole period of more than
five years.
D. Conclusion
67. The Commission concludes, by 8 votes to 5, that there has been
a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.
Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(H.C. KRÜGER) (J. A. FROWEIN)
Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. Danelius
joined by MM. J.A. Frowein, E. Busuttil and F. Martinez
I regret not to be able to share the majority's opinion that
there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the
present case. My reasons are as follows.
As the majority has rightly pointed out (para. 61 of the
Report), the present case differs from the Eriksson and Nyberg cases
in that there is no evidence of the social authorities having acted
against the aim of reunification of parent and child. The question
nevertheless remains whether these authorities took sufficient
measures to promote that aim or whether, by failure to act, they
unnecessarily prolonged the prohibition on removal.
In this respect, I first accept the Commission's finding
(para. 59 of the Report) that in March 1986, when the Supreme
Administrative Court refused leave to appeal, there existed
"sufficient" reasons to consider that it was necessary to maintain the
prohibition on removal.
As to the time thereafter, I note that the applicant had, from
May 1986, continuous and regular contact with Susanne who, as a rule,
spent every second weekend at the applicant's home and who joined him
for longer periods during summer and other holidays. In these
circumstances I find no basis for considering that the social
authorities should have been active in bringing about an even more
extensive access.
I further note that, according to the Social Council's
memorandum of 15 December 1987 (para. 26 of the Report), the applicant
had since the autumn of 1985 declined contact with the social
authorities which, since they had no contact with the applicant, were
unable to work actively for better relations between him and
the foster home. The applicant has contested that the social authorities
had in reality any intention of working for the improvement of these
relations. Nevertheless, the applicant's refusal of contact with
these authorities must be regarded as an element which made it more
difficult for them to promote the aim of reunification, and, in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, it must be assumed that they
would have been prepared to take certain measures for the purpose
indicated in the Social Council's memorandum, which might, if
successful, have facilitated Susanne's transfer to the applicant's
home.
Having regard to these facts, and in the absence of any other
evidence of inadequate action by the social authorities, I find no
basis for any particular criticism against these authorities in the
present case. It is true that it took a long time before Susanne
moved to the applicant's home but, having regard to the State's margin
of appreciation in this sensitive area, I am not prepared to conclude,
on the basis of Article 8 of the Convention, that the reunification
should have been effected earlier.
Consequently, I find that the Swedish authorities could
reasonably consider that the interference with the applicant's right
under Article 8 was necessary in a democratic society for the purpose
of protecting Susanne's health and rights. It follows that in my view
Article 8 has not been violated in the present case.
Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. G. Schermers
1. In the present case I am not convinced that the social
authorities were insufficiently active in promoting a reunification of
father and child (Report para. 61). It is difficult to create bonds
of love between people who hardly know each other and forcing a child
to love a hardly known father might well have had the opposite
effect. Leaving the initiative for visiting and staying overnight
with her father to the child may well have been the wisest possible
approach under the circumstances of the case. I sincerely doubt
whether the social authorities had any real possibility for a more
active policy. I therefore do not share the opinion of the majority
of the Commission, expressed in paragraphs 65 and 66 of the Report,
that the interference in the family life of the applicant was
disproportionate to the aim of protecting the interests of the child.
In my opinion the interference with the applicant's right to respect
for his family life was justified under Article 8 para. 2.
2. Apart from the family life of the applicant, account should
also be taken of the right of the foster parents to respect for their
family life with the child they had educated from her early infancy.
In my opinion both the applicant and the foster parents had strong
ties with the child and for all of them family life with the child was
of great importance. But the father, as well as the foster parents
are adult people who have more interests in life and whose welfare and
happiness should not entirely depend on their relationship to this
particular child. This is different for the child herself. For a
young child the family is the only safe place and family life is a
vital necessity. The most essential issue in the present case is,
therefore, the family life of the child. What is the family life of
the child? She entered the foster home when she was less than a year
old. The District Court of Södertälje found in 1981 "It is
apparent that Susanne is well settled in the foster home, and that
she is secure and at home there and regards the foster family as her
own" (see para. 16 of the Report). For a child aged younger than about
eight, the blood relationship cannot be a clear concept. At that age
family life is identical with the actual family in which the child
lives. Only when the child gets older does it begin to look outside
the actual family and at that time Susanne was helped to develop a
closer relationship to her father. When 13 she agreed to stay with
her father. Under those circumstances I do not find an infringement
with the child's right to family life. But there would have been an
infringement of the child's family life if the social authorities had
forced Susanne into closer family life with her father before she was
ready for it. Would that infringement have been justified under
Article 8, para. 2. Would it have been necessary to force the child
for the sake of the family life of the father? I doubt it. Had the
social authorities interfered more actively they might well have
infringed the rights of the child under Article 8 of the Convention.
Under these circumstances, I find it impossible to blame the
Swedish authorities, let alone to find a violation of a fundamental
human right.
Concurring opinion of Mrs. G. H. Thune
While sharing the opinion of the Commission, I would like to
add the following.
The violation in this case seems to me to be a direct result
of the Swedish legislation regulating the situation when a care order
is lifted.
When a child like Susanne has been living in a foster home
for a number of years, there can only be a question of transfer to the
natural parent home when:
1. objections can no longer be held against the situation
in the parental home, and
2. a transfer is not considered detrimental to the child.
