AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 16318/90
by Reinhard Peter & Co. KG and
Franz Martin ZUMTOBEL
against Austria
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 15 October 1991, the following members being present:
MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President
S. TRECHSEL
F. ERMACORA
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
J.C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission,
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 28 February
1990 by Reinhard Peter & Co. KG and Franz Martin ZUMTOBEL against
Austria and registered on 19 March 1990 under file No. 16318/90;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
Particular circumstances of the case
The first applicant is a company of limited partnership
(Kommanditgesellschaft) under Austrian law. The second applicant, an
Austrian citizen residing at Dornbirn, is its manager.
On 14 August 1984 the Klagenfurt Local Council (Gemeinderat)
decided to grant a special designation for shopping areas to the
second applicant's land. However, this designation did not enter into
force as it was not approved by the Carinthian Provincial Government
(Landesregierung).
On 9 April 1986 the Mayor of Klagenfurt refused the second
applicant's request for a permit to build a supermarket
(Grossverbrauchermarkt). In his decision the Mayor stated in
particular that the building permit was requested for an area that was
not designated as an area for shopping centres (Fläche für
Einkaufszentren).
The second applicant appealed against the decision, claiming
that the decision was unlawful as its legal basis, the Community
Planning Act (Gemeindeplanungsgesetz), was unconstitutional.
On 1 September 1986 the first applicant informed the authority
that it had entered into the rights of the second applicant and that
it was now requesting the building permit.
On 28 November 1986 the Klagenfurt City Council (Stadtsenat)
dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was not competent to
consider if the Community Planning Act was unconstitutional.
On 15 May 1987 the Carinthian Provincial Government
(Landesregierung) dismissed the first applicant's further appeal on
the ground that the authorities had been bound by the law.
The first applicant lodged a complaint with the Constitutional
Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). It submitted that the decision
violated its right of property and its rights under Articles 6 and 13
of the Convention to a decision by a tribunal and an effective remedy.
It further contended that paras. 4 and 5 of Section 5 of the Community
Planning Act were unconstitutional, as the provincial legislature was
not competent to enact it.
On 1 October 1988 the Constitutional Court dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that Article 6 of the Convention was not
applicable to the proceedings in question and that the provincial
legislature had been competent to enact Section 5 paras. 4 and 5 of
the Carinthian Community Planning Act.
The Constitutional Court found no other indication of a
violation of the first applicant's constitutional rights and referred
the case to the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).
On 10 March 1989, in a supplement to its complaint, the first
applicant contended that the authority had not decided on the
amendment of the area zoning plan and that the area zoning plan was
unlawful. It furthermore alleged a violation of Articles 6 and 13 of
the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
On 4 July 1989 the Administrative Court dismissed the
complaint. In the Court's opinion it was undisputed that the first
applicant's project was a shopping centre for which there was no
special designation as the decision of the Klagenfurt Local Council
had not been approved by the Provincial Government. Therefore the
refusal of the building permit for non-conformity with the area zoning
plan was lawful. The decision was served on the first applicant on
31 August 1989.
&SRelevant domestic law and practice&-
I. Building permits
According to Section 9 para. 1 of the Carinthian Building
Regulations (Bauordnung) a preliminary examination (Vorprüfung) of
the request for a a building permit has to take place.
Section 9 para. 2 states:
[Translation]
"In the preliminary examination the authority has to
establish whether:
a) ...
b) the area zoning plan,
...
preclude(s) the project."
Section 11 para. 1 states:
"If one of the reasons in Section 9 para. 2 precludes the
project, the authority has to refuse the request."
[German]
"[9] (2) Bei der Vorprüfung hat die Behörde festzustellen, ob
dem Vorhaben
a) ...
b) der Flächenwidmungsplan,
...
entgegenstehen.
[11] (1) Steht dem Vorhaben einer der Gründe des § 9
Abs. 2 entgegen, hat die Behörde den Antrag abzuweisen."
II. Land planning legislation
Land planning in Austria is divided into regional and local land
planning (überörtliche und örtliche Raumordnung). In the present case
land planning was governed by Carinthian law.
Section 2 para. 2 of the Carinthian Regional Planning Act
(Raumordnungsgesetz) lays down the aims of regional land planning.
The local land planning is carried out by the communities.
The latter issue area zoning plans (Flächenwidmungspläne) which have
to be approved by the Provincial Government.
Section 5 of the Community Planning Act provides for special
designation of land. Its paras. 4 and 5 read as follows:
[Translation]
"(4) Areas for shopping centres require special
designation.
(5) Shopping centres are sales rooms of retail and
wholesale trade, such as supermarkets, cash-and-carry
markets etc., in which goods of different categories of
articles including articles of everyday use, are offered and
in which the economically connected sales area exceeds
600 m²."
[German]
"(4) Flächen für Einkaufszentren müssen als Sonderwidmung
festgelegt werden.
(5) Einkaufszentren sind Verkaufslokale des Einzelhandels
und des Großhandels, wie Verbrauchermärkte, Abholgroßmärkte
u.ä., in denen Güter mehrerer Warengruppen einschließlich
von Waren des täglichen Bedarfes, angeboten werden und bei
denen die wirtschaftlich zusammenhängende Verkaufsfläche
600 m² übersteigt."
Proceedings for special designation of land are divided into
two parts. First the local council of a community decides on a
special designation. There is, however, no individual right that the
local council grant a special designation to a particular plot of
land.
The decision of the local council must then be approved by the
supervisory authority, the Provincial Government of Carinthia. The
individual land owner, having no right to have the local council's
decision approved, is not a party to the proceedings.
Area zoning plans are Ordinances (Verordnungen). These
ordinances can be challenged before the Constitutional Court
(Verfassungsgerichtshof) for unlawfulness according to Article 139 of
the Austrian Federal Constitution. Area zoning plans which have not
been approved cannot be challenged as they did not enter into force.
It is also impossible to complain about the fact that the Provincial
Government has not approved a particular area zoning plan.
III. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court
The Austrian Constitutional Court pronounced itself on the
applicability and scope of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention to
building proceedings originating from Austrian administrative
authorities in its decision of 14 October 1987 (B 267/86, VfSlg
11500/1987). It held that the refusal of a building permit was not a
decision on a "civil right". The Court stated the following:
[Translation]
"The refusal of a building permit is rather an interference
by the State in the public interest - it is indeed the very
archetype of such an interference -, and the upholding of
public interests including the necessary balancing of public
and private interests is the essential function of
administration. The fact that the subject of the
interference is generally property and hence a private
property right, does not change its public law character."
[German]
"Vielmehr ist die Versagung einer Baubewilligung ein
hoheitlicher Eingriff im öffentlichen Interesse - ja
geradezu der Prototyp eines solchen Eingriffs -, und die
Wahrnehmung der öffentlichen Interessen einschließlich der
nötigen Abwägung gegenüber privaten Interessen die
wesentliche Aufgabe der Verwaltung. Daß der Gegenstand des
Eingriffs regelmäßig das Eigentum und damit ein privates
Vermögensrecht ist, ändert an seinem öffentlich-rechtlichen
Charakter nichts."
The Court distinguished between decisions concerning the core
of civil law (i.e. disputes among private persons) and decisions on
disputes which only concern civil rights in their effects (namely the
relationship between the private person and the public). In order to
avoid a complete change of the Austrian State structure, the Court
considered that the requirements of a tribunal within the meaning of
Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention should depend on whether the
dispute concerned the one or the other category. With regard to
decisions concerning civil rights only in their effects the Court
found that it sufficed under Article 6 para. 1 if a tribunal exercised
a mere subsequent control of the decision. The Court continued:
[Translation]
"Such a subsequent control would in any event suffice if,
regardless of its nature as a merely subsequent control
which does not provide for the reopening of proceedings, the
court effectively (and not merely theoretically and in the
abstract) has the possibility to convince itself of the
correctness of the solution in regard to the facts and
the law applied and its judgment on the matter is capable of
being enforced. Such a control falls to the Austrian
Administrative Court in the light of an understanding of the
Administrative Court Act which is oriented towards the
Constitution."
[German]
"Eine solche nachprüfende Kontrolle müsste jedenfalls dann
genügen, wenn sie ungeachtet ihres bloss nachprüfenden,
nicht auf einer Neudurchführung des Verfahrens beruhenden
Charakters dem Gericht - nicht bloss theoretisch und
abstrakt, sondern im Ergebnis auch wirksam - Gelegenheit
gibt, sich von der Richtigkeit der Lösung sowohl der Tat -
wie der Rechtsfrage zu überzeugen und sein Urteil über die
Sache auch durchzusetzen, wie dies bei einem an der
Verfassung orientierten Verständnis des
Verwaltungsgerichtshofgesetzes dem österreichischen VwGH
aufgetragen ist."
IV. Proceedings before the Administrative Court
According to Article 130 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution
the Administrative Court reviews allegations of unlawfulness of an
administrative decision. Article 130 para. 2 excludes the review of
the exercise of discretionary powers within the scope of the law. The
Administrative Court is also competent to deal with complaints that
the administrative authority has violated its duty to take a decision
(Article 132).
Section 41 of the Administrative Court Act provides, insofar
as relevant:
[Translation]
"(1) Insofar as the Administrative Court does not find
unlawfulness on account of a lack of jurisdiction of the
authority against which the appeal is directed or on account
of a violation of procedural provisions (Section 42 para. 2
[2] and [3]) ..., the Court must examine the contested
decision on the basis of the facts as accepted by the
authority against which the appeal is directed within the
framework of the alleged complaint ... If it is of the
opinion that reasons would be relevant for the decision on
the unlawfulness of the contested decision ... which were
so far not known to a party, it must hear the parties
thereupon and, if necessary, adjourn the proceedings.
(2) In the cases of Article 132 of the Federal Constitution
the Court must determine the facts, taking into account
Section 36 para. 9."
[German]
"(1) Der Verwaltungsgerichtshof hat, soweit er nicht
Rechtswidrigkeit wegen Unzuständigkeit der belangten Behörde
oder wegen Verletzung von Verfahrensvorschriften gegeben
findet (§ 42 Abs. 2 Z 2 und 3) ... den angefochtenen
Bescheid auf Grund des von der belangten Behörde
angenommenen Sachverhaltes im Rahmen der geltend gemachten
Beschwerdepunkte ... zu überprüfen. Ist er der Ansicht,
dass für die Entscheidung über die Rechtswidrigkeit des
Bescheides in einem der Beschwerdepunkte ... Gründe
massgebend sein könnten, die einer Partei bisher nicht
bekanntgegeben wurden, so hat er die Parteien darüber zu
hören und wenn nötig, eine Vertagung zu verfügen.
(2) In den Fällen des Art. 132 B-VG hat der
Gerichtshof den Sachverhalt unter Bedachtnahme auf § 36 Abs.
9 festzustellen."
As regards the decisions of the Administrative Court, Section
42 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act provides, insofar
as relevant:
[Translation]
"(2) The contested decision must be quashed
1. on account of the unlawfulness of its content,
2. on account of unlawfulness due to the lack of
jurisdiction of the authority against which the
appeal is directed,
3. on account of unlawfulness due to a violation of
procedural provisions because
a) the authority against which the appeal is
directed has determined the facts on an
important point contrary to the
case-file, or
b) the facts need to be supplemented on an
important point, or
c) procedural provisions have been disregarded
which, if taken into consideration by the
authority against which the appeal is
directed, would have led to a different
decision of the authority."
[German]
"(2) Der angefochtene Bescheid ist aufzuheben
1. wegen Rechtswidrigkeit seines Inhaltes,
2. wegen Rechtswidrigkeit infolge Unzuständigkeit
der belangten Behörde,
3. wegen Rechtswidrigkeit infolge Verletzung von
Verfahrensvorschriften, und zwar weil
a) der Sachverhalt von der belangten Behörde
in einem wesentlichen Punkt aktenwidrig
angenommen wurde oder
b) der Sachverhalt in einem wesentlichen
Punkt einer Ergänzung bedarf oder
c) Verfahrensvorschriften ausser acht gelassen
wurden, bei deren Einhaltung die belangte
Behörde zu einem anderen Bescheid hätte
kommen können."
The proceedings before the Administrative Court consist of an
exchange of written observations between the parties (Section
36) and an oral hearing of their legal arguments (Sections 39 and
40). The parties have a right to request a hearing (Section 39,
para. 1 [1]).
The decision of the Administrative Court is either to dismiss
the complaint or to quash the decision complained of (Section 42 para.
1). If the complaint is allowed the authorities are obliged to
establish immediately with the legal means available to them the legal
situation which corresponds to the view of the Administrative Court
in the particular case (Section 63).
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention that in the building proceedings they did not benefit from
a procedure in conformity with this provision before an independent
and impartial tribunal having full jurisdiction on questions of law
and fact. In particular they complain about the fact that no tribunal
decided on the designation of their land.
With reference to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention the applicants complain that Section 5 of the Carinthian
Community Planning Act constituted an unjustified restriction of the
use of property.
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain that in the proceedings in which they
were involved they did not have access to an independent and impartial
tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. This
provision states, insofar as it is relevant:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to
a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ..."
a) The applicants complain in particular that they did not have
access to an independent and impartial tribunal in the designation
proceedings.
The applicants submit that the proceedings at issue concerned
their right to build a shopping centre and subsequently their right to
practise gainful activities in the shopping centre. In their view
their civil rights have been determined in the building proceedings.
The Commission recalls that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention applies only to disputes over "rights and obligations"
which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised
under domestic law. Article 6 (Art. 6) does not in itself guarantee any
particular content for "rights and obligations" in the substantive law
of the Contracting States (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow and others
judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A No. 102, p. 70, para. 192).
The Commission further recalls that the Court found that
there was a dispute over a "right" if an unlawful prolongation of the
building prohibition by an area plan is alleged (Eur. Court H.R.,
Allan Jacobsson judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A No. 163, pp. 19 -
20, para. 67 et seq.), if an unlawful amendment of a building plan is
alleged (Eur. Court H.R., Mats Jacobsson judgment of 28 June 1990,
Series A No. 180, p. 12 et seq., para. 30 et seq.), or if the
applicant claims a right to an exemption from the building plan (Eur.
Court H.R., Skärby judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A No. 180, p. 36 et
seq., para. 27 et seq.). The Commission recalls that these judgments
dealt with building proceedings in which the applicants could claim an
individual right which was affected by a building or area plan.
The Commission notes that in the present case the applicants
do not have an individual right to the designation and its approval by
the Provincial Government. According to Austrian law the approval of
an area zoning plan forms part of the supervisory activity of the
Provincial Government.
The Commission therefore concludes that the question whether a
development programme should have been issued did not involve a
"determination of (the applicants') civil rights and obligations"
within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
It follows that, insofar as the applicants complain that in
the proceedings concerning the issue of a development programme they
did not have access to an independent and impartial tribunal, the
application is incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention
within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
b) The applicants also direct their complaints under Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention against the proceedings concerning the
building permit.
The Commission does not find it necessary to decide whether
there was a serious dispute over a right within the meaning of Article
6 (Art. 6) of the Convention. It notes that the applicants applied for a
permit to build on their land and that the applicants had a right in
general to build on their land according to the regional legislation.
Assuming that the applicants could claim a "right" to build on
their land, this "right" would be of a "civil" nature for the purposes
of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (see e.g. the above-mentioned Allan
Jacobsson judgment, p. 20, para. 73).
The Commission therefore accepts that Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention is applicable to the building proceedings
at issue.
With regard to the proceedings concerning the building permit
the applicants complain under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) that they
did not have access to an independent and impartial tribunal.
The Commission considers that the proceedings before the
Mayor, the City Council and the Provincial Government do not satisfy
the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
However, these requirements would be satisfied if subsequently the
applicants' civil rights had been determined by a tribunal within the
meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1). Such a determination would
require that the court could undertake a comprehensive examination of
all relevant questions of law and fact (see Ettl and others v.
Austria, Comm. Report 3.7.1985, para. 78 with further references).
In the present case the Commission need not examine in the
abstract whether the Administrative Court meets the requirements of
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. The Commission notes in
particular that in the proceedings before the Administrative Court the
establishment and the assessment of the facts were not in dispute
between the parties. Rather the only question raised by the first
applicant within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court was
whether or not the request for building a shopping centre complied
with the requirements of the area zoning plan. This was, however,
solely a question of the application of the law. It is not contested
by the applicants that the Administrative Court was competent to
undertake this examination.
As a result, the Commission considers that the requirements of
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention have been complied
with. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of
the Convention.
2. The applicants also allege a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in that Section 5 of the Carinthian Community Planning
Act constituted an unjustified restriction of their use of property.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest
and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the
general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any
way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes
or other contributions or penalties."
In fact, Section 5 of the above-mentioned law made the right
to build a shopping centre on a particular plot of land subject to a
special designation which had to be approved by the Provincial
Government.
The Commission considers, assuming that this restriction was
an interference with the applicants' right to peaceful enjoyment of
their possessions, that it was justified under the second paragraph
of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) (see, mutatis mutandis, the
above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, p. 16, para. 54).
The Commission notes that the restriction was lawful.
Moreover, the purpose of the provisions - to facilitate land planning
- is in accordance with the general interest as envisaged in Article 1
para. 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-2).
As to the proportionality the Commission finds that it cannot
be considered disproportionate to the requirements of the legitimate
aim of land planning if the Provincial Government is given competence
to decide if there should be a shopping centre in a particular
community.
As a result this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Deputy Secretary to the Commission Acting President of the Commission
(J. RAYMOND) (J.A. FROWEIN)
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