Communicated on 15 September 2014
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 56609/13
Przemysław Wojciech RODZOCH against Poland
lodged on 21 August 2013
and 2 other applications
(see appendix)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A list of the applicants is set out in the appendix.
A. The circumstances of the cases
The facts of the cases, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
1. Application no. 56609/13
(a) Background
The applicant and E.R., who are both Polish, met in Ireland in 2008. They got married in 2009 and their daughter was born in December 2009. In January 2012 the applicant moved out from the common apartment. Around the same time the applicant and E.R. had a dispute over contacts with the child which involved police intervention. A temporary restraining order was issued against the applicant to the effect that he could not come near his wife and the child. E.R. did not pursue the case and the restraining order was lifted in March 2012. It appears that proceedings to obtain a passport for the child without the father’s consent (instituted by the mother) and for access to the child (instituted by the applicant) were pending around that time in Ireland.
(b) Abduction and proceedings under the Hague Convention
On 22 January 2012 without his consent, the applicant’s wife returned to Poland with the child.
On 29 March 2012 the applicant filed a motion for the child’s return under the Hague Convention.
On 21 September 2012 the Legionowo District Court issued a return order in favour of the applicant (V Nsm 126/12).
The court obtained the following evidence: testimony of the applicant, E.R. and the members of both families and a report of experts in psychology from the Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno‑Konsultacyjny) RODK). The latter was ordered by the domestic court on 3 July 2012 and issued by the experts on 16 August 2012.
The experts were ordered to assess “whether and to what extent the possible return of [the child] to Ireland and the change of her caretakers and peers-environment would affect her emotional condition [and] whether and to what extent such situation would put the child at risk of psychological and physical harm, and if so would she find herself on an intolerable situation.”
The experts examined the applicant, E.R. and the child who was at that time 2 years and 8 months old.
They concluded that the child’s return to Ireland would have a negative effect on her emotional condition and could expose her to physical and psychological harm if she were to leave Poland without her mother. To this effect the report read as follows “The child perceives her mother as the primary care-taker, she has a close emotional bond with her and is in need of her constant presence and closeness”. It was also stated that the change of the environment could in itself be accepted by the child and would not necessarily cause her a particular distress, as it was established that the child adapted well to new situations and was properly developing. It was nevertheless considered that because the girl had recently started settling in her new environment in Poland and because of the tension between her parents, a new change of environment was inadvisable.
The first-instance court considered that the RODK’s report was thorough, clear and of a high evidentiary value.
On the merits, the domestic court found that E.R. wrongfully abducted the child within the meaning of the Hague Convention. In particular, it was considered that the child’s permanent place of residence was Ireland. This is where the child was born and lived all her life with her parents. The child had a Polish citizenship by virtue of the origin of her parents but her visits to Poland were only temporary. The applicant and E.R. had never lived together outside Ireland and the centre of their life and employment was in Dublin. At the time of the abduction both parents enjoyed full custody rights.
The domestic court did not attach any importance to the temporary restraining order issued in Ireland against the applicant because that case was never resolved on the merits.
The Legionowo District Court considered that the aim of the Hague Convention was achieved regardless of whether the child returned to the country of origin with or without the abducting parent. The court found that E.R. had failed to prove that objective obstacles existed to her return to Ireland. She is young, educated and efficient. She speaks English and prior to her departure, she was employed in Ireland, earning 2,000 EUR per month. She declared her willingness to move back to Ireland with the child in the event a return order was issued.
The domestic court acknowledged that making the child go back to Ireland without her mother or authorising her stay in Poland where she would not be cared for by her father were two situations which were undoubtedly against the child’s best interest. The proceedings under the Hague Convention, however, were distinct from the custody proceedings and the circumstances of the case at hand did not fall under any of the five exceptions allowing for a dismissal of the return motion. The court’s reasoning consists of five pages.
The applicant’s wife and the prosecutor appealed.
E.R. argued that the first-instance court had erred inter alia (1) in holding that, if returned the child was not at grave risk of suffering psychological or physical harm within the meaning of Article 13 (1) b of the Hague Convention despite the RODK’s report which concluded to the contrary; (2) in not defining the best interest of the child in the case at hand and (3) in considering that Ireland and not Poland was the child’s place of residence.
The prosecutor argued that the first-instance court had erred in “making a wrong interpretation of Article 13 (1) b of the Hague Convention ... and establishing that in the case at hand there was not grave risk that the return of [the child] would expose her to physical or psychological harm and would place her in an intolerable situation, whereas the circumstances of the case point to a contrary conclusion.”
On 6 March 2013 the Warszawa Praga Regional Court (IV Ca 1865/12) changed the District Court’s decision and refused to issue a return order.
The assessment of the same facts by the appellate court led to the conclusion that “the child’s return would not be in her best interest and that would expose her to risk of a serious psychological and physical harm what is clearly derived from the RODK’s report”. In practice E.R. has personally cared for the child since her birth. She is an important figure for her daughter and has a tight emotional bond with her. It was also noted that both, parents and the child were Polish and they lived in Ireland because of employment opportunities. The father does not have proper housing conditions (he lives in a rented flat with three flatmates). The mother lived in Ireland only temporarily (she had a mortgage loan in Poland). She has a stable job in Poland and cares for the child together with her parents (the child goes to kindergarten). The appellate court’s holding read as follows: “Ordering E.R. to go back to Ireland together with her child is unjustified and unauthorised” in view of divorce proceedings pending in Poland and “surrendering the child to her father is against the child’s best interest as provided in Article 13 (1) b of the [Hague Convention]. The court’s reasoning is one- paged long.
(c) The applicant’s contacts with the child and recent developments
Since the child’s departure from Ireland, the applicant’s contacts with her have been irregular and scarce. He met with his daughter for the first time in June 2012. The visit took place in the house of the maternal grandparents and in presence of some relatives.
In August 2012 the child started being monitored by a psychologist.
It appears that on 19 March 2012 the Legionowo District Court issued a provisional order fixing the child’s residence with the mother. This decision was to be quashed in April 2012. In April 2012 E.R. filed for a fault-divorce and a full deprivation of the applicant’s parental rights.
2. Application no. 2171/14
(a) Background
The applicant and E.K., who are both Polish, got married in Canada in 2009. They continued living in Canada and their son was born there in September 2010.
(b) Abduction and proceedings under the Hague Convention
In April 2011 the family went to Poland on a holiday. E.K. refused to return to Canada with the child. The couple split up in May 2011. Soon afterwards the applicant went back to Canada alone. He briefly returned to Poland in July 2011 when his son underwent an emergency surgery.
On 31 October 2011 the applicant filed a request for the child’s return under the Hague Convention. It appears that this request was registered with the Kielce District Court in January 2012.
On 2 January 2013 the Kielce District Court dismissed the request (IIRNsm 87/12).
The court obtained the following evidence: testimony of the applicant, E.K. and the members of both families, medical reports and a report of experts in psychology from the Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno-Konsultacyjny) RODK). The latter was issued by the experts on 7 December 2012 (copy not filed with the Court) and was based on the examination of the child, E.K. The applicant, who was convoked, did not come to the appointment at the RODK.
The first-instance court considered that the RODK’s report was thorough, clear and of a high evidentiary value. Relying on the report and other evidence, the first-instance court established that since his birth the child had been under the constant and good care of his mother (who did not work in Canada). The child has a strong emotional bond with the mother, does not remember the applicant and does not perceive him as a parent. The applicant does not show any interest in the child. Since July 2011, he saw his son only once in March 2012, despite the fact that he was in Poland for a month.
In view of the above it was held that separating the two-year old child from the mother and returning him to his father in Canada would be traumatic and hard to bear for the child, and therefore it would pose a risk to his emotional and social development and would perturb his sense of security and life-stability.
The applicant appealed, arguing that the first-instance court erred in that inter alia, it had given a broad and not restrictive interpretation to Article 13 (1) b of the Hague Convention and had dismissed the applicant’s request even though it had not been established that the child was at a grave risk of physical or psychological harm if returned to Canada.
On 9 July 2013 the Kielce Regional Court (II Ca 551/13) dismissed the appeal.
The appellate court observed that the international and domestic practice required that Article 13 (1) b be given a restrictive reading to the effect that, in principle, any unfavourable consequences of the child’s separation stemming from the order to surrender the child by the abducting parent, did not give rise to the grave risk of physical or psychological harm within the meaning of that provision. It also noted that the aim of the Hague Convention would be realised if the abducting parent returned with the child. If no objective obstacles to the abducting parent’s return existed, it could be inferred that the parent refusing to return, was acting in his or her own interest and not the interest of the child.
The appellate court reasoned further that the application of the above-mentioned principles was more complex in cases concerning very young children. The Hague Convention put in place only a maximum age requirement for children whose return could be sought under its provisions (sixteen). It also protected very young children from possible harmful effects of the return if it was shown that the parent seeking the return had not taken care of the child before the abduction or that the child had already adapted to the new environment (under Article 12 of the Hague Convention). Following this approach, separating an abducted child from the parent who had had a dominating role in the child’s life would not fall within the Article 13 (a) b exceptions unless objective obstacles to the parent’s return were shown to exist. This approach, however, was difficult to accept in cases concerning abductions of infants by mothers because of the special relationship between them. This is true even in absence of any objective obstacles to the mother’s own return because every separation of an infant from his or her mother will inevitably be contrary to the child’s best interests.
In light of the facts that the applicant’s son arrived in Poland with both parents at the age of eight months, in April 2011; that since that time the child had been taken care of solely by the mother and did not have any memories of his life in Canada; and that the applicant had not considered this situation illegal prior to October 2011, it was held that the utmost importance had to be attached to the child’s contact with the mother and his separation from her would place him in an intolerable situation.
(c) The applicant’s contacts with the child and recent developments
The applicant visited his son once in March 2012 during his monthly stay in Poland.
Divorce proceedings are currently pending in Poland before the Kielce Regional Court. On 22 November 2011 the Kielce Regional Court gave an interim order, establishing the child’s residence with the mother.
On 27 October 2011 the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario, Canada, issued an interim order granting full custody over the child to the applicant, authorising him and the law enforcement authorities to apprehend the child and ordering E.K. to surrender the child without delay. To this effect, a wanted notice for E.K. was issued by the Interpol for the offence of kidnapping.
3. Application no. 30813/14
(a) Background
The applicant and M.J. are both Polish and married. In 2005 they moved to the United Kingdom. Their daughter was born there in January 2010.
(b) Abduction and proceedings under the Hague Convention
On 17 July 2012 M.J. and the child went to Poland on a holiday. On 9 September 2012 M.J. informed the applicant that she was not going back to the United Kingdom with the child.
On an unspecified date soon afterwards, the applicant filed a motion for the child’s return under the Hague Convention.
The request was registered with the Grudziądz District Court. In reply to the applicant’s request, M.J. submitted that in 2011 her husband and she had started becoming distant; the applicant had lost interest in his family and had been spending his spare time playing computer games.
On 8 May 2013 the Grudziądz District Court dismissed the applicant’s request (III Nsm 999/12).
The court obtained the following evidence: testimony of the applicant, M.J. and the members of both families and a report of experts in psychology from the Family Consultation Centre (Rodzinny Ośrodek Diagnostyczno Konsultacyjny) RODK). The latter was ordered by the domestic court on 4 February 2013 and issued by the experts on 17 April 2013.
The experts were ordered to assess “whether moving [the child] under her father’s care, linked with her separation from the mother, would disturb [the child’s] sense of security and would affect in a negative way her emotional state; or is it indicated, [in view to] the adequate psycho-physical development of the child, to [put the child under the father’s care] linked with [giving] an order to surrender the child by the mother.”
The experts examined the applicant, M.J. and the child who was at that time 3 years old.
They concluded that “the child’s return to the United Kingdom and her separation from the mother” - her primary care-taker, “would cause more emotional harm to the child than the lack of daily contact with her father.” In particular, the child’s sense of security and stability could be disturbed. To this effect the report read as follows: “Considering the [young] age and the sex of the child, it must be stated that the mother is currently best suited to fulfil her daughter’s needs.”
The experts also noted that the child was emotionally attached to both parents; she was developing well; perceived Poland and the United Kingdom on an equal footing; spoke Polish and had adapted well to her new life in Poland. It was recommended that the child should stay with her mother in Poland and have regular contacts with her father.
The first-instance court considered that the RODK’s report was thorough, clear and of a high evidentiary value.
On the merits, the Grudziądz District Court considered that it was called to examine “the relationship between the child and [each of] the parents, her physical and psychological development and also, a [possible] physical or psychological harm [which could occur] in the event of the child’s return to her father without the mother.”
The domestic court held, relying on the experts’ report, that there was a grave risk of psychological harm if she were to return to the United Kingdom without her mother. It was noted that Article 13 (1) b of the Hague Convention protected abducted children to such a great extent that it did not allow for their return if that was going to put them in an “disadvantageous situation” (w niekorzystnej sytuacji).
The applicant appealed, arguing inter alia that the first-instance misinterpreted Article 13 (1) b of the Hague Convention in that it concluded that the circumstances of the case did not allow for the child’s return to the United Kingdom.
On 14 October 2013 the Torun Regional Court (IV Ca 1865/12) dismissed the appeal.
The appellate court fully relied on the findings of facts made by the first‑instance court and held that the child’s return to the United Kingdom without the mother would place her in an intolerable situation (“w sytuacji nie do zniesienia”) in view of the child’s very young age and the fact that since the abduction the child had been under her mother’s care practically all day long and that her contacts with the applicant had been rare. The domestic court further observed that the child’s return with the mother would not have a positive effect on the child’s development either. To this effect, it was noted that M.J. had never adapted to her life in the United Kingdom; she was in conflict with the applicant and that her departure from Poland would be forced by the circumstances and against her will.
(c) The applicant’s contacts with the child and recent developments
Since the child’s departure from the United Kingdom, the applicant’s contacts with her have been rare.
Two sets of divorce proceedings are currently pending in the United Kingdom and Poland.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
The amendment to the 1964 Code of Civil Procedure (Kodeks Postępowania Cywilnego) introduced on 19 July 2001, which entered into force on 27 September 2001, deals with the proceedings concerning the return of children under the Hague Convention.
Article 5986 provides, that if a person who is ordered to return a child does not comply with the court’s order, the court will instruct the guardian to remove the persons concerned forcibly (przymusowe odebranie osoby).
According to Article 59810:
“Upon a request of a court guardian, the police are obliged to help him in carrying out the forcible removal of [a minor].”
Article 59811 § 1 provides as follows:
“If forcible removal of [a minor] is hindered because that person is hidden or because other action is taken with the aim to stop the enforcement of the order, the court guardian shall inform a prosecutor.”
Pursuant to 59812:
Ҥ 1. The court guardian, in carrying out the removal of [a minor], shall be especially careful and shall do everything to ensure that the well-being of that person is not disturbed and that [he or she] does not sustain physical or moral harm. If necessary, the guardian shall request the assistance of the social services or another institution tasked with this function.
§ 2 If the well-being of [a minor] would be in danger as result of the removal, the guardian shall stop the enforcement of the order until the danger is over, unless the stopping of the enforcement would cause greater danger to the person.”
Article 577 provides a remedy to seek a modification of a final family law decision, including a decision given under the Hague Convention. It reads as follows:
“The custody court shall modify its decision, even if final, if the best interests of the person it concerns so require.”
Article 177 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives a discretionary power to a civil court to stay the proceedings pending before it if another court is expected to give a preliminary ruling, that is a ruling which would constitute a necessary element or the ground of a substantive or procedural decision in the case at stake. The provision reads as follows:
“A court shall stay the proceedings of its own motion if:
(1) the resolution of the case depends on the outcome of another [set] of civil proceedings [which are] pending ...”
The practice shows that in cases brought under the Hague Convention, the Supreme Court was the court of the highest instance (see the Supreme Court’s decisions of: 7 October 1998 no. I CKN 745/98; 31 March 1999 no. I CKN 23/99; 1 December 1999 no. I CKN 992/99; 2 June 2000 no. II CKN 959/00; 2 June 2000 no. V CKN 1747/00; 1 December 2000 no. V CKN 1747/00; and 19 December 2000 no. III CKN 1254/00).
Since the amendment of 1 July 2000, which entered into force on 1 October 2000, Article 5191 § 2 of the Code expressly provides for a cassation appeal only in those family, custody or guardianship law cases which concern adoption and division of conjugal property. Consequently, a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court is no longer available in cases decided under the Hague Convention.
C. Relevant International Law
1. The Hague Convention
The Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction which has been ratified by Poland, Ireland, Canada and the United Kingdom provides, in so far as relevant, as follows.
Article 3
“The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where -
a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and
b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.
The rights of custody mentioned in sub-paragraph a) above, may arise in particular by operation of law or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision, or by reason of an agreement having legal effect under the law of that State.”
Article 4
“The Convention shall apply to any child who was habitually resident in a Contracting State immediately before any breach of custody or access rights. The Convention shall cease to apply when the child attains the age of 16 years.”
Article 12
“Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 and, at the date of the commencement of the proceedings before the judicial or administrative authority of the Contracting State where the child is, a period of less than one year has elapsed from the date of the wrongful removal or retention, the authority concerned shall order the return of the child forthwith.
The judicial or administrative authority, even where the proceedings have been commenced after the expiration of the period of one year referred to in the preceding paragraph, shall also order the return of the child, unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment.
Where the judicial or administrative authority in the requested State has reason to believe that the child has been taken to another State, it may stay the proceedings or dismiss the application for the return of the child.”
Article 13
“Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that -
a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or
b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account the information relating to the social background of the child provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority of the child’s habitual residence.”
Article 14
“In ascertaining whether there has been a wrongful removal or retention within the meaning of Article 3, the judicial or administrative authorities of the requested State may take notice directly of the law of, and of judicial or administrative decisions, formally recognised or not in the State of the habitual residence of the child, without recourse to the specific procedures for the proof of that law or for the recognition of foreign decisions which would otherwise be applicable.”
Article 15
“The judicial or administrative authorities of a Contracting State may, prior to the making of an order for the return of the child, request that the applicant obtain from the authorities of the State of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention, where such a decision or determination may be obtained in that State. The Central Authorities of the Contracting States shall so far as practicable assist applicants to obtain such a decision or determination.”
Article 19
“A decision under this Convention concerning the return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any custody issue.”
2. The International Convention on the Rights of the Child
The relevant provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed in New York on 20 November 1989, read as follows:
Preamble
“The States Parties to the present Convention,
...
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, ...
Have agreed as follows:
...
Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth... to know and be cared for by his or her parents...
Article 9
1. States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or her parents against their will...
Article 14
1. States Parties shall respect the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
2. States Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or her right in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child...
Article 18
1. States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic concern.
...”
The concept of the child’s best interests, derived from the second principle of the Declaration on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1959, was reproduced in 1989 in Article 3 § 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child:
“In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”
In its General Comment No. 7 (2005) on Implementing child rights in early childhood, the Committee on the Rights of the Child wished to encourage recognition by States Parties that young children are holders of all rights enshrined in this Convention and that early childhood is a critical period for the realisation of these rights. The best interests of the child are examined, in particular, in section 13, which is worded as follows:
“13. Best interests of the child. Article 3 sets out the principle that the best interests of the child are a primary consideration in all actions concerning children. By virtue of their relative immaturity, young children are reliant on responsible authorities to assess and represent their rights and best interests in relation to decisions and actions that affect their well-being, while taking account of their views and evolving capacities. The principle of best interests appears repeatedly within the Convention (including in articles 9, 18, 20 and 21, which are most relevant to early childhood). The principle of best interests applies to all actions concerning children and requires active measures to protect their rights and promote their survival, growth, and well-being, as well as measures to support and assist parents and others who have day-to-day responsibility for realizing children’s rights:
(a) Best interests of individual children. All decision-making concerning a child’s care, health, education, etc. must take account of the best interests principle, including decisions by parents, professionals and others responsible for children.
States parties are urged to make provisions for young children to be represented independently in all legal proceedings by someone who acts for the child’s interests, and for children to be heard in all cases where they are capable of expressing their opinions or preferences;
...”
3. European Union law
The relevant provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union state:
Article 7
Respect for private and family life
“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications.”
Article 24
Rights of the child
“1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity.
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.
...”
Council Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (known as “Brussels II bis Regulation”) reads, in particular, as follows:
“...
(12) The grounds of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility established in the present Regulation are shaped in the light of the best interests of the child, in particular on the criterion of proximity. This means that jurisdiction should lie in the first place with the Member State of the child’s habitual residence, except for certain cases of a change in the child’s residence or pursuant to an agreement between the holders of parental responsibility.
(13) In the interest of the child, this Regulation allows, by way of exception and under certain conditions, that the court having jurisdiction may transfer a case to a court of another Member State if this court is better placed to hear the case. However, in this case the second court should not be allowed to transfer the case to a third court.
...”
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complained under Article 8 of the Convention that the respective domestic courts’ decisions dismissing their Hague Convention requests breached their right to respect for their family life. The impugned decisions were contrary to each child’s best interest within the meaning of Article 13 (1) b of the Hague Convention and protected the interests of the children’s mothers who decided not to return along with their children.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has there been a violation of the applicants’ right to respect for their family life, contrary to Article 8 of the Convention?
2. In particular, is the interpretation of the notions of a “psychological harm” and an “intolerable situation” within the meaning of Article 13 (b) of the Hague Convention as it was applied by the domestic courts in the cases at hand, compatible with the procedural requirements of Article 8 of the Convention?
APPENDIX:
1. 56609/13 Rodzoch v. Poland; the applicant Przemysław Rodzoch was born in 1978 and lives in Dublin, Ireland.
2. 2171/14 G.N. v. Poland; the applicant G.N. was born in 1961 and lives in Mississauga, Canada. He is represented in the proceedings before the Court by Mr Grégory Thuan dit Dieudonné, a lawyer practicing in Strasbourg, France.
3. 30813/14 K.J. v. Poland, the applicant K.J. was born in 1978 and lives in Maidstone, United Kingdom.
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