It seems to me extremely unfortunate that Swedish law opts for
the lifting of a care order as soon as the first of these two conditions
is fulfilled. It is obviously not possible to move a child until the
second condition also is complied with.
In the present case, the social authorities, when lifting the
care order, had no intention of a speedy reunification. The available
documents suggest rather the contrary. I here refer to the
psychiatric opinion by Dr. Sari Granström and Jarkko Rantanen. They
state inter alia:
"A move to Susanne's natural father requires that the
relationship between him, his present wife and Susanne be
developed and deepened. Furthermore, it requires that
Susanne be sufficiently mature for the move to be discussed
with her, with its advantages and disadvantages and related
feelings of loss and sorrow, which has as yet proved
impossible in her case according to the investigation at
PBU. As a consequence, Susanne should be allowed to
continue to develop and mature within the family frame that
has been her home for more than six years. This also means,
in our opinion, that she should not be subjected to new
examinations connected with her return home within the next
few years, but Susanne's contact with her father needs to be
continued and developed in collaboration with her foster
parents. "
Accordingly, the prohibition on removal, which is defined and
understood as a temporary short-term measure, was implemented with the
obvious intention, on the part of the social authorities, not to
keep it in force for a short time, but rather the contrary. This, in
my view, is most objectionable in the present case.
When a care order is to be lifted, the authorities must at the
same time take a decision in respect of the child. Steps must be
taken either with a view to the transfer of the custody or adoption in
favour of the foster parents, or active steps must be taken to prepare
a transfer of the child to the natural parents within a fixed time
limit. Such a time limit should normally not exceed one year.
Accordingly, a prohibition on removal which has been enforced for more
than one year will normally amount to a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention. It cannot be defended as showing respect for the natural
parents' family life in the interests of the child to apply a
temporary measure as a more or less permanent measure.
Concurring opinion of Mrs. J. Liddy
I agree with the Commission's opinion but wish to add a word
about the statement in paragraph 61 thereof that, as in the Eriksson
case, heavy reliance has been placed on the child's wishes. I formed
the impression that the present case was characterised by near-total,
if not total, reliance on an initiative to be taken by a very young
child, and a corresponding transfer to her of the burden of decision.
This situtation I found difficult to reconcile with the legal duty of
the Social Council to actively promote a reunification as soon as a
prohibition on removal has been issued (paragraph 65 of the Report).
Concurring opinion of Mr. L. Loucaides
1. I agree with the Commission's opinion, but I wish to add
certain considerations which have been important for me to conclude
that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
2. My starting point is that when the prohibition on removal was
issued in October 1984 the authorities had a duty to see to it that
appropriate measures aimed at reuniting the applicant were taken
without delay (cf. para. 56). Subsequently, regular contact between
the applicant and his daughter was established. But it appears from
the file that the measures and steps taken by the authorities depended
entirely on the wishes of the daughter. At the hearing before the
Commission the Agent of the Government, in reply to a question whether
any efforts were made in the form of advising th child that at some
stage she must join the applicant, stated that that would be to put
pressure on the child and he found "it highly unlikely that they
would try to influence the child." Although I find it important that
the child's interest be given great weight in determining when a
prohibition on removal can be lifted, I cannot accept that the child,
who was at the age of 8 to 13 years during the relevant time, should
in practice decide herself when the transfer should take place. It is
potentially harmful to place such a burden on the child and it is
certainly extremely difficult to establish what is the true wish of a
child of that age. In this respect I must stress that I consider it
the duty of the authorities to advise and encourage the child in
favour of the choice to join her father because of the general
obligation imposed on them by the Convention to protect the family
life of the individuals.
3. Further, I am not prepared to accept the conclusion in para.
59 that the prohibition on removal was justified up to March 1986.
Already at that stage one and a half years had elapsed after the
issuing of the prohibition on removal and no regular contact had been
established between the applicant and his daughter.
4. Finally, I attach importance to the total duration of the
proceedings, from November 1981, when the applicant started
proceedings to gain custody over his child, until March 1986, when the
Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal on the issue of
the prohibition on removal (cf. Decision on admissibility p. 31).
APPENDIX I
HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Date Item
__________________________________________________________________________
28 July 1986 Introduction of the application.
1 September 1986 Registration of the application.
Examination of the admissibility
6 October 1987 Commission's deliberations and decision to
invite the Government to submit observations
in writing.
26 February 1988 Government's observations.
26 April 1988 Applicant's observations in reply.
9 December 1988 Commission's deliberations and decision to
invite the parties to a hearing on the
admissibility and merits of the application.
17 March 1989 Commission's decision to grant legal aid.
5 July 1989 Hearing on admissibility and merits. The
parties were represented as follows:
Government: Mr. Hans Corell
Mr. Leif Lindgren
Mr. Pär Boqvist
Applicants: Mr. Lennart Hane
The applicant and his wife
were also present.
5 July 1989 Decision to declare the application partly
admissible and partly inadmissible
Examination of the merits
5 July 1989 Commission's deliberations on the merits
10 October 1989 Transmission to the parties of the text of the
decision on admissibility
20 November 1989 Applicant's further observations
24 November 1989 Government's further observations
9 January 1990 Government's further observations
10 February and Commission's consideration of the state of
7 July 1990 proceedings
2 October 1990 Commission's deliberations on the
merits, final votes and and adoption of the
Report
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